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Although the concepts of truth and belief are fundamental in philosophy, in recent years they have 
come under attack from various quarters. I argue that philosophers have been too quick to find 
these concepts problematic and in need of being replaced. For example, the Liar Paradox is 
sometimes taken to show that the concept of truth is inconsistent, and thus unsuitable for rigorous 
inquiry. But I develop a solution that gives a consistent account of this concept, allowing us to 
retain it in spite of the paradox. I argue that when the word ‘true’ occurs in such a sentence, it 
undergoes a one-off aberration in its reference, failing to refer to truth. Thus, Liar sentences and 
their kin fail to say what they pre-theoretically appear to say. However, there is no need to conclude 
that these sentences are meaningless; rather, I illustrate how these sentences come very close to 
saying what they appear to say, in spite of the aberrations they witness.  
As with the concept of truth, intentional concepts like those of belief, meaning, and 
reference have been subject to skepticism and attempts at excision. I show that the content of the 
claim that the use of intentional concepts can be eliminated from scientific explanations depends 
on broader issues about how one conceives of explanations. Then I argue that intentional concepts, 
in particular the concept of belief, play an ineliminable role in the explanation of behavior: when 
we learn what someone believes, we get some information about how she would react to a variety 
of possible scenarios. This information that is useful in everyday life, and would be important in a 
science whose aim was to improve on our folk-psychological explanations. But so far, explanations 
 that avoid talk of beliefs have failed to replicate this distinctive kind of informativeness. Thus, we 
have reason to think that belief-attributions are indispensable when it comes to explaining people’s 
behaviors, and so we have reason to retain the notion of belief.  
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1. Introduction 
Many diagnoses of the Liar paradox are rightly criticized for being ad hoc. That is, these 
solutions turn on claims about the semantic behavior of some of the expressions involved in the 
paradox, but fail adequately to support these claims with independent linguistic evidence. Rather, 
the claims are motivated primarily by their purported effectiveness in helping us avoid paradox. 
On the other hand, however, there are good reasons to think that if one is to avoid paradox, at 
least some measure of ad hoc-ness is inescapable. The very reason that the Liar paradox is so 
compelling is that if the laws of logic and the expressions involved in generating the paradox are 
as they seem to be, then it follows that some contradictions are true (and thereby, via the 
classical inference rule ex falso quodlibet, that everything is true1). Any way to circumvent the 
paradox is bound to violate at least some of our pre-theoretical impressions, either about the 
behavior of the expressions involved, the laws of logic, or both.  
Given that some measure of ad hoc-ness is inevitable, the charge of ad hoc-ness finds the 
most traction when directed against solutions that have significant consequences concerning the 
semantic behavior of non-paradoxical sentences, or concerning the ways that the expressions 
implicated in the Liar paradox behave when they occur in such sentences. For while the paradox 
itself gives us good reasons to suspect that something unusual is going on in the sentences 
involved, the same does not obviously apply to the rest of language. It is methodologically 
unsound to let one’s account of the non-paradoxical elements of language be driven by one’s 
attempts to solve the Liar paradox, without regard to the linguistic data. And indeed, as we will 
                                                          
1 One can react to this situation by rejecting ex falso quodlibet (EFQ), but that commits one to denying that the word 
‘not’ behaves as logicians have canonically taken it to behave. This canon is not simply a high-handed scholarly 
imposition, made without respect for everyday language; rather it is a way of making precise the everyday truism 
that one who accepts a contradiction might as well accept anything, a truism which in turn gives substance to the 
nearly universal conviction that it is bad to accept contradictions. The point is, philosophers who respond to the Liar 
paradox by rejecting ex falso quodlibet are, like their competitors, committed to some unusual claims about the 
behavior of some of the expressions involved in the paradox.  
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see below, views that employ this unsound methodology overwhelmingly do conflict with the 
data.  
These reflections motivate a kind of diagnosis and solution to the Liar paradox and its ilk 
that I call aberrationism. According to aberrationism, what occurs in the Liar paradox is a one-
off aberration in the behavior of the expressions involved. In non-paradoxical sentences, the 
expressions that are implicated in the paradox behave exactly as the linguistic data tell us they 
do; but in situations in which this behavior would lead to paradox, these expressions behave 
slightly differently—as slightly as one can get away with allowing, without lapsing again into 
contradictions. Like their competitors, aberrationist views are still ad hoc in that they justify their 
claims about the semantic behavior of the problematic expressions primarily by showing these 
claims to be effective in circumventing paradox. But unlike their competitors, aberrationist view 
refrain from making unsupported assertions about any phenomena that are not directly 
implicated in the paradox. Moreover, if they can find ways to minimize the severity of the 
aberrations that they posit when paradox is afoot, these solutions can come close to allowing that 
the expressions concerned behave as they pre-theoretically appear to behave.  
In this essay, I will present and defend an aberrationist approach to the Liar paradox and 
its ilk. In Section 2, I define a number of central concepts, present a general articulation of 
aberrationism, and show how aberrationism is supposed to work as a solution. Then in Section 3 
I distinguish a moderate version of aberrationism from a radical version that I take to be 
implicitly advocated in (Smith 2006). This distinction helps to clarify the nature of 
aberrationism, and to make clear exactly what aberrationism needs in order to work as a solution. 
Then I argue that the moderate version of aberrationism is preferable, using my own preferred 
way of developing it as an illustrative example. Next, in Sections 4-10 I defend aberrationism in 
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general against various competing approaches. Lastly, in Section 11, I say a few more things to 
motivate the two important claims that constitute aberrationism. As with all other prominent 
approaches, my principal justification for these theses is that they provide a more effective way 
to circumvent paradox than the competing solutions can offer, and that they provide the overall 
best explanation of how natural languages manage to be consistent in the face of the paradox. 
But in Section 11, I argue that these two claims also have some independent motivation.  
 
2. Important Definitions 
2.1. Liar Sentences and Russellian Propositions 
For any sentence x, let us say that x is a Liar sentence if x is the negation of a sentence 
whose grammatical subject refers to x and whose grammatical predicate is an expression that 
refers to truth. (Henceforth, I’ll use ‘refer’ so that it includes not only reference for singular 
terms, but also the reference-like relation in which predicates and relation symbols can stand to 
properties and relations. I’m neutral on whether this is in fact just reference, or whether it is 
ascription or something else, distinct from reference.) 
Here is an example of a Liar sentence, which I will frequently refer back to in what 
follows:  
(A) A is not true. 
 
Let’s check that A is a Liar sentence. Note firstly that ‘A’ refers to the sentence ‘A is not true’. 
This is guaranteed by the stipulative way that I introduced the name ‘A’. Moreover, the word 
‘true’ refers to truth. Or at least, while these intuitive claims are not beyond question, a virtue of 
aberrationism is that it allows us not to question them.2 Secondly, note that ‘A is not true’ is the 
                                                          
2 See Sections 4, 9, and 10 for discussion of views that question these claims. 
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negation of the sentence ‘A is true’. So ‘A is true’ is a sentence whose grammatical subject refers 
to A and whose grammatical predicate is an expression that refers to truth. Thus ‘A is not true’ is 
the negation of a sentence whose grammatical subject refers to A and whose grammatical 
predicate is an expression that refers to truth. Since A = ‘A is not true’, it follows that A is a Liar 
sentence.  
Loosely speaking, the central claim of aberrationism is that Liar sentences fail to say of 
themselves that they are not true. More generally, this idea can be applied to all of the many 
different Liar-like sentences: no Liar-like sentence succeeds in saying what it appears to say, or 
in saying anything else that would generate paradox. However, because the word ‘say’ can be 
interpreted in several different ways, a rigorous formulation of my claims will need to be more 
precise. To move toward that, I will introduce the notion of a Russellian proposition below.  
To see the need for a more precise formulation, notice that it follows from my definition 
of Liar sentences that there are Liar sentences which have grammatical predicates other than ‘is 
not true’. For example, assume that truth is the most philosophically interesting property. Then 
consider: 
(D) It is not the case that D has the most philosophically interesting property.  
Clearly D’s grammatical predicate is something other than ‘is not true’. But as one can easily 
check, D is the negation of a sentence whose grammatical subject is an expression that refers to 
D and whose grammatical predicate is an expression that (we are assuming) refers to truth. So, D 
is a Liar sentence. Though note that D would not be a Liar sentence in a world in which justice 
rather than truth was the most philosophically interesting property.  
Now ask: does D say of itself that it is not true? On one way of using ‘say’, it certainly 
appears to. This is the use of ‘say’ that I will employ throughout. Still, on another quite common 
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way of using ‘say’, D does not even so much as appear to say of itself that it is not true. Rather, 
all it says is that it lacks the most philosophically interesting property, whatever that property 
may turn out to be.  
The notion of a Russellian proposition helps to clarify the sense of ‘say’ in which D 
appears to say of itself that it is not true. Think of Russellian propositions as ordered tuples: for 
any object o and property P, one can identify the Russellian proposition that o has P with the pair 
<o, P>. Now let’s apply this to the case of D. Imagine a world w in which the most 
philosophically interesting property is justice. On one way of using ‘says’, in w, D says that D 
lacks the most philosophically interesting property, just as it says in the actual world, @. But in 
w, the Russellian proposition whose negation D expresses is <D, justice>, not <D, truth>. By 
contrast, assuming that the most philosophically interesting property in @ is truth, in @ D 
appears to express the negation of the proposition <D, truth>. In that sense, D appears to say of 
itself that it is not true. 
I just wrote ‘appears to say’ rather than ‘says’, and for an important reason. Applied to D, 
the characteristic claim of aberrationism is that D does not succeed in expressing the negation of 
the Russellian proposition <D, truth>. Nor, recalling the earlier example of A, does A succeed in 
expressing the negation of <A, truth>. More generally, no Liar sentence S succeeds in expressing 
the negation of the Russellian proposition <S, truth>.3 And even more generally, something 
similar holds for all other Liar-like sentences, such as Curry sentences, Yablo sentences, etc.4 In 
Section 2.3 I will state aberrationism in its most general form, a form that allows it to apply to 
                                                          
3 Of course, this proposition may nonetheless exist. See Chapter 2 Section 5 and also Section 5 below for more 
explanation of how my view can accommodate the existence of such propositions. 
4 See Chapter 2 Section 6 for an in-depth discussion of how best to define ‘Liar-like sentence’. 
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sentences of all these different kinds. To that end, I will now introduce a few more essential 
concepts.  
 
2.2. Occurrences 
Again, aberrationism claims that for any Liar sentence S, S fails to express the negation 
of the Russellian proposition <S, truth>. It may seem that there are only two ways that a 
declarative sentence S’ can fail to express the negation of the Russellian proposition <S’, truth>:  
(i) no expression in S’ refers to S’, or  
(ii) no expression in S’ refers to truth.  
After all, it is via either (i) or (ii) that the vast majority of sentences S’ manage to avoid 
expressing the negation of such a proposition. For instance, the English sentence ‘Grass is not 
blue’ fails to express the negation of <‘Grass is not blue’, truth> because the word ‘Grass’ refers 
not to the sentence ‘Grass is not blue’ but rather to grass, and because the word ‘blue’ refers not 
to truth but to blueness.  
However, given the way that I defined Liar sentences, neither (i) nor (ii) holds of them. 
Taking A from above as an example, surely the name ‘A’ as I defined it does refer to A, and 
surely the word ‘true’ does refer to truth. At least, it is worth making an effort to retain these 
intuitive claims.5 But in that case, how could A possibly fail to express the negation of the 
Russellian proposition <A, truth>? Aberrationism claims that this can happen, and in a way 
different from (i) and (ii): 
(I) either the occurrence of ‘A’ in A fails to refer to A or the occurrence of ‘true’ in A 
fails to refer to truth, and  
(II) which Russellian proposition (if any) A expresses the negation of is determined 
by the reference of the occurrences of ‘true’ and ‘A’ in sentence A, rather than by 
the reference of the expressions ‘true’ and ‘A’ simpliciter.  
                                                          
5 See Section 10 for further discussion. 
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(I) and (II) invoke the notion of an occurrence of an expression, which may be unfamiliar. Since 
this notion is quite central to aberrationism, I will take a moment to clarify it.  
First let’s consider a few examples. A variable can occur multiple times in a formula, 
with some but not all of these occurrences being bound by a quantifier. E.g., consider the 
following formula: 
x is yellow and for all x, if x is blue then x is great 
The first occurrence of ‘x’ is unbound, but the second, third, and fourth occurrences are bound 
by the universal quantifier. For another example, there are three occurrences of the letter ‘c’ in 
the word ‘occurrence’, and two occurrences of the word ‘an’ in the sentence ‘An occurrence of 
an expression is a lovely thing’.  
Formally, one can represent an occurrence of an expression as an ordered pair of the 
expression and a component context. One can think of a component context as the result of using 
a hole-punch to punch out a single occurrence of an expression from the sentence or formula, 
replacing it with a blank. Thus the occurrence of ‘true’ in sentence A can be represented as the 
ordered pair <‘true’, ‘A is not *’>, where I use ‘*’ to designate a blank space. In what follows it 
will be harmless to identify occurrences with these ordered pairs. (Though we should carefully 
distinguish them from Russellian propositions, which we are also taking to be ordered pairs. This 
is easy, since unlike any component context, every Russellian proposition has at least one 
constituent that is either a property or a relation.)  
It is easy to mix up occurrences and tokens, but in our discussion this distinction is 
important. To see the difference, consider that a sentence can exist and be part of a language, 
even if no one has yet tokened it—that is, uttered or written it. The same goes for occurrences of 
words in a sentence. E.g., as long as the sentence ‘An occurrence of an expression is a lovely 
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thing’ exists, so, too, do its two occurrences of ‘an’. Those occurrences would have existed even 
if the sentence had never been tokened, just as the sentence itself would have. On the other hand, 
no (actual) tokens of an expression exist until someone actually writes or utters that expression. 
Similarly, tokens are tied to the particular time and place in which they are brought about. If I 
write the sentence ‘An occurrence of an expression is a lovely thing’ on the blackboard, I 
produce two tokens of ‘an’ that did not exist before. By contrast, the two occurrences of ‘an’ in 
that sentence existed before I decided to write anything on the blackboard. Again, their existence 
depends only on that of the word ‘an’ and the sentence in which they occur.  
(I) and (II) are formulated with specific attention to the Liar sentence A. However, as I 
mentioned earlier, there are a variety of different paradoxes in the vicinity of the Liar that arise 
from sentences of similar kinds. Aberrationism applies to all of these paradoxes, and so must be 
formulated in a general way. Thus, in the next subsection I’ll give a general formulation, leading 
up to it with several important definitions.6  
 
2.3. Liar-like Paradoxes, Liar-like Sentences, and the Official Statement of Aberrationism 
Let us begin by looking at the word ‘satisfies’, in logicians’ English, which I’ll define by 
the following rules:  
(Sat-intro)  φ(a1,…,an)   
satisfies (<a1,…,an>, ‘φ(x1,…,xn)’)  
 
 
(Sat-elim) satisfies (<a1,…,an>, ‘φ(x1,…,xn)’) 
φ(a1,…,an) 
 
                                                          
6 See Chapter 2 for a detailed application of aberrationism to a wide variety of Liar-like paradoxes, making frequent 
use of the generality of the definition. 
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Suppressing issues of context-sensitivity, here the 21st letter of the Greek alphabet is a 
substitutional variable ranging over all formulas of English, for each Arabic numeral, the 24th 
letter of the lowercase Latin alphabet subscripted by that numeral is a substitutional variable 
ranging over all objectual variables in English, and for each Arabic numeral, the 1st letter of the 
lowercase Latin alphabet subscripted by that numeral is a substitutional variable ranging over all 
English singular terms.  
An important special case of (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim) are the two rules (T-intro) and (T-
elim) below. (T-intro) and (T-elim) “govern” the word ‘true’ in at least the sense that they are 
widely accepted and deeply entrenched. By and large we are disposed to follow them, and, when 
we are feeling helpful, to correct uses of ‘true’ that deviate from them. (T-intro) and (T-elim) 
will figure prominently in what follows, so it will be good to keep them in mind throughout.  
(T-intro)   φ  
                 ‘φ’ is true  
 
 
(T-elim)        ‘φ’ is true  
                        φ 
 
Suppressing issues of ambiguity and context-sensitivity, here the 21st letter of the Greek alphabet 
is a substitutional variable ranging over all declarative sentences of English. A moment’s 
reflection reveals (T-intro) and (T-elim) to be, modulo some trivial cosmetic differences, the 
special cases of (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim) in which n = 0. This follows straightforwardly from 
the fact that declarative sentences are simply formulas with no free variables; so, for example, 
when n = 0, ‘satisfies (<a1,…, an>, ‘S(x1,…,xn)’)’ becomes ‘satisfies (‘S’)’. The trivial cosmetic 
differences are those between, e.g., ‘satisfies (‘S’)’ and ‘‘S’ is satisfied’, and between ‘‘S’ is 
satisfied˺ and ‘‘S’ is true’.7 
                                                          
7 Setting the two rules side by side makes the point obvious. E.g.: 
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Now for just a few more definitions. Let us say that an expression e is an alethic 
expression if  
(Base Clause)  e is inter-substitutable with an expression that is governed by  
(Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim), for some n,  
or  
 
(Inductive Clause) the result of replacing each non-primitive component expression in 
e with its definiens contains an alethic expression.  
 
By (Base Clause), ‘true’ is an alethic expression, since it is governed by the special case of (Sat-
intro) and (Sat-elim) where n = 0. Likewise, by (Base Clause), any other expression that refers 
either to truth or to satisfaction is an alethic expression, since it is intersubstitutable with ‘true’ or 
‘satisfies’, respectively. So, for example, if Brian is thinking about truth right now, then right 
now the expression ‘the property that Brian is thinking about right now’ is an alethic expression.  
Let us say that a paradox is a Liar-like paradox if it makes ineliminable use of (Sat-intro) 
and (Sat-elim), perhaps modulo minor cosmetic differences. So in particular, classic versions of 
the Liar paradox count, as they make such use of (T-intro) and (T-elim). With this definition of 
‘Liar-like paradox’ in hand, we can now say that a sentence is a Liar-like sentence if it gives rise 
to a paradox that is Liar-like.8  
For our purposes, it will be safe to assume that every Liar-like sentence contains some 
alethic expression. Still, not every occurrence of an alethic expression in such a sentence need be 
involved in giving rise to the associated paradox. Let’s refer to the problem-causing occurrences 
                                                          
(T-intro)   φ  
       ‘φ’ is true  
 
(Sat-intro)  φ  
       satisfies(‘φ’)  
Each of these rules allows one to derive from a declarative sentence the result of applying a predicate to a quote 
name of that sentence.  
8 See Chapter 2 Section 6 for further explanation of the terms ‘paradox’, ‘ineliminable use’, and ‘gives rise to’. 
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as key occurrences. Key occurrences are hard to define rigorously, but it is very easy to get the 
main idea. Consider (Aw):  
 (Aw) Aw is not true, and ‘War causes suffering’ is true.  
 
Clearly, only the first occurrence of ‘true’ plays an essential role in generating the paradox 
associated with Aw. So only that first occurrence is a key occurrence.
9  
Given these definitions, we can now define aberrationism as the conjunction of the 
following two claims:  
(Aberrations) For any Liar-like sentence, the key occurrences of its alethic 
expressions differ in reference from the expressions of which they 
are occurrences. 
 
(Determined) When an occurrence of an expression in a Liar-like sentence 
differs in reference from the expression of which it is an 
occurrence, what Russellian propositions (if any) the sentence 
expresses, expresses the negation of, expresses the conjunction of, 
the disjunction of, etc., is determined by what the occurrence refers 
to, rather than by what the expression simpliciter refers to.10  
 
A quick remark on my reason for including (Determined) here. For all (Aberrations) says, what a 
Liar-like sentence expresses, expresses the negation of, expresses the conjunction of, the 
disjunction of, etc. could be determined solely by the reference of its expressions simpliciter, not 
by the occurrences of these expressions in that sentence. In that case, even if an occurrence 
                                                          
9 For present purposes, the following definition of ‘key occurrence’ will suffice. Given a Liar-like sentence S, fix the 
Liar-like paradox D to which S gives rise. Since D makes ineliminable use of (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim), S must 
contain at least one occurrence of at least one alethic expression e. Let a key occurrence of e in S be an occurrence 
of e in S to which one of (Sat-intro) or (Sat-elim) is applied, or that is used to introduce a step to which the rule 
Contradiction Introduction is applied. 
10 As a historical note, when it comes to sentences that attribute propositional attitudes, (Frege 1892) is committed to 
something quite similar to (Aberrations) and (Determined). Frege holds that when a word occurs in the that-phrase 
of such a sentence, it refers to what is usually its sense (its customary sense), rather than what is usually its referent 
(its customary referent). But this amounts to the claim that the occurrence of the word in the that-phrase differs in 
reference from its other occurrences, or, if one prefers, from the word simpliciter. Moreover, in such cases it is 
reference by the occurrence in the that-phrase that contributes to the truth-conditions of the attitude-attributing 
sentence, not reference by the word simpliciter or by its other occurrences. So, for what it is worth, views of the sort 
I defend here are not without historical precedent. I am grateful to Harold Hodes for bringing this observation to my 
attention.  
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undergoes an aberration in its reference, that does not change what the sentence expresses, 
expresses the negation of, etc.; so, for example, Liar sentences succeed after all in saying of 
themselves that they are not true. Clearly, in that scenario, positing aberrations does nothing to 
help explain how natural languages manage to be coherent in the face of the paradox. For that to 
work, we need to claim that the aberrations have an effect on what proposition the sentence in 
question expresses, expresses the negation of, etc.  (Determined) guarantees this.  
Now that I have stated aberrationism precisely and in a way that enables it to apply to 
many different Liar-like sentences, let us see in greater detail exactly how it is supposed to work 
as a solution to the Liar paradox.  
 
2.4. The Paradoxical Reasoning Connected with Sentence A 
The motivating idea behind aberrationism is that if S is a Liar sentence, then the 
reasoning involved in the paradox to which S gives rise should best be interpreted as a reductio 
of the assumption that S expresses the negation of the Russellian proposition <S, truth>; and 
similarly for other Liar-like sentences.11 To see how this idea works as a solution, consider the 
following derivation. (In what follows, any step prefixed by ‘|’ is or occurs under an 
undischarged assumption.)  
                                                          
11 Other theorists make similar moves. In Section 4 below I discuss (Goldstein 2009), which denies that any 
seemingly-paradox-inducing sentence expresses a proposition. This view is also discussed in (Parsons 1974) and 
(Glanzberg 2001), and has also been attributed to (Kripke 1975), on some interpretations.  
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1. A = ‘A is not true’   (definition of ‘A’) 
2. | A is true    (Assume for reductio) 
3. | ‘A is not true’ is true   (Substitution, (1), (2)) 
4. | A is not true   ((T-elim), (3)) 
5. | Contradiction    (Contradiction introduction, (2), (4)) 
6. A is not true    (Negation Introduction, (1)-(4)) 
7. ‘A is not true’ is true  ((T-intro), (6)) 
8. A is true     (Substitution, (1), (7)) 
9. Contradiction    (Contradiction introduction, (6), (8)) 
 
For this derivation to be sound, (4) must express the negation of what (2) expresses, and (6) must 
express the negation of what (8) expresses. (Otherwise, the instances of Contradiction 
Introduction fail to go through.) Given that (2) and (8) express the Russellian proposition <A, 
truth>, (4) and (6) must express the negation of that proposition.  
However, on pain of absurdity, the derivation is not sound. As the best explanation of 
this, aberrationism proposes that (4) and (6) fail to express the negation of the proposition <A, 
truth>; that, aberrationists claim, is why the derivation does not go through. For (4) and (6) not to 
express the negation of the proposition <A, truth>, either the occurrence of ‘A’ in A must fail to 
refer to A, or the occurrence of ‘true’ in A must fail to refer to truth. (For if the occurrence of ‘A’ 
in A refers to A and the occurrence of ‘true’ in A refers to truth, then surely A expresses the 
negation of the Russellian proposition <A, truth>.) Aberrationism claims that of these two 
possibilities, the one that makes for a better explanation is that the occurrence of ‘true’ in A fails 
to refer to truth.12  
As I have been stressing, aberrationists market their view as the best explanation of how 
natural languages avoid incoherence in the face of the Liar paradox. Of course, other 
philosophers disagree; any bit of Liar-like reasoning can be cast as a reductio of any number of 
claims. Thus, it needs to be shown that the explanation that aberrationism recommends is 
                                                          
12 In Section 10 I will discuss views that instead target the occurrence of ‘A’. 
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genuinely better than the alternatives. That will be the business of Sections 4-10 below. 
However, before getting to that, I will clarify exactly what (Aberrations) and (Determined) 
commit us to; what exactly is and what is not essential for aberrationism’s functioning as a 
solution.  
 
3. Radical vs. Moderate Aberrationism 
3.1. Smith  
In (Smith 2006), Nicholas Smith defends an approach to the Liar paradox that I take to be 
best classified as a version of aberrationism. He claims that in uttering a Liar sentence like A 
from above (recall: ‘A is not true’),  
either I do not refer to the sentence I utter, or I do not say of what I refer to that it is not 
true. I claim this is the solution to the Liar paradox. There is no paradox, because there is 
no Liar sentence—that is, no sentence which says of itself only that it is not true. When 
you try to construct such a sentence, you fail: either you do not refer to what you wanted 
to refer to (the very [sentence] you uttered), or you do not say of what you do refer to that 
it is not true (Smith 2006, p.182, emphasis his).  
 
While Smith’s talk of what one refers to by making an utterance suggests that his concern is with 
speech acts, at the same time he is clearly also committed to a strong claim about what sentences 
themselves can and cannot say: namely, the claim that no sentence can say of itself only that it is 
not true.13 Moreover, in order for a sentence S to say of itself that it is not true, it would have to 
express the negation of the Russellian proposition <S, truth>. So, Smith is committed to denying 
that any sentence S can express the negation of <S, truth>. Even further, throughout his paper 
                                                          
13 Thus, his claim is not merely, as one might have supposed from the talk of utterances, that it is impossible to make 
an utterance which says the same thing as a sentence which says of itself that it is not true. Note that if he takes this 
view and also admits that there are such sentences, then he is committed to the claim that there are some 
propositions that no utterance can express—namely, any propositions expressed by such a sentence. It would be 
uncharitable to attribute this claim to Smith, given things he says elsewhere (see his discussion of 
“incompleteness”).  
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Smith uses ‘true’ and ‘A’ to refer to truth and A, respectively. So, he is implicitly committed to 
the claim that ‘A’ refers to A and ‘true’ refers to truth. Thus, the only way he can hold that A 
fails to express the negation of the Russellian proposition <A, truth>, and thus that A fails to say 
of itself that it is not true, is by endorsing aberrationism. So, I take Smith to be tacitly committed 
to aberrationism.  
However, Smith couples his tacit commitment to aberrationism with the rejection of 
some highly plausible theses about language. In the rest of this section, I will show that these 
theses are in fact compatible with aberrationism. This observation will serve to clarify the nature 
of aberrationism. Moreover, it will be a convenient way to get my own cards on the table. I will 
defend the compatibility claim by presenting my preferred way to develop aberrationism, which 
retains the theses that Smith rejects. I will then use my own preferred view as an example to 
illustrate the advantages available to versions of aberrationism that retain these theses. 
 
3.2. Semantic Supervenience and Semantic Regularity 
Most philosophers who discuss the Liar paradox—and this includes me—are at least 
tacitly committed to holding that meaning and reference are part of the natural world. In 
particular, most philosophers assume that when our words refer, what they refer to is determined 
by our linguistic behavior involving these words, the mental states we use them to express, and 
how our uses of them are related to our physical environment. (Henceforth I will include all of 
these things when I speak of the use of an expression.) It follows that whenever an expression 
refers to something, there are some non-semantic facts, such as facts about how the expression is 
used, which determine that it refers to that thing. According to philosophers who accept this, 
these non-semantic facts determine that either within Liar sentences or at some step in any Liar-
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like paradox, some of the expressions involved (or, in the aberrationist case, some of their 
occurrences) do not refer to what they would have to refer to, in order for a contradiction to 
follow. However, in several striking passages, Smith says things that can be interpreted as 
rejecting this view. For example: 
Sometimes our words do not mean what we want14 them to mean: not due to hidden 
complexities of our semantic mechanisms, operating behind the scenes to produce 
unforeseen results—i.e., not for some principled, bottom-up reasons; but because our 
words cannot mean what we want them to mean, and so our semantic mechanisms simply 
break or malfunction, and some of our words get assigned meanings more or less 
randomly (p.195).  
 
Here I understand Smith’s talk of meaning as referring to reference. (Whether or not this was 
Smith’s actual intention, the view that I wish to discuss is the one which makes the above claims 
about reference.)  
On one rather strong reading of Smith’s claim that some expressions “get assigned 
meanings more or less randomly” rather than for any “bottom-up reasons,” he is committed to 
denying a claim that I will call Semantic Supervenience:  
(Semantic Supervenience) The semantic properties strongly locally supervene on the 
non-semantic properties.  
 
For two kinds of properties A and B, the A-properties strongly locally supervene on the B-
properties if and only if for any possible worlds w1 and w2 and any individuals x in w1 and y in 
w2, if x in w1 is indiscernible from y in w2 with respect to B-properties, then x in w1 is 
indiscernible from y in w2 with respect to A-properties.
15  
On this reading, in denying Semantic Supervenience one would have to claim that there 
are two possible worlds w1 and w2, and two expressions, x and y, such that x in w1 is 
                                                          
14 Admittedly, speakers’ desires and intentions are only one factor that might contribute to determining the reference 
of their expressions. However, we will soon see that Smith is likewise skeptical about the determinative influence of 
the other putatively contributing factors.  
15 See (Kim 1987) and (McLaughlin and Bennett 2014) for this definition and further discussion.  
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indistinguishable from y in w2 with respect to all non-semantic properties—in particular, 
properties having to do with use—but x in w1 and y in w2 do differ with respect to their semantic 
properties. Applied to the case of reference and put in more informal terms, the view would say 
that expressions can acquire referents in ways that are entirely unaffected by how they (the 
expressions) are used. It is in that sense that they “get assigned meanings more or less 
randomly,” and not for “bottom-up” reasons. On this reading of Smith, a bottom-up reason why 
an expression means what it does would include non-semantic facts, such as facts about how the 
expression is used.  
Now, it may be unfair to saddle Smith with the denial of Semantic Supervenience, since 
‘randomly’ can be interpreted several ways and anyhow it is not clear to what extent his 
approach to the Liar paradox relies on his claim that sometimes reference is “determined more or 
less randomly.” Still, it will be useful to have Semantic Supervenience (and its negation) on the 
table in what follows; what matters for my purposes is not exactly which view Smith holds, but 
rather the fates of the various views in the vicinity. In that connection, it is worth noting that 
(Kearns & Magidor 2012) find reasons independent of the Liar paradox to deny Semantic 
Supervenience. Philosophers sympathetic to their view might be further encouraged if the view 
turned out to provide a distinctive solution to the Liar that could not be had by other means. An 
important upshot of my discussion will be that this is not so; one can reap the benefits of 
aberrationism without embracing Semantic Supervenience.  
A somewhat more moderate view—likely the better interpretation of Smith—is neutral 
about Semantic Supervenience, but instead denies a thesis that Smith calls ‘Semantic 
Regularity’:  
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(Semantic Regularity) There are perfectly reliable, principled relationships 
between our behavior, mental states and physical 
environment on the one hand, and what [our words mean16] 
on the other hand (p.188, emphasis mine).  
 
Smith presents the denial of Semantic Regularity as being quite central to his solution to the Liar 
paradox. However, an important upshot of this section will be that one can adopt a similar 
solution while still reasonably claiming to retain Semantic Regularity and Semantic 
Supervenience.  
I say ‘reasonably’ because as written, Semantic Regularity is obscure, owing to obscurity 
in the phrase ‘perfectly reliable, principled relationships’. As I prefer to understand ‘perfectly 
reliable, principled relationships’, my own view is that there is indeed a relationship of this kind 
between the semantic and the non-semantic, but that the relationship is more complicated than 
one might initially have thought. In what follows, I will present my view in this way, since that 
best serves to highlight the differences between me and Smith. Once I have said more about what 
I take the relationship of the semantic to the non-semantic to be, it will become much clearer in 
what ways this relationship can be considered reliable and principled, and in what ways 
complicated.  
Let us call any version of aberrationism that accepts both Semantic Supervenience and 
Semantic Regularity a moderate version. And let us call any version that rejects one, the other, or 
both a radical version. In crudest terms, the difference between moderate and radical 
aberrationism is that only moderate approaches hold that it is possible to have a (correct) theory 
of reference. (This, at least, is the issue that I take to be at stake in Smith’s rejection of Semantic 
Regularity.) Even this crude way of putting the distinction helps to clarify aberrationism: 
                                                          
16 Smith writes “what we mean by our utterances”. Since my concern is with expression types rather than their 
tokens, I will address the version of Semantic Regularity that concerns types. 
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although aberrationism is committed to positing referential aberrations, and thus to denying that 
sentences always say what they pre-theoretically appear to say, it is not committed to the claim 
that what our words mean can float free of how we use them, in a way that precludes there being 
a correct theory of reference. One of the main goals of this section is to show that the fate of 
theories of reference is in fact a separate question, on which advocates of aberrationism can in 
principle take different stances.  
In the rest of this section and in Chapter 2, I defend moderate aberrationism, using my 
own preferred variant as an example to illustrate its advantages over radical aberrationism. The 
point is essentially as follows. Because they doubt the robustness of the relation between 
semantic phenomena and non-semantic phenomena, radical versions of aberrationism are not in a 
good position to explain our very vivid sense of what Liar-like sentences seem to say by 
appealing to facts about language use, or even, setting explanation aside, to identify what these 
sentences in fact say by looking at facts about language use. By contrast, moderate aberrationism 
has more resources available on both these scores. On moderate views, when an occurrence of a 
word cannot co-refer with that word, it need not follow that the reference of the occurrence has 
nothing to do with how we use the word. Rather, there are patterns that link facts about a word’s 
use to the reference of its occurrences. In particular, my own preferred moderate view claims that 
these patterns determine that the occurrence’s referent is something similar to the referent of the 
word simpliciter.  
While I will present my own preferred version of moderate aberrationism in some detail, 
readers should keep in mind that my goal here is not to defend that moderate view in particular, 
but rather merely to illustrate the advantages of moderate views in general over their radical 
cousins in a plausible, concrete way.  
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3.3. A Concrete Moderate Proposal 
3.3.1. Principles, Respect, and Closeness 
 Let us temporarily set aside reference by occurrences and return to the more familiar 
conception of reference as a relation between expressions simpliciter and things in the world. 
Plausibly, what if anything an expression refers to is determined at least in part by how the 
expression is used. Moreover, it is quite plausible that, for many linguistic expressions, there are 
certain principles—inference rules or sentences (types) in which the expression occurs—which 
play an especially significant role in determining the reference of the expression. In general, the 
principles for an expression form a proper subset17 of the totality of sentences and inference rules 
in which the expression figures. For example, they might include the sentences and inference 
rules which play widely accepted and deeply entrenched roles in governing people’s uses of the 
expression.18 For example, throughout his work David Lewis claimed that a theoretical term—a 
term that is introduced into a language by a theory—has the conjunction of the sentences of the 
theory as a principle, in my sense of the word ‘principle’.19 And Matti Eklund has suggested that 
the same holds for ‘true’ and the inference rules (T-intro) and (T-elim).20  
To explain how an expression’s being governed by a principle can influence the 
determination of its reference, I will need to introduce the notions of respect and closeness. To 
get a grip on these notions, it will help to consider some quite closely related ideas from (Lewis 
1972), those of a realization and a near-realization. Lewis introduces these notions via an 
                                                          
17 It is plausible that this can be a fuzzy set (or elsewise a set with vague boundaries), allowing for vagueness as to 
which sentences or rules are principles.  
18 See below for more on the relationship between this idea and the notion of meaning-constitutivity developed in 
(Eklund 2007).  
19 For example, see (Lewis 1970), (Lewis 1972), (Lewis 1994) p.58, (Lewis 1997), (Eklund 2002), and (Eklund 
2007). See also (Braddon-Mitchell and Nola 1997) and (Melia and Saatsi 2006). 
20 See, e.g., (Eklund 2002) p.269 footnote 41.  
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example. He imagines a detective introducing a theory, in an attempt to explain the data at a 
crime scene. The theory, displayed below, introduces three terms, ‘X’, ‘Y’, and ‘Z’:  
X, Y and Z conspired to murder Mr. Body. Seventeen years ago, in the gold fields of 
Uganda, X was Body’s partner…Last week, Y and Z conferred in a bar in 
Reading…Tuesday night at 11:17, Y went to the attic and set a time bomb...Seventeen 
minutes later, X met Z in the billiard room and gave him the lead pipe…Just when the 
bomb went off in the attic, X fired three shots into the study through the French 
windows…(p.250) 
 
Then, Lewis imagines, we learn that the story “is true of a certain three people: Plum, Peacock 
and Mustard. If we put the name ‘Plum’ in place of ‘X’, ‘Peacock’ in place of ‘Y’, and ‘Mustard’ 
in place of ‘Z’ throughout, we get a true story about the doings of those three people.” Lewis 
describes this situation by saying that “Plum, Peacock and Mustard together realize (or are a 
realization of) the detective’s theory” (p.251, italics mine). Next, he imagines us learning that 
this triple uniquely realizes the theory—that is, this triple and no other realizes the theory. In that 
case, 
we would surely conclude that X, Y and Z in the story were Plum, Peacock and Mustard. 
I maintain that we would be compelled so to conclude, given the senses borne by the 
terms ‘X’ , ‘Y’ and ‘Z’ in virtue of the way the detective introduced them in his 
theorizing, and given our information about Plum, Peacock and Mustard. In telling his 
story, the detective set forth three roles and said that they were occupied by X, Y and Z. 
He must have specified the meanings of the three T-terms ‘X’, ‘Y’ and ‘Z’ thereby; for 
they had meanings afterwards, they had none before, and nothing else was done to give 
them meanings. They were introduced by an implicit functional definition, being reserved 
to name the occupants of the three roles. When we find out who are the occupants of the 
three roles, we find out who are X, Y and Z. (p.251) 
 
In my terminology, the sentence that expresses the detective’s theory counts as a principle for the 
expressions ‘X’, ‘Y’, and ‘Z’. And respecting that principle is just like realizing it, in Lewis’ 
sense. Similarly, coming close to respecting the principle is just like being a near realization of it. 
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With these comparisons in place, below are some more precise definitions of respecting and 
coming close to respecting.21  
Suppose we are given an expression e and a principle P for e. Assume for simplicity that 
other than e, every singular term, function constant, relation symbol, and predicate in P is 
context-insensitive and refers to something. Given an entity y, if P is a sentence then y respects P 
if and only if, if every occurrence of e in P were to refer to y then P would be true.22 (Compare 
Lewis’ remark from above: “If we put the name ‘Plum’ in place of ‘X’, ‘Peacock’ in place of 
‘Y’, and ‘Mustard’ in place of ‘Z’ throughout, we get a true story about the doings of those three 
people.”)  
The case of sentences is helpful for getting a grip on the notion of respect and connecting 
it with Lewis’ ideas, but more important for my purposes is the case of respect as it functions for 
rules of inference. If P is a rule of inference, then y respects P if and only if y respects every 
instance of P. y respects a given instance N of P if and only if:  
a) if P is an introduction rule, then: if every occurrence of e in N that is introduced by 
the application of P were to refer to y, then N would be truth-preserving, and  
 
b) if P is an elimination rule, then: if every occurrence of e in N that is eliminated by the 
application of P were to refer to y, then N would be truth-preserving.23  
 
                                                          
21 For an alternative definition, please see the Appendix. 
22 It is worth noting that in the case of sentences, the notion of respect is quite similar to the notion of satisfaction, 
introduced in Section 2.3. The difference is that respect is defined in terms of a modal condition on reference and in 
terms of truth, whereas the notion of satisfaction is introduced simply by stipulating that the rules (Sat-intro) and 
(Sat-elim) are henceforth to define the word ‘satisfies’. 
23 Since I have characterized reference determination in terms of respect and then characterized respect in terms of 
subjunctive conditions that involve reference, one might worry that my remarks about reference amount to an 
explanatory circle. However, keep in mind that my aim in taking about reference is rather modest. I am not out to 
provide a full explanation, in non-semantic terms, of how reference is determined. I am just presenting a fact that I 
take to be partly explanatory of reference-determination. Please see the Appendix for an alternative, model-theoretic 
definition of respect that does not invoke reference, and an examination of the consequences of adopting this 
definition, vis à vis my diagnosis of the Liar paradox.  
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For my purposes, it will be harmless to ignore the case in which P is a rule of inference that is 
neither an introduction nor an elimination rule.  
Now that I have introduced the notion of respect, I will introduce that of closeness, again 
drawing inspiration from (Lewis 1972). Here the relevant notion from Lewis is that of a near-
realization, which he introduces after explaining the notion of a realization: 
A complication: what if the theorizing detective has made one little mistake? He should 
have said that Y went to the attic at 11:37, not 11:17. The story as told is unrealized, true 
of no one. But another story is realized, indeed uniquely realized: the story we get by 
deleting or correcting the little mistake. We can say that the story as told is nearly 
realized, has a unique near-realization. (The notion of a near-realization is hard to 
analyze, but easy to understand.) In this case the [terms ‘X’, ‘Y’, and ‘Z’] ought to name 
the components of the near-realization. More generally: they should name the 
components of the nearest realization of the theory, provided there is a unique nearest 
realization and it is near enough. Only if the story comes nowhere near to being realized, 
or if there are two equally near nearest realizations, should we resort to treating the [terms 
‘X’, ‘Y’, and ‘Z’] like improper descriptions. (p.252) 
 
Just as something can come close to realizing a theory and thereby be a near-realization of the 
theory, something can come close to respecting a principle.  
Unfortunately, like the notion of a near-realization, the notion of coming close to 
respecting a principle is hard to analyze. One might initially hope to define relative closeness to 
respecting a principle in terms of relative number of instances satisfied: for all principles P and 
entities y1 and y2, y1 comes closer to respecting P than y2 does if and only if y1 respects more 
instances of P than y2 does. But (McGee 1992) demonstrates that this way of cashing out 
closeness fails.24 Still, although the notion is difficult to analyze, (Eklund 2005) argues that 
                                                          
24 To see why, let us consider the schema (T) below rather than (T-intro) and (T-elim), considering (T) as a principle 
for ‘true’:  
(T) ‘φ’ is true if and only if φ  
(McGee 1992) proves that there are some maximal consistent sets of instances of (T) that entail ‘‘2 + 2 = 4’ is true’, 
and others that entail ‘‘2 + 2 = 5’ is true’. (These sets are maximal in the sense that any proper superset of them is 
inconsistent.) But, fixing such sets Δ and Г, the point is this: when asking which objects come closer to respecting 
(T), other things being equal it would be perverse to allow that an object which satisfies all and only the instances of 
(T) that are contained in Г comes as close as an object which satisfies all and only the instances of (T) that are 
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“reliance on a notion of closeness is necessary…from a number of…theoretical viewpoints,” and 
“our grasp of the notion is sufficient to make reasoned judgments about closeness” (p.50). One 
convincing example that Eklund raises has to do with the idea that the task of a scientist—in 
Eklund’s case a semantic theorist, though it applies across all the sciences—is to come up with a 
theory that best fits the data. The notion of closeness, Eklund points out, “is what underlies the 
talk of ‘best fit’” (p.51).25  
As a final remark concerning closeness, it is worth noting that it is judgments about 
relative closeness—about one thing’s coming closer than another to respecting a principle—that 
are most important for my purposes, and that principled judgments about relative closeness can 
be easy to come by, even when judgments of absolute closeness are not. An example will help 
bring out the point. Say a sentence S is grounded if, given the truth values of all the sentences 
that contain no uses of ‘true’, one can determine the truth value of S in finitely many steps.26 
Thus, for example, Liar sentences are ungrounded, as are sentences such as ‘This sentence is 
true’; in neither case does evaluation of the sentence in question bottom out in consideration of 
the non-linguistic part of reality. Now imagine that there is a property Q that respects all 
instances of (T-intro) and (T-elim) for grounded sentences, but fails for all ungrounded 
sentences. And now contrast Q with the property being made of goat cheese. The point is that 
while neither Q nor being made of goat cheese respects both rules, Q clearly comes closer to 
doing so.  
                                                          
contained in Δ. That is to say, when we assess how closely candidate referents for ‘true’ come to respecting (T), 
there needs to be some weighting that assigns greater importance to the respect of some, and less importance to the 
respect of other, instances of (T).  
25 See also Eklund’s example of the two linguistic communities L and L* on pp.51-52. 
26 See (Kripke 1975) and Section 5 below for more on groundedness.  
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For example, being made of goat cheese fails to respect any instance of (T-intro) that 
involves a true sentence, regardless of whether that sentence is grounded. Consider for instance 
‘Grass is green’. That gives us the following instance of (T-intro):  
 Grass is green. 
 _____________________  (T-intro) 
 ‘Grass is green’ is true.  
 
If the occurrence of ‘true’ in the conclusion were to refer to being made of goat cheese, then the 
conclusion would say that the sentence ‘Grass is green’ is made of goat cheese. This inference 
would then fail to be truth-preserving, since it would have a true premise and a false conclusion. 
It is now plain that the same goes for any other true sentence that one substitutes for ‘Grass is 
green’. By contrast, in the instance of (T-intro) just displayed, if the occurrence of ‘true’ were to 
refer to Q then by our assumption about Q, both the premise and the conclusion would be true 
and so that instance of (T-intro) would be truth-preserving. And in fact, the same goes for all 
other grounded sentences. Even if it is unclear exactly what would make Q come closer than 
being made of goat cheese comes to respecting (T-intro), that it does come closer is hard to 
dispute.  
 
3.3.2. A Lewisian Story about Reference Determination 
With the notions of principles, respect, and closeness in place, I can now give a semi-
detailed sketch of a concrete view that illustrates my main point against radical versions of 
aberrationism. That point, again, is that one can reap the benefits of positing one-off aberrations 
while retaining Semantic Regularity. On the view I am sketching, the reference of any 
occurrence of ‘true’ is significantly influenced by how we use the word ‘true’—in particular, by 
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the central role of (T-intro) and (T-elim) in governing our uses of this word. That holds even for 
occurrences that cannot, on pain of contradiction, refer to truth.  
For the moment, let us continue with our familiar talk of reference as a relation between 
expressions simpliciter and objects. Now consider the following Lewisian claims about 
reference:27 
i. For some expressions e and principles P involving e, e refers to that entity y,28 if 
there is one, which comes closest to respecting P, and  
ii. if there are several entities y1,…yn which respect P or come equally close to 
respecting P, then e is indeterminate in reference as between y1,…yn, and  
iii.  if nothing even comes close to respecting P, then e altogether fails to refer.  
 
In broadest outline, my plan is to extend (i)-(iii) to the case of reference by occurrences. The idea 
is as follows. Truth is the property that comes closest to respecting (T-intro) and (T-elim).29 So 
most occurrences of the word ‘true’ refer to truth. However, on pain of contradiction, this cannot 
hold for the key occurrence of ‘true’ in any Liar sentence. Still, it need not follow that there is no 
principled, reliable relationship between the reference of this occurrence and (T-intro) and (T-
elim). Rather, such an occurrence refers to that property, if there is one, which comes next 
closest (after truth) to respecting these rules. If there is more than one such property, then the 
occurrence is indeterminate in reference. If there is no such property, then the occurrence fails to 
refer.  
                                                          
27 See (Lewis 1970) and (Lewis 1972), including the passages quoted above in the main text, for expressions of (i). 
Lewis advocates (ii) in (Lewis 1994), but then adopts a more qualified position in (Lewis 1997). His later position is 
that for e to be indeterminate, the candidate referents have to be sufficiently similar. Otherwise, if multiple very 
different entities come equally close to respecting P, then e has no referent whatsoever. I find this modification 
plausible, but for simplicity I omit it from the main text, as it will not feature importantly in what follows. (Once one 
sees what the candidate referents for occurrences of ‘true’ in Liar sentences are, it becomes plausible that these 
candidates are similar enough so that these occurrences of ‘true’ are indeterminate. See below for my description of 
the candidate referents.) For other discussions of Lewisian views about reference for theoretical terms, see (Eklund 
2002), and (Eklund 2005).  
28 One might think that ‘e refers to y’ immediately entails ‘every occurrence of e refers to y’. But, of course, a central 
claim constitutive of aberrationism is that this is not so. See Section 11 for further discussion.  
29 See Section 3.3.3.2 below for an argument. 
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 Plainly, however, these claims about the key occurrences of ‘true’ in Liar sentences do 
not immediately follow from (i)-(iii), since (i)-(iii) only address reference by expressions 
simpliciter, not reference by occurrences. Thus, I propose to supplement (i)-(iii) so as to address 
reference by occurrences:  
iv. Suppose E is an occurrence of e. If there is some entity y such that e refers to y, 
then E refers to y, unless this would lead to a contradiction. If this would lead to a 
contradiction, then E refers to that unique thing, if there is one, which is next in line 
for coming closest to respecting P. If multiple things y1,…yn are next in line, then 
the reference of E is indeterminate as between y1,…yn. If nothing comes sufficiently 
close, then E fails to refer.  
 
(iv) is clearly in the same Lewisian spirit as (i)-(iii). And note that with acceptance of (iv), we are 
able to say that while ‘true’ simpliciter refers to truth, the key occurrences of ‘true’ in Liar 
sentences do not.30 As (iv) specifies, the “next-in-line rule” applies to expression-occurrences, 
and it is only occurrences of ‘true’ in Liar sentences and their ilk that cannot, on pain of 
contradiction, refer to truth. Thus, all the rest of the occurrences of ‘true’ in the wide variety of 
non-paradoxical English sentences are free to refer to the thing that comes closest to respecting 
(T-intro) and (T-elim), namely, (as we’ve assumed) truth itself; and the occurrences of ‘true’ in 
Liar-like sentences are free not to refer to truth.31  
                                                          
30 Here again, I assume that truth comes closest to respecting (T-intro) and (T-elim). See Section 3.3.3.2. 
31 Here I gloss over a complication. Consider the instances of (T-intro) and (T-elim) that involve sentence A. Let E0 
be the underlined occurrence of ‘true’, and E1 be the non-underlined occurrence: 
 
(IN) 
A is not true  
_________________________     (T-intro) 
‘A is not true’ is true 
 
(OUT) 
‘A is not true’ is true  
_________________________    (T-elim) 
A is not true 
 
Now, (iv) says that E0 refers to truth unless that would lead to a contradiction. But whether it would lead to a 
contradiction depends also on what E1 refers to. And vice versa. That is, one can avoid contradiction by allowing 
either E0 or E1 to fail to refer to truth; one isn’t forced to choose. So, (iv) doesn’t yield a definite verdict on the 
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3.3.2.1. Applying (i)-(iv) to the Case of ‘true’  
 As we have seen, (Lewis 1970) advocated something like (i) as, in the first instance, a 
characterization of reference for “theoretical terms”—terms that are introduced into a language 
by a scientific theory. This is also made clear by the example from (Lewis 1972), in which the 
terms ‘X’, ‘Y’, and ‘Z’ are introduced by the detective’s theory about the crime. That said, Lewis 
later extended his view so as to apply to certain folk terms, such as the names for colors.32 Even 
so, the question naturally arises whether Lewis’ views about reference, and by that token, (i)-(iv), 
apply to ‘true’.  
One thing that makes this concern especially pressing is the widespread belief that 
“descriptivist” theories of reference such as the Lewisian one I have presented apply only to 
some kinds of expressions, if any. (For concreteness, let’s say a theory of reference for 
expressions of a given kind (or occurrences thereof) is descriptivist if it holds that the referent of 
an expression of that kind (or occurrence thereof) is that entity, if there is one, which most 
closely fits (that is, respects) a certain description. If ‘description’ in the relevant sense also 
applies to inference rules, then it’s clear that the conception of reference that I have advocated 
for the word ‘true’ and its occurrences is descriptivist in this sense.) In particular, for example, 
while descriptivism about proper names has historically had some supporters, at the time of 
writing the mainstream consensus is that this view is false.33  
                                                          
reference of either. To get the desired conclusion (namely, that E0 but not E1 fails to refer to truth), something needs 
to be added to (iv). For the sake of brevity, I will leave that for another occasion, and simply assume that it is 
reference by E0 that needs to change.  
32 See (Lewis 1997). 
33 For supporters of descriptivism, see (Frege 1892), (Russell 1905), and (Searle 1958). For problems with the 
descriptivist account of proper names, see (Marcus 1947) and (Kripke 1980). For a sketch of a popular alternative 
account, see (Kripke 1972), beginning p.91. For yet a further alternative, see (Graff Fara 2015), which argues that 
names are predicates of a certain distinctive kind.  
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Of course, the case of proper names need not be an immediate concern, since ‘true’ is not 
a proper name but rather (on most accounts) a predicate. Moreover, the most prominent non-
descriptivist accounts of reference for proper names sound implausible when applied to ‘true’. 
For instance, on the view sketched in (Kripke 1980), a name acquires its referent in what he calls 
an “initial baptism,” an event in which the name is first deliberately applied to an object that is 
identified in some other way, e.g., via ostension. Reference to that object by that name is then 
sustained by causal relations that relate that initial event to subsequent uses of the name. 
Kripke’s account sounds most plausible as applied to names for objects that can be readily 
identified, e.g., by ostension, not for unobserved entities that are introduced by scientific theories 
or abstract properties like truth. Thus, causal theories of reference à la Kripke pose less of a 
threat to my claims about ‘true’ than one might have thought.  
A consideration that positively supports the idea of (T-intro) and (T-elim) being a 
reference-determining theory is the centrality of these rules in governing our uses of ‘true’. The 
use of ‘true’ in accordance with these rules is deeply entrenched and widely accepted, more so 
than any other patterns of use for it. Indeed, if someone failed to find these rules generally 
compelling, that would raise prima facie doubts about her grasp of the word. And it is reasonable 
to suspect that the uses of an expression that are most deeply entrenched and widely accepted 
play the most significant roles in determining the expression’s reference.  
A closely related idea, defended in (Eklund 2002) and (Scharp 2013) Chapter 2, is that 
(T-intro) and (T-elim) are meaning-constitutive for ‘true’.34 That is, using ‘true’ to mean what it 
means in English consists in standing in some special, receptive cognitive relation to (T-intro) 
and (T-elim). For instance, one might hold that using ‘true’ to mean what it means in English 
                                                          
34 For further discussion of related issues, see (Eklund 2002) and (Scharp 2013) pp.43-56 and p.62.  
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consists in being disposed to accept these inference rules. On another variant of the view, using 
‘true’ to mean what it means in English consists in finding these inference rules primitively 
compelling—finding them compelling, and not in virtue of finding anything else compelling.35 
Whatever in the end meaning-constitutivity amounts to, one who likes the idea can identify the 
reference-determining principles for an expression as those sentences or inference rules that are 
meaning-constitutive for it.  
 I find the idea of meaning-constitutivity appealing, and I am sympathetic with the idea 
that if an expression has principles that are meaning-constitutive for it, then these principles play 
a more significant role in determining its reference than any other sentences or inferences in 
which it features do. However, since the notion of meaning-constitutivity is controversial, I 
emphasize that I do not obviously need to invoke it here. What I need is for ‘true’ to have its 
referent be determined by (T-intro) and (T-elim) in the manner described by (i)-(iv). I see no 
reason why this claim cannot be based entirely on the centrality of these inference rules in 
governing our practices with ‘true’, leaving open the question of meaning-constitutivity.  
 Before laying out my preferred view in further detail, I should stress a few important 
points concerning the flexibility of moderate aberrationism. Readers should keep in mind that 
moderate aberrationism is defined only by the acceptance of (Semantic Supervenience), and 
(Semantic Regularity) (along, of course, with (Aberrations) and (Determined)). It need not be 
committed to the Lewisian views about reference that I have just laid out. Moreover, even if it is 
committed to these Lewisian views as applied to some terms, it need not be committed to their 
application to ‘true’.36 Likewise, even fans of moderate aberrationism who endorse my 
                                                          
35 The idea of someone’s finding something primitively compelling is due to (Peacocke 1992), Chapter 2.  
36 That said, to remain faithful to (Semantic Regularity), moderate aberrationists who do not apply the Lewisian 
views to ‘true’ will need some other principled account of what determines the reference of the key occurrences of 
alethic expressions in Liar-like sentences. They will need this in order to remain faithful to (Semantic Regularity).  
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application of the Lewisian views to ‘true’ might disagree with me about which properties come 
closest to respecting (T-intro) and (T-elim). One can see, then, that within moderate 
aberrationism there is room for a great variety of positions. Again, my only goal here (Section 
3.3) is to develop a sample moderate view, one that can compellingly illustrate the advantages 
available in principle to moderate aberrationism. For all I say here, other moderates may have 
different ways to secure these advantages, and still others may not be able to secure them. Much 
rests on the details of the particular views.  
 
3.3.3. The Reference of the Occurrence of ‘true’ in A  
 We will see below that some of the advantages of moderate aberrationism over its radical 
cousins rest on moderates’ views about of what Russellian propositions Liar-like sentences 
express the negation, the conjunction, disjunction, etc., and thus in turn on their answers to 
questions such as, ‘To what (if anything) does the occurrence of ‘true’ in A refer?’. In this 
subsection, I will develop my own preferred answer: such occurrences are indeterminate in 
reference as between two quite truth-like properties, ascending truth and descending truth, which 
are described in (Scharp 2013). Neither property respects both (T-intro) and (T-elim), but each 
comes equally close to doing so, and both properties come closer than anything else (besides 
truth itself). In that sense, ascending truth and descending truth are “tied for second place” when 
it comes to respecting (T-intro) and (T-elim). It then follows from the Lewisian views about 
reference from Section 3.3.2—that is, from (i)-(iv)—that when an occurrence of ‘true’ in a Liar-
like sentence cannot refer to truth, its reference is indeterminate as between ascending truth and 
descending truth. Given this, it then follows from (Determined) that all Liar sentences are 
indeterminate in content: for any Liar sentence S, it is indeterminate of which of the propositions 
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<S, ascending truth>, and <S, descending truth> S expresses the negation. Similar remarks apply 
to all other Liar-like sentences. (The role of (Determined) here is to get us from indeterminacy in 
the reference of the occurrence of ‘true’ to indeterminacy as to what Russellian proposition is 
such that its negation is expressed.) 
The view just described serves as an illustration of how a moderate aberrationist might 
reasonably answer the question of what Liar-like sentences say. In Section 3.3.4, I will explain 
why this sort of answer is better than those available to radical aberrationism. Before that, 
however, I will say some things to make my illustration more concrete and plausible. I will 
describe ascending truth and descending truth in some further detail, and justify some of my 
claims about these properties. This will also enable me in Section 3.3.3.2 to make good on my 
promise to show that truth is the unique property which comes closest to respecting (T-intro) and 
(T-elim).  
 
3.3.3.1. Ascending Truth and Descending Truth 
 In (Scharp 2013), Kevin Scharp introduces two predicates, ‘ascending true’ and 
‘descending true’. These two predicates are defined by a list of 20 axiom schemata in which they 
feature.37 He calls the set of all instances of these axiom-schemata ADT—“the theory of 
ascending and descending truth.” In particular, two of the axiom-schemata that help to define 
these predicates are closely related to the rules (T-intro) and (T-Elim):  
 (A1) If S then ‘S’ is ascending true 
(D1) If ‘S’ is descending true then S 
                                                          
37 See his p.154 for a full list. 
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Here, setting aside issues of context-sensitivity, the 19th letter of the uppercase Latin alphabet 
ranges over declarative sentences of English.  
Importantly, however, no instance of either (A1#) or (D1#) below is in ADT: 
(A1#) If ‘S’ is ascending true then S 
(D1#) If S then ‘S’ is descending true 
In practical terms, the inclusion of (A1) and (D1) and exclusion of (A1#) and (D1#) means that 
speakers can always use ‘ascending true’ in accordance with (T-intro) but not always (T-elim). 
Similarly, they can always use ‘descending true’ in accordance with (T-elim), but not always (T-
intro). So, the idea is, instead of having a single word, ‘true’, that we pre-theoretically take to 
obey both rules, we now have two different words, each of which we treat as obeying one rule 
but not always the other.  
 It is worth noting that similar moves can be made with ‘satisfies’ in place of ‘true’. That 
is, just as Scharp proposes to divide the principles for ‘true’ between two separate predicates, an 
analogous move can be made with ‘satisfies’, giving rise to two predicates, ‘ascending satisfies’ 
and ‘descending satisfies’, each of which can be applied, for any n, to an n-tuple of objects and 
an n-ary formula. Thus, Scharp’s ideas, and my appropriation of them, can be extended to Liar-
like sentences which speak of satisfaction rather than truth.  
 So far, I have only been describing Scharp’s predicates. But the claims that I want to 
make concern the properties to which these predicates purport to refer. (See below for more on 
whether there are any such properties.) Again, those claims are as follows:  
1. There are two properties, ascending truth and descending truth, to which the 
predicates ‘ascending true’ and ‘descending true’ respectively refer. 
2. Ascending truth respects (T-intro) but not (T-elim), and descending truth respects (T-
elim) but not (T-intro).  
3. Ascending truth and descending truth both come close to respecting (T-intro) and (T-
elim).  
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4. In fact, they come equally close.  
5. Nothing else, besides truth itself, comes closer to respecting these rules. 
 
As we saw earlier, given (1)-(5) and the Lewisian views about reference (i)-(iv) from Section 
3.3.2, any key occurrence of ‘true’ in any Liar sentence is indeterminate in reference as between 
ascending truth and descending truth, and likewise for all other Liar-like sentences. I will now 
make a few remarks on (1)-(5).  
In his book, Scharp proves the consistency of ADT relative to set theory by constructing 
a set-theoretic model, M2, of ADT.
38 Assuming that set theory is consistent, a proof that an 
expression defined by a list of axioms has an extension in a set theoretic model serves as 
evidence that if the expression were added to English, defined by those axioms, it would refer. 
At least, this is how philosophers routinely reason. In particular, then, the fact that ‘ascending 
true’ and ‘descending true’ have extensions when interpreted in M2 serves as evidence that they 
refer when added to English and defined by the adoption of the elements of ADT as axioms. 
Moreover, Scharp is careful not to impose any expressive limitations on the language of M2 that 
might be relevant to its extensibility to a full natural language such as English. Indeed, he objects 
to other theorists’ failure to take such precautions.39 In light of these observations, I propose to 
accept (1) on the basis of the evidence Scharp provides.  
Quite similar is the matter of thesis (2), concerning the non-satisfaction of (T-intro) and 
(T-elim). Scharp claims to have proven that all instances of (A1) and (D1) are true-relative-to-
M2, whereas only some instances of (A1#) and (D1#) are true-relative-to-M2.
40 That serves as 
evidence that ascending truth, if it exists, respects all instances of (A1) and (T-intro), but only 
                                                          
38 See his Section 6.6 (pp.157-169) and an appendix (p.178) to his Chapter 6.  
39 See p.156.  
40 See his Section 6.A.4, beginning bottom p.186. He does not give a full proof, but rather provides only the proof 
for (D1) in a footnote. 
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some instances of (D1#) and (T-elim). Likewise, we have similar evidence that descending truth, 
if it exists, respects all instances of (D1) and (T-elim), but only some instances of (A1#) and (T-
intro). In particular, we will soon see that α and δ below are counterexamples to (A1#) and 
(D1#), respectively: 
(α) α is not ascending true 
(δ) δ is not descending true 
More generally, I will soon (Section 3.3.4.3) show that any sentence S which says of itself that it 
is not ascending true is (contrary to what it says) ascending true, and therefore false. Similarly, 
any sentence S which says of itself that it is not descending true is not descending true, and is 
thus true. These observations help give a better grip on ascending and descending truth. 
Let us now discuss (3), the claim that ascending truth and descending truth come close to 
respecting both (T-intro) and (T-elim). As a first thing to note, both properties respect all 
instances of each rule which involve sentences that are “safe” (p.186).41 A sentence is safe if it is 
either descending true or not ascending true. Respect of both rules when it comes to safe 
sentences is significant, since the safe sentences include most sentences that anyone would ever 
want to use. In particular, Scharp points out, “every sentence that is grounded (in something like 
Kripke’s sense) is safe” (p.170). A sentence is grounded in Scharp’s sense if “its ascending truth 
value and descending truth value are completely determined by the ascending truth values and 
descending truth values of sentences that have no occurrences of ‘ascending true’ or ‘descending 
true’.” All sentences that are grounded in Scharp’s sense are safe. Moreover, “many ungrounded 
sentences, like ‘every sentence is either ascending true or not ascending true’ and ‘no sentence is 
both descending true and not descending true’ are safe.” So, the range of sentences for which 
                                                          
41 Scharp proves that all sentences which are safe have the same ascending truth and descending truth values, and 
that (A1#) and (D1#) hold for all such sentences. 
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ascending truth and descending truth respect both rules is significant; it includes most sentences 
that anyone would normally want to use, and more besides.  
Scharp himself sums up the situation thus:  
only sentences that contain ‘ascending true’, ‘descending true’, or ‘safe’ might turn out to 
be unsafe and, even among those, only sentences that would be paradoxical if ‘true’ were 
substituted in for these terms might be unsafe. (p.186) 
 
It is worth flagging the second conjunct here. This is a substantial claim that needs careful 
justification, which Scharp does not provide in his book and which I am inclined to doubt. We 
will return to this matter later, in the discussion of wholesale indeterminism in Section 9. For 
present purposes, however, even if Scharp’s definition of safety counts a few pre-theoretically 
unproblematic sentences as unsafe, and even if ascending truth and descending truth fail to 
respect the instances of (T-intro) and (T-elim) involving these sentences, that need not prevent 
these properties from coming close to respecting both rules. For in this case, non-respect would 
still be restricted to a small range of sentences. As I’ll explain in the next section, near-respect of 
both rules is sufficient to render ascending truth and descending truth very truth-like. This is 
important, since it allows Liar-like sentences to come very close to saying what they appear to 
say.  
 Now for (4), the claim that both properties come equally close to respecting both rules. 
Here I will be brief. The claim is plausible from the outset, given the symmetry of the axioms 
that define these properties. Moreover, we just saw that each property respects all instances of 
one rule, and all the safe instances of the other. That is enough for present purposes, since the 
goal is merely to give an illustration. I leave to another occasion the task of exhaustively 
verifying that each property comes equally close.  
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 Finally, we come to (5), the claim that nothing (besides truth) comes closer to respecting 
both (T-intro) and (T-elim). While I find this claim quite plausible, I need not defend it here.42 
For even if something(s) else besides truth comes closer, that does not threaten the point I am 
trying to make in favor of moderate aberrationism. In that case, advocates of such views can still 
retain my Lewisian views about reference, and so claim that what Liar-like sentences say is 
powerfully influenced by how their component expressions are used, in particular by our use of 
‘true’ in accordance with (T-intro) and (T-elim). Moreover, they can still claim that Liar-like 
sentences come close to saying what they appear to say. The reason is that nothing could come 
close to respecting (T-intro) and (T-elim) without thereby being quite similar to truth. Respect of 
(T-intro) and (T-elim) is the hallmark feature of truth; it is arguably the feature that contributes 
most significantly to making truth a useful property to attribute.43 So, any property that comes 
close to respecting it is similar to truth in the respect that matters most to us.  
 
3.3.3.2. Aberrations and Respect  
 Up to this point, the reader may reasonably have been wondering: does truth even respect 
(T-intro) and (T-elim)? If not, does it come closer than ascending and descending truth? These 
                                                          
42 Scharp repeatedly emphasizes that ascending and descending truth are to be embraced as a team. Matti Eklund 
raises the question whether, even when taken separately, these properties still tie for second-closest when it comes to 
respecting (T-intro) and (T-elim). In response, it helps to note that all other truth-like properties that have been 
described fail to respect some instances of either (T-intro) or (T-elim) which involve sentences that we would pre-
theoretically judge to be non-paradoxical. (For instance, truthmp fails to respect the instance of (T-intro) involving 
the sentence ‘If this sentence is true then this sentence is true’.) Because identifying all and only the paradoxical 
sentences is notoriously difficult, a fortiori, targeting all and only these sentences for failures of (T-intro) or (T-elim) 
is a daunting challenge. In the above discussion of my claim (3), we had Scharp claiming that his properties succeed 
in meeting this challenge: ascending truth fails to respect (T-elim), and descending truth fails to respect (T-intro), on 
all and only the sentences that would be paradoxical if they contained ‘true’ rather than ‘ascending true’ or 
‘descending true’. If indeed Scharp is right about this, then it is plausible that his properties really do tie for second 
place for respecting (T-intro) and (T-elim), even when taken separately; for (prior to (Scharp 2013), we are 
assuming,) respecting the rules on all pre-theoretically non-paradoxical sentences has yet to be achieved. That said, 
Scharp does not provide a proof, and given the difficulty of the challenge, there is room for skepticism.  
43 See (Quine 1970) pp.10-12 for more on this. 
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questions matter, since if it does not come closer, then that is very bad for the Lewis-inspired 
version of moderate aberrationism that was laid out in the previous subsections—for then by the 
Lewisian theory (i)-(iv) no occurrence of ‘true’ refers to truth. Rather, all occurrences of ‘true’ 
are indeterminate between ascending and descending truth. (That is, assuming there’s no yet 
further property that comes closer than these do to respecting (T-intro) and (T-elim). See below 
for more on this question).  
Since non-Liar-like sentences pose no obstacle to respect, whether truth respects (T-intro) 
and (T-elim) depends entirely on whether the instances of these rules that involve Liar sentences 
would be truth-preserving, if the occurrences of ‘true’ therein were to refer to truth. But as I’ll 
now explain, according to any aberrationist, no such instances are possible. For according to any 
such approach, no key occurrence of an alethic expression in a Liar-like sentence can co-refer 
with that expression, on pain of contradiction.44 Now, I claim, in assessing whether truth comes 
closer to respecting (T-intro) and (T-elim) than ascending and descending truth do, we should 
surely count only the genuinely possible instances of these inference rules.45 If we make our 
assessment in this way, then truth clearly wins out. Whereas we will soon see (in the next 
subsection) that the sentences α and δ from Section 3.3.3.1 prevent ascending truth and 
descending truth, respectively, from respecting both (T-intro) and (T-elim), sentence A, failing as 
it does to express the negation of the Russellian proposition <A, truth>, does not prevent truth 
from respecting both (T-intro) and (T-elim). So, by (i)-(iii) the word ‘true’ refers to truth.  
                                                          
44 As explained at the end of Section 2, the full justification for this claim will come only once I have shown that this 
is the best solution out of all of the alternatives.  
45 Here I legislate away a potential complication. The claim that truth satisfies (T-intro) and (T-elim) is a hypothesis 
about impossible things, analogous to the claim that if there were round squares, then there would be a formula for 
determining their area. If such claims are all false, then it is false that truth satisfies (T-intro) and (T-elim), and so it 
may be that by some measure of closeness either ascending truth or d-truth comes closer. Alternatively, if such 
claims are all indeterminate, then it is indeterminate whether truth satisfies (T-intro) and (T-elim). In the latter case 
the question of which property—truth, ascending truth, or d-truth—comes closest is hard to settle.  
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 At this point I am in a position to claim that while ascending and descending truth come 
close to respecting (T-intro) and (T-elim), they do not come as close as truth itself. Thus, if 
indeed ascending truth and descending truth are “tied for second place,” then by (iv) the 
occurrence of ‘true’ in any Liar sentence is indeterminate in reference, with ascending and 
descending truth serving as candidate referents. (More generally, for any e and y1, …, yn, if it is 
indeterminate whether e refers to y1, to y2, …, or to yn, let’s say that y1, …, yn are candidate 
referents for e.) The fact that all these candidate referents are quite truth-like gives us a 
respectable sense in which Liar-like sentences come quite close to saying what they appear to 
say.  
 
3.3.3.3. The Status of A and Other Liar-like Sentences 
 Suppose I am right that the occurrence of ‘true’ in A is indeterminate in reference as 
between ascending and descending truth. Then, I have claimed, A is indeterminate in content: it 
is indeterminate of which Russellian proposition A expresses the negation. But, one wonders, is 
it therefore indeterminate what truth value A has? I will now consider two prominent views 
concerning the truth values of sentences that contain indeterminate terms, and show that both 
views yield the verdict that A is indeterminate as to its truth value.  
On one available view, any sentence that contains some indeterminate terms is 
indeterminate in truth value.46 If indeed the occurrence of ‘true’ in A is indeterminate in 
reference, then this view has the immediate consequence that A is indeterminate in truth value. 
There is a slight complication here given that we are dealing with indeterminacy in an 
                                                          
46 Kleene’s “weak” truth tables assign values in this way. This is the right way to assign truth values if one 
conceives of indeterminacy as being akin to incoherence. The idea is that the result of using a logical connective to 
combine a sentence with something incoherent is itself incoherent.  
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occurrence rather than in a word simpliciter, but we are already assuming that the semantic status 
of the sentence is determined by that of its occurrences. (Keep in mind: here we are figuring out 
the consequences of a given moderate aberrationist view.)  
On a different view about indeterminacy, a sentence containing exactly one indeterminate 
term is true (false) if, for every candidate referent for that term, if the term referred to that 
candidate referent, the sentence would be true (false). If this holds for some candidates but not 
others, then the sentence is indeterminate in truth value. (This view can be easily recast in terms 
of occurrences rather than terms simpliciter.) Now our question is, which description fits A?  
Start by supposing that the occurrence of ‘true’ in A refers to ascending truth, so that A 
expresses the negation of the Russellian proposition <A, ascending truth>. We will now figure 
out the status of A in that case. Consider first the sentence α:  
(α) α is not ascending true 
Scharp explains that from the construction of α and the fact that ‘ascending true’ respects (T-
intro), we can prove both ‘α is ascending true’ and ‘‘α is not ascending true’ is ascending true’.47. 
On pain of contradiction, then, we cannot infer from ‘‘α is not ascending true’ is ascending true’ 
to ‘α is not ascending true’—for the latter would then contradict ‘α is ascending true’.48 
Returning to the case of A, we can mimic the argument just given. Assuming that the occurrence 
of ‘true’ in A refers to ascending truth, from the construction of A we can prove both ‘A is true’ 
                                                          
47 See his p.151. He writes: “we can prove A(a) and A(˹~a˺).” To keep things as informal and simple as possible, I 
am writing ‘It’s not the case that α is not ascending true’ rather than ˹~α˺ and then substituting ‘α is ascending true’ 
for ‘It’s not the case that α is not ascending true’.  
48 Here is the proof:  
1. α = ‘α is not ascending true’   definition of ‘α’ 
2. α is ascending true     proven elsewhere 
3. ‘α is not ascending true’ is ascending true  proven elsewhere 
4. If ‘α is not ascending true’ is ascending true  Instance of (A1#) 
then α is not ascending true 
5. α is not ascending true    modus ponens, (3), (4)     
6. Contradiction     Contradiction Introduction, (2), (5) 
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and ‘‘A is not true’ is true’. And then on pain of contradiction, ascending truth cannot respect the 
following instance of (T-elim): 
‘A is not true’ is true   (T-elim) 
A is not true  
Now, it turns out that this failure of (T-elim) gives us some useful information about the status of 
A. To see the point, note the following fact about respect. When a property P fails to respect an 
instance of (T-elim) involving a sentence S, that is because S has P (and so ˹‘S’ is true˺ is true, if 
the occurrence of ‘true’ therein refers to P), but S is not true. (Thus the inference from ˹‘S’ is 
true˺ to S is not truth-preserving.) Therefore, given that ascending truth fails to respect the 
instance of (T-elim) that takes us from ‘‘A is not true’ is true’ to ‘A is not true’, we can conclude 
that A is ascending true, but not true. (Again, here we are assuming that the occurrence of ‘true’ 
in A refers to ascending truth.)  
The situation is quite symmetrical when we consider descending truth. Suppose that the 
occurrence of ‘true’ in A refers to descending truth, so that A expresses the negation of the 
Russellian proposition <A, descending truth>. To see the status of A in that case, consider the 
sentence δ:  
(δ) δ is not descending true 
Similarly to what we had with α, from the construction of δ and the fact that ‘descending true’ 
respects (T-elim), we can prove both ‘δ is not descending true’ and ‘‘δ is not descending true’ is 
not descending true’.49 On pain of contradiction, then, we cannot infer from ‘δ is not ascending 
true’ to ‘‘δ is not ascending true’ is descending true’. Returning to the case of A, we can mimic 
the argument just given. Given that the occurrence of ‘true’ in A refers to descending truth, from 
                                                          
49 See p.151. 
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the construction of A we can prove both ‘A is not true’ and ‘‘A is not true’ is not true’. And then 
on pain of contradiction, ascending truth cannot respect the instance of (T-intro) that takes us 
from ‘A is not true’ to ‘‘A is not true’ is true’.  
Now note the following fact about respect. When a property P fails to respect an instance 
of (T-intro) involving a sentence S, that is because S is true, but S does not have P. (Thus the 
inference from S to ˹‘S’ is true˺ is not truth-preserving, if the occurrence of ‘true’ in the latter 
refers to P. In that case, the premise is true but the conclusion is not.) So, given that descending 
truth fails to respect the instance of (T-intro) that takes us from ‘A is not true’ to ‘‘A is not true’ 
is true’, we can conclude that A is true, but not descending true. 
Summing up, if the occurrence of ‘true’ in A referred to ascending truth then A would be 
false, whereas if the occurrence of ‘true’ in A referred to descending truth then A would be true. 
Given that ascending truth and descending truth are candidate referents for the occurrence of 
‘true’ in A, that is enough to show that A is indeterminate, on the second view about how lexical 
indeterminacy relates to truth values of sentences that I described. Since both such views yield 
the verdict that A is indeterminate, in what follows I will assume that A is indeterminate. The 
same goes for other Liar-like sentences.  
  
3.3.4. The Advantages of Moderate Over Radical Aberrationism: 
At this point, I have introduced my own preferred version of moderate aberrationism. 
According to it, Liar-like sentences fail to say what they appear to say, because the key 
occurrences of their alethic expressions fail to co-refer with those expressions. Rather, the 
aberrant occurrences of ‘true’ are indeterminate in reference as between ascending and 
descending truth; and similarly when it comes to other alethic expressions. Because of this, the 
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reasoning involved in Liar-like paradoxes does not go through. A crucial feature of this view is 
that it respects Semantic Regularity: whether we are dealing with ordinary theoretical terms or 
with the occurrences that feature centrally in generating a paradox, reference-determination 
proceeds according to the same Lewisian pattern. That is something one might reasonably call a 
“perfectly reliable, principled relationship” between facts about language use and facts about 
reference.  
Even given all this, however, moderate views might not initially seem much better than 
radical ones. Both must, for example, deny, contrary to appearances, that A expresses the 
negation of the Russellian proposition <A, truth>. In denying this, both views depart from most 
people’s initial, intuitive reactions to A. However, it should be clear that the radical views depart 
for a much more distant destination. The point is especially clear in the case of views that reject 
Semantic Supervenience. On such views, again, what A says needn’t have anything to do with 
how we use or are disposed to use any of A’s constituent expressions. As Smith puts it, what (if 
any) proposition A expresses is determined quite randomly, and similarly for its occurrences of 
‘A’ and ‘true’. Thus, for all we know, the occurrence of ‘A’ might refer to North Korea and the 
occurrence of ‘true’ to being made of goat cheese, so that A would say that North Korea is not 
made of goat cheese. One who denies Semantic Supervenience has no way to rule this sort of 
thing out.  
In stark contrast, on my view and other moderate views like it, while A does not express 
the negation of the Russellian proposition <A, truth> or say of itself that it is not true, it 
nonetheless comes fairly close. On my own preferred view, in particular, A is indeterminate as 
between expressing the negation of the proposition <A, ascending truth> and that of <A, 
descending truth>. Likewise, it is indeterminate as between denying that it (namely, A) is 
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ascending true and denying that it is descending true. While neither ascending truth nor 
descending truth is identical with truth, each differs from truth only with respect to a quite 
narrow range of sentences. Recall, for example, that for all sentences S which are grounded in 
Scharp’s sense, S’s ascending truth value equals its descending truth value, which equals its truth 
value. With this in mind, compare a sentence which denies that North Korea is made of goat 
cheese with a sentence that is indeterminate as between denying that it (that sentence) is 
ascending true and denying that it is descending true. Whatever closeness amounts to in the end, 
it is clear that the latter sentence comes much closer to saying of itself that it is not true. Thus, 
my view comes closer to allowing that A says what it pre-theoretically seems to say. And, I take 
it, short of accepting contradictions, the closer one can get to allowing that A says what it pre-
theoretically seems to say, the better.  
Now admittedly, the denier of Semantic Supervenience could propose that it is simply a 
brute fact that the occurrence of ‘true’ in A refers to some very truth-like property. However, 
without appealing to any principles that link reference to facts about use, it is hard to see what 
could justify such a proposal. In particular, the availability of my view shows that such a 
proposal is not necessary for solving the paradox, and so cannot be justified solely on that basis. 
The brute fact idea solves the paradox while respecting our pre-theoretical impressions about 
what Liar sentences say, but my own claims—that is, (i)-(iv)—have these same advantages while 
in addition respecting the widely accepted, deeply entrenched thesis of Semantic Supervenience.  
Similar things can be said concerning a slightly less radical theorist who rejects Semantic 
Regularity but retains Semantic Supervenience. To respect our pre-theoretical impressions about 
what Liar sentences say, a less radical theorist needs to hold that the occurrence of ‘true’ in A 
refers to something that is similar to truth. As compared to her more radical counterpart who 
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denies Semantic Supervenience, the only additional resource that this less radical theorist has are 
the non-semantic facts on which the reference of this occurrence of ‘true’ supervenes. But 
precisely what the less radical theorist claims is that the supervenience of the semantic on the 
non-semantic is messy, in some way that rules out a “perfectly reliable, principled” relationship. 
So precisely what she cannot do is appeal to the existence of such a relationship to argue that it 
determines that the referent of the occurrence of ‘true’ in any Liar sentence is something similar 
to truth.50 In a way, the less radical theorist is in an even worse position than one who denies 
Semantic Supervenience, since the less radical theorist cannot claim that the semantic fact she 
needs is simply a brute fact. She holds that the reference of the occurrence of ‘true’ in every Liar 
sentence is determined by the non-semantic facts, but in a way that by her own lights admits of 
no straightforward explanation.  
Like her more radical counterpart, the less radical theorist can claim that her view is 
justified because it solves the paradox while respecting our pre-theoretical impressions about 
what Liar sentences say. But again, moderate versions of aberrationism have these same virtues, 
while in addition respecting the plausible thesis of Semantic Regularity. In fact, even (Smith 
2006) concedes it is better to retain Semantic Regularity than to reject it, other things being 
equal. It is just that Smith thinks other things are not equal, and that rejecting Semantic 
Regularity is the least painful way to extricate ourselves from contradictions in the face of the 
                                                          
50 However, Vivek Matthew suggests to me that one who denies Semantic Regularity could appeal to an imperfect-
but-still-somewhat-reliable relationship between matters semantic and matters non-semantic, in order to show that 
the occurrences of ‘true’ in Liar-like sentences refer to something truth-like. I have little to say against such a view, 
given how similar it is to my own. As I pointed out in Section 3.2, at the risk of misleading, my own position can be 
described in these terms. My point here is simply that there is tension between the claim that the relationship 
between matters semantic and matters non-semantic is unreliable and “unprincipled” and the hope of using some 
non-semantic facts to explain the reference of the occurrences of ‘true’ in Liar sentences. I do not insist that there is 
no way to resolve this tension, though for my own part I cannot see how to do it.  
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Liar paradox. However, if moderate aberrationism is indeed a viable option then Smith is wrong 
on this.  
 So much, then, for internal debates between different versions of aberrationism. In 
Sections 4-10, I will set these disputes aside, and instead contrast aberrationism with various 
competing approaches. Although I will discuss a wide variety of views, the main goal will be to 
showcase the distinctive advantages of aberrationism, not to conduct a fully exhaustive survey of 
the competition. I will thus take the liberty of omitting views about which I have little original to 
say. For example, while I have serious objections to the views articulated in (Tarski 1935), 
(Tarski 1944), and (Priest 1987), these objections are already articulated in (Smith 2006), among 
many other places.  
 
4. The No-Proposition View 
 A close cousin of aberrationism is the no-proposition view, which rests on the claim that 
Liar-like sentences fail to express propositions.51 The motivating idea of the no-proposition view 
is that if Liar-like sentences fail to express propositions, then they fail to say of themselves that 
they are not true, and in that case, there is no genuine inconsistency. As the reader may have 
guessed, the no-proposition view is compatible with several versions of aberrationism. My main 
point in this section will be that the best ways to develop the no-proposition view are the ways 
most congenial to aberrationism.  
The classic problem for the no-proposition view, discussed by (Parsons 1974), is that 
once the notion of a sentence’s expressing a proposition (or not) has been introduced, it then 
                                                          
51 This view is discussed in (Parsons 1974), and is advocated in (Goldstein 2009). See Chapter 2 Section 5.2 for 
discussion of some prominent objections to the no-proposition view from (Scharp 2013).  
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seems we can formulate a sentence which says of itself that it does not express any true 
proposition: 
 (LN) LN does not express any true proposition 
Applying the no-proposition view to LN, we get the result that LN fails to express any 
proposition. It follows that in particular, LN fails to express any true proposition. However, the 
objection goes, that would make LN true after all.  
 The obvious response is that while the objector has purported to assume the no-
proposition view and then derive a contradiction, in fact she has simply reneged on the 
commitments of the no-proposition view, illegitimately acquiescing to our pre-theoretical 
impressions about what LN says. But, the response stresses, if indeed LN fails to express any 
proposition, then in particular—and despite whatever appearances suggest—LN does not say of 
itself that it fails to express any true proposition. So, LN’s failure to express any true proposition 
does not render LN true after all.
52  
 Even if this response is good, however, advocates of the no-proposition view face a 
challenge. There are uncontroversial compositional rules that specify how the reference of a 
sentence’s constituents, plus the way these constituents are arranged, combines to determine 
which proposition the sentence expresses. Let general compositionality be the claim that these 
rules generally apply to sentences in natural languages.53 Given LN’s syntax and lexical 
constituents, and given our default views about the reference of its constituents, general 
compositionality gives us good reasons to believe that LN says of itself that it is not true. 
Therefore, advocates of the no-proposition view must either reject our default views about the 
                                                          
52 Compare the remarks on (Goldstein 2009) p.385. 
53 See Section 11 for some independent evidence that these rules do not apply to absolutely every sentence.  
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reference of some of LN’s constituents, argue that LN constitutes an exception to general 
compositionality, or reject general compositionality.  
The last of these three positions can be rejected out of hand, as it flies in the face of the 
myriad successes of compositional semantics. Turn, then, to the proposal to give up our pre-
theoretical default views about the reference of some of LN’s constituents. E.g., one could claim 
that the word ‘LN’ simpliciter fails to refer to anything, that ‘express’ fails to refer to anything, or 
that the word ‘true’—again, the word simpliciter, not merely its occurrence in LN—fails to refer 
to anything. If any of these claims were true, then that would arguably leave LN without a 
proposition to express, since it is plausible that in general a sentence that contains a non-referring 
expression fails to express any proposition.  
However, even if these diagnoses can succeed in staving off contradictions, they all posit 
implausible restrictions on the expressiveness of natural languages. For example, we can use the 
name ‘LN’ in plenty of seemingly coherent, non-paradoxical sentences, such as ‘LN is a sentence 
of English’. This coherence would be hard to explain if the word ‘LN’ simpliciter failed to refer 
as expected. Likewise, we often speak quite coherently of sentences’ expressing propositions; 
this would be hard to explain if the word ‘express’ simpliciter failed to refer to the relation 
expressing. And lastly, in much of our talk involving ‘true’, we seem perfectly able to express 
definite propositions. That would be hard to explain if the word ‘true’ simpliciter failed to 
refer.54  
In contrast to the extreme view just described, a more plausible way to develop the no-
proposition view is more in the style of aberrationism. Instead of claiming that LN’s constituent 
                                                          
54 (Brandom 1994) argues that ‘true’ is not a referring expression such as a normal predicate but instead something 
rather like a pronoun. Even if Brandom can explain the coherence in our use of ‘true’ without claiming that this 
word refers simpliciter, the view on offer here is one that takes ‘true’ to be a predicate that fails to refer. It is hard to 
see how this view can explain our ability to express propositions using the predicate ‘is true’.  
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words fail to refer simpliciter, one can embrace the aberrationist idea that it is merely the 
occurrences of some of these expressions in LN which fails to refer. Call this version of the no-
proposition view the occurrence theory. As I explain in Section 10, I think the right expression to 
target here is ‘true’ rather than, for example, ‘LN’ or ‘expresses’; and any occurrence theorist 
who heeds this advice and focuses on ‘true’ (and generally, on alethic terms,) will, indeed, 
qualify as an aberrationist. She could qualify as either a moderate or a radical aberrationist, 
depending whether she claims (moderate) or denies (radical) that the aberrant occurrence’s 
failure to refer can be explained by a theory of reference.55  
Whatever expression an occurrence theorist chooses to target, her view has one of the 
distinctive advantages of aberrationism: it leaves unperturbed all the occurrences of the targeted 
expression in non-paradoxical sentences, and thus accords with the most plausible accounts of 
these sentences that we are afforded by casual inspection and by linguistics. E.g., instead of 
having to say, quite implausibly, that no sentence containing the name ‘LN’ expresses a 
proposition, one can make this claim only about Liar-like sentences. This is all to the good, since 
it is the Liar paradox and not quite-general reflections on language that motivates the no-
proposition view in the first place.  
I just contrasted the occurrence theory with the approach that gives up our default views 
about LN’s constituents. That places it in the category of views that beg an exception to general 
compositionality when it comes to Liar-like sentences. And it is easy to see that, like 
aberrationism, the occurrence theory does this. When it comes to accounting for what 
                                                          
55 Note, however, that the occurrence theory is inconsistent with my own favored version of moderate aberrationism, 
which claims not that aberrant occurrences of ‘true’ fail to refer whatsoever, but rather that their reference is 
indeterminate. Thus, I think it is indeterminate which proposition a Liar-like sentence expresses (see Section 3.3.3); 
but that is different from the claim that these sentences fail whatsoever to express propositions, as on the no-
proposition view.  
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proposition a sentence expresses, general compositionality (as formulated above) looks to the 
reference of the sentence’s constituent words simpliciter rather than to their occurrences; and 
here we have views that look to the reference of the occurrences. That said, however, occurrence 
theorists and aberrationists can still endorse general compositionality as a true generalization 
with some exceptions. Moreover, the position of aberrationists and occurrence theorists is from 
the beginning quite congenial to the spirit of general compositionality, if not the letter: they can 
claim that which proposition (if any) a sentence expresses is determined by the reference of the 
occurrences of its constituent expressions, plus the way they are combined. So, general 
compositionality need be rejected only lightly, if at all.  
 
5. Aberrationism vs. Saul Kripke  
Let us say that a diagnosis of the Liar is incomplete if it lacks the resources to account for 
all the semantic phenomena whose existence would follow from the diagnosis, were the 
diagnosis correct. In particular, a diagnosis of Liar sentences that posits a property P that can be 
had by sentences in any language must be able to account for reference to this property in the 
language in which the diagnosis is stated. If it cannot account for this, then it is incomplete. In 
this section, I will argue that the view defended in (Kripke 1975) is incomplete in this way. The 
same problem applies to more recent and elaborate views in the general family of (Kripke 1975). 
By contrast, aberrationism is not incomplete.  
In (Kripke 1975) Saul Kripke defines a property of groundedness (recall Section 3.3.1 
and see below), and argues that Liar sentences are ungrounded. Kripke develops a mathematical 
model that partitions the sentences of the object language—the language being modeled—into 
three disjoint and exhaustive sets: the set of true sentences, the set of false sentences, and the set 
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of ungrounded sentences. Roughly, a sentence S is grounded if, given the truth values of all the 
sentences that contain no uses of ‘true’, one can determine the truth value of S in finitely many 
steps. The point of introducing groundedness is that it gives us a way to diagnose Liar-like 
sentences: they turn out to be ungrounded.  
Kripke’s model is good as far as it goes, but it requires that the object language and 
metalanguage be distinct. For it is a time-honored observation that if English contained a 
predicate, ‘grounded’, that referred to the property of being a sentence of English that is 
grounded in Kripke’s sense, then consideration of the sentence K below would lead quickly to 
contradictions:56 
 (K) K is either false or ungrounded.  
Thus, on pain of contradiction, Kripke’s model cannot be used to model any fragment of English 
that contains a word that refers to the property of being an ungrounded sentence of English. 
Since English contains such a word (thanks to Kripke’s own work!), his view cannot 
straightforwardly be applied to English.57 Of course, one can get out of this situation by claiming 
that while the word ‘ungrounded’ refers to ungroundedness, nonetheless its occurrences in Liar-
like sentences such as K fail to do so. But clearly that claim would amount to a version of 
aberrationism.58  
 Now that I have accused (Kripke 1975) of incompleteness, the question arises whether 
aberrationist approaches to the Liar-like paradoxes are themselves incomplete. By the above 
remarks about incompleteness, any account of Liar phenomena which entails that there are 
propositions about the semantics of English that cannot be expressed in English would count as 
                                                          
56 By now this is a time-honored observation.  
57 Kripke himself makes this observation about his own view. 
58 Compare similar remarks in (Smith 2006) pp.190-191. 
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incomplete. And prima facie, this is a concern one might reasonably have about views that 
endorse (Aberrations) and (Determined). In expressing semantic propositions about English, we 
often use the word ‘true’. For instance, consider sentence s below: 
(s) For any thing x and name n, if n is a name for x in English then ˹n is a dog˺ is true 
if and only if x is a dog.  
 
However, if not all occurrences of the word ‘true’ refer to truth, then ‘true’ cannot always be 
used to state semantic propositions in this way. Notice, for instance, that if the occurrence of 
‘true’ in s refers to the property being made of goat cheese, then s fails to express any semantic 
proposition. Rather, s says (falsely) that for any thing x and name n, if n is a name for x in 
English then ˹n is a dog˺ is made of goat cheese if and only if x is a dog.  
 An immediate response to this worry is that: (a) most sentences which we take to express 
semantic propositions, and s in particular, are not Liar-like; therefore, the occurrences of ‘true’ in 
these sentences refer to truth, as expected. Moreover, (b) the (semantic) things which Liar-like 
sentences cannot say about themselves can be said by other, non-Liar-like sentences. For 
instance, though A does not say of itself that it is not true, other sentences can surely say this 
about A. For instance, B does the job:  
(B) ‘A is not true’ is not true.  
(Throughout, I presuppose a scheme for individuating sentences on which A and B are distinct 
sentences. It helps to note that A and B contain distinct noun phrases: A contains ‘A’, whereas B 
contains ‘‘A is not true’’.) Note that, crucially, B is not a Liar sentence: B expresses the negation 
of the attribution of truth not to itself but rather to the (distinct) sentence A. 
Now, a typical problem for approaches to the Liar paradox is that the apparatus used to 
state the semantic status of paradoxical sentences can be used to formulate a “revenge sentence,” 
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indescribable using that apparatus, which leads to contradictions.59 (E.g., relative to the notion of 
groundedness, K is a revenge sentence.) And the introduction of B to articulate the semantic 
status of A raises an immediate question whether the method by which B was constructed—
using quote marks—can be used to generate a revenge sentence. However, this cannot happen. 
The crucial point here is that all sentences have finite depth. That is, for any two syntactic 
locations in any sentence, the number of other syntactic locations between them is finite. Thus, 
on pain of having infinite depth, no sentence can have its own quote name as a lexical 
constituent. Now, the way that I constructed B was by using A’s quote name. (By contrast, if I 
had simply used ‘A’, then B would have been identical with A, and therefore similarly 
defective.) So, to get a paradoxical sentence by using quote names instead of the usual non-meta-
linguistic names (such as ‘A’), one would have to construct a sentence that says of itself that it is 
not true, referring to itself by its own quote name. But on pain of having infinite depth, no 
sentence can contain its own quote name. So, constructing a paradoxical sentence by this method 
is impossible. Thus, the quote-name method for stating the defective status of Liar sentences is a 
safe one, and therefore it is possible to attribute that status to any such sentence without getting 
into any contradictions.60  
 
                                                          
59 See Chapter 2 for a fuller discussion of revenge in connection with aberrationism.  
60 Still, one might reasonably be concerned about the fact that B can be converted into a Liar sentence by 
substituting the name ‘A’ for the co-referential quote name ‘‘A is not true’’. Should not B therefore count as Liar-
like? And if indeed B is Liar-like, then doesn’t its key occurrence of ‘true’ undergo an aberration, by aberrationists’ 
lights? But then, if B witnesses such an aberration, then B fails to say of A that it is not true, as was intended. That 
failure would raise the question whether any sentence can say of A that it is not true. These reflections raise a deep 
question about what is the right way to define ‘Liar-like sentence’. There is not enough space to explore this issue 
here; see Chapter 2 for a full discussion, including a definition of ‘Liar-like sentence’ which includes A but excludes 
B.  
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6. Contextualist Views 
I have been arguing that the reference of an expression can depend on its component 
context. By contrast, many other approaches to the Liar paradox turn on the claim that some of 
the expressions implicated in the paradox are sensitive to contexts of utterance61 or contexts of 
evaluation. Let us call any such approach a contextualist one. In this section, I will discuss 
several prominent contextualist views. 
I’ll begin with that of (Glanzberg 2004a), because on the one hand I have a particular, 
rather intricate objection to his view, and on the other hand he gives a plausible criticism of other 
contextualist views that I will echo later on. So, here is the plan for Section 6. In Sections 6.1 and 
6.2 respectively, I’ll present and criticize Glanzberg’s view. Next, in Section 6.3 I’ll present 
Glanzberg’s criticism of other contextualist views. I’ll show that whereas aberrationism is 
immune to this criticism, one can apply it with great force to Tyler Burge’s view from (Burge 
1979). Then in Section 6.4 I’ll discuss how Burge might respond to Glanzberg’s criticism. 
Finally, in Section 6.5 I’ll discuss (Simmons 1993). 
 
6.1. Glanzberg’s View 
 In (Glanzberg 2004a), Michael Glanzberg offers a contextualist diagnosis of Liar 
sentences. However, rather than claiming that the truth-predicate is context-sensitive, Glanzberg 
argues that the logical form of each Liar sentence involves a tacit quantifier which ranges over 
propositions, and whose domain—despite initial appearances—is contextually sensitive. To 
arrive at this view, Glanzberg begins with the assumption that truth is fundamentally a property 
of propositions. Thus, he thinks, when someone says that any given sentence is not true, what she 
                                                          
61 Throughout, I use ‘context of utterance’ in a way that is synonymous with ‘discourse contexts’ as used by 
linguists. I take this usage to be standard.  
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is really saying—or, as Glanzberg puts it, the logical form of the sentence she is uttering—is that 
there is no true proposition which is expressed by that sentence (presumably: in that context). 
Therefore, according to Glanzberg, any paradigmatic Liar sentence such as A above has a logical 
form closely analogous to that of l:  
 (l) It is not the case that there is some proposition p such that l expresses p and p is 
true.  
Glanzberg then asserts that the only plausible source of context-dependence in l is in the 
existential quantifier.62 (In what follows I’ll have more to say about this assertion. For now, just 
note that he makes it.) On Glanzberg’s view, one of the steps in the reasoning that moves from 
consideration of l to a contradiction causes a context-shift that changes the domain of this 
existential quantifier. With a few cosmetic changes, here is the reasoning that Glanzberg 
presents:  
 1. Suppose l expresses proposition q.  
 2. Suppose q is true.  
  a) so, l is true.  
b) thus, there is no true proposition that l expresses.  
  c) thus, q is false. 
 3. On the other hand, suppose q is false.  
  a) so, l is false.  
b) then there is a true proposition, p, expressed by l.  
  c) since l expresses at most one proposition, p = q.  
  d) thus, q is true.  
 4. Thus q is true if and only if q is not true, which leads to contradiction.   
 5. Therefore, by reductio ad absurdum: there is no proposition which l expresses.  
 6. Therefore: there is no true proposition which l expresses.  
 7. Now we have proven l.  
 8. So, l is true.  
 9. But then l expresses a true proposition, contradiction.63  
 
                                                          
62 See p.33 and p.34 final paragraph. 
63 See pp.33-34 for Glanzberg’s presentation.  
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Glanzberg claims that between steps (5) and (6) there is a context shift, and that the domain of 
the existential quantifier is sensitive to this shift. Thus, he alleges, while the context-shift renders 
the reasoning invalid, both (5) and (6) are true: the context shift effected by (5) creates a context 
in which a certain proposition is newly available to be quantified over by the existential-
quantifier-occurrence in (6).  
 Here is the view in greater detail. For Glanzberg, propositions are sets of truth-conditions. 
(Glanzberg is neutral on what exactly truth-conditions are. He suggests that they might be sets of 
possible worlds, “or whatever else we use to model individual truth-supporting circumstances” 
(p.35). It is worth noting the difference between the familiar view that propositions are sets of 
possible worlds and Glanzberg’s suggestion that propositions are sets of sets of possible worlds.) 
His idea is then that for each context X, there is a “background domain” of truth-conditions 
which are available for forming the propositions that one can quantify over in X (p.35). Thus, 
cross-contextual shifts in this background domain induce shifts in the ranges of quantifiers that 
quantify over propositions. Glanzberg’s proposal is that between steps (5) and (6) in the 
reasoning above, there is a shift in the background domain of truth-conditions, and that this shift 
adds a proposition to the range of the existential quantifier, making (6) true. In particular, he 
thinks, the mention of the expression relation (viz., expressing,) in (5) makes this relation 
contextually salient, and—in a way that is fairly intricate—this changes the background domain 
of truth-conditions.  
 More specifically, Glanzberg’s idea is that which truth-conditions are in the background 
domain of a given context depends on which “expressive resources” are available for making 
distinctions among sets of possible worlds in that context (p.44).64 In the above Liar reasoning, 
                                                          
64 See pp.42-44 for this claim.  
58 
 
Glanzberg holds, making the expression relation salient at step (5) greatly increases the 
contextually available expressive resources, which in turn expands the background domain of 
truth-conditions.  
The overall point is that, relative to the context thus created—the one in which (6) enters 
the picture—there is a proposition that l expresses, and it is false. Thus (6) is true.65 (Glanzberg’s 
account of precisely which proposition l expresses relative to the post-(5) context is quite 
technical and involved, but for present purposes it does not matter exactly what proposition that 
is.)  
 Now that I have presented Glanzberg’s view, I’ll articulate two criticisms of it, and then 
address his criticisms of views that, like aberrationism, target the truth predicate rather than posit 
a tacit quantifier.  
 
6.1.1. Problems for Glanzberg 
6.1.1.1. The Existential Quantifier 
Glanzberg’s approach rests on the assumption that the logical form of every Liar sentence 
includes an existential quantifier. While it is plausible that if propositions exist then sentences 
can be true only when they express propositions, it need not follow that the logical form of any 
sentence which attributes truth to a sentence involves an existential quantifier over propositions. 
In particular, the claim that propositions exist is, though plausible, metaphysically substantial. 
While common ways of speaking can turn out to come with tacit, substantial metaphysical 
commitments, still a philosopher who claims this about any particular way of speaking needs to 
support that claim with an argument. To be fair, Glanzberg is not alone in needing an argument 
                                                          
65 See p.77 for Glanzberg’s explanation of this point. 
59 
 
for the claim that attributions of truth to sentences involve existential quantification over 
propositions. Many other philosophers make that claim. But on the other hand, there are also 
plenty of philosophers who deny that propositions exist and are nonetheless happy to attribute 
truth to various sentences, without, of course, taking themselves thereby to be committed to any 
contradictions.66  
Another prima facie concern about the claim that the logical form of truth-attributions 
involves a quantifier over propositions is that if the logical form of a sentence is something the 
grasp of which is necessary for understanding the sentence, then it is implausible that the logical 
form of every sentence that attributes truth to a sentence involves an existential quantifier over 
propositions. That is because people who do not know what propositions are can understand 
attributions of truth to sentences. Glanzberg might respond by suggesting that such people could 
in fact be said to have only tacit grasp of the logical forms of these sentences, where that grasp 
would consist in how these people would think and speak about attributions of truth to sentences 
once propositions were explained to them, or how they are disposed to defer to the assertions of 
people who do understand propositions. But, prima facie, not everyone has those dispositions. 
Some people, including the philosophers mentioned above, respond to learning about 
propositions by denying that propositions exist.  
                                                          
66 Here I am thinking of Ted Sider, Vann McGee, Mark Balaguer, J.C. Beall, Bradley Armour-Garb, James 
Woodbridge, and W.V.O. Quine. As far as Quine is concerned, Glanzberg may have a good response here, based on 
the fact that Quine was primarily interested in formal languages, not in natural language. While the truth predicates 
in Quine’s formal languages were defined so as to apply only to sentences, Glanzberg could insist that if Quine had 
paid closer attention to natural language he would have seen that in that setting, any attribution of truth to sentences 
involves existential quantification over propositions. Now, since Quine refused to countenance propositions, Quine 
would then have had to claim that in any natural language, any attribution of truth to any sentence is false. And he 
would have had to relinquish his claim that ‘true’ is nothing but a device of disquotation, at least as far as natural 
languages are concerned. But, Glanzberg could point out, since Quine’s concern was with formal languages, he 
might have been perfectly happy to say these things; so much the worse for natural languages. Still, it is less 
plausible that this argument can be applied to other philosophers who take natural language more seriously.  
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Now, Glanzberg could insist that these philosophers do in fact have the relevant 
dispositions, despite what they explicitly say when discussing ontology. To that end, he could 
stress that linguists often propose hidden mechanisms such that other linguists—competent 
speakers—explicitly deny that there are such things. Surely it would be premature to conclude 
just from the presence of these denials that the mechanisms in question do not exist. Given this, I 
do not insist that Glanzberg has no way to develop his view about the logical form of truth 
attributions to sentences, and accordingly I do not rest my case against Glanzberg’s view on this 
objection. The point is merely that more needs to be said. If indeed logical form is something of 
which speakers must have tacit grasp, then Glanzberg needs to show that people who understand 
attributions of truth to sentences have tacit grasp of the logical forms of these attributions, 
whatever that tacit grasp consists in. And the explicit statements of skeptics of propositions who 
are happy to ascribe truth to sentences will need to be explained away in one way or another.  
 
6.1.1.2. Contextual Salience 
My second and more important concern about Glanzberg’s view67 is as follows. It is 
central to his view that the expression relation only becomes salient between steps (5) and (6), 
for it is this change in salience that induces the context shift that enables (5) and (6) both to be 
(non-paradoxically) true. However, the argument starts out as a proof that there’s no proposition 
that l expresses—and indeed the expression relation is mentioned already in step (1).68 For 
whoever carries out this argument, the expression relation will be salient from the beginning. But 
                                                          
67 As (Scharp 2013) explains (and as Glanzberg himself admits in (Glanzberg 2004b), p.289), Glanzberg cannot 
allow for unrestricted quantification, and, relatedly, must deny that the concept of truth can ever be fully articulated. 
(See Scharp, pp.117-119). I am quite sympathetic with Scharp’s criticisms, but I won’t reproduce them here because 
I have little to add. Note, though, that both these criticisms, if correct, would classify Glanzberg’s account as 
incomplete.  
68 Moreover, Glanzberg’s own presentation of the argument relies on some further premises, “(T-Exp)” and “(U-
Exp)”, which also make reference to expressing. See p.33 for these. 
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if expressing is salient already in step (1), then the context shift that Glanzberg argues for does 
not occur where he needs it to occur.  
 Glanzberg does provide a reason for thinking that the shift occurs between (5) and (6). He 
explains that (5) “corresponds to the first point in the proof...where there are no undischarged 
premises” (p.39). Then he writes, “Hence, I suggest, it is the point where the [expression] 
relation is accepted as salient in the discourse.” So, Glanzberg is claiming that the expression 
relation is salient when it appears in an undischarged premise, but not before. But this is a 
substantive claim about contextual salience, one which is far from being obviously true. At least, 
it is not generally the case that items occurring in undischarged premises fail to be salient. To see 
the point, consider the following argument, in which any step prefixed by ‘|’ is or occurs under 
an undischarged assumption. 
1. | Suppose Jacob ate your cookies.  
2. | If he ate your cookies, then there would be crumbs on his shirt.  
3. | Therefore, there are crumbs on his shirt. 
4. | There are no crumbs on Jacob’s shirt. Contradiction. 
5. Therefore, he did not do it.  
 
One mark of an item’s contextual salience is its ability to serve as a referent of subsequent 
anaphors.69 And it is clear that the occurrences of ‘he’ and ‘his’ in (2), (3), and (5) anaphorically 
refer to Jacob, and that the occurrence of ‘it’ in (5) anaphorically refers to eating the 
interlocutor’s cookies. So, although they are introduced in premises that occur under an 
undischarged assumption, it can’t be that Jacob and eating the interlocutor’s cookies become 
salient only with the advent of step (5).  
 
                                                          
69 See, e.g., (Karttunen 1976) for more on markers of salience.  
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6.2. Glanzberg’s Criticisms of Other Contextualist Views 
Glanzberg briefly addresses diagnoses of the Liar paradox that target the truth-predicate 
rather than posit a tacit quantifier. In particular, he discusses views according to which the truth-
predicate is sensitive to contexts of use. He writes:  
A more common idea [than Glanzberg’s own] is to suppose that the truth predicate itself 
contains a hidden indexical component. Let me briefly note that I do not think this is a 
promising option. It is a commonly voiced objection to it that we simply do not 
intuitively see such an indexical element in our ordinary truth predicate, expressed by the 
ordinary term ‘true’. I believe this line of argument can be bolstered. If there were such a 
hidden indexical, it would behave as other implicit parameters do. In the case of a 
gradable adjective, for instance, we can see the hidden comparison class at work when we 
bind the hidden variable, as in: 
  Most species S have members that are small for S.  
 We see no such behavior with the truth predicate (pp.30-31). 
 
In an attached footnote, Glanzberg refers his readers to some further diagnostic tests for context-
sensitivity, though he does not explicitly spell out why the truth predicate fails these tests.70 I will 
not go through the details here, since what Glanzberg says in the above passage is already 
persuasive. 
 
6.2.1. Ad hoc-ness and Glanzberg’s Own View  
Prima facie, Glanzberg’s argument here seems odd. On the one hand, the essence of his 
objection to views that posit a context-sensitive truth predicate is to stress that neither casual 
inspection nor certain standard tests show this expression to be context-sensitive. Yet at the same 
time, Glanzberg’s own approach involves positing a kind of context-sensitivity that he considers 
extraordinary. He writes:  
We now have some idea what the extraordinary context dependence involved in the Liar 
is. It is the dependence of the background domain of truth conditions upon context. This 
is not ordinary context dependence, as it is the context dependence of the background 
                                                          
70 Here he cites (Larson 1988) and (Ludlow 1996).  
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domain, the maximal domain of truth conditions with which speakers may form 
propositions. It markedly does not behave like other forms of context dependence. But it 
is a form of context dependence nonetheless (p.43).  
A sensible initial reaction to Glanzberg’s view is: if Glanzberg is allowed to posit an unusual 
variety of context-sensitivity, then why cannot his competitors do the same?  
However, Glanzberg has a ready answer to this question:  
 
though extraordinary, the context dependence involved [in Glanzberg’s view] does find 
motivation in the linguistics of context dependence….it is not an ad hoc posit (p.28).  
Thus, the idea must be, it is generally acknowledged by linguists that the expressive resources 
available to interlocutors in a context influences the variety of possible worlds they can 
distinguish in that context, and thereby influences the background domain of truth-conditions for 
that context. Thus, given the assumption that propositions are sets of truth-conditions, it makes 
sense that a conversational move which increases the expressive resources could induce an 
expansion in the range of propositional quantifiers—although, Glanzberg grants, this occurs 
quite rarely. By contrast, Glanzberg holds, since ‘true’ does not pass the standard test(s?) for 
having a hidden indexical, anyone who targets it as a source of context-sensitivity is thereby 
making an ad hoc posit.  
So, Glanzberg’s strategy is to charge that diagnoses of the Liar paradox that contradict 
the linguistic data (e.g., by positing context-sensitivity in expressions that do not pass standard 
tests for context-sensitivity) are ad hoc. By contrast, diagnoses whose posits are sanctioned by 
the dominant views in linguistics are not vulnerable to this charge, however unusual might be the 
phenomena that they posit, such as “extraordinary” varieties of context-dependence.  
In fact, for the reasons I spelled out in the introduction, it might even be a virtue that a 
diagnosis of the Liar paradox relies on positing some unusual phenomena. For any piece of 
reasoning involved in any version of the Liar paradox, eminently plausible premises seem 
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compellingly to lead to an utterly unacceptable conclusion. This gives us reason to expect that 
something unusual is going on, either with the sentences involved or with the steps leading from 
one to the next. Indeed, any view which purports to avoid contradictions by appealing to the 
normal operation of familiar semantic rules runs a risk of not being able to explain why the 
premises and inferential steps so strongly seem to be acceptable. (Of course, that is not to say 
that the wilder the malfunction posited by a diagnosis, the more plausible the diagnosis.) 
Glanzberg can claim to avoid this risk by positing a kind of context-sensitivity that, while 
sanctioned by the dominant views in linguistics, is highly unusual.  
All of this defense of Glanzberg is fine as far as it goes. But it is worth keeping in mind 
that even if sensitivity of the ranges of tacit quantifiers to the background domain of truth-
conditions is sanctioned by contemporary linguistics, I emphasized in Section 6.1.1.2 that this is 
less obviously so for the claim about salience that Glanzberg needs (namely, that in his version 
of the Liar reasoning, the expression relation is not salient until it appears in a premise with no 
undischarged assumptions). Unless this claim is also sanctioned, Glanzberg’s own view is 
vulnerable to the ad hoc-ness objection that he raises.  
 
6.2.2. Ad hoc-ness, (Burge 1979), and Aberrationism 
Whatever may be the applicability of the ad hoc-ness charge to Glanzberg’s view, (Burge 
1979)’s view is a ripe target for this criticism, since it indeed holds that “the truth 
predicate…contains a hidden indexical component” (Glanzberg p.30). Burge starts with the idea 
that instead of there being a single property, truth, there are infinitely many truth-like properties, 
arranged hierarchically as on the view of (Tarski 1935) and (Tarski 1944). For instance, at level 
1 there is a property, truth1, which applies to all and only the pre-theoretically-true sentences that 
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contain no semantic terms. So, sentences like ‘Snow is white’ are true1. Then, at level 2, we find 
all and only the pre-theoretically-true sentences that make semantic claims about sentences that 
contain no semantic terms. Thus, the sentence ‘‘Snow is white’ is true’ is true2. And so on, 
infinitely far up. Then, Burge’s thought is, in each context in which an application of ‘true’ is 
evaluated, there is some i such that truthi is maximal for that context, in the following sense: 
where n is the highest number of nested semantic attributions which are up for evaluation in that 
context, i = n + 1. Truthi is then the referent of ‘true’ relative to that context.71 Since it is obvious 
that this view posits indexicality in the truth predicate, it is plain that the view falls prey to 
Glanzberg’s ad hoc-ness charge.  
By contrast, according to aberrationism, the truth-predicate has no indexical component, 
hidden or otherwise. In every non-paradoxical sentence, ‘true’ behaves as a context-insensitive 
predicate that refers to truth.72 What ‘true’ does in otherwise-paradoxical sentences—namely, 
                                                          
71 Here I omit many complexities of Burge’s view that are irrelevant for present purposes. Despite my 
simplification, however, there is reason to think that in its relevant aspects the view is as I present it. Here is a 
passage that provides some evidence for this. Burge writes: 
 Suppose Dean says,  
(i) All Nixon’s utterances about Watergate are untrue 
and Nixon asserts 
(ii) Everything Dean utters about Watergate is untrue. 
Each wishes to include the other’s assertion within the scope of his own assertion….each person’s truth 
predicate should be assigned the same subscript, i….we assume i is high enough to interpret any statement 
by Dean or Nixon other than (i) or (ii)….[I]n evaluating (i) and (ii), we use ‘truei + 1’, since on this approach 
sound semantical evaluation will be forced to a higher level….Suppose Dean has uttered at least one truthi 
about Watergate. It follows from the semantical rules for the quantifier…that Nixon’s assertion (ii) is…not 
truei+1….If none of Nixon’s other Watergate utterances besides (ii) are truei, then since (ii) itself is not 
truei…Dean’s (i) is truei+1. On the other hand, if Nixon eked out at least one truei statement, then Dean’s (i) 
is not truei+1….By erasing the subscripts…we have a piece of reasoning that is intuitive. Our theory 
accounts for the reasoning (p.194, italics mine).  
Burge’s argument here is that, by replacing each subscripted term with ‘true’ but taking the resulting occurrence of 
‘true’ to attribute the truth-like property attributed by the original subscripted term, we accurately model the 
behavior of ‘true’. In the sense of ‘minimal’ defined in the main text, i + 1 is minimal with respect to any context of 
evaluating (just) (i) and (ii); and sure enough, here we see Burge suggesting that the referent of ‘true’ in any such 
context is truei + 1. So, this evidence suggests that, as I claimed, Burge holds that ‘true’ is sensitive to contexts of 
evaluation, and that in any context of evaluation X it refers to the truth-like property that is minimal with respect to 
X.  
72 Strictly speaking there may be an exception to this, since whether a sentence is a Liar sentence can depend on the 
context. Thus, on my view whether an occurrence of ‘true’ refers to truth must also depend on the context. See 
below for further discussion. 
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fail to refer to truth—is then a one-off aberration from its behavior everywhere else. (Thus, 
aberrationism does not predict that ‘true’ will pass the standard tests for context-sensitivity, or 
even for sensitivity to component-contexts.) This is precisely how advocates of aberrationism are 
able to explain why Liar sentences so strongly appear to lead to contradictions, even though none 
in fact follow. So, it is hardly an objection to point out that on their view what happens in Liar 
sentences is different from what happens everywhere else. But this is what Glanzberg’s charge of 
ad hoc-ness would come to, as applied to aberrationism.  
 
6.3. (Burge 1979) in Earnest 
 Since I have applied Glanzberg’s ad hoc-ness charge to Burge, I should mention that 
Burge’s discussion of a similar problem supplies him with a potential response to this charge. 
This similar problem has to do with our intuitive judgments about the univocality of ‘true’. As 
Burge observes, Tarski has been charged with violating these intuitive judgments:  
Criticisms of Tarski’s construction as a resolution of the natural language paradoxes have 
taken several forms. It has been held…that ‘true’ is univocal, whereas Tarski fragments 
the notion of truth into infinitely many predicate constants (p.171).  
 
Burge thinks that he has a way to avoid this problem, however:  
What of the univocality criticism of Tarski?....Unlike Tarski, we[, the author,] do not 
interpret our systems as involving constant truth predicates. In natural language there is a 
single indexical predicate. We represent this predicate [in our formal model of English] 
by the schematic predicate expression ‘truei’. This expression may in particular contexts 
be filled out by any of an unlimited number of numerical subscripts. Any one of the 
resulting predicates (formally, there are infinitely many) may represent a particular 
occurrence of ‘true’ in a context in which its application is fixed. Thus numerals 
substituted for ‘i’ mark not new predicate constants, but contextual applications of the 
indexical ‘true’. We have a general method for using this predicate. The existence of this 
method…provides considerable substance to the notion that ‘true’ has a single meaning 
(p.191).  
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It is indeed a virtue of Burge’s view that it allows ‘true’ to have a single meaning; and in that 
sense, he does succeed in allowing that this expression is univocal. However, the pre-theoretical 
impression that ‘true’ is univocal goes even further. Prior to consideration of the Liar, we are 
also inclined to judge that ‘true’ has a single referent, which is attributed in assertive utterances 
of ‘true’. Burge’s view violates this intuitive judgment. At this point in the discussion—the point 
where we are talking about intuitive judgments of univocality—the pressure of Glanzberg’s 
observation that ‘true’ fails the standard tests for context-sensitivity should be keenly felt.  
Burge responds to such concerns by claiming that we have some further pre-theoretical 
impressions which his view respects and the single-referent view does not. “[T]he view that 
‘true’ has a single extension is in conflict,” he tells us, “with intuitions about…the moves from 
(b) to (c) in our examples” (p.191). Here is one of the examples to which Burge is referring:  
(C) Suppose a student, thinking that he is in room 10 and that the teacher in room 9 is 
a fraud, writes on the board at noon 8/13/76: (a) ‘There is no sentence written on 
the board in room 9 at noon 8/13/76 which is true as standardly construed’. 
Unfortunately, it being Friday the 13th, the student himself is in room 9, and the 
sentence he writes is the only one on the board there-then. The usual reasoning 
shows that it cannot have truth-conditions. From this, we conclude that it is not 
true. But this leads to the observation that (b) there is no sentence written on the 
board in room 9 at noon 8/13/76 which is true as standardly construed. But then 
we have just asserted the sentence in question. So we reason (c) that it is true 
(p.179). 
 
Burge interprets this example as follows.  
In the moves from (a) to (b) and (b) to (c) in example (C), there seems to be no change in 
the grammar or linguistic meaning of the expressions involved….Since there is a shift 
from saying that the relevant sentence is not true to saying that the sentence is true ((b) to 
(c))—a shift in truth value without change in meaning—there is an indexical element at 
work. The indexicality is most plausibly attributed to the truth predicate (p.179). 
 
Burge’s claim, then, is that we find the shift from (b) to (c) intuitive, and therefore a good 
semantic account of the reasoning will allow that both (b) and (c) are true. But, his view is, the 
best way to allow this is to hold that the property which (b) denies of the sentence in question 
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(namely, the token of ‘There is no sentence written on the board in room 9 at noon 8/13/76 
which is true as standardly construed’ which is written on the board at noon 8/13/76) is distinct 
from the property which (c) affirms of the sentence. This can only occur if ‘true’ undergoes a 
reference shift between (b) and (c). If Burge is right, then his observations here help him respond 
to Glanzberg’s criticism. If correct, Burge’s observations count as positive evidence that ‘true’ 
experiences contextual reference shifts, in a way that allows both (b) and (c) to be true. Thus, 
even if ‘true’ fails some tests for context-sensitivity, if Burge is right then there is also some 
positive evidence that it exhibits some context-sensitive behavior.  
 Here is my response. As I emphasized in the introduction, given the eminent plausibility 
of the inferences in the Liar reasoning and the unacceptability of the conclusion, we should be 
prepared to give up some of our pre-theoretical impressions about Liar sentences, or about the 
reasoning that leads to paradox. So, to provide the strongest support for Burge’s view, the 
evidence of context-sensitivity should be independent of our impressions about what happens in 
contexts in which Liar sentences are uttered. Burge is proposing not only that ‘true’ exhibits 
context-sensitivity in contexts in which Liar sentences are uttered, but, more strongly, that it is 
context-sensitive more generally (though, perhaps, sensitive only to context-shifts that involve 
changes in semantic attributions). For evidence of this, we need to see evidence of context-
sensitivity outside of paradoxical contexts. But Glanzberg’s objection is that such evidence 
cannot be found. If the best Burge can do is point to context-sensitive behavior in paradoxical 
contexts, we have no reason to believe that ‘true’ exhibits this behavior anywhere else, and so no 
reason to accept his description of the general behavior of ‘true’. Burge is urging us to sacrifice a 
more trustworthy pre-theoretical impression (one about the behavior of the word ‘true’ in a wide 
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range of different contexts) in favor of a less trustworthy one (one about the status of certain 
sentences which are crucially involved in the Liar reasoning).  
These reflections raise the question of whether a friend of Burge should instead claim that 
‘true’ shifts in reference in, and only in, contexts of utterance that involve otherwise-paradox-
inducing sentences. Indeed, one might reasonably wonder why consideration of the Liar 
reasoning motivates my view, rather than one that posits aberrations that occur in certain very 
specific contexts of utterance rather than in certain very specific component contexts.  
However, this play on Burge’s view has a problem of its own: it entails that even 
occurrences of ‘true’ in straightforwardly non-paradoxical sentences shift in reference, relative to 
any context in which a seemingly-paradoxical sentence has been uttered. Thus, for example, if 
someone utters sentence A, then relative to that context of utterance even the occurrence of ‘true’ 
in the sentence  
(Snow) ‘Snow is white’ is true.  
has shifted in reference. But this consequence seems false; uttering a paradoxical sentence does 
not change what references we make when we then utter a non-paradoxical sentence. Moreover, 
in addition to being implausible this consequence is unmotivated, as it does nothing to enhance 
the effectiveness of the view that it serves in avoiding paradox. All the work is done by the shift 
that occurs in the paradoxical sentence. 
 This last remark brings to mind a yet further view. Notice that contingent Liar sentences, 
such as the sentences described in Burge’s case (C), show that context can affect whether or not 
a sentence is a Liar sentence. On the view now being canvassed, an occurrence of ‘true’ 
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undergoes a referential shift when, and only when, the context renders the sentence in which it 
occurs a Liar-like sentence.73 More precisely: 
(Context Sensitive Occurrences) Occurrences refer only relative to context, and 
 
(Context Sensitive Aberrations) For any sentence S and any context C, if S is Liar-
like relative to C then, relative to C, S’s key 
occurrences of its alethic expressions differ in 
reference from the expressions of which they are 
occurrences, and   
 
(Context Sensitive Determined) For any sentence S and any context C, if S is Liar-
like relative to C then what S says relative to C is 
determined by the reference-in-C of S’s key 
occurrences of its alethic expressions, rather than by 
the reference-in-C of the expressions of which they 
are occurrences. 
 
Clearly this view is just a version of aberrationism that has incorporated the general relativization 
of reference to contexts. So, let’s call it CSaberrationism, for “context-sensitive aberrationism”. 
CSaberrationism is a version of aberrationism in that it adopts versions of (Aberrations) and 
(Determined), but it is contextualist in the sense that it claims that the reference of occurrences of 
‘true’ can change with the context. Since CSaberrationism is a version of aberrationism, I have 
little to say against it. Indeed, I think adopting CSaberrationism is precisely how aberrationists 
should react to contingent Liar sentences. It is only for simplicity of presentation that I have 
suppressed issues of context-sensitivity throughout. Returning now to the dialectical context of 
my criticism of Burge, my point is this: it is hardly an objection to aberrationism to point out that 
contextualists can solve the problems that arise for their views by adopting a view that is a 
version of aberrationism.  
Burge’s approach serves as just one example of a more general trend: views that posit the 
same mechanisms at work both within Liar sentences and in non-Liar sentences overwhelmingly 
                                                          
73 I am grateful to Yuna Won, David Fielding, and Brandon Conley for helpful discussion of this issue. 
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misrepresent the behavior of the latter. Accordingly, we should question the common wisdom 
that it is ad hoc to solve the paradox by claiming that something exceptional goes on in 
paradoxical sentences. Rather, we should be open to the idea that the Liar Paradox reveals 
something genuinely distinctive and new, a kind of linguistic behavior that is peculiar to the 
words and sentences involved. This lesson lies at the heart of aberrationism.  
 
6.4. (Simmons 1993)  
 In (Simmons 1993), Keith Simmons develops a context-sensitivity approach to the Liar 
that differs significantly from Burge’s. For Simmons, “a given use of ‘true’ applies to all the 
truths, except for certain singularities—sentences to which the given use does not apply truly or 
falsely” (preface p.x). Moreover, a sentence which is a singularity relative to one use of ‘true’ 
can be in the extension of a different such use.  
 The motivation for Simmons’ view as an approach to the Liar paradox is that it tries to 
honor certain pre-theoretical impressions about certain evaluations of utterances of Liar 
sentences. On Simmons’ story, reflection on a Liar sentence goes like this. First, someone utters 
a strengthened Liar sentence—one that seems to say of itself that it is not true. A few brief 
reflections on this sentence lead us to the conclusion that it is paradoxical. This brings about a 
context in which we can correctly evaluate the sentence as being neither true nor false. Then, 
bearing this evaluation in mind, we reflect on what the sentence says in the first place, namely, 
that it is not true. This last reflection brings us into yet a third context, in which we can correctly 
evaluate the sentence as being true.  
(Grim 1995) offers some compelling criticisms of Simmons’ view. The most impressive 
of these points to some inconsistencies in Simmons’ claims about the context-sensitivity of 
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‘true’. As we saw, according to Simmons the referent of ‘true’ shifts relative to each context of 
evaluation. But, Grim asks, what Simmons can say about the sentence X: 
(X) X is not true in any context (Grim 1995, p.468). 
(Here it is understood that ‘context’ refers to contexts of evaluation.) Grim explains that “In 
reflection upon X…Simmons accepts the reasoning that X cannot be true in any context” 
(p.468). However, as Simmons would surely grant, 
This seems to lead to the reflection given what X says, that  
(Y) X is true after all.  
 
But then, Grim explains,  
Simmons accepts the validity of the argument and the truth of Y. But “if we take the use 
of ‘true’ in our final evaluation Y as a context-sensitive use, then the intuitively valid 
argument is invalidated. So we should regard the use of ‘true’ in Y as context-
independent” [(Simmons 1993, p.173)]. In direct contrast to the initial claim that “there is 
in English a single, context-sensitive truth predicate” [(Simmons 1993, p.x)], Simmons 
concludes that “there are uses of ‘true’ that are context-independent” [(Simmons 1993, 
p.174)] (Grim 1995, pp.468-469).  
 
Admittedly, it is an appealing feature of Simmons’ view that it allows us to truly assert Y 
after reflecting on X, as we are naturally inclined to do. But Grim’s observations—which I fully 
endorse—show that Simmons’ way of accommodating this inclination comes with a heavy cost. 
I mention Simmons’ view only in order to emphasize that aberrationism does not fall afoul of 
Grim’s criticism. Like Simmons’ view, aberrationism could be said to posit some sort of context-
sensitivity in ‘true’: whereas Simmons holds that ‘true’ is sensitive to contexts of evaluation, 
aberrationists hold that it experiences referential shifts in a very limited range of component 
contexts. Accordingly, one might wonder whether X above causes problems for aberrationism as 
well. This, however, is not the case. According to aberrationism, relative to every context of 
evaluation, the occurrence of ‘true’ in X fails to refer to truth; it is indeterminate between 
ascending and descending truth. Suppose we are given a context of evaluation, C. If the 
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occurrence of ‘true’ in X refers to truth in C, then X’s truth relative to C entails its non-truth 
relative to C, and vice versa, and we have a paradox. Thus, the occurrence of ‘true’ in X fails to 
refer to truth relative to C. By my reasoning in Section 3.3.2, this occurrence is indeterminate in 
reference between ascending and descending truth.  
As for the semantic value of X itself, it follows from the above that X is indeterminate 
relative to every context of evaluation. To see why, recall from Section 3.3.2 the two views about 
sentences that contain indeterminate expressions. If every such sentence is indeterminate, then in 
particular X is indeterminate in every context of evaluation, since, as just argued, its occurrence 
of ‘true’ is indeterminate relative to every such context. On the other view, a sentence containing 
an indeterminate expression is true if every way of resolving the indeterminacy would render it 
true, false if every such resolution would render the sentence false, and indeterminate otherwise. 
Recall also that every sentence that denies of itself that it is ascending true is false, and every 
sentence that denies of itself that it is descending true is true. So, suppose we are given a context 
C. If the occurrence of ‘true’ in X were to refer to ascending truth relative to C then X would be 
false in C; whereas if the occurrence of ‘true’ in X were to refer to descending truth relative to C 
then X would be true relative to C. So, on the view under consideration, if ‘true’ is indeterminate 
relative to C then X is indeterminate in C. Thus, X is indeterminate relative to every context of 
evaluation. Unlike Simmons, however, I do not conclude from all this that X is true after all. 
Since X does not say what it appears to say, that conclusion must be resisted. This enables me to 
claim that Y is false, and so I am not forced to conclude that the occurrence of ‘true’ in X was 
“context-independent”, referring to truth after all.  
On the other hand, it is no problem for aberrationism if the reference of some occurrences 
of ‘true’ is independent of contexts of evaluation. Indeed, contexts of evaluation are not even the 
74 
 
place to look for trouble, since the main mechanism of aberrationism is to posit reference shifts 
in response to component contexts. Still, one might try to formulate a problematic sentence by 
quantifying over component contexts: 
(X*) In no component context does the occurrence of ‘true’ in X* refer to anything 
which would make the resulting sentence true. 
 
However, X* makes no sense. Each occurrence has a component context as an essential 
ingredient, so it makes no sense to speak of reference by occurrences as being relativized to 
component contexts.  
Still, one might think that the following related sentence causes problems:  
(X**) The occurrence of ‘true’ in X** fails to refer to anything that would make X** 
true.  
 
However, it is straightforward what aberrationism says about sentences like this: they fail to say 
what they appear to say, because their occurrences of ‘true’ fail to refer to truth. Thus X** fails 
to say anything that entails that X** is not true; so, there is no paradox. For the sake of 
explicitness, I’ll now take a moment to spell out how I arrive at these conclusions, given my 
claims in earlier sections.  
Assume that the occurrence of ‘true’ in X** refers to truth. If that makes X** true, then 
X** is not true. (That is because, on the assumption given, X** denies that its occurrence of 
‘true’ refers to anything that makes X** true.) Thus, it must be that the occurrence’s referring to 
truth fails to make X** not true. But then the occurrence of ‘true’ in X** fails to refer to 
anything that makes X** true; and so, X** is true after all. We arrived at this contradiction by 
assuming that the occurrence of ‘true’ in X** refers to truth, so we should give up that 
assumption. By my reasoning in Section 3.3.2, this occurrence is indeterminate in reference 
between ascending and descending truth.  
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7. Token-Based Views 
In (Gaifman 1992), Haim Gaifman develops an approach to some Liar-like phenomena 
that focuses on sentence-tokens. His discussion takes off from examples such as the following:74  
line 1: The sentence on line 1 is not true. 
line 2: The sentence on line 1 is not true. 
 
Reflecting on this example and other similar ones, Gaifman writes: 
The moral of all these puzzles is simple. In situations of this nature we should assign 
truth values not to sentence types but to their tokens. Having concluded that the line-1 
sentence [token] is not true, we state the conclusion by displaying another token of the 
very same sentence [type]. The second token, on line 2, expresses something altogether 
different from what is expressed, if anything, by the token on line 1 (pp.224-225).75 
Gaifman’s idea, then, is as follows. Assume that in the above sentence tokens, the tokens of the 
phrase ‘The sentence on line 1’ refer to the sentence-token displayed on line 1. (This is the most 
charitable interpretation of the above passage. See below for what happens if we do not assume 
that reference is to the sentence-token.) According to Gaifman, the sentence token on line 1 is 
neither true nor false, but the token on line 2 is true. On his view, the token on line 1 has the truth 
value “GAP”—neither true nor false.76 But since this token fails to express the proposition that it 
(that very token) is not true, the token on line 1 is not (paradoxically) made true by the fact that it 
is not true. Nonetheless, the token on line 2 expresses the (true) proposition that the token on line 
1 is not true. In its general form, Gaifman’s view is that when assigning a value of either truth or 
                                                          
74 See pp.224-225 for Gaifman’s statement of his view. Contingent liars—sentences that are only contingently 
paradoxical—pose a problem for Gaifman as presented in the main text. For an example of such a sentence, see 
(Simmons 1993) pp.101-102. However, Gaifman deals with this difficulty by using the abstract notion of a pointer 
instead of the notion of a token. For brevity, I omit these complexities from the main text. 
75 Here I have disambiguated Gaifman’s uses of ‘sentence’ by inserting ‘token’ and ‘type’. What results is the most 
charitable interpretation of his view. But this interpretation masks an important question that I will take up shortly in 
the main text: even if when paradox threatens we ought only to assign truth values to sentence tokens, how should 
we evaluate seemingly-paradoxical tokens that attribute truth values to sentence types?  
76 See p.225. 
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falsehood to a sentence-token would result in paradox, this token a) is neither true nor false, and 
b) fails to say this about itself. Nonetheless, however, other, unproblematic tokens of the same 
sentence-type (such as the token on line 2) can correctly say of this token that it is not true.  
Gaifman spends much of his essay developing a procedure for consistently assigning 
truth values to sentence-tokens in light of examples such as the one just given. And for all that I 
will say here, Gaifman’s claims are both true and effective for avoiding the problems that these 
examples raise. My point is that his remarks do not suffice to solve the problem that centrally 
concerns me. Despite his recommendation that “In situations of this nature we should assign 
truth values not to sentence types but to their tokens,” many sentences—both types and tokens—
do attribute truth values to sentence types. Thus, the question arises what Gaifman should say 
about such cases. In particular, one wonders what he should say about sentence-types S which 
appear to express the negation of the Russellian proposition <S, truth>, and about sentence-
tokens s that appear to express the negation of the proposition <S, truth>, where S is the type of 
which s is a token. Presumably this is something that any token of a Liar sentence would appear 
to do. I will consider these cases in turn. 
 Let us begin with sentence types, and A in particular. Is the case of sentence A a 
“[situation] of this nature,” in which “we should assign truth values not to sentence types but to 
their tokens”? That is, on Gaifman’s view, does A lack a truth-value? If so, then he must explain 
how exactly that comes about, given that many other sentence-types do have truth values. One 
option, of course, is simply to take a step toward embracing aberrationism: he could hold that 
Liar sentence-types S lack truth values because they fail to express the negation of the Russellian 
proposition <S, truth>. On the other hand, Gaifman could hold that sentence types such as A do 
have truth values; e.g., he could say that they are true, that they are false, or that they have the 
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value GAP. In any of these cases, he would have to spell out how paradox can be avoided.77 
Again an option for him would be simply to move in the direction of aberrationism, and say that 
such sentences S are indeterminate, because they fail to express the negation of the Russellian 
proposition <S, truth>. The point is that whatever he might say, Gaifman’s claims about the 
tokens on lines 1 and 2 provide little guidance here, since unlike A, those tokens concern a 
sentence-token rather than a type. To qualify as a general solution to the Liar paradox, Gaifman’s 
view needs to address the status of sentence types that appear to comment on the semantic values 
of sentence-types.  
Gaifman’s extant remarks are similarly unhelpful when it comes to sentence tokens that 
appear to comment on the semantic status of seemingly-paradoxical sentence types. Consider, in 
particular, the following token of A: 
(At) A is not true.  
Does the token At express the negation of the Russellian proposition <A, truth>? Given what we 
have seen him say already, it might be natural for Gaifman to answer affirmatively. Gaifman 
already holds that some tokens of a sentence-type t can without any trouble comment on the 
semantic status of some other, problematic tokens of type t. So perhaps he would also hold that 
some tokens of type t can also comment on the semantic status of the problematic type t. The 
general idea would be that some tokens of any paradoxical sentence (type or token) can 
successfully state the status of that sentence. If he took this line, Gaifman would have two 
options, depending on what he would say about the sentence-type A. He could hold that A has no 
truth value, but that nonetheless the token At (correctly) expresses the negation of <A, truth>, or 
                                                          
77 There is a third option: one says that A has a truth value, but that it is indeterminate which value A has. However, 
I doubt that Gaifman would take this option. The motivation for taking this option is the threat that A generates 
paradox. But because “in situations of this nature we should assign truth values not to sentence types but to their 
tokens,” that threat would motivate Gaifman to deny that A has a truth value. 
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he could say that A has the truth value GAP, and so because At expresses the negation of <A, 
truth> At itself has the value GAP.  
 However, it is not clear that At can express the negation of <A, truth> unless A itself does 
this. Indeed, some of Gaifman’s own remarks emphasize this point:  
in general what a token expresses depends on (1) what it says, i.e., on the sentence type 
and (2) on the whole network: on the tokens to which the sentence refers and on the 
tokens to which they in their turn refer, etc. (p.225). 
 
While it is plausible that (1) plays a significant role quite generally—that is, in general what 
proposition (if any) a sentence token expresses depends partly on of what type it is a token—
factor (2) is present only for sentence tokens that comment on the status of other sentence tokens. 
When it comes to At this factor is absent, since At concerns a sentence type. Thus, At’s truth 
value (if any) cannot depend on those of “the tokens to which [At] refers.” So, if Gaifman’s 
remarks in the above passage are correct, then what proposition At expresses is determined solely 
by “what it says, i.e., on the sentence type.” But if what proposition At expresses depends on its 
being a token of A, then it is hard to see how At could express the negation of the Russellian 
proposition <A, truth>, unless A itself expresses the negation of that proposition. And, of course, 
if A itself expresses the negation of that proposition, then it needs to be explained how paradox is 
to be avoided. The point is that if Gaifman wants to say that At expresses the negation of <A 
truth>, then he has to say more about how that comes about. If the passage quoted above is any 
indication, his answer would likely involve claiming that A expresses the negation of <A, truth>. 
But this claim raises problems that are not obviously solved by Gaifman’s view, given that that 
view only concerns sentence tokens that comment on the status of other tokens.  
 Alternatively, Gaifman could claim that neither A nor At expresses the negation of <A, 
truth>. That would sit well with his claim that “what a token expresses depends on…the sentence 
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type,” and would free him of the problems associated with allowing that A expresses the 
negation of <A, truth> (p.225). However, if Gaifman were to take this route, then his view about 
tokens that concern sentences such as A would not even come close to involving a generalization 
of the approach that he develops in connection with sentence tokens that concern other tokens. 
The crux of that approach is that its allowance that certain tokens can (correctly) state the 
semantic status of items (tokens, in Gaifman’s original example) that are paradoxical. But here 
we do not have a case of At stating the semantic status of the paradoxical entity in question 
(namely, the sentence-type A).  
Again, my point is not to criticize Gaifman’s approach to the examples that he discusses. 
It is merely to emphasize that this approach alone is insufficient to solve the problem that 
concerns me—that is, the problem that appears to arise in connection with sentences (types and 
tokens) that attribute truth values to sentence types.  
 
7.1. Another View that Focuses on Tokens  
In the above discussion of Gaifman, I left out the view that A expresses the negation of 
the Russellian proposition <A, truth>, but no token of A expresses the negation of that 
proposition. I left this view out because it is antithetical to the idea that seems to motivate 
Gaifman, namely, that what cannot be said by a sentence type (without inviting paradox) can be 
said safely by some of its tokens.  
It is worth noting that quite independently of its unavailability to Gaifman, this view 
faces a serious problem. Whether or not any token of A can express the negation of <A, truth>, 
the claim that A itself does is enough to generate a paradox. Consider the argument that I 
presented in Section 2.4, which begins from consideration of A and ends with a contradiction. 
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Even if that argument can never successfully be tokened in order to explicitly derive a paradox 
(since the token of A that it would contain would fail to express the negation of <A, truth>), as 
long as A expresses the negation of <A, truth>, the argument itself, considered as a sequence of 
sentence types, successfully proves a contradiction. (Pending the success of some other solution 
to the Liar paradox, that is.)  
 
8. Prosententialism  
Another approach to Liar phenomena is provided by prosentential theories about ‘is true’ 
and its kin. Prosentential theories about ‘is true’ hold that sentences involving this expression 
behave like anaphora. Anaphora are expressions, such as pronouns, which inherit their reference 
from other expressions that occur earlier in the discourse. Consider, e.g., the following sentence:  
(M) When Martha opened the car door, she could hardly believe what she saw. 
Both occurrences of ‘she’ in M inherit their reference from the occurrence of ‘Martha’ at the 
beginning.  
According to prosentential theories, any sentence involving the word ‘true’ is a 
prosentence—a sentence that inherits all the content it has from some antecedent sentence. To 
see the view, consider the following dialogue:  
Chrissy:  Mousavi became president of Iran in 2009.  
Angela:  That’s true.  
 
On any prosentential theory, Angela’s sentence has exactly the same content as Chrissy’s; it is 
just as if Angela had uttered the same sentence as Chrissy did. Prosentential theories have similar 
ways of handling ‘is not true’. Suppose instead that the following dialogue takes place between 
Chrissy and Angela: 
Chrissy:  Mousavi became president of Iran in 2009.  
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Angela:  That’s not true.  
 
In this case, Angela’s sentence still inherits its content from Chrissy’s; the only difference is that 
now it is just as if Angela had said ‘Mousavi did not become president of Iran in 2009’.  
 Prosentential views about truth have a convenient response to the Liar paradox that is 
somewhat like my own. According to any prosententialist, sentence A is a prosentence that is its 
own antecedent. Thus, A inherits whatever content it has from itself. But since prosentences do 
not have any content independently of what they inherit from other sentences, when it comes to 
the inheritance of content, A never gets off the ground. So, A has no content; it fails to express 
any proposition. Thus, prosententialists conclude, there is no paradox.  
 There are two prominent prosentential theories about truth, that of (Grover, Camp, and 
Belnap 1975) and that of (Brandom 1994). For brevity, I will consider only Brandom’s view, 
which improves on Grover, Camp, and Belnap’s in an important respect.78 According to 
Brandom, ‘is true’ is a prosentence-forming operator. That is, when it is appended to an 
expression that refers to a sentence, the result is a prosentence that inherits its content from the 
sentence to which the referring expression refers. Consider again the sentence (Snow):  
(Snow) ‘Snow is white’ is true.  
On Brandom’s view, (Snow) is a prosentence whose content is identical to that of the sentence 
named by the expression ‘‘Snow is white’’; that is, the sentence ‘Snow is white’.  
 However, Brandom’s view faces some serious problems. James Beebe gives a 
particularly nice explanation of one of these, which he attributes to (Wilson 1990): 
                                                          
78 (Kirkham 1992) pp.325-329 raises an important objection to Grover, Camp, and Belnap’s view. See also (Beebe 
2015) Section 7 for a helpful exposition of this objection, and an explanation of the way in which Brandom’s 
improved version of prosententialism addresses the concern. 
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Consider the following example inspired by [(Wilson 1990)’s] criticisms of the 
prosentential theory.  
(44) Steve: Boudreaux won the mayoral election.  
Kate: What that conniving, good-for-nothing bum said was true.  
 
If Brandom’s version of the prosentential theory is correct, Kate’s utterance should have 
no more content than Steve’s. Clearly, however, Kate’s remark does more than simply 
reassert the content of Steve’s remark. It casts aspersions on Steve’s character. According 
to Brandom’s seemingly more defensible version of the prosentential theory, a referring 
expression used at the head of a prosentence serves only to pick out an antecedent from 
which the prosentence can inherit its content. But referring expressions can be naughty or 
nice, informative or dull. Once Brandom opens the door for prosentences to be formed by 
conjoining any referring expression to the prosentence-forming operator ‘…is true,’ it 
seems that he can no longer maintain that prosentences never have any more content than 
their anaphoric antecedents. [Many] referring expressions are not all like proper names. 
Very often they bring with them a great deal more content than is strictly necessary for 
them to succeed in referring. A proper interpretation of prosentences cannot ignore this 
extra content. (Beebe 2015, Section 7) 
 
(Wilson 1990) raises another objection, connected with sentences such as  
 (4) That Bleda is vicious is true.  
and 
 (5) It is true that Bleda is vicious. 
 
On any prosententialist view, including Brandom’s, the expressions ‘that…is true’ and ‘it is true 
that…’ are what Wilson calls “sentential connectives”: when they are applied to a sentence, a 
sentence results. Therefore, Brandom must analyze (4) and (5) in such a way that the expressions 
‘that…is true’ and ‘it is true that…’ turn out to be grammatical constituents. However, “an 
alternative hypothesis is that ‘is true’ functions as a predicate.” This hypothesis, Wilson writes, 
“is better supported by the data of English than is the [prosententialist] hypothesis that ‘it is true 
that’ is a sentential connective in English” (Wilson p.23). According to Wilson, the linguistic 
evidence about English supports taking the constituents of (5) to be ‘it is true’ and ‘that Bleda is 
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vicious’, rather than, as the prosententialist would have it, ‘it is true that’ and ‘Bleda is vicious’. 
Here is Wilson’s explanation.  
Sentences of certain forms are widely recognized as grammatically related. An 
explanation of this is that they are related by rules which move an element in one 
sentence from one position to another to obtain the other sentence. It is a fundamental 
assumption of grammatical theory that these rules apply only to constituents. Some of 
these relations follow…. 
 
[F]rom (5) we can obtain the cleft 
 
It is that Bleda is vicious that is true.  
but not 
*It is Bleda is vicious that that is true. 
 
From (5) we can obtain the pseudo-cleft  
 
What is true is that Bleda is vicious. 
but not 
*What is true that is Bleda is vicious. 
 …. 
 
Additional evidence comes from the possibility of inserting parenthetical expressions 
between ‘true’ and ‘that’, possible usually only at breaks between major constituents: 
 
It is true—as you should know better than anyone—that crimes have been 
committed. 
 
*It is true that—as you should know better than anyone—crimes have been 
committed. 
 
Notice also that we have 
 
A: Bill said that Susan is ill.  
B: Is it true? / That Susan is ill? / *Is it true that? (Wilson 1990 pp.23-24). 
 
For my purposes, the upshot of Wilson’s observations is that while prosententialism 
supplies a convenient solution to the Liar paradox, the view conflicts with the linguistic data 
about English. It does this because it is a quite general claim about the behavior of the English 
expression ‘is true’ and its kin. By contrast, aberrationism concerns only the behavior of 
occurrences of ‘is true’ in Liar-like sentences, and so it does not challenge any of the data 
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concerning the behavior of this expression anywhere else. As a second point, whereas the theory 
of the relation of grammatical constituency is on comparatively solid footing, reference remains 
a topic of active research and competing theories. Accordingly, then, it is preferable to take the 
Liar paradox to teach us something surprising about reference than to take it to refute linguists’ 
canonical views about grammatical constituency.  
Still, however, it is important to note that strictly speaking, prosententialists do not need 
to claim that ‘it is true that’ acts as a separate grammatical constituent in the sentences in which 
it occurs. Rather, all that they really need to endorse is a claim about the logical form of 
sentences that involve this expression. As Wilson concedes, 
Some of [the above] relationships show at most that ‘that S’ is a constituent of surface 
structure. It might be argued that at the level of representation of logical form, ‘it is true 
that’ is nevertheless a constituent. (Wilson 1990 p.24). 
 
Indeed, prosententialists can point out, it is widely acknowledged that expressions with different 
semantic behavior can occupy some of the same grammatical roles. E.g., in the sentence ‘I saw 
Jolene’, ‘Jolene’ refers; whereas in the sentence ‘I saw a woman’, the phrase ‘a woman’ serves 
as a noun phrase, like ‘Jolene’, despite the fact that at the level of logical form it expresses 
existential quantification, not reference to an individual.  
All that said, while there are known mismatches between occupying the grammatical role 
of a referring expression and being a referring expression, there is a general presumption against 
positing such mismatches. This presumption underlies Wilson’s final observation concerning his 
examples displayed above, that “it remains for the advocates of [prosententialism] to find the 
syntactical theory that would support their analysis” of these examples (p.24).  
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8.1. Prosententialism and the Existence of Truth 
 One motivation shared by all prominent prosententialists is the desire to “undermine the 
idea that ‘is true’ is a property-ascribing locution” (Beebe 2015, Section 7). For Brandom, this 
motivation in turn stems from a desire to deny that there is such a property as truth. 
Prosententialism facilitates this denial by removing the need to appeal to truth as the property 
attributed by ‘is true’. (Thus, while prosententialism does not in itself require one to relinquish 
the claim that truth exists, it does remove an obvious reason for making this claim.) Thus, 
prosententialism tends to appeal to philosophers who regard truth as being suspiciously 
mysterious, metaphysical, or both.  
 On the other hand, pre-theoretically the claim that truth exists is uncontroversial; surely 
the burden of proof is on those who would deny this claim. Of course, someone who recognizes 
this might nonetheless be impressed by the prosententialist approach to the Liar paradox. But 
then any such theorist should be drawn to the aberrationist approach, which has similar virtues 
but allows one to say that truth exists. Like prosententialists, aberrationists also hold that Liar 
sentences fail to say of themselves that they are not true, and trace this failure to the behavior of 
the occurrence of ‘is true’ in these sentences. (Again, the prosententialist view is that (a) the 
presence of an occurrence of ‘true’ makes the sentence a prosentence, and that (b) from the way 
the sentence is constructed, this occurrence is its own antecedent, preventing the sentence from 
acquiring any content.) However, unlike prosententialism, my view is compatible with the 
claim—and the linguistic evidence—that ‘is true’ is a normal predicate whose job is to attribute a 
property. Thus it is also more congenial to the intuitive, pre-theoretical view that there is a 
property to which ‘true’ refers, namely, truth. 
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9. Wholesale Indeterminism 
 I will now examine an approach to the Liar-like paradoxes that is closely related to 
aberrationism, but differs from it in an important way. According to wholesale indeterminism,  
a) Every occurrence of the word ‘true’ is indeterminate in reference, as between two or 
more distinct properties, such as ascending truth and descending truth.  
b) However, the extensions of these properties diverge from the class of sentences which 
we pre-theoretically judge to be true, and from one another, only when it comes to 
Liar-like sentences. 
c) None of these properties is determinately identical with truth. 
 
By (a), the indeterminacy of ‘true’ is wholesale in the sense that it affects all occurrences of 
‘true’ rather than just those in Liar-like sentences. On the other hand, (b) guarantees that, and 
helps to explain why, nearly all of our informal uses of ‘true’ are unproblematic.79  
In broadest strokes, the difference between aberrationism and wholesale indeterminism is 
as follows. Aberrationism preserves the bulk of our informal reasoning with ‘true’ by restricting 
its aberrant behavior to Liar-like sentences, whereas wholesale indeterminism posits widespread 
aberrant behavior—insofar as indeterminacy is considered aberrant behavior—but insists that the 
aberrance only affects matters when we are dealing with Liar-like sentences. That said, both 
views preserve the vast majority of our informal uses of ‘true’. Moreover, like moderate 
aberrationism, wholesale indeterminism makes an effort to accommodate our pre-theoretical 
impressions about what Liar-like sentences say, allowing for a sense in which these sentences 
come close to saying what they appear to say.  
Before examining some important differences between these two views, I should clarify 
an important detail about wholesale indeterminism. On first blush, wholesale indeterminism can 
seem to deny that truth exists. And whatever the other advantages might be, on first blush, that 
                                                          
79 I take wholesale indeterminism to be in the same general family as the views of (Eklund 2002) and (Burgess 
2014). I am grateful to Eklund for bringing wholesale indeterminism to my attention. 
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denial would certainly make the view less appealing. However, this reaction conflates the denial 
that truth exists with the denial there is any single property that is determinately identical with 
truth. As it turns out (see below), the wholesale indeterminist can assertively utter the sentence 
‘There is a property P such that P = truth’. Indeed, she can even assertively utter the sentence 
‘There is a unique property P such that P = truth’. Rather, what she cannot assertively utter are 
things like ‘There is a unique property P such that it’s determinate that P = truth’.  
More precisely, the move I am describing here—and it is a standard one among 
advocates of views of this kind—is to adopt something like a supervaluational semantics for 
sentences involving the word ‘true’. If w is a word that is indeterminate in reference, let a 
precisification of w be a model M = <D, V>, where D is a domain and V is a valuation function 
such that V(w) = P, where P is a candidate referent for w. For simplicity, assume that the 
referents of all the other expressions in the language are fixed across all precisifications, so that 
for each candidate referent P of w there is a unique precisification, MP. Truth-under-a-
precisification of w is then simply truth-in-MP for some P that is a candidate referent for w. With 
these notions in place, the idea is that when it comes to sentences that involve the word ‘true’, 
the wholesale indeterminist is to endorse all and only those sentences which come out true-
under-all-precisifications-of-‘true’. Thus, in effect, wholesale indeterminists treat ‘true’ not as a 
normal predicate but rather as an expression that involves universal quantification over candidate 
referents. However—and this is the key point—because the candidate referents differ from our 
informal truth-attributions only when it comes to Liar-like sentences, our informal truth-talk fails 
only in connection with Liar-like sentences. For most practical purposes it is harmless to treat 
‘true’ as a normal predicate.  
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Now to explain the wholesale indeterminist’s claims concerning truth. On the one hand, 
one can readily check that the sentences  
(Identity)  Truth = truth 
and 
(Unique)  There is a unique property Q such that Q = truth  
 
are true-under-all-precisifications of ‘true’. For each property P that is a candidate referent for 
‘true’, ‘truth’ refers-in-MP to P. Thus, for each such P, ‘Truth = truth’ says-in-MP that P = P and 
thus is true-in-MP. Similarly, for each such P, ‘P is unique and P = truth’ is true-in-MP, making 
Unique also true-in-MP, since the rule of existential generalization is valid in MP. Since these 
conditions hold for each candidate referent P and thus for each precisification M, the wholesale 
indeterminist can endorse Identity and Unique.  
On the other hand, consider what happens when we add the determinacy operator. For 
any sentence φ, ˹determinately φ˺ means that φ is true-in-all-precisifications. Now, since 
wholesale indeterminists take the reference of ‘true’ to be indeterminate as between two or more 
distinct candidate referents, for any candidate referent Q there exists a distinct candidate referent 
P such that ‘Q = truth’ is false-in-MP. So, for no candidate Q is the sentence ‘Q = truth’ true-
under-all-precisifications. Thus, the wholesale indeterminist cannot endorse the following: 
(Determinate) There is a unique property Q such that determinately Q = truth 
As the wholesale indeterminist reads Determinate, it says that there’s a unique property Q such 
that ‘Q = truth’ is true-in-all-precisifications. But it is a constitutive part of her view that that is 
false.  
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9.1. Pros and Cons of Wholesale Indeterminism  
9.1.1. A Methodological Point 
My first point about wholesale indeterminism is a methodological one. Though it is 
certainly not beyond question that there is a unique property determinately identical with truth, 
still this is a claim that many people are pre-theoretically disposed to accept. So, there is 
motivation for developing approaches to the Liar paradox that enable us to keep this claim. Of 
course, if those approaches prove too costly, then one will be forced to choose some other 
alternative, and in that event wholesale indeterminism may be the best option. However, one 
cannot judge the case until views that posit a property determinately identical with truth have 
been fully developed. I take this essay to be a step in that direction. On that note, even if all my 
discussion shows is that aberrationism is the best of the views which insist that there is a 
property determinately identical with truth, I take that to be an interesting result.  
 
9.1.2. In Practice, but not in Spirit 
My second point is that in positing widespread indeterminacy, one commits oneself to 
some strong claims about the behavior of ‘true’ in non-Liar-like sentences, claims that are 
largely unmotivated except for their role in solving Liar-like paradoxes. (Here I have in mind the 
claim that for each non-Liar-like sentence S that contains ‘true’, the occurrence of ‘true’ in S is 
indeterminate in reference.80) While I have stressed that some measure of ad hoc-ness is 
inevitable in any solution, the availability of aberrationism demonstrates that one can restrict the 
                                                          
80 However, it is worth noting that some might take this view to be motivated by considerations of vagueness. If 
‘Harry is bald’ is indeterminate in truth value, then perhaps ‘‘Harry is bald’ is true’ is as well. One way to diagnose 
the latter indeterminacy is by taking ‘true’ to be indeterminate in reference as between a number of different 
candidate properties, some of which the sentence ‘Harry is true’ has and others of which it lacks. If this view is 
right, then the idea that ‘true’ is indeterminate can be motivated independently of the Liar paradox. Still, it is worth 
noting that this diagnosis of sentences such as ‘‘Harry is bald’ is true’ is controversial. A different approach would 
be to say that ‘true’ refers to a single property, such that it is indeterminate whether ‘Harry is bald’ has that property. 
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ad hoc-ness to one’s diagnoses of the occurrences that are directly implicated, a desirable result. 
This is something that wholesale indeterminism manifestly fails to do, since it posits a wholesale 
indeterminacy in the reference of ‘true’. In that respect, it has the same flaw as the classic 
contextualist views that I criticized above.  
On the other hand, wholesale indeterminism does have an advantage over those views: if 
indeed the candidate referents agree with our intuitive judgments of truth everywhere except on 
Liar-like sentences (as specified in part (b) of wholesale indeterminism), then in practical terms 
the indeterminacy affects nothing except when we are dealing with such sentences. So, unlike 
classic contextualists, the wholesale indeterminist can endorse nearly all of our pre-theoretical 
reasoning involving ‘true’; it comes out correct on her supervaluational reading. In this sense, 
one might claim, wholesale indeterminism respects the linguistic data about ‘true’ much more 
effectively than the vast majority of other approaches that make claims about its behavior outside 
the realm of paradox.  
Still, part (b) of wholesale indeterminism is a substantive claim, one that needs to be 
verified by careful attention to the candidate referents being attested. As I mentioned in passing 
in Section 3.3.3, Scharp endorses this claim when it comes to ascending truth and descending 
truth:81 that is, he claims that for all non-Liar-like sentences S, each of ascending truth and 
descending truth respects the instances of (T-intro) and (T-elim) that involve S. However, Scharp 
does not provide a proof, and settling the matter is too big a job to undertake here.82 It is worth 
noting that wholesale indeterminism relies on this strong, as-yet-unproven claim.  
                                                          
81 See his p.186. 
82 For one thing, in general it is hard to prove negative existential claims. For another, most consistent approaches to 
the Liar paradox end up excluding some pre-theoretically unproblematic sentences from participation in (T-intro), 
(T-elim), or both. A third difficulty is that it is arguably vague which sentences are Liar-like and which are not.  
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Moreover, even if the claim turns out to be true, I see a problem in the fact that so much 
hangs on it. As a methodological principle, it is best for one’s accounts of non-paradoxical 
sentences not to be driven by one’s diagnosis of the Liar paradox. Because the thesis of 
wholesale indeterminacy in the reference of ‘true’ is motivated by the Liar paradox, it is 
therefore best that this thesis’ consequences be necessarily restricted to paradoxical sentences. 
One’s ability to honor our informal observations and linguistic data about non-paradoxical 
sentences should not depend on the extent to which the candidate referents for occurrences of 
‘true’ turn out to be truth-like, even if in fact they do turn out to be quite truth-like. In spirit if not 
in practice, wholesale indeterminism disregards the lessons brought out in my criticisms of 
contextualist approaches.  
 
9.1.2.1. Tu Quoque 
Given that I myself introduced two properties (ascending truth and descending truth) that 
I held to be quite truth-like, a wholesale indeterminist might attempt a dialectical response. If the 
candidate referents for occurrences of ‘true’ (whether all of them or just those in Liar-like 
sentences) turn out not to be very truth-like, then isn’t that also bad for my own preferred version 
of moderate aberrationism, described in Section 3.3? After all, the less truth-like these candidates 
are, the less plausible it is that Liar-like sentences come close to saying what they appear to say. 
While this is a reasonable question, a few important observations reveal that the situation just 
described is much more tolerable for moderate aberrationism than it is for the wholesale 
indeterminist.  
Firstly, and most importantly, even in the situation just described, one could maintain that 
occurrences of ‘true’ in non-Liar-like sentences refer to truth, and so behave exactly as one 
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expects prior to exposure to the Liar paradox. In that important respect, the situation would be 
much better for aberrationism than for wholesale indeterminism. Secondly, the other central 
claim of moderate aberrationism—that reference is powerfully influenced by language use—
would remain untouched. So, there would be no general problem for moderate aberrationists, 
only for those that claim that Liar-like sentences come close to saying what they appear to say.  
A third observation is that wholesale indeterminism requires a higher degree of truth-
likeness than my own preferred view requires. That is because for my view, failures of truth-
likeness only affect the diagnosis of Liar-like sentences: if the “second in line” property is truth-
like but not dramatically so, then I can still claim that Liar-like sentences come close to saying 
what they appear to say; I just have to admit that they do not come dramatically close. By 
contrast, for wholesale indeterminists, failures of truth-likeness affect all of the sentences with 
respect to which the property in question diverges from our intuitive truth-attributions.  
The property truthmp, defined in (Kripke 1975), serves as an illustrative example here.
83 
Kripke’s idea is that for any language, there are stages in the determination of truth values for its 
sentences. Sentences which do not address the semantic status of other sentences are assigned 
truth values at stage 0. At stage 1, sentences which attribute truth values to stage-0-sentences 
acquire truth values. And so on, to infinity. Thus ‘Snow is white’ gets the value true at stage 0, 
and ‘The sentence ‘Snow is white’ is true’ gets the truth value true at stage 1. By contrast, Liar-
like sentences such as A are not assigned any truth values at any stage in this process. Kripke 
proves that there is a unique (infinite) least ordinal number κ such that all the sentences which 
will ever acquire truth values via the process just described have received them by stage κ. This 
                                                          
83 The term ‘truthmp’ stands for truth-in-the-minimal-fixed-point. The minimal fixed point is also the least fixed 
point. (See below in the main text.) 
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ordinal κ is the minimal fixed point. A sentence is then truemp if and only if it receives the value 
true at some stage less than or equal to κ. 
For present purposes, the point is this. English speakers generally feel at least some 
inclination to say that the sentence COND is true:  
(COND)  If COND is true then COND is true  
However, COND is not truemp. So truthmp differs at least that much from truth as pre-
theoretically understood. Now suppose that ascending truth and descending truth do not exist, 
and instead it is truthmp which comes the closest, after truth itself, to respecting (T-intro) and (T-
elim). Then, according to versions of moderate aberrationism that endorse the Lewisian views 
about reference described in Section 2.3, the key occurrences of ‘true’ in Liar-like sentences 
refer to truthmp. For aberrationist purposes, this situation is sub-optimal, but still acceptable. For 
there would still be a reasonably robust sense in which Liar-like sentences come close to saying 
what they appear to say—though they would not come as close as we would have had with 
ascending truth and descending truth in place of truthmp. And, all the other, non-paradoxical 
sentences of English, including COND, would be exactly as we pre-theoretically expect. By 
contrast, this situation would be much worse for a wholesale indeterminist. Such a theorist would 
have to reject the intuitive (for many) judgement that COND is true, together with all our other 
pre-theoretically-acceptable attributions of truth to sentences that are not truemp. 
This concludes my discussion of alternative approaches to the Liar paradox that do not 
embrace (Aberrations) and (Determined). Now I will discuss some approaches that embrace 
these views, but which target expressions other than those that refer to truth.  
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10. Alternative Culprits  
As I have been stressing throughout, the Liar paradox gives us good reasons to suspect 
that either within Liar sentences or somewhere in the reasoning that leads to paradox, at least one 
of the expressions involved must fail to behave as it pre-theoretically seems to behave. 
Borrowing a term from (Eklund 2002), let us call this expression(s), whatever it is, the 
culprit(s).84 And if an expression is under consideration for being a culprit, let’s call it a suspect. 
Throughout, I have been advocating that in any Liar-like sentence, the (unique) culprits are the 
alethic expressions—that is, the expressions that are governed by (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim), 
either by definition or via some auxiliary theses. But, why not instead blame the expression that 
refers to the sentence itself (when indeed there is such an expression), or the expression that 
refers85 to negation (when there is one), or all of the above?86 Before examining any such views 
in detail, I will present an argument for targeting only alethic expressions, and not anything else, 
as the culprits. The argument appeals to a methodological principle and then an important 
observation about seemingly Liar-ish paradoxes.87  
The methodological principle is this:  
(Method)  
a) if one cannot set up a seemingly Liar-ish paradox without employing an 
expression of a given sort, then one is justified in taking expressions of that sort to 
be culprits in all seemingly Liar-ish paradoxes in which they feature.  
 
                                                          
84 An important difference between my use of ‘culprit’ and Eklund’s is that for Eklund, the culprits are false 
assumptions, whereas for me, they are those expressions whose behavior is not as it pre-theoretically seems to be, on 
pain of paradox.  
85 The word ‘express’ is more familiar here. But I reserve ‘express’ for the relation between expressions and 
concepts, and between sentences and propositions. Here when I talk of negation I am talking about a certain truth-
function, not a concept. So I use ‘refer’ rather than ‘express’.  
86 In fact, (Smith 2006) faces a similar worry. Smith claims that either the name ‘A’ or the predicate ‘true’ is the 
culprit. But, one might ask, why not ‘not’ instead?  
87 In this section, one of the questions at issue is that of exactly which paradoxes are Liar-like. To avoid begging the 
question against such philosophers, I use ‘seemingly Liar-ish’ in place of the contested term ‘Liar-like’. See below 
in the main text for further discussion.  
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b) And on the other hand, if one can readily set up a seemingly Liar-ish paradox 
without employing expressions of a given sort, then that counts against one’s 
justification for holding that expressions of that sort are culprits in any seemingly 
Liar-ish paradox in which they feature.  
 
One thing that makes (Method) appealing is its likelihood of leading to satisfying solutions of the 
paradox. The satisfactoriness of a solution to one seemingly Liar-ish paradox lies in part in its 
usefulness against a wide variety of other seemingly Liar-ish paradoxes.88 Solutions which target 
expressions that are essential to many different such paradoxes are, if good at all, good also 
against those many paradoxes. By contrast, a solution that targets an expression that is only 
essential for formulating one seemingly Liar-ish paradox will not straightforwardly apply to 
others that do not involve this expression.  
In addition to leading to satisfying solutions, (Method) is commonly accepted. For 
instance, it is common to object to a purported solution to a seemingly Liar-ish paradox by 
emphasizing the failure of this approach to address other seemingly Liar-ish paradoxes. But the 
failure of a solution to generalize to various other paradoxes poses no problem for it, unless one 
assumes that a single phenomenon is responsible in all the cases one has in mind. And on most 
proposals which take all of various different paradoxes to be due to a single phenomenon, that 
phenomenon involves a single expression’s being the unique culprit.  
Others before me have used (Method) to justify identification of the truth predicate as a 
culprit. (Scharp 2013)’s discussion serves as an excellent example:  
We can construct artificial languages that contain the [other suspects besides the truth 
predicate], and they are perfectly well-behaved as long as they do not contain truth 
predicates (or related semantic terms). Of course, we can also construct artificial 
languages with truth predicates that are perfectly well-behaved as long as they do not 
contain the [other suspects]. However, the difference is that there are many different 
ways to construct revenge paradoxes; one involves truth and exclusion negation, one 
involves truth and another non-monotonic sentential operator, one involves truth and the 
                                                          
88 Here I leave open whether these other paradoxes are, in some ultimate sense, versions of the Liar paradox.  
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conditional, one involves truth and an idempotent determinacy operator, etc. Exclusion 
negation is not involved in each case, nor are any of the other outlaw linguistic 
expressions. However, truth is involved every time (p.120).  
 
Here Scharp makes tacit appeal to (Method). Because expressions that refer to truth are involved 
in every known seemingly Liar-ish paradox, he argues, it is these expressions that should 
properly be targeted as responsible in all cases.89 Indeed, Scharp also articulates something close 
to the observation that is central to my argument: he claims that the truth predicate is the only 
expression that is necessary for setting up all seemingly Liar-ish paradoxes. Thus, by (Method), 
one can conclude that the truth predicate is the sole culprit in any such paradoxes in which it 
features.  
My only modification to Scharp’s claims here is that instead of just the truth predicate, 
the focus should instead be on all alethic expressions—that is, all expressions that are, either by 
explicit definition or via intersubstitutability, governed by (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim), either in 
general or for some particular natural number n. The reason for this modification is that 
Grelling’s paradox is a palpably Liar-ish paradox that employs ‘satisfies’ rather than ‘true’.90  
 One might reasonably feel concerned about (Method)’s appeal to the vague and obscure 
property being seemingly Liar-ish. Unless this property is defined in some precise way, it will be 
unclear exactly which paradoxes are eligible to falsify hypotheses as to which expression is the 
culprit. My own preferred way to help clarify this property is to identify it with being Liar-like as 
                                                          
89 Strictly speaking, Scharp’s concern is with the everyday concept of truth, assuming there is a unique one. But for 
my purposes it is safe to assume that he is also concerned with the predicate ‘is true’ (as ordinarily used).  
90 Here is Grelling’s paradox:  
1. |satisfies (‘~satisfies (x, x)’, ‘~satisfies (x, x)’)   (assume for reductio) 
2. |~satisfies (‘~satisfies (x, x)’, ‘~satisfies (x, x)’)    (Sat-elim), (1)  
3. |Contradiction       Contradiction Intro, (1), (2) 
4. ~satisfies (‘~satisfies (x, x)’, ‘~satisfies (x, x)’)   Reductio ad absurdum, (1)-(3) 
5. satisfies (‘~satisfies (x, x)’, ‘~satisfies (x, x)’)   (Sat-intro), (4) 
6. Contradiction       Contradiction Intro, (4), 
(5) 
Most commentators who consider Grelling’s paradox find it to be seemingly Liar-ish.  
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defined in Section 2. (Recall: a paradox is Liar-like if it makes ineliminable use, for some natural 
number n, of (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim), possibly modulo some minor cosmetic differences. So, 
given that (T-intro) and (T-elim) are essentially the special case of (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim) for 
n = 0, any paradox that makes ineliminable use of (T-intro) and (T-elim) will count as Liar-like.) 
One can readily check that this definition agrees with most of our informal judgments about 
which paradoxes are Liar-ish, and it is hard to come up with counterexamples. However, this 
way of making ‘Liar-ish’ precise puts my claim that ‘true’ is the culprit at a serious advantage by 
legislating paradoxes that don’t involve expressions that refer to truth out of the definition. 
Therefore in the rest of this section I’ll leave ‘Liar-ish’ unspecified, to be understood in an 
informal way. It won’t matter in what follows, since most people would be willing to count all of 
the particular paradoxes that I’ll discuss as being seemingly Liar-ish.  
 
10.1. Negation  
 Concerning most views that target ‘not’ and its kin, I have already said most of what I 
want to say. For one thing, in the passage quoted above, Scharp already mentions that there are 
seemingly Liar-ish paradoxes in which negation does not feature, such as Curry’s paradox (see 
below). So, the view that negation is the culprit in the seemingly Liar-ish paradoxes in which it 
features falls afoul of (Method). Moreover, most views that target negation involve allowing that 
some sentences that express genuinely contradictory propositions can nonetheless be jointly true. 
However, this concession violates a belief that is much more deeply entrenched than any that 
aberrationism requires us to relinquish.91  
                                                          
91 See (Smith 2006) for a related criticism of (Priest 1987). 
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 All that said, there is one particular view that targets negation which I ought to discuss, 
given its similarity to aberrationism in a certain important respect. Like aberrationists, in (Kearns 
2007) John Kearns posits a one-off aberration in the culprit that he identifies; but unlike 
aberrationists he identifies negation as the culprit. Kearns’ view concerns not sentences but 
rather entities that he calls “statements”—speech acts that are performed by uttering sentences 
and which are either true or false.92 The core of the view is the claim that when we try to make a 
“Liar statement”—a statement that asserts of itself that it is not true, we fail. He considers the 
following example:  
(a) Statement (a) is not true  
Here, following Kearns, one should take ‘(a)’ to refer not to the sentence displayed, namely, 
‘Statement (a) is not true’, but rather to the (putative) statement that one would make by 
assertively uttering that sentence. According to Kearns, “In trying to make a statement that is 
true or false [by uttering the displayed sentence], we end up with a ‘statement’ that is true if, and 
only if, it is not true. But this is not possible. Nothing has a property if, and only if, it does not 
have that property” (p.53). Thus, he concludes, (a) is not in fact a statement, but rather an 
“attempted statement.”  
Now, Kearns does think that there is such a thing as the statement  
 (b) Statement (a) is true 
(Similarly to ‘(a)’, ‘(b)’ here should be understood as referring to the statement one would make 
by assertively uttering the sentence ‘Statement (a) is true’.) One initial complication that Kearns 
acknowledges is that since (a) is merely an attempted statement, the term ‘Statement (a)’ may 
fail to refer, thereby robbing (b) of any subject matter. That would, it seems, interfere with (b)’s 
                                                          
92 See p.32 for Kearns’ definition of ‘statement’. 
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being a statement. However, Kearns suggests instead that ‘Statement (a)’ refers to the “attempted 
statement” (a), despite the fact that (a) is not a genuine statement (p.53). Let us grant this for the 
sake of argument. (Note also that the concern is mollified somewhat if one changes (b) by 
deleting ‘Statement’. Even if (a) isn’t strictly a statement, whatever it is, as long as it exists one 
can surely use ‘(a)’ to refer to it.)  
Kearns claims that (b) is simply false.93 At the same time, he denies that the result of 
applying negation to (b)—namely, (a)—is itself a statement. He writes:  
The intention for negation is that in negating a true statement, we will obtain a statement 
that is not true, and in negating a statement that is not true, we will obtain a true 
statement….[This] intention…is realized on most occasions when we negate a statement. 
It cannot be realized when the negation is applied in such a way as to yield a paradoxical 
attempted statement. There are…attempted Liar statements, but no actual Liar 
statements….[These are] cases of [speech] acts that aspire to be acts of a certain kind, but 
fail to make the grade. (p.53) 
 
So, Kearns posits a one-off aberration in the behavior of negation as applied to statements: the 
negation of a false statement is usually itself a statement, but sometimes this fails. (Similarly, 
Kearns is committed to positing a one-off aberration in the behavior of ‘not’ (and its formal 
counterpart ‘~’): for certain, Liar-ish putative statements S (such as (a) above), in assertively 
uttering the result of concatenating ‘~’ with a sentence that attributes truth to S, one fails to make 
any statement whatsoever. By contrast, for most other putative statements S’, assertively uttering 
such a sentence will amount to (performing the speech act of) negating <S’, truth>. In these 
respects, Kearns’ view is like aberrationism, except that it targets ‘not’ and the like.)  
Before I engage with Kearns in earnest, a word about negations of statements. The word 
‘statement’ is often used to designate sentences or propositions, and the idea of the negation of a 
sentence or a proposition is clear and familiar. But for Kearns statements are speech acts, and it 
                                                          
93 See p.55. 
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is less clear what the negation of a speech act is than what the negation of a sentence or 
proposition is. Of course, if Kearns’ talk of negating statements is unclear, then so is his 
diagnosis of the Liar paradox. And even further, for Kearns, (a) is the result of negating a 
statement, namely (b); so if it is unclear what the result of negating a statement is, then even 
Kearns’ formulation of the paradox is unclear.  
Here, then, is my best attempt to clarify the idea of negation as applied to statements. 
Firstly, I’ll assume henceforth that only statements that consist of assertions of propositions can 
be negated. Now, suppose we are given a statement S which consists in the assertion of some 
proposition p. Then, I propose, to negate S is to make a statement—following Kearns, let’s give 
it the labels ‘~S’ and ‘the negation of S’. ~S, I suggest, is the speech act that consists of asserting 
the proposition ~p. Importantly, this way of characterizing statement negation makes room for 
Kearns’ distinction between denying a statement and accepting its negation. (Though I do not see 
how one can define the act of accepting the negation of a statement except by identifying it with 
the act of negating the statement. But none of Kearns’ claims relies on there being a distinction 
between these.) And my characterization of negation as applied to statements makes sense of 
Kearns’ claim that (a) is the result of negating (b): (b) is the speech act consisting of asserting the 
proposition that (a) is true, and (a) is the speech act consisting of asserting the negation of that 
proposition, namely, the proposition that (a) is not true.  
While Kearns might be able to accept my characterization of negation as applied to 
statements, it is worth noting that he would probably not endorse it as a definition. That is 
because for Kearns, speech acts, not propositions, are the most fundamental bearers of semantic 
properties, and therefore are the most fundamental things that can be negated, conjoined, 
disjoined, etc. By contrast, to take my characterization as a definition is to define negation as 
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applied to statements in terms of propositional negation. But whether it counts as a definition or 
merely a characterization, for the sake of clarity I’ll henceforth understand Kearns’ talk of 
negation as applied to statements in the way I have described.  
  With that description of negation for statements in hand, a Liar statement would 
presumably be a statement S which consists of asserting the proposition that S is not true.94 (So, 
such a statement S would not be identical with its own negation. The negation of S would be the 
speech act consisting of the assertion of the proposition that the proposition that S is not true is 
not true.) That definition, at least, includes (a). Kearns’ claim, again, is that there are no Liar 
statements, so on my characterization it would amount to the claim that there is no statement S 
consisting of the assertion of the proposition that S is not true. 
Now to articulate my objections to Kearns’ solution. The main problem is that the 
solution does not extend to Curry’s paradox as adapted to statements.95 Consider the following 
“Curry statement”:  
 (c) If (c) is true then grass is purple  
(Again, take ‘(c)’ to denote not a sentence but a statement or putative statement.) Provided, as 
Kearns’ discussion presupposes, that we can reason with statements as we do with sentences, 
reflection on (c) leads quickly to contradictions.96 And whereas Kearns’ solution was to posit a 
                                                          
94 Kearns uses ‘Liar statement’ in several places, particularly to describe (a) above. But he never explicitly defines 
‘Liar statement’.  
95 See (Prior 1955) for the first articulation of the paradox in the form it has standardly assumed.  
96 Here is a simple proof:  
1. |(c) is true     (assumption) 
2. |If (c) is true then grass is purple ((T-out), (1)) 
3. |Grass is purple    (conditional elimination, (1), (2)) 
4. If (c) is true then grass is purple  (conditional introduction, (1)-(3)) 
5. (c) is true    ((T-in), (4)) 
6. Grass is purple   (conditional elimination, (4), (5)) 
One might be concerned about the fact that this derivation invokes both conditional introduction and conditional 
elimination, and only the material conditional obeys both of these rules. Since the material conditional can be 
defined in terms of disjunction and negation, one might conclude that Curry’s paradox invokes negation in disguise. 
However, there are versions of the paradoxical reasoning that do not appeal to both conditional introduction and 
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one-off aberration in the behavior of negation as applied to statements, the case of (c) appears to 
show that the conditional-as-applied-to-statements must also be subject to such aberrations, if 
paradox is to be avoided along anything like the lines Kearns proposes. Kearns could solve this 
problem by holding that both negation and the conditional exhibit aberrations. But rather than 
posit several different kinds of aberrations, a more efficient solution would be the analogue of 
aberrationism as applied to statements: posit some aberrations in the truth-attributing operator 
(that is, the operator that when attached to a statement S results in a statement consisting of the 
assertion that S is true).  
 A variation on this problem for Kearns arises in connection with sentences. Kearns would 
not deny that it makes sense to speak of sentences as being true or false.97 But in that case, we 
can formulate Liar sentences such as sentence A and then ask after their alethic statuses. Initially, 
one simply worries that Kearns has no way to answer such questions, since his view addresses 
itself only to statements. However, the matter turns out to be more complex, since Kearns holds 
that sentences acquire their semantic features from the statements that they are conventionally 
used to make: 
It is [speech] acts which are the primary bearers of such semantic features as meaning 
and truth. Written and spoken expressions have syntactic features and can themselves be 
regarded as syntactic objects. Most expressions are conventionally used to perform acts 
with particular meanings; the meanings commonly assigned to expressions are the 
meanings of acts they are conventionally used to perform. However, these conventions 
are not the source of the meanings of meaningful acts, for the language user’s intentions 
determine the meanings of his language acts. (p.32) 
 
If Kearns is right that sentences acquire their semantic properties from the speech acts they are 
conventionally used to perform, then to see whether there are any Liar sentences (in my sense of 
                                                          
elimination. As (Beall 2013) illustrates, it suffices to have a conditional  for which the sentence ˹(φ & (φ  ψ))  
ψ˺ is true, for all sentences φ and ψ. Alternatively, it also suffices to have a conditional for which ˹(φ  (φ  ψ))  
(φ  ψ)˺ is true for all sentences φ and ψ. 
97 See his p.32.  
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the term98), one needs to examine the speech acts that such sentences and their constituents are 
conventionally used to perform. Kearns needs to show one of two things: either i) that there are 
no Liar sentences, or ii) that there are Liar sentences but that it follows from the way they or their 
constituents are conventionally used to perform speech acts that these sentences do not say what 
they appear to say.  
(i) is quite implausible. Let us grant Kearns his view about how sentences acquire their 
semantic properties, and assume likewise for sub-sentential expressions—that is, we will assume 
that sub-sentential expressions acquire their semantic values from the way they are used in the 
performance of speech acts. Then it is clear that ‘is not’ is used to perform speech acts of 
negation and that ‘true’ is used to perform speech acts that consist of, among other things, 
attributing truth. Furthermore, the speech act performed by introducing the expression ‘A’ via a 
setoff and parentheses, as in  
(A) A is not true 
guarantees that in the ensuing discussion, ‘A’ will be used to perform speech acts which involve 
reference to the sentence displayed. Given the above facts about which speech acts the 
constituents of A are used to perform, it is hard to deny that these expressions simpliciter refer as 
we pre-theoretically expect. For that reason, then, it is hard to deny that there are Liar sentences 
(on my definition of ‘Liar sentence’): sentences S that result from concatenating a negation 
symbol to a sentence whose grammatical subject is an expression that refers to S and whose 
grammatical predicate is an expression that refers to truth.  
                                                          
98 Kearns uses ‘Liar sentence’ in a different way. For him, if a (putative) statement says of itself that it is not true, 
then any sentence(s) used to express that statement is a Liar sentence. (See p.51 and p.53 for evidence that this is 
how Kearns uses the term ‘Liar sentence’.) 
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Given that there are Liar sentences, Kearns ought to embrace (ii). And given what Kearns 
wants to say about statements, his most natural move is to claim that the occurrence of ‘not’ in 
any Liar sentence undergoes an aberration, failing to refer to the standard truth function. 
However, similarly to the statement (c) above, there are Liar-like sentences that do not involve 
negation. The most prominent example is Curry sentences, such as ‘If this sentence is true then 0 
= 1’. As stated, Kearns’ most natural approach to Liar sentences does not generalize to these 
other Liar-like sentences.  
  
10.2. Self-Reference 
Historically, blaming and then banning self-reference has been a common approach to the 
Liar paradox.99 Why, one might wonder, is the expression in Liar sentences that refers to that 
sentence itself not a culprit? Does not self-reference show up in all seemingly Liar-ish 
paradoxes?  
In fact, however, this second question has a straightforward, negative answer. (Yablo 
1993) develops a seemingly Liar-ish paradox that does not rely on self-reference. The paradox 
consists of an infinite list of sentences:  
 (S1) For all n > 2, Sn is not true.  
 (S2) For all n > 3, Sn is not true.  
 … 
 (Sm) For all n > m + 1, Sn is not true.  
 … 
 
A few moments’ reflection on these sentences generates a paradox that is palpably Liar-ish. But 
it is clear that none of the sentences contains any expression referring to that sentence.  
                                                          
99 For example, (Tarski 1935) can be read this way.  
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 Still, however, while Yablo’s paradox does not strictly speaking involve self-reference, it 
does involve a kind of circularity,100 and one might take circularity of whatever form to be 
responsible for the paradox, self-reference being just a special case. Accordingly, then, one 
might take the culprit in each Liar-like sentence to be whatever expression is responsible for the 
circularity. In (Cook 2006), Roy Cook does an admirable job making this idea more precise. 
There, Cook defines four different kinds of fixed points. (For my purposes it doesn’t matter 
exactly what fixed points are, or what Cook’s particular kinds of fixed points are.) He shows that 
formalizing any of several familiar seemingly Liar-ish paradoxes, including Yablo’s, will 
involve invoking the Diagonal Lemma (or some generalization thereof) to prove the existence of 
a fixed point of one of these four kinds. Thus, one might conclude, for any Liar-like sentence, 
whatever expression (putatively) makes the sentence count as a fixed point of one of these kinds 
is the culprit in that sentence. (In Liar sentences as I have defined them, the expression in 
question would be the one that putatively refers to the sentence itself.)  
 However, Cook also shows that one can get a palpably Liar-ish paradox without either 
the Diagonal Lemma or fixed points, by using infinitary conjunction:  
 (S1’) S2’ is not true & S3’ is not true &…  
 (S2’) S3’ is not true & S4’ is not true &…  
… 
 (Sm’) Sm+1’ is not true & Sm+2’ is not true &… 
 … 
Thus, ubiquitous as fixed points are in formalizations of seemingly Liar-ish paradoxes, they are 
not strictly necessary for constructing a paradox that is palpably Liar-like.  
                                                          
100 On some readings, each sentence begins with a universal quantifier that ranges over all natural numbers, followed 
by a conditional. E.g., ‘For all n, if n > 2 then Sn is not true’. On these readings, there is circularity, in the sense that 
each sentence contains a quantifier that ranges over its own index.  
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One might respond here by doubting that Cook’s paradox really is Liar-like, despite the 
fact that it strikes many philosophers as being so. Any genuinely Liar-like paradox, one might 
insist, must involve referential circularity of one kind or another. (In fact, a similar reaction to 
Yablo’s paradox was available: one might have insisted that every paradox deserving of the title 
‘Liar-like’ must involve self-reference.) But as it stands this response is dissatisfying. It amounts 
to simply legislating circularity into one’s definition of ‘Liar-ish’, in defiance of the obvious 
similarities between Cook’s paradox and Yablo’s. The most striking such similarity is the fact 
that for each natural number i, (Si) and (Si’) say very similar things; they have, for example, the 
same truth conditions, insofar as one can make sense of the notion of truth-conditions as applied 
to paradox-generating sentences. If Yablo’s paradox counts as Liar-like, I contend, then surely 
Cook’s Paradox should as well. (Note also, for what it is worth, that on my preferred way of 
defining being Liar-like, Cook’s paradox counts: the reasoning involved makes central use of (T-
intro) and (T-elim).)  
 Finally, whether or not Cook’s paradox is Liar-like, it is a virtue of approaches to the Liar 
which target alethic expressions that they can be applied to it. By contrast, approaches that target 
fixed points cannot apply to Cook’s paradox. Similarly, solutions that target alethic expressions 
can be applied to Yablo’s paradox, whereas solutions that target self-reference strictly so-called 
cannot. So, approaches to the Liar paradox that target alethic expressions have the added benefit 
of applying to other paradoxes, whether or not these officially count as Liar-like. 
 I will end my discussion of alternative approaches on this optimistic note. In the next 
section, I will provide some support for (Aberrations) and (Determined) that is independent of 
considerations having to do with the Liar paradox.  
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11. Independent Motivations for Reference by Occurrences and (Determined)  
11.1. Reference by Occurrences  
In this subsection, I will argue that quite generally it makes sense to speak of an 
occurrence of an expression as having a referent. Then, in Section 11.2, I will argue that for any 
sentence, what Russellian proposition(s) it expresses, expresses the negation of, etc.  is 
determined by the reference of the occurrences of the expressions it contains, rather than the 
expressions simpliciter.  
To begin with, it helps to note that the notion of reference by occurrences has a long and 
distinguished history in analytic philosophy. (Frege 1892) holds that when a word occurs in the 
that-phrase of a propositional attitude description (such as ‘Sylvia believes that it will rain 
tomorrow’), the word refers to what is usually its sense (its customary sense), rather than what is 
usually its referent (its customary referent). This amounts to the claim that the occurrence of the 
word in the that-phrase differs in reference from its other occurrences, or, if one prefers, from the 
word simpliciter. Moreover, it is worth noting, in such cases it is reference by the occurrence in 
the that-phrase that contributes to the truth-conditions of the attitude-attributing sentence, not 
reference by the word simpliciter or by its other occurrences. Thus, on Frege’s account, the 
reason that the sentences ‘Lois believes that Superman is Clark Kent’ and ‘Lois believes that 
Superman is Superman’ differ in truth value is that the occurrences of ‘Superman’ refer to the 
customary sense of ‘Superman’ and the occurrence of ‘Clark Kent’ refers to the customary sense 
of ‘Clark Kent’.  
Even if Frege endorsed the notion of reference by occurrences, however, it will help to 
have some less controversial examples. Perhaps the most compelling case is that of pronouns. A 
pronoun simpliciter never refers, but in general, some of its occurrences do. E.g., the word ‘him’ 
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does not refer to any particular individual, but in the sentence ‘Michelle Obama plays with Bo by 
throwing sticks for him to fetch’, the occurrence of ‘him’ refers to Bo. (That is, relative to 
contexts in which ‘Bo’ is understood to refer to the Obama family’s dog.) Pro-adjectives are 
similar. The word ‘so’ (when used as a proadjective, as well as more generally) does not refer 
simpliciter. However, in the sentence ‘The voters wanted Barack Obama to be judicious, and he 
is so’, the occurrence of the word ‘so’ refers to judiciousness. Similar claims can be made about 
other pro-forms—pro-verbs, pro-adverbs, etc.  
 Another convincing example of reference by occurrences arises when an ambiguity is 
resolved by a word’s component context. As (Pustejovsky 1996) explains,  
there are some cases of…ambiguity that do not require context [of utterance] and 
pragmatic information for disambiguation, so much as the disambiguation that comes by 
virtue of the predication relation in the sentence. For example, in (15) below, the 
appropriate sense for the noun club is arrived at by virtue of sortal knowledge of the NP 
appearing in the inverted subject position… 
(15)  a. Nadia’s favorite club is the five-iron. 
           b. Nadia’s favorite club is the Carlton. (p.30) 
 
If indeed the underlined occurrences in (a) and (b) are occurrences of a single word, ‘club’, then 
we have here a case in which the reference of the occurrence of a word depends on the 
component context. However, some philosophers and linguists are reluctant to regard the 
occurrences underlined above as occurrences of the same word.101 So, it is worth noting that 
Pustejovsky’s remarks also hold in the more straightforward case of polysemy, which is 
traditionally understood as the special case of ambiguity in which the distinct meanings involved 
                                                          
101 If we identify words with lexical entries, then this denial sits naturally with the conception of ambiguity as 
involving two lexical entries which are associated with a single grapheme, phoneme, or grapheme-phoneme pair, as 
opposed to a single lexical entry with multiple meanings listed within it. A consideration that supports taking the 
occurrences underlined above to be occurrences of different words is that one might understand uses of ‘club’ as in 
(15)a but not as in (15)b, and such a failure need not be due to stupidity or inattentiveness—that is, it need not be a 
failure of performance. This suggests that the particular psychological competences involved in understanding these 
sentences are different; and it is reasonable to hold that words which are understood via the exercise of different 
psychological competences are different words. I am grateful to Harold Hodes for pointing this out.  
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are closely related.102 In such cases, it is less controversial that it is the same word which occurs. 
For example, from his p.53:  
 (48)  a. Mary regretted publishing the article in Illustrated Semantics.103 
         b. Mary regretted the article in Illustrated Semantics.  
 
It is uncontroversial that the underlined occurrences above are occurrences of the same word.104 
But in (48)a the occurrence of ‘regretted’ refers to a relation between persons and action types, 
whereas in (48)b it refers to a relation between persons and objects. Because the disambiguation 
is achieved by the component context, it is, in effect, the occurrences that refer; and it is their 
reference that contributes to the truth-conditions of the respective sentences.  
 Having emphasized that polysemy furnishes us with plausible examples of reference by 
occurrences, I hasten to add that aberrationism is not committed to the claim that ‘true’ and other 
alethic expressions are polysemous. The most striking difference between one-off aberrations 
and polysemy is that polysemous words have multiple (though closely related) senses as well as 
multiple referents. By contrast, for example, although key occurrences of ‘true’ in Liar-like 
sentences fail to refer to truth, the word ‘true’ has only one sense.105 Another difference is that 
polysemy is not “one-off”—that is, while the reference of a polysemous expression can depend 
on its component context, for each one of its distinct referents there is a wide range of 
component contexts that can trigger reference to that referent. By contrast, alethic expressions 
                                                          
102 If ambiguity is characterized by distinct lexical entries associated with the same grapheme, phoneme, or 
grapheme-phoneme pair, then polysemy is characterized by a single lexical entry with multiple meanings listed 
within it. If ambiguity is characterized by a single lexical entry with multiple distinct meanings listed within it, then 
polysemy is the special case of ambiguity in which these meanings are closely related. According to (Sennet 2016), 
polysemy has traditionally been understood in the latter way. 
103 I have changed Pustejovsky’s example slightly. His (48)a involves a propositional attitude construction, which 
complicates matters unnecessarily.  
104 Returning, for example, to the question of the competences involved in understanding these occurrences, it is 
plausible that understanding (48)a and (48)b involves the same competence, and that understanding one but not the 
other is indicative of a failure of performance, not of competence. So, if we individuate words via the competences 
involved in understanding them, then we will count the underlined occurrences in (48) as occurrences of the same 
word.  
105 Or, at least, aberrationists need not claim that it has multiple senses.  
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undergo aberrations only in a very narrow range of component contexts: when they occur as key 
occurrences in Liar-like sentences.  
 Before moving on, I will discuss two more controversial examples of (what I take to be) 
reference by occurrences. (Dummett 1973) observes that “[e]ven when a sequence of words has 
a sense, taken as a whole, and the words composing it occur in succession in a sentence, they 
may not, in that sentence, compose that or any other phrase having sense as a whole” (p.34). He 
gives two examples:  
(Tore)  The man wearing my coat tore up the letter 
(Killed)  Was what Henry killed a man? 
Again, Dummett’s claim is that the occurrences of the underlined phrases fail to have senses, 
despite the fact that the phrases of which they are occurrences, considered as expressions 
simpliciter, do have senses. But as with sense, so with reference—or, if one prefers, semantic 
value. The semantic value of the phrase ‘my coat tore’ simpliciter is a proposition (in many 
contexts of utterance). But its occurrence in the sentence (Tore) does not have a semantic value. 
Similarly, the phrase ‘killed a man’ simpliciter refers to an action-type. But its occurrence in 
(Killed) does not refer. These examples, then, are cases in which the semantic value of an 
occurrence of an expression (if there is one in these cases) can come apart from that of the 
expression simpliciter.106  
Finally, consider the case of names. In (Jeshion 2015), Robin Jeshion argues that as they 
occur in most sentences, names designate individuals. However, she also holds that as they occur 
in certain kinds of sentences, names function as count nouns, designating properties.107 That is to 
                                                          
106 Thanks to Harold Hodes for these examples.  
107 Chomsky makes a similar claim in (Chomsky 1965) p.100. 
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say, for many names, some occurrences of the name refer to individuals, while others refer to 
properties. Here are some of Jeshion’s examples:  
[1] Alfred studies in Princeton. 
[17] Some Alfreds are crazy; some are sane. 
On Jeshion’s view, the occurrence of ‘Alfred’ in [1] refers to an individual, whereas the 
occurrence in [17] refers to a property, being called ‘Alfred’. The point is that if Jeshion is right, 
then in general the reference of a name is sensitive to its component context, and it makes sense 
to speak of an occurrence of a name as referring.  
In light of all these examples, I now claim that even for an expression that is usually 
thought to refer simpliciter, it can also make sense to speak of some occurrences of this 
expression as referring. For instance, in the sentence ‘Hillary Clinton spoke in the 2015 
Democratic debate’, the occurrence of the name ‘Hillary Clinton’ refers to Hillary Clinton. 
Admittedly, in the case of an expression simpliciter that refers to something, speaking of 
reference by the occurrences of the expression is usually unnecessary, because these usually refer 
to the referent of the expression simpliciter. Still, necessary or not, speaking of reference by the 
occurrences is harmless and makes perfectly good sense. To bring the point home, it is worth 
noting that people have made similar arguments concerning the relativization of reference to 
contexts of utterance. It is now utterly standard in semantic theory to speak of expressions as 
referring relative to contexts of utterance. On this way of speaking, it is trivial to treat a context-
insensitive expression as referring to the same thing relative to all (or nearly all) contexts of 
utterance, rather than as referring simpliciter.  
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11.2. The Independent Case for (Determined) 
Even if one were to grant that occurrences can refer and that they can differ in reference 
from the expressions of which they are occurrences (that is, that (Aberrations) is true), one might 
doubt that this helps with avoiding paradox. For example, one might think that whether or not A 
expresses the negation of the Russellian proposition <A, truth> is determined by what ‘true’ and 
‘A’ refer to, and what any of their occurrences refer to is simply irrelevant. And one might make 
similar claims for any other sentence: quite generally, what (if any) Russellian propositions a 
sentence expresses, expresses the negation of, the conjunction of, etc., one might argue, depends 
on the reference of its expressions simpliciter, not of their occurrences. Thus, one might hold that 
(Determined) is false. (Recall: (Determined) is the claim that when an occurrence of an 
expression in a Liar-like sentence differs in reference from the expression of which it is an 
occurrence, what Russellian propositions (if any) the sentence expresses, expresses the negation 
of, the conjunction of, etc., is determined by what the occurrence refers to, rather than by what 
the expression simpliciter refers to.) 
One might dodge this worry by maintaining that strictly speaking expressions as such do 
not refer. On that view, an expression simpliciter can refer to something only in the sense that 
most of its occurrences refer to that thing. For any sentence which contains an expression that 
refers in this sense, it is implausible that the referential behavior of the occurrences of the 
expression outside this sentence could have more influence on what Russellian propositions the 
sentence expresses, expresses the negation of, the conjunction of, etc. than the referential 
behavior of the occurrence(s) in the sentence. Thus, if expressions simpliciter do not strictly 
speaking refer, then (Determined) seems likely to come out true.  
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However, the claim that expressions as such do not refer is controversial, and 
aberrationism does not require that it be true. Instead, I propose to defend (Determined) by 
repeating my argumentative strategy from the last subsection, that is, by generalizing from 
examples in which it is reference by occurrences that determines what sentences say. More 
specifically, I now make the following claim: 
(Generalized Determined) What Russellian propositions (if any) a sentence expresses, 
expresses the negation of, the conjunction of, etc., is 
determined by what the occurrences of its constituent 
expressions refer to, rather than by what the expressions 
themselves refer to. 
 
To see why (Generalized Determined) is true, recall the case of pro-forms: again, a pro-form 
simpliciter never refers, but some of its occurrences do. E.g., the word ‘him’ does not refer to 
anything, but (relative to a context of use establishes that the name ‘Bo’ refers to the Obamas’ 
dog, Bo,) the occurrence of ‘him’ in the sentence ‘Michelle Obama plays with Bo by throwing 
sticks for him to fetch’ refers to Bo. Now, relative to such a context, this example sentence 
attributes a relation to the pair <Michelle Obama, Bo>. And which pair this sentence attributes 
this relation to must be determined (in part) by facts about reference, in particular facts about the 
reference of ‘him’ or its occurrence in the sentence. But since the pronoun ‘him’ does not refer 
simpliciter, there is only one candidate referential relation here: the one between the occurrence 
of ‘him’ in the sentence and Bo. Thus the fact that this occurrence refers to Bo has to be what (in 
part) determines to which pair the sentence attributes the relation.  
 Pro-adjectives provide a similar example. E.g., the word ‘so’ does not refer to anything, 
but in the sentence ‘The voters wanted Barack Obama to be judicious, and he is so’, the 
occurrence of ‘so’ refers to judiciousness. Now, this sentence attributes a property to Barack 
Obama. And which property the sentence attributes must be determined (in part) by facts about 
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reference, in particular facts about the reference of ‘so’. But since the pro-adjective ‘so’ does not 
refer simpliciter, there is only one candidate referential relation here: the one between the 
occurrence of ‘so’ in the sentence and Barack Obama. Thus, the fact that this occurrence refers to 
Barack Obama has to be what (in part) determines to which pair the sentence attributes the 
relation.  
 The same points hold for the other examples we have seen. Even in contexts in which the 
phrase ‘my coat tore’ expresses a proposition, it is not by expressing this proposition that this 
phrase contributes to the determination of what the sentence ‘The man wearing my coat tore up 
the letter’ says. Rather, the occurrence of the phrase in that sentence arguably fails to refer, and 
surely enough, the sentence expresses no proposition involving the tearing of a coat. Similarly 
with the sentence (Killed) from above. In all these cases, then, it is the semantic behavior of the 
occurrence, not the expression simpliciter, that matters for what proposition the sentence 
expresses. Generalizing on these examples, we arrive at (Generalized Determined).  
Admittedly, in the case of sentences that contain referring expressions such as names and 
predicates, it will usually be harmless to take reference by the expression simpliciter to 
determine what Russellian propositions the sentence expresses, expresses the negation of, etc.  
That is because an occurrence of an expression that refers to something nearly always refers to 
that same thing. But the point concerns the comparative naturalness of rival semantic theories, 
not the ways that these theories might be put into practice. The point is that it would be oddly 
disjunctive to regard reference by occurrences as being the thing that contributes to what 
Russellian propositions a sentence expresses, expresses the negation of, etc.  in the case of the 
kinds of examples we have seen, but to regard reference by expressions simpliciter as making 
this contribution in other, more familiar cases. Rather, the more natural view is that the same 
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thing—viz., reference by occurrences—makes this contribution in both settings, but that this 
contribution is masked by the fact that most referring expressions agree in reference with nearly 
all of their occurrences.  
 
11.2.1. Making Mysteries 
 Another concern about (Generalized Determined) is that together with (Aberrations) it 
makes a mystery out of the fact that for any expression that refers to something, nearly all of the 
occurrences of that expression refer to that same thing. Pre-theoretically, one might have 
explained this by endorsing (Explanation): 
(Explanation) An occurrence of a referring expression in some sense gets 
its referent (if any) from the expression of which it is an 
occurrence.  
 
Now, “gets its referent from” is obscure. But there is a particularly straightforward way of 
making it precise:  
(Expressions Fundamental) An occurrence of a referring expression can refer to an 
object x only in the sense of being an occurrence of an 
expression that refers to x.  
 
Plainly, however, (Expressions Fundamental) contradicts (Aberrations), and so is unavailable to 
aberrationists.  
Still, it is worth observing that there may be ways of clarifying (Explanation) that are 
compatible with aberrationism. Admittedly, this is not immediately obvious; (Generalized 
Determined) makes it hard to see how anything like (Explanation) could be true. If an occurrence 
of a referring expression in some sense gets its referent from the expression, then how come it is 
reference by the occurrences of the expression in a sentence that contributes to what Russellian 
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propositions the sentence expresses, expresses the negation of, etc., rather than reference by the 
expression itself?  
 My answer lies in the Lewisian claims about reference that I made in Section 3.3.2. As I 
explained there, for some kinds of expressions, in particular, expressions that are introduced via 
a theory, an expression of this kind refers to that thing (if there is one) that comes closest to 
respecting the principles that govern the expression. (Again, as I defined respect in Section 3.3.2, 
an object respects a principle for an expression if, were the expression to refer to that object, the 
principle comes out true, or truth-preserving. See Appendix A for an alternative definition.) It 
follows from these claims that any occurrence of such an expression that has a referent has that 
same referent, unless that would lead to a contradiction. In that event, the occurrence refers to 
that thing (if there is one) which is next in line for coming closest to respecting the principles for 
the expression. That, I propose, is the sense in which (Explanation) is true; an occurrence of a 
theoretical term acquires an object o (if any) as its referent in virtue of the fact that the term is 
governed by certain principles P, and the fact that o comes as close as possible to respecting P, or 
is next in line. So, one can correctly say that the occurrence acquires its referent by being an 
occurrence of an expression that has P as a principle.  
Again, the point here is that I can tell a principled story about why there is generally 
agreement in reference between a referring expression and its occurrences. Indeed, as one might 
have desired, that story can involve appealing to (Explanation), provided that (Explanation) is 
clarified in the way that I propose.  
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12. Concluding Remarks  
 In this essay, I have argued that no Liar-like sentence says what it would have to say in 
order for the reasoning in the associated paradox to be legitimate. In particular, sentence A from 
the beginning fails to express the negation of the Russellian proposition <A, truth>, and similarly 
for all other Liar sentences. Assuming that the word ‘true’ refers to truth and the name ‘A’ as 
used in this essay refers to A, I showed that for A to fail to say of itself that it is not true, the 
following must hold:  
(Aberrations) For any Liar-like sentence, the key occurrences of its alethic 
expressions differ in reference from the expressions of which they 
are occurrences. 
and 
(Determined) When an occurrence of an expression in a Liar-like sentence 
differs in reference from the expression of which it is an 
occurrence, what Russellian propositions (if any) the sentence 
expresses, expresses the negation of, the conjunction of, etc. is 
determined by what the occurrence refers to, rather than by what 
the expression simpliciter refers to. 
 
One contribution of this paper is simply to articulate and endorse (Aberrations) and (Determined) 
explicitly. While I have argued that (Smith 2006) must rely on these claims, open endorsement 
of them, and concerted hashing out of their consequences, is, as far as I know, unique to me. In 
addition, in Section 11 I argued that these claims have some plausibility quite independently of 
Liar-like paradoxes.  
Moreover, the availability of moderate aberrationism as an alternative to radical 
aberrationism (Section 3) is important. Radical approaches would have us give up the plausible 
idea that what our words refer to is determined in principled ways by our behavior, mental states 
and physical environment. The availability of moderate views shows that one can diagnose and 
solve the Liar-like paradoxes without giving up this idea. One especially appealing way to 
develop this view, I argued, is to hold that the key occurrences of the alethic expressions in any 
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Liar-like sentence acquire their referents via the same Lewisian pattern that determines reference 
for theoretical terms generally. In addition to allowing for the retention of Semantic 
Supervenience and Semantic Regularity, the availability of this view shows that moderate 
aberrationists have the tools to allow that Liar-like sentences come quite close to saying what 
they appear to say, and thus to do a significant measure of justice to our pre-theoretical 
impressions about these sentences.  
While moderate versions of aberrationism are superior to their radical cousins, both are 
superior to the many alternatives in the literature. The no-proposition view can be cast as a 
distinct approach, but it soon emerges that the best way to develop it is by embracing 
aberrationism. For another thing, aberrationist approaches are not plagued by the incompleteness 
that afflicts views along the lines of (Kripke 1975). They are also preferable to contextualist 
views, such as that of Michael Glanzberg. I questioned Glanzberg’s claim that the logical forms 
of Liar sentences involve quantification over propositions, and found a serious problem with his 
account of context-shifts in the Liar reasoning. However, I saw insight in his observation that 
‘true’ does not pre-theoretically seem to be context-sensitive or the pass ordinary tests for 
context-sensitivity. I argued that these observations cause no problems for aberrationists, since 
aberrationists hold that the behavior of ‘true’ in Liar-like sentences is a one-off aberration from 
its context-insensitive behavior everywhere else. On the other hand, views on which ‘true’ 
contains an indexical element, such as Burge’s, are vulnerable to Glanzberg’s objection.  
After discussing Burge’s view, I turned to that of Keith Simmons, which runs into trouble 
when one tries to quantify over contexts of evaluation. Simmons has to say contradictory things 
about whether the uses of true in certain seemingly paradoxical sentences are context-
independent. This contrasted with aberrationism, which gives the unproblematic diagnosis that 
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the occurrences of ‘true’ in the relevant sentences fail to refer to truth. More generally, for 
aberrationism, unlike for Simmons’ view, no problem is raised by the possibility of quantifying 
over all contexts—be they contexts of evaluation or component contexts.  
Next, I examined Haim Gaifman’s view, which focuses on sentence tokens that comment 
on the semantic status of other sentence tokens. I concluded that Gaifman’s view may be good as 
far as it goes, but it does not address sentences (types or tokens) that comment on the status of 
sentence-types. Thus, as stated it fails to solve the problem that centrally concerns me in the 
essay; and it is not clear how Gaifman’s remarks about the examples that he presents can be 
adapted so as to solve this problem.  
Next I criticized the prosentential views. My objection was that of (Wilson 1990): the 
principal claim made by these views—that sentences involving the word ‘true’ are 
prosentences—violates the linguistic data about English; thus, it is inferior to alternative 
approaches to the Liar that do better on this score, such as my own. For people who endorse the 
pre-theoretically plausible claim that truth exists, the inferiority of prosententialism as an 
approach to the Liar paradox should be welcome news. 
I also argued that aberrationism is superior to wholesale indeterminism, although the two 
views are closely related. Aberrationism’s principal advantage is that it restricts its allegations of 
indeterminacy to the occurrences that are implicated in Liar-like paradoxes, rather than holding 
that all occurrences of ‘true’ are indeterminate. Another advantage is that aberrationism allows 
us to retain the pre-theoretically appealing idea that there is a single property that is 
determinately identical with truth.  
The last family of views I criticized were those that posit some sort of one-off aberration, 
but which target something other than alethic expressions. I discussed (Kearns 2007), which 
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formulates a Liar paradox in terms of “statements”—speech acts in which propositions are 
asserted, denied, conjoined, etc., and which targets negation as applied to statements. I objected 
that Kearns’ view is ill-equipped to handle Curry’s paradox as formulated for statements, and, 
for similar reasons, Curry’s paradox as formulated for sentences. In that section I also discussed 
views that posit one-off aberrations in the expressions that make for self-reference in Liar-like 
sentences of the most familiar kinds. Against these views, I argued that one can construct a 
palpably Liar-ish paradox, due to (Cook 2006), that does not involve self-reference. By a 
familiar methodological principle (applied also to Kearns’ view in connection with Curry’s 
paradox), the expressions (if any) that make for self-reference in a Liar-like sentence are not the 
appropriate ones to target for aberrant behavior.  
 Overall, the greatest strength of aberrationism lies in the balance that it achieves between 
two conflicting requirements: on the one hand, explaining why the Liar reasoning is so 
compelling, and, on the other hand, limiting the semantic abnormalities posited to what is 
necessary for diagnosing these sentences and avoiding paradox. I satisfy the first requirement by 
positing one-off aberrations. Except when they occur in Liar sentences, the expressions 
implicated in the Liar paradox behave exactly as they appear to behave. It is thus only natural for 
us to expect them to behave in these ways in Liar sentences as well. I resist paradox by denying 
that these expressions behave in these ways when they occur in Liar sentences. Still, 
aberrationists are able to satisfy the second, limiting requirement by holding that the aberrations 
are rare: only when they occur in Liar-like sentences do alethic expressions fail to refer as 
expected; this is a one-off aberration from their behavior everywhere else. Thus, aberrationists 
avoid making empirically unsubstantiated claims about how these expressions behave in 
unproblematic sentences.  
121 
 
 
Appendix A: Respect and Explanatory Circles 
In Section 3.3.2, I described reference determination in terms of respect, and then 
described respect in terms of subjunctive conditions that involve reference. One might therefore 
worry that, insofar as they were supposed to explain anything about how reference is determined, 
these descriptions amount to an explanatory circle. However, one should keep in mind that my 
explanatory aim in invoking David Lewis’ ideas about reference is rather modest. I am not 
purporting to define reference in entirely different terms, or demonstrate in full detail how the 
facts about what refers to what are determined from the facts about how people use words, 
though my remarks would naturally fit in as part of such a story. (Note how what I describe in 
(i)-(iv) contrasts with so-called “deflationary” views according to which all that can be said 
about the nature of reference is that ‘dog’ refers to dogs, ‘rain’ refers to rain, and so on.108)  
Still, one might hope to accomplish more than I do by way of explaining reference in 
independent terms. Indeed, perhaps Lewis intended to do more in (Lewis 1970). In particular, 
rather than defining it in terms of reference, one might have taken Lewis to be identifying respect 
with satisfaction-in-the-model-theoretic-sense—henceforth ╞ —and then characterizing 
reference in terms of respect-so-understood. Lewis’ characterization could not count as a 
reduction or even partial reduction of reference, since it describes reference for terms that are 
introduced by a theory in terms of reference for the other terms that feature in the theory.109 But 
still, one might find it more illuminating to characterize one expression’s reference in terms of 
another’s, as Lewis does, than to characterize it in terms of that expression’s own reference in 
                                                          
108 For an example of such a view, see (Horwich 1997). (Field 1994) presents an analogous view concerning truth. 
Compare also (Brandom 1984). 
109 He writes: “Let us assume that [these other terms] have conventionally established interpretations, already well-
known to us” (p.429). Here ‘interpretation’ arguably refers to the term’s referent.  
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other possible worlds, as I do in Section 3.3.2. This is what a definition of the respect relation 
from (i)-(iv) in model-theoretic terms—that is, in terms of ╞ —could hope to accomplish. I will 
now show that someone who insists on such a definition can adopt an aberrationist approach to 
the Liar paradox. However, it will turn out that she must take more assumptions on board than 
she would have to if she understood respect as I do, in terms of subjunctive conditions on 
reference.  
Note first that ╞ is a relation that holds between pairs <M, v> and formulas φ, where M is 
a model and v a variable assignment. However, in (i)-(iv) I speak of respect as a relation between 
a property and a principle, where the latter could be an inference rule. Here, then, is how a 
definition of respect in terms of ╞ would go. Let e be an expression and P an inference rule that 
is a principle for e. (I’ll ignore cases in which the principle is a sentence, since my concern is 
with ‘satisfies’ and (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim) are inference rules.) Let N be an instance of P. If P 
is an introduction rule, let Conclusion(X) be the formula that results from substituting all 
occurrences of e that are introduced via N with occurrences of a free variable X of the 
appropriate type (first order if e is a singular term, second order if e is a predicate). And if P is an 
elimination rule, let Conclusion(X) be the conclusion of N, unchanged. Similarly, if P is an 
elimination rule, let Premise1(X),…,Premisen(X) be the formulas that result from substituting all 
occurrences of e that were eliminated in N with occurrences of a free variable X of the 
appropriate type (first order if e is a singular term, second order if e is a predicate). And if P is an 
introduction rule, let Premise1(X),…,Premisen(X) be N’s premises, unchanged. Let a standard 
model be a model whose interpretation function maps e* to its referent110 for each expression e* 
in N other than e. Then y respectsMT N if and only if: For every standard model M and every 
                                                          
110 Again, recall Lewis, who writes “conventionally established interpretations” (p.429). Keep in mind that we are 
characterizing reference of one expression in terms of the reference of others that are linked to it by a theory.  
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variable assignment v that maps X to y, if <M, v>╞ Premise1(X), and …, and <M, v>╞ 
Premisen(X), then <M, v>╞ Conclusion(X). The idea on offer here is that the relation of respect 
which ought to feature in (i)-(iv) is respectMT, defined in model-theoretic terms.  
So, let us see how (i)-(iv) fare once they are understood in terms of respectMT. First, 
consider my claim that the word ‘true’ simpliciter refers to truth. Plugging respectMT into (i)-(iv), 
we get the claim that ‘true’ refers to that thing, if there is any, which comes closest to 
respectingMT (T-intro) and (T-elim). So, we must figure out whether truth respectsMT (T-intro) 
and (T-elim). The answer depends in part on whether truth respectsMT the following instances 
(and likewise, others that involve Liar-like sentences, but for brevity I’ll leave those to another 
occasion):111  
A is not true 
______________________     (T-intro) 
‘A is not true’ is true 
And:  
‘A is not true’ is true 
______________________     (T-elim) 
A is not true 
 
Let’s start with the instance of (T-intro) above. Suppose that the occurrence of ‘true’ in the 
conclusion is replaced by a free second order variable, X. That gives us:  
A is not true 
______________________     (T-intro) 
‘A is not true’ is X 
 
Now, suppose we are given a standard model M and a variable assignment v that maps X to truth. 
We want to know whether or not the following conditional is true:  
(SatI) If <M, v>╞ ‘A is not true’ then <M, v>╞ ˹‘A is not true’ is X˺  
                                                          
111 Here I simply assume that truth is well-behaved on instances of (T-intro) that do not involve paradoxical 
sentences. 
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How should we evaluate this conditional? Of course, if we assume the antecedent, we can 
disprove the consequent. But on the other hand, for the conditional to be false the antecedent 
must be true and the consequent false. However, the status of both the antecedent and the 
consequent just boils down to the alethic status of A.  
More precisely: for (SatI) to be false, it must be that <M, v>╞ ‘A is not true’ but not <M, 
v>╞ ˹‘A is not true’ is X˺. Fix nonempty set U and interpretation function V such that M = <U, 
V>. Is the antecedent of (SatI) true? <M, v>╞ ‘A is not true’ if and only if V(‘Sentence A’) is not 
an element of V(‘true’) (assuming that the latter is a set!). By the hypothesis that M is a standard 
model, V(‘A’) = A and V(‘true’) = truth. So, (fudging the distinction between truth and the set of 
true sentences, and assuming the latter exists,112) <M, v>╞ ‘A is not true’ if and only if A is not 
true. The same situation arises for the question of whether <M, v>╞ ˹‘A is not true’ is X˺. <M, 
v>╞ ˹‘A is not true’ is X˺ if and only if V(‘A is not true’) is in v(X) (assuming the latter to be a 
set!). But by the assumption that M is a standard model, V(‘A is not true’) is A, and by our 
choice of v, v(X) is truth. Thus <M, v>╞ ˹‘A is not true’ is X˺ if and only if A is true. Looking 
ahead, it is easy to see that the same situation arises for the question of whether ‘true’ respects 
(T-elim). The conditional that is relevant to that question is simply the converse of (SatI).  
So, whether or not truth respectsMT (T-intro) and (T-elim) depends on the status of A. 
That means that my justification for the claim that A is indeterminate cannot rely on the claim 
that truth respectsMT (T-intro) and (T-elim). But recall, my view was that A is indeterminate 
because its occurrence of ‘true’ is indeterminate in reference as between ascending truth and 
descending truth. And in turn I justified that claim by arguing that, after truth, ascending truth 
                                                          
112 The model-theoretic definition of satisfaction is applicable only when the referents of the predicates in the 
language being considered are sets. If there is no set of all and only the true sentences, then it does not make sense to 
speak of truth’s respectingMT the principles for any predicate. This is a significant challenge for those who wish to 
identify respect with respectMT in settings that involve the word ‘true’.  
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and descending truth are tied for second place with respect to respecting (T-intro) and (T-elim). 
The most natural and convincing strategy for justifying that latter claim would involve showing 
that while truth respects these rules, neither ascending truth nor descending truth does. However, 
that strategy has now been ruled out, since it begs the question as to the status of A. I am not sure 
what other strategy might work.  
Given this situation, it seems that a fan of my view who insists on understanding my talk 
of respect as talk of respectMT has no choice but to adopt the claim that A is indeterminate as an 
additional assumption or as justified on independent grounds, rather than proving this claim from 
the thesis that truth comes closer than ascending truth and descending truth to respecting (T-
intro) and (T-elim). While such a position is less satisfying than the one I set out to defend, I will 
now show that it is coherent nonetheless. That is, I will argue that if we plug respectMT into (i)-
(iv) and assume that A is indeterminate, then we can verify that truth comes closer than 
ascending truth and descending truth come to respecting (T-intro) and (T-elim). It then follows 
that the occurrence of ‘true’ in A is indeterminate in reference as between ascending truth and 
descending truth (making A indeterminate, consistent with our assumption). Thus, we will be 
able to conclude, a version of my view is available to theorists who insist on understanding my 
talk of respect in terms of respectMT. That version is the package consisting of (Aberrations), 
(Determined), the claim that A is indeterminate, and the claims (i)-(iv) with ‘respects’ therein 
understood as referring to respectMT. I will also show that someone who adopts this view would 
do best to hold that the conditional used to define respectMT (e.g., the one that features in (SatI)) 
obeys the Łukasiewicz truth table.  
Suppose that A is indeterminate. Then it is indeterminate whether A is true and 
indeterminate whether A is not true. Thus both the antecedent and the consequent of (SatI) are 
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indeterminate. We now want to know whether or not truth respectsMT (T-intro) and (T-elim). 
That depends on the truth of the conditional (SatI) and its converse, (SatE).
113 For both these 
conditionals, both the antecedent and the consequent are indeterminate. Whether that makes 
these conditionals true depends on what the correct logic of indeterminacy is. According to the 
Łukasiewicz truth table for three-valued propositional logic, a conditional both of whose 
constituent sentences are indeterminate is true. In that case, both (SatI) and (SatE) are true, and 
thus truth respects (T-intro) and (T-elim). Now, in Section 3.3.3 I showed that ascending truth 
fails to respect (T-elim) and descending truth fails to respect (T-intro), using the notion of respect 
described in terms of reference. But these arguments can easily be recast in terms of respectMT.
114 
Therefore truth comes closer than either ascending truth or descending truth to respecting both 
(T-intro) and (T-elim).  
However, Łukasiewicz’s logic of indeterminacy is not the only game in town. In 
Kleene’s Weak truth table and his Strong truth table, a conditional both of whose constituent 
                                                          
113 That is:  
 (SatE) If <M, v>╞ ˹‘A is not true’ is X˺ then <M, v>╞ ‘A is not true’ 
 
114 Let us figure out whether d-truth satisfies (T-intro). Start with the sentence  
(Sd) Sd is not d-true 
Now consider the following inference:  
Sd is not d-true 
_________________ 
‘Sd is not d-true’ is true 
I will show that d-truth fails to respect this instance of (T-intro). To show this, suppose we are given a second order 
variable X, and we replace the occurrence of ‘true’ introduced in this instance with X as follows:  
Sd is not d-true 
_________________ 
‘Sd is not d-true’ is X 
Now suppose we are given a standard model M and a variable assignment v’ that maps X to d-truth. Fix nonempty 
set U and interpretation function V such that M = <U, V>. Then since M is standard, V(‘Sd’) = Sd and V(‘d-true’) = 
d-truth. Recall from the definition of d-truth that every sentence S that expresses the negation of the Russellian 
proposition <S, d-truth> to itself is not d-true. Thus V(‘Sd’) is not an element of V(‘d-true’), and so <M, v’>╞ ‘Sd is 
not d-true’. However, because ‘Sd is not d-true’ expresses the negation of the Russellian proposition <Sd, d-truth>, it 
is not d-true. Thus it is not an element of v’(X), which is d-truth. Thus V(‘Sd is not d-true’) is not an element of V(X) 
(which is v’(X)), so it is not the case that <M, v’>╞ ˹Sd is not d-true’ is X˺. Thus d-truth fails to respect the displayed 
instance of (T-intro), and so fails to respect (T-intro). One can make a parallel argument concerning ascending truth 
and (T-elim). 
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sentences are indeterminate is itself indeterminate. That would make (SatI) and (SatE) are both 
indeterminate. Still, even in that case it is not obviously untenable that truth comes closer than 
ascending truth and descending truth to respecting both (T-intro) and (T-elim). The idea would 
be that, so to speak, two indeterminates comes closer than a definite respect and a definite non-
respect. That is, by being indeterminate with respect to both rules, truth comes closer to 
respecting them both than either ascending truth or descending truth comes, given that each of 
these (latter) properties respects one rule but not the other. While I am unsure how to defend this 
view, at the same time it is not obviously untenable.  
 At any rate, it is worth noting that Łukasiewicz’s truth tables have some appealing 
features. In particular, for Łukasiewicz the sentence ˹If P then P˺ comes out true for all sentences 
P that are indeterminate in truth value. Contrast Kleene’s tables, for which ˹If P then P˺ comes 
out indeterminate if P itself is.115  
 
 
  
                                                          
115 See (Sider 2010), p.77 footnote 29. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE ABERRATIONIST APPROACH TO THE LIAR PARADOX AND ITS KIN: REVENGE 
AND OTHER CHALLENGES 
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5. Articulating Aberrationism in Full Generality 
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1. Aberrationist Approaches to the Liar Paradox 
1.1. Aberrationism in General 
 To begin with, let us define Liar sentences. For any sentence x, let us say that x is a Liar 
sentence if x is the negation of a sentence whose grammatical subject is an expression that refers 
to x and whose grammatical predicate is an expression that refers to truth.1 In Chapter 1, I focus 
on Liar sentences much like L* below:  
(L*) L* is not true.  
Consideration of L* leads quickly to contradictions. Suppose L* is true. Then it is not true, a 
contradiction. Thus L* is not true. But since that is precisely what L* says, it is then true, a 
contradiction.  
I’ll now take a moment to put this reasoning more formally. To that end, it is worth 
taking a quick detour to introduce some rules of inference that will be used in the formal version, 
as well as throughout the rest of the essay. These are the rules of inference below, which are 
intimately associated with the term ‘true’:  
(T-intro)   φ  
             ‘φ’ is true  
 
(T-elim)        ‘φ’ is true  
             φ 
 
Suppressing issues of ambiguity and context-sensitivity, here the 21st letter of the Greek alphabet 
is a substitutional variable ranging over all declarative sentences of English. These rules 
“govern” the word ‘true’ in at least the sense that by and large we are disposed to follow them, 
and, when we are feeling helpful, to correct uses of ‘true’ that deviate from them. (T-intro) and 
                                                          
1 Throughout, I will use ‘refers’ so as to include not only reference by singular terms but also the reference-like 
relation in which predicates stand to properties, if this is something other than reference.  
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(T-elim) will figure prominently in what follows, so it is worth taking a moment to make them 
familiar.  
With (T-intro) and (T-elim) in hand, here is a formal version of the reasoning associated 
with L*. It is called the Strong Liar paradox:  
1. L* = ‘L* is not true’   (definition of ‘L*’) 
2. | L* is true      (Assume for reductio) 
3. | ‘L* is not true’ is true    (Substitution, (1), (2)) 
4. | L* is not true    ((T-elim), (3)) 
5. | Contradiction     (Contradiction introduction, (2), (4)) 
6. L* is not true     (Negation Introduction, (1)-(4)) 
7. ‘L* is not true’ is true   ((T-intro), (6)) 
8. L* is true      (Substitution, (1), (7)) 
9. Contradiction     (Contradiction introduction, (6), (8)) 
 
If the reasoning above is truth-preserving, then some contradictions are true. And as we 
classically reason, if some contradictions are true then all other sentences are true. Yet somehow, 
not absolutely every sentence is true. So, something in the reasoning which led to this conclusion 
has to be wrong. The task of diagnosing the paradox as it arises for natural languages is therefore 
not one of concocting a new, paradox-free language, but rather one of giving the best explanation 
of how natural languages manage already to be coherent. In what follows, I will defend what I 
take to be the best explanation: a view I will call aberrationism.  
 To work as an explanation, aberrationism must at the very least entail that the paradoxical 
reasoning fails to go through. Let us now see how that is achieved. Notice that if L* fails to say 
of itself that it is not true, but at the same time the sentence written on lines (2) and (8) succeeds 
in saying of L* that it is true, then steps (2) and (4) do not contradict, and neither do steps (6) and 
(8). Aberrationists develop this claim by arguing that the occurrence of the word ‘true’ in L* 
fails to refer to truth. In brief, the view is that when a word like ‘true’ or ‘satisfies’ occurs in a 
Liar-like sentence, the occurrence of that word in that sentence fails to refer to truth. Therefore, 
 136 
these sentences fail to say what they appear to say, and so they generate no contradictions. In a 
similar way, it helps to note, no contradictions arise when I utter ‘I am hungry’ and you utter ‘I 
am not hungry’; in different mouths, the sentences fail to express propositions that are genuinely 
contradictory. The distinctive claim of aberrationism is that this sort of thing can happen on a 
one-off basis in sentences that would otherwise be paradoxical, without any indexicality as we 
had with the word ‘I’. Again, aberrationists defend this claim as the best explanation of how 
natural languages manage to be coherent in the face of the Liar paradox.  
Since the above diagnosis invokes occurrences, I should say a few words about these. It 
is easy to confuse occurrences with tokens, but the two are importantly distinct. Tokens, but not 
occurrences, are concrete. With respect to abstractness, occurrences are more similar to words 
and sentences than to their tokens. For instance, if I write the sentence ‘An occurrence of an 
expression is a lovely thing’ on a blackboard, I have created two tokens of the word ‘an’. But 
even before these tokens existed there were two occurrences of ‘an’ in that sentence. Once I 
erase the board, the tokens go out of (present) existence, but the occurrences do not.  
For getting a grip on occurrences, it also helps to have a way of representing them 
formally. It will be harmless in what follows to think of an occurrence of an expression as an 
ordered pair of the expression and a component context. One can think of an occurrence’s 
component context as the result of using a hole-punch to remove the occurrence from the 
sentence, and replacing it with a blank (or, as I’ll write, ‘_’). Thus the occurrence of ‘true’ in L* 
can be represented as the ordered pair <‘true’, ‘L* is not _’>.  
Before I can articulate aberrationism precisely, I need to introduce a few more concepts. 
For now, let us say that an expression e is an alethic expression if  
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(Base Clause) e is inter-substitutable with an expression that is governed 
by (T-intro) and (T-elim),2  
or  
 
(Inductive Clause)  the result of replacing each non-primitive component  
expression in e with its definiens contains an alethic 
expression. 
  
Now notice that the same alethic expression can occur more than once in a Liar-like sentence, 
with only some of these occurrences being responsible for the paradox to which the sentence 
gives rise. Let’s refer to these problem-causing occurrences as key occurrences. Key occurrences 
are hard to define rigorously, but it is very easy to get the main idea. Consider (Aw) below:  
 (Aw) Aw is not true, and ‘War causes suffering’ is true.  
 
Clearly, only the first occurrence of ‘true’ plays an essential role in generating the paradox 
associated with Aw. So only that first occurrence counts as a key occurrence.  
Given these definitions, aberrationism consists of the following two claims:  
(Aberrations) For any Liar-like sentence, the key occurrences of its alethic 
expressions differ in reference from the expressions of which they 
are occurrences.3 
 
(Determined) When an occurrence of an expression in a Liar-like sentence 
differs in reference from the expression of which it is an 
occurrence, what (if anything) the sentence says4 is determined by 
what the occurrence refers to, rather than by what the expression 
simpliciter refers to.  
 
                                                          
2 In Section 4.6, Grelling’s Paradox will give us a reason to expand this definition. But until then, this simpler 
version will suffice. 
3 A similar view would simply say that the reference of the occurrences in question differs from that of the other 
occurrences of the expression, insisting that an expression simpliciter can refer to a thing x only in the sense that 
most of its occurrences refer to x. While this view is consistent with the spirit of aberrationism, it is worth noting 
that the view is controversial and aberrationism is not committed to it. See Chapter 1 Section 11.2 for further 
discussion.  
4 In this essay, I will use ‘says’ in such a way that in any world w in which redness is the most interesting property, 
the sentence ‘Roses have the most interesting property’ counts, in w, as saying that roses are red. This contrasts with 
a different use of ‘says’, on which this sentence counts only as saying that roses have the most interesting property, 
whatever that property may be.   
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Before moving on, a few clarificatory remarks about this definition. I use the term ‘aberrations’ 
because when an occurrence of an expression in a sentence fails to co-refer with that expression, 
it makes sense to say that the expression is there undergoing an aberration in its referential 
behavior. These aberrations are “one-off”, because they only arise in cases in which there would 
otherwise be paradox. The idea for this overall approach was loosely inspired by (Smith 2006), 
who I take to be implicitly committed to (Aberrations) and (Determined).5 However, explicit 
formulation and endorsement of these claims is due to me.  
It is worth taking a moment to understand the role of (Determined) in the aberrationist 
picture. For all (Aberrations) says, what a Liar sentence says could be determined solely by the 
reference of its expressions simpliciter, not by the occurrences of these expressions in that 
sentence. In that case, even if the key occurrences of its alethic expressions underwent referential 
aberrations, that would not change what the sentence said; the sentence would give rise to 
contradictions regardless of these aberrations. In that case, the sentence would still give rise to 
contradictions, and positing aberrations would be of no use as an explanation of how ordinary 
speakers manage to avoid incoherence. For aberrationism to work as an explanation, then, we 
need the aberrations to affect what the sentence says. (Determined) guarantees this. 
As another matter, the reader may have noticed that the definition of aberrationism uses 
the term ‘Liar-like sentence’. This raises the difficult question of exactly which sentences count 
as Liar-like. In Section 5, I’ll take up this question in detail. For now, it suffices to leave this 
matter at an informal level. Since I will arrive at a precise definition of ‘Liar-like’ by reflecting 
on the wide variety of sentences to which I want it to apply, it will be best to look first at these 
sentences and the paradoxes to which they give rise.  
                                                          
5 See Chapter 1, Section 3.  
 139 
One last clarificatory remark. Aberrationism does not claim that alethic expressions are 
sensitive to their contexts of use, or that they contain hidden indexical elements. Those varieties 
of referential shiftiness are neither one-off nor aberrations. For one thing, on those views, an 
occurrence of an alethic expression in a non-Liar-like sentence will undergo referential shifts 
when the sentence is uttered in the same context as a Liar sentence. Nothing like this happens on 
the aberrationist picture; it is only Liar-like sentences that witness aberrations. As a related point, 
indexical and context-sensitive expressions undergo shifts in reference in a wide variety of 
different situations, not just in Liar-like sentences. For instance, on some views,6 the reference of 
these terms shifts in response to the number of nested semantic attributions being made in the 
context of utterance. By contrast, according to aberrationism, it is a mistake to try to explain 
what happens in paradoxical situations in terms of what happens anywhere else, or, relatedly, to 
claim that it happens anywhere else. Precisely one of the lessons of Liar-like paradoxes is that 
something genuinely distinctive and unique is going on in such cases.  
My main goal in this essay is to show that aberrationism is invulnerable to revenge 
problems, and that it can be fruitfully applied to a wide variety of Liar-like paradoxes. I will also 
argue throughout that moderate versions of aberrationism are superior to other, radical versions, 
associated with (Smith 2006). I will use my own preferred version of moderate aberrationism to 
illustrate this point. With those goals in mind, I’ll use the rest of this section to introduce the 
moderate vs. radical distinction and sketch my own preferred moderate view. Then, in Section 2, 
I will introduce the issue of revenge.  
 
                                                          
6 See (Burge 1979). 
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1.2. Moderate vs. Radical One-Off Aberrations Approaches 
If aberrationism is correct, then an important lesson of the Liar paradox is that our 
sentences cannot always say what we pre-theoretically take them to say. As (Smith 2006) does 
and as I do at length in Chapter 1, one argues for this by showing that the consequences of 
allowing a Liar sentence such as L* to say of itself that it is not true are worse than the 
consequences of denying that it does this. Still, necessary though it may be, this denial is painful 
and unintuitive. L* really does appear to say of itself that it is not true.  
According to Smith, we simply need to bite the bullet here; there is little we can do to 
mollify the discomfort. He claims that  
Sometimes our words do not mean what we want them to mean: not due to hidden 
complexities of our semantic mechanisms, operating behind the scenes to produce 
unforeseen results—i.e., not for some principled, bottom-up reasons; but because our 
words cannot mean what we want them to mean, and so our semantic mechanisms simply 
break or malfunction, and some of our words get assigned meanings more or less 
randomly (p.195).  
 
In the vicinity of these remarks are two views, each of which consists of the rejection of one of 
the theses below:  
(Semantic Supervenience) For every semantic property, there are some non-semantic 
properties on which it supervenes.7  
 
(Semantic Regularity) There are perfectly reliable, principled relationships 
between our behavior, mental states and physical 
environment on the one hand, and what we mean by our 
utterances on the other hand (Smith 2006 p.188, emphasis 
mine).  
 
Let us call any version of aberrationism that rejects either Semantic Supervenience or Semantic 
Regularity a radical one-off aberrations approach, henceforth radical aberrationism. I argue in 
Chapter 1 that because they cast into doubt the robustness of the relation between semantic 
                                                          
7 For a definition of supervenience, see (Bennett and McLaughlin 2014).  
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phenomena and non-semantic phenomena, radical approaches are not in a good position to 
explain our very vivid sense of what Liar-like sentences seem to say by appealing to facts about 
language use, or to identify what these sentences in fact say by looking at facts about language 
use. (Here and henceforth, when I speak of how words are used, I will include such phenomena 
as our linguistic behavior involving these words, the mental states we use them to express, and 
how our uses of them are related to our physical environment.) 
By contrast, let us call any version of aberrationism that accepts both Semantic 
Supervenience and Semantic Regularity a moderate approach, henceforth moderate 
aberrationism. This is the approach that I defend here and in Chapter 1. In particular, in Chapter 
1 I argue that the appearance that a sentence like L* says what it appears to say is in general very 
nearly correct, because such sentences come very close to saying what they appear to say. That is 
because, on my view, when an occurrence of a word cannot co-refer with that word, it need not 
follow that what the occurrence refers to has nothing to do with how we use the word. More 
specifically, even when an occurrence of ‘true’ cannot, on pain of contradiction, refer to truth, 
what it refers to is still influenced by our use of ‘true’ in accordance with (T-intro) and (T-elim).  
In the rest of this section, I will describe what I find to be a plausible account of the 
nature of this influence, and show how this account can allow that L* comes close to saying what 
it appears to say. Readers should keep in mind that the purpose of this account is merely to serve 
as an illustration of the advantages that moderate approaches can in principle have over their 
radical cousins. Accordingly, while I will strive to present the account in sufficient detail to 
make it plausible, I will not provide its every element with a sustained defense. The same goes 
for Chapter 1, although the reader can find more details there.  
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1.2.1. An Example Moderate View 
1.2.1.1. The General Idea 
In Chapter 1, I describe a relation of respect that a property can bear to an inference rule. 
(See below for more on this relation.) Following a suggestion from (Lewis 1970), and noting the 
intimate relationship between the rules (T-intro) and (T-elim) and the word ‘true’, I claim that 
the word ‘true’ refers to that property, if there is one, which comes closest to respecting these 
rules. That thing, I argue there, is truth. Then I argue that something similar holds for 
occurrences of ‘true’ that cannot, on pain of contradiction, refer to truth. These occurrences refer 
to that thing, if there is one, which comes next-closest (after truth itself8) to respecting (T-intro) 
and (T-elim). If there are multiple such things, the occurrence is indeterminate in reference as 
between these. In Chapter 1, I suggest that this is precisely the situation. From (Scharp 2013) we 
learn of two quite truth-like properties, ascending truth and descending truth, which, I argue 
there, are tied for second place (after truth itself) when it comes to coming close to respecting (T-
intro) and (T-elim). The reference of the occurrence of ‘true’ in L* is thus indeterminate as 
between these properties. L* is then indeterminate in content; that is, it is indeterminate whether 
L* says of itself that it is not ascending true or says of itself that it is not descending true. 
Because L* is indeterminate in content, it is also indeterminate in truth value.9 Moreover, similar 
remarks hold for all other Liar-like sentences.  
The version of moderate aberrationism just described is moderate in two important 
respects. Firstly, it allows us to retain the plausible thesis that the reference of any (English) 
occurrence of ‘true’ is significantly influenced by how we use the word ‘true’. Secondly, it does 
                                                          
8 See Chapter 1 Section 3.3.3.2 for an argument that truth respects these rules.  
9 See Chapter 1 Section 3.3.3.3 for further explanation of how the one variety of indeterminacy leads to the other in 
this case. 
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some justice to our strong pre-theoretical impression that L* says of itself that it is not true. As 
just noted above, L* is indeterminate as between saying of itself that it is not ascending true and 
saying of itself that it is not descending true. Because ascending truth and descending are quite 
similar to truth, L* thereby comes quite close to saying what it appears to say; and similarly for 
other Liar-like sentences. Moderate approaches in general have the potential to share these two 
virtues, depending on what exactly they say about the relationship between semantic and non-
semantic phenomena.  
 
1.2.1.2. Getting a Concrete Sense of Ascending Truth and Descending Truth 
Since I will be using the moderate view just described as an illustrative example 
throughout, I will now give the reader a more concrete sense of the properties that it invokes, 
ascending truth and descending truth. In later sections, some of the discussion will turn on 
claims about ascending truth and descending truth that I justify in what follows. Readers who 
want to skip the details in the rest of this section can simply take those claims on faith.  
In the rest of this section, the essential idea to have in the background is that because (T-
intro) and (T-elim) play a highly significant role in governing our uses of ‘true’, they also play a 
highly significant role in determining its reference, and that of its occurrences. In particular, 
when an occurrence of ‘true’ fails to refer to truth, if it succeeds in referring at all then it refers to 
something that, like truth, has an intimate relationship with these rules of inference. Ascending 
truth and descending truth, I claim, have such a relationship: ascending truth respects (T-intro) 
and descending truth respects (T-elim).  
By ‘respects’ I mean the following. A property P respects (T-intro) if for any declarative, 
context-insensitive sentence S, if the occurrence of ‘true’ in ˹‘S’ is true˺ were to refer to P then 
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the inference from S to ˹‘S’ is true˺ would be truth-preserving. (That is, if the premise were true 
then the conclusion would be true.) Likewise, a property P respects (T-elim) if for any 
declarative, context-insensitive sentence S, if the occurrence of ‘true’ in ˹‘S’ is true˺ were to refer 
to P then the inference from ˹‘S’ is true˺ to S would be truth-preserving. The point about 
ascending truth and descending truth is that ascending truth respects (T-intro) but not (T-elim) 
(although it comes close), and descending truth respects (T-elim) but not (T-intro) (although it 
comes close). Thus, each property respects one rule and comes close to respecting the other.  
We have reason to think that ascending truth and descending truth respect (T-intro) and 
(T-elim), respectively, because of the way these properties are introduced. (Scharp 2013) 
presents two predicates, ‘A(x)’ and ‘D(x)’, which are defined by a list of 20 axiom schemata, 
including two that are conditionalized versions of (T-intro) and (T-elim):10  
(A1) If S then A(‘S’)  
(D1) If D(‘S’) then S 
Here I use the 19th letter of the uppercase Latin alphabet substitutionally, to range over 
declarative, context-insensitive sentences of English. Scharp calls the set of all instances of his 
axiom-schemata ADT—“the theory of ascending and descending truth.” Ascending truth and 
descending truth, then, are introduced as being those properties, if there are any, to which the 
predicates ‘A(x)’ and ‘D(x)’ respectively refer, when added to English and defined by our 
adopting the axioms in ADT.  
When understood in this way, we have indeed some reason to think that the predicates 
‘A(x)’ and ‘D(x)’ refer. That is because Scharp proves the consistency of ADT relative to the 
axioms of set theory. He does this in the standard way, by constructing a set-theoretic model, M2, 
                                                          
10 See Scharp’s p.154 for a full list. 
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of ADT.11 For similar reasons we are justified in taking ascending truth and descending truth to 
respect (T-intro) and (T-elim). That is, the referents-in-M2 of ‘A(x)’ and ‘D(x)’ respect these 
rules, and that gives us inductive evidence that when these predicates are added to English and 
defined by ADT, their referents respect (T-intro) and (T-elim), respectively. So, if we take 
Scharp’s model-construction seriously, we can take it to be a defining feature of ascending and 
descending truth that they respect (T-intro) and (T-elim), respectively.  
A different defining feature of ascending and descending truth is that neither property 
respects the rule that the other respects. To begin with, no instance of either (A1#) or (D1#) 
below is in ADT: 
(A1#) If A(‘S’) then S 
(D1#) If S then D(‘S’) 
Furthermore, it is not just that no instances of these schemata show up in the theory. It turns out 
that there are many instances of (A1#) and (D1#) which come out false in every model of ADT. 
Indeed, Scharp claims (p.186) that this is what happens for all and only pre-theoretically Liar-ish 
sentences (though he does not provide a proof).  
One pair of sentences is particularly illuminating. Consider the sentences below, together 
with their associated instances of (A1#) and (D1#):  
(α)  α is not ascending true 
(δ)  δ is not descending true 
 
(A1#)α  If A(‘α is not ascending true’) then α is not ascending true 
                                                          
11 See his Section 6.6 (p.157-169) and an appendix (p.178) to Chapter 6. Assuming that set theory is consistent, in 
general a proof that an expression defined by a list of axioms has an extension in a set theoretic model serves as 
inductive evidence that if the expression were added to English, defined by those axioms, it would refer. In 
particular, then, the fact that ‘ascending true’ and ‘descending true’ have extensions when interpreted in Scharp’s 
model serves as inductive evidence that they too would refer, if added to English and stipulated to be governed by 
the axioms in ADT. Moreover, Scharp is careful not to impose any expressive limitations on the language of M2 that 
might be relevant to its being extensible to a full natural language such as English. Indeed, he objects to other 
theorists’ failure to take such precautions (see p.156). Therefore, the point is, Scharp’s discussion gives us some 
reason to think that ‘A(x)’ and ‘D(x)’, considered as expressions of an expanded English, refer.  
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(D1#)δ  If δ is not descending true then D(‘δ is not descending true’) 
 
Since they can be used to derive contradictions, (A1#)α and (D1#)δ are false in every model of 
ADT.12 Thus we have reason to believe that the sentences (A1#)α and (D1#)δ are false when ‘A’ 
and ‘D’ are considered as predicates added to English. 
This example enables us to make two generalizations about ascending and descending 
truth, which may help the reader get a further grip on these properties. Firstly, any sentence S 
which says of itself only that it is not ascending true is (contrary to what it says) ascending true, 
and therefore false. And similarly, any sentence S which says of itself only that it is not 
descending true is not descending true, and is thus true.13  
We just saw some instances of (A1#) and (D1#) that come out false in every model of 
ADT, and thus are arguably false when ‘A(x)’ and ‘D(x)’ are interpreted as predicates added to 
English. On the other hand, there are some other instances of (A1#) and (D1#) which come out 
true in every model of ADT. A quick look at which sentences these are will further help to give a 
concrete sense of ascending and descending truth. Scharp proves that all instances of (A1#) and 
(D1#) that involve sentences which are “grounded” come out true. A sentence is grounded in 
                                                          
12 Here is a derivation of a contradiction that uses (A1#)α: 
1. α = ‘α is not ascending true’   (definition of ‘α’) 
2. α is ascending true     (proven elsewhere by Scharp) 
3. ‘α is not ascending true’ is ascending true (proven elsewhere by Scharp) 
4. If ‘α is not ascending true’ is ascending true  (A1#)α) 
then α is not ascending true 
5. α is not ascending true   (modus ponens, (3), (4))     
6. Contradiction    (Contradiction Introduction, (2), (5)) 
13 Here is the reasoning that justifies these generalizations. Since (A1#)α is false, it has a true antecedent and a false 
conclusion. So ‘A(‘α is not ascending true’)’ is true and ‘α is not ascending true’ is false. From both these claims we 
can conclude that α is ascending true. Since this contradicts what α says, that makes α false. Similarly for (D1#)δ. 
Since (D1#)δ is false, it has a true antecedent and a false conclusion. So, ‘δ is not descending true’ is true and ‘D(‘δ 
is not descending true’)’ is false. From both these claims we can conclude that δ is not descending true. Since this 
confirms what δ says, that makes δ true. Now, presumably (A1#) and (D1#) fail not only for α and δ, but for all 
sentences that deny of themselves that they are ascending true or that they are descending true, respectively. At least, 
Scharp is certainly committed to this claim, since he holds that (A1#) and (D1#) fail for all pre-theoretically Liar-ish 
sentences. And it is surely sufficient for a sentence’s being pre-theoretically Liar-ish that it says of itself that it is not 
ascending (descending) true. Such sentences mimic Liar-sentences in an obvious way. 
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Scharp’s sense if “its ascending truth value and descending truth value are completely 
determined by the ascending truth values and descending truth values of sentences that have no 
occurrences of ‘ascending true’ or ‘descending true’” (p.170). So, although (A1#) and (D1#) are 
not generally true, they hold for any sentences that are grounded in Scharp’s sense.  
More generally, every sentence which is safe comes out true in every model of ADT. A 
sentence is safe if it is either descending true or not ascending true (see his p.186). Every 
sentence that is grounded is safe, but some ungrounded sentences are also safe. These include the 
sentence ‘Every sentence is either ascending true or not ascending true’ and ‘No sentence is both 
descending true and not descending true’ (see p.170). These examples of grounded and safe 
sentences help to give at least a rough sense of which instances of (A1#) and (D1#) are true in 
every model of ADT, which in turn helps to give a sense of ascending and descending truth.  
So much, then, for getting a sense of ascending and descending truth. Now for how they 
fit into the moderate aberrationist view that I favor. It is my view that not only do ascending and 
descending truth exist and come close (after truth itself14) to respecting (T-intro) and (T-elim), 
but moreover they come equally close, and nothing else comes closer. Thus, they are “tied for 
second place” when it comes to respect of (T-intro) and (T-elim). It is for that reason that when 
an occurrence of ‘true’ cannot refer to truth, it divides its reference between ascending and 
descending truth. However, I will not defend the “tied for second place” claim here.15 For our 
current purposes, it suffices to note that if indeed ascending truth and descending truth are tied 
for second place, then by the Lewisian claims that I described earlier, the reference of the 
occurrence of ‘true’ in L* is indeterminate as between ascending truth and descending truth. 
Since these properties are quite similar to truth, that then gives a robust sense in which L* comes 
                                                          
14 At the beginning of Section 1.2.1.1 I claimed that truth respects these rules. 
15 See Chapter 1 Section 3.3.3.1 for further discussion. 
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close to saying of itself that it is not true. This enables my preferred version of moderate 
aberrationism to go a significant way toward honoring our pre-theoretical impressions about 
what Liar-like sentences say.  
Now that I have introduced moderate aberrationism and my own preferred version of it, I 
am in a position to discuss three questions:  
A. Does aberrationism in general, or my own preferred version of it in particular, 
face a revenge problem?  
B. Can moderate aberrationists invoke indeterminacy without falling victim to the 
classic revenge problems for approaches that invoke indeterminacy?  
C. Even if aberrationism solves the Strong Liar paradox (which was used to 
introduce it), does it fall prey to any other Liar-like paradoxes?  
 
In Sections 2, 3, and 4, I address these questions, defending both aberrationism in general and 
my own favored version of it. Then in Section 5 I explain how aberrationist approaches to the 
Strong Liar paradox can generalize to all other Liar-like paradoxes.  
 
2. Revenge Problems: An Introduction  
2.1. The Classic Liar and Strong Liar 
Solutions to the Liar paradox tend, notoriously, to be vulnerable to revenge problems. A 
solution faces a revenge problem if the terms or concepts that the solution introduces can be used 
to state a palpably Liar-ish paradox, one that, by the lights of the solution being proposed, cannot 
be solved using those same terms or concepts. In this section, I will give several examples of 
approaches to the Liar paradox and revenge problems they face, to give the reader a sense of 
what revenge problems are. Let’s start with the Classic Liar Paradox. There, consideration of the 
following sentence quickly leads to contradictions:  
(L) L is false 
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Suppose L is true. Then L is false, a contradiction. So, then L must not be true. But then L is 
false. However, that is precisely what L says! So, L is true after all, contradicting what we have 
shown, namely, that L is false. Paradox! 
A classic reaction to this situation is to hold that L is neither true nor false. L, one might 
say, has no truth value. However, a sentence that has no truth value is in particular not true; it 
lacks the truth value truth. And now that the notion of a sentence’s not being true has been 
introduced, we can obtain a new version of the paradox, the Strong Liar Paradox, using the 
following sentence:16 
(L*) L* is not true. 
Suppose L* is true. Then L* is not true, a contradiction! Thus L* is not true. But that is precisely 
what L* says! So, L* is true after all, a contradiction! Thus, classic approaches to the Liar 
paradox which involve denying that Liar sentences such as L have any truth values face a 
revenge problem in connection with L*.  
 
2.2. Contextualist Views  
 Views on which all Liar sentences contain some context-sensitive elements also tend to 
face revenge problems. For example, (Simmons 1993) takes the word ‘true’ to refer to different 
properties in different contexts of use. Thus, in no context of use does the word ‘true’ refer to 
any property that would render any sentences paradoxical relative to that context. However, this 
solution falls prey to a revenge problem. Once one has introduced contexts of use, one can 
construct sentences of the following sorts:  
                                                          
16 There is also a different way to make trouble. L says of itself that it is false. Suppose L is neither true nor false. 
Then in particular it is not false. Then what L says is not the case. But that would make L false after all, 
contradicting the original assumption that L is neither true nor false.  
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 (X) X does not fall under ‘true’ in any context of use 
 (X1) X1 has none of the properties over which ‘true’ ranges, across all different 
contexts of use 
To deal with sentences like X and X1, all contextualist views have to ban unrestricted 
quantification of some kind or other—either over contexts of use,17 or over the properties 
available as referents for ‘true’ across all different contexts.18 The point is, contextualists 
introduce contexts of use and various properties to which ‘true’ refers relative to different 
contexts of use; and both of these notions can be used to restate a new version of the paradox, 
one that cannot be solved without importing some further assumptions.  
 
2.3. Dialetheism 
Dialetheist approaches to the paradox also face revenge problems. A dialetheist approach 
is one that relies on the claim that some sentences, in particular Liar sentences, are both true and 
not true. Now, one might initially worry that dialetheist approaches are bound to be trivial. An 
approach to the Liar paradoxes is trivial if anyone who endorses the approach is thereby bound 
to accept that absolutely every declarative sentence is true, or to committed to assent to 
absolutely every declarative sentence. Triviality concerns about dialetheism stem from the fact 
that the classical law ex falso quodlibet allows one to derive any declarative sentence whatsoever 
from a contradiction—a sentence of the form ‘P and not P’—and dialetheists accept some 
                                                          
17 (Grim 1995), pp.468-469, shows that (Simmons 1993) has to ban unrestricted quantification over contexts of use. 
18 According to both (Burge 1979) and (Glanzberg 2004a), there are infinitely many truth-like properties, which are 
arranged in an infinite hierarchy and indexed according to their levels in the hierarchy. Burge and Glanzberg ban 
unrestricted quantification over indices. See (Glanzberg 2004b) p.289, and (Burge 1979) p.196 fn. 28 for further 
discussion, and see (Scharp 2013) pp.117-119 for related criticism of Glanzberg.  
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contradictions. However, dialetheists avoid triviality by rejecting ex falso quodlibet. They insist 
that contradictions, properly understood, do not entail absolutely everything.  
As is typical with revenge problems, one of the notions that features centrally in the 
articulation of dialetheism can be used to construct a new, problematic sentence. Once the notion 
of a sentence’s entailing absolutely everything (or, likewise, the notion of its not doing so) is 
introduced, one can introduce an expression, ‘NOT’, by simply stipulating that for any 
declarative sentence S, from S and ˹NOT-S˺ everything follows.19 That is, from this pair one may 
infer any declarative sentence one likes.20 With ‘NOT’ in hand, one can easily construct a 
sentence consideration of which leads to triviality:  
(LNOT) LNOT is NOT true 
To avoid triviality in the face of LNOT, dialetheists need to insist that it is impossible to define 
‘NOT’ or any other expression in the way just described.21 Some philosophers22 question how 
reasonable this insistence is, and I sympathize heartily with this skeptical reaction; still, we need 
not dig deeply into this complex matter here. The point for now is just that like many other 
responses to the Liar, the dialetheist’s initial move introduces a concept that can, prima facie, be 
used to state a new, recalcitrant version of the paradox.  
 So far, we have seen some alternative approaches to the Liar paradox and the revenge 
problems that afflict them. One of my main goals in this essay is to show that aberrationism, and 
in particular moderate aberrationism, is invulnerable to such problems.  
 
                                                          
19 Here I set aside considerations of context-sensitivity. 
20 Indeed, this is how logicians, except for devotees of dialetheism, have modeled our everyday use of the word 
‘not’. Ex falso quodlibet can be seen as a way of articulating the idea that one who accepts a contradiction might as 
well accept anything else, which in turn is a way of cashing out the near-universal idea that accepting contradictions 
is bad. 
21 Many prominent dialetheists do in fact deny this. See, for example, (Priest 1990), pp.204-209. 
22 (Scharp 2013) Section 4.3.2 (p.104). 
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3. Aberrationism and Revenge  
3.1. A General Lesson 
Before I get going discussing the revenge problems that might arise for aberrationism, I 
want to articulate an important general lesson concerning these problems. Nearly every approach 
to the Liar paradox introduces some special property P, and then appeals to P in order to 
(putatively) solve the paradox. Revenge problems arise when one defines a predicate that refers 
to P, and then uses that predicate to construct a new, problematic sentence. Most approaches are 
then stuck between two unsatisfying lines of response. The first kind of response is to deny that 
there is a predicate that refers to P; or, more strictly speaking, that refers to whatever P-ish 
property one appeals to in constructing the new problematic sentence.23 But for two reasons, that 
line of response is a dead end. Firstly, theorists who want to appeal to a property P need a way to 
attribute P to things; invariably, they will end up needing a predicate that, by their own lights, 
refers to P. But then, if in fact that predicate cannot refer to P, then this calls into question the 
intelligibility of their own attributions of P. Secondly, philosophers who want to ban predicates 
that refer to P have to explain why we cannot simply introduce one. (The reader may anticipate a 
similar objection to aberrationism, which purports to introduce a predicate all of whose 
occurrences refer to truth. I address this objection in Section 3.3.)  
A different kind of response, then, is to distinguish between an object language—the 
language one is describing, for which the paradox arises—and the meta-language—the language 
that one is using to describe the object language. Then one insists that one is solving the paradox 
only for the object language, doing so by introducing a new expression into (only) the meta-
                                                          
23 For example, recall from Section 2 that contextualists introduce the notion of falling under ‘true’ relative to a 
context, but then have to deny that one can speak of a sentence’s failing to fall under ‘true’ relative to any context. 
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language.24 But such approaches face a dilemma. If it is possible to apply the new expression to 
sentences in the metalanguage, then revenge problems arise. If the expression can be applied 
only to sentences in the object language, then the approach in question is incapable of providing 
a fully general solution to the Liar paradox. It can at best solve the versions of the paradox that 
arise for languages other than the one in which the solution itself is expressed. Of course, the 
solution’s advocate may insist that she has still provided a solution recipe: the same sort of thing 
can be obtained for the current metalanguage as for the object language, by ascending to a meta-
meta-language, and so on all the way up. But this response nonetheless makes a significant 
concession: that there is no single language in which we can say everything we want to say. To 
this, actual natural languages such as English strongly appear to be counterexamples. They 
seem—somehow!—to allow for just the kind of expressiveness that the thinker in question 
claims is impossible. It is worth developing approaches to the Liar paradox that do not force us 
to relinquish this idea.  
Aberrationism, we will soon see, does better on all the matters just described. For one 
thing, it can allow that for any property, we can have a predicate that refers to that property. One 
avoids revenge by denying that this predicate can in turn be used to construct a new, problematic 
sentence. Importantly, that is not because reference to the property is altogether impossible. 
Rather, it is only the key occurrences of the expression in question in the offending sentence fail 
to refer to the property; by contrast, all the occurrences that are used in stating aberrationism 
succeed in referring to the property. Secondly, because unproblematic occurrences of the 
predicate succeed in referring to the property, reference to the property does not require a retreat 
to a meta-language. And since it does not require a meta-language, aberrationism can apply to 
                                                          
24 See (Kripke 1975) for this kind of move. 
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the very language(s) in which it is stated. In short: for the price of a minor constraint on which 
sentences can say which things, we can have a single language that allows us (one way or 
another) to say everything we want to say.25 Freedom from revenge-sentences and from the need 
to retreat to a meta-language are major advantages of aberrationism.  
 As we have seen, a revenge problem occurs when the notions that one introduces to solve 
one form of the Liar paradox can be used to formulate a new version of the paradox, one that 
cannot be solved by appealing to those same notions. The potentially problematic notions 
common to all versions of aberrationism are that of a component context, reference by an 
occurrence, and a Liar-like sentence. To these notions, my own preferred view (along with 
various other versions of aberrationism) adds to these the notions of indeterminacy and of 
ascending truth and descending truth. In the rest of Section 3, then, I will discuss a variety of 
attempts to formulate a new Liar-like paradox using these notions—though I will postpone 
discussion of revenge problems involving the term ‘Liar-like sentence’ until I have explored 
some definitions of this term in Section 5. The basic strategy for avoiding revenge is the same in 
all the cases I will discuss here, and is precisely the strategy employed to solve the original, 
Strong Liar Paradox: posit a one-off aberration. The challenge will be to show that the same 
considerations that one marshals to support an aberrationist diagnosis of the Strong Liar can be 
marshalled in these cases as well.  
                                                          
25 In particular, one might have worried that my use of the expression ‘the property of being true’ throughout the 
essay requires that all of its occurrences refer to truth, and that this can only happen if the expression belongs to a 
meta-language. However, this concern fundamentally misunderstands the nature of aberrationism. All aberrationists 
require is that all the occurrences of ‘the property of being true’ employed in the course of arguing for aberrationism 
refer to truth. Aberrationists can allow that various other occurrences fail in this regard. Indeed, they must allow this 
in order to apply aberrationism to sentences such as ‘This sentence lacks the property of being true’; precisely what 
they want to say about that sentence is that the occurrence of ‘the property of being true’ in that sentence fails to 
refer to truth, and so the sentence fails to say of itself that it is not true. One can of course say of that sentence that it 
is not true; it is just that one needs a different sentence to do it. For instance, the following will do: ‘The sentence 
‘This sentence lacks the property of being true’ lacks the property of being true’. That sentence is perfectly in order, 
as it fails to say of itself that it is not true. Rather, it speaks to the status of a different sentence.  
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3.2. Occurrences and Component Contexts  
Let us begin by trying to construct a revenge sentence using the notions of an occurrence 
and a component context. Just as some contextualist approaches cannot accommodate 
unrestricted quantification over contexts of utterance, one might worry that aberrationism cannot 
accommodate unrestricted quantification over component contexts. For contextualists, the 
sentence that brings out this problem is one that says of itself that it does not fall under the 
extension of ‘true’ in any context of utterance. So, one might hope to formulate an analogous 
sentence that instead quantifies over component contexts. Here is my best attempt to formulate 
such a sentence:  
 (X*) In no component context does the occurrence of ‘true’ in X* refer to anything 
which would  
make the resulting sentence true. 
 
In parsing X*, keep in mind that what I am asserting to be relativized to component contexts 
(strictly speaking) is reference by expression types, not reference by occurrences. On my picture, 
occurrences refer simpliciter. So, strictly speaking, it makes no sense to speak of the reference of 
an occurrence <e, C> as being relative to a component context C*, even if C* = C. Rather, if <e, 
C> refers at all then it refers simpliciter, not relative to anything. Therefore, strictly speaking, 
(X*) makes no sense, since it treats reference by an occurrence (namely, the occurrence of ‘true’ 
in X*) as being relative to the component context.  
Less strictly speaking, though, one might simply reinterpret talk of what an occurrence 
refers to relative to all component contexts as talk of what it refers to. That view would take X* 
to be synonymous with X** below:  
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(X**) The occurrence of ‘true’ in X** fails to refer to anything that would make X** 
true.  
X** makes perfectly good sense. However, it is straightforward what aberrationism says about 
sentences like this: they fail to say what they appear to say, because their occurrences of ‘true’ 
fail to refer to truth. Thus X** fails to say anything from which it follows that X** is not true; 
so, there is no paradox here.  
 
3.3. Stipulations 
 In Section 2.3, I mentioned that according to dialetheists, the English connective ‘not’ 
fails to obey the rule ex falso quodlibet. This claim enables dialetheists to insist that for some 
sentences S the conjunction ˹S and not-S˺ is true, without allowing that every declarative 
sentence whatsoever is true. As we saw there, the question then arises whether it is possible 
simply to add to English a connective, ‘NOT’, that does obey ex falso quodlibet. If this is 
possible, then it hardly matters whether the dialetheists’ claims about the original word ‘not’ are 
correct. For as we saw, in that case it is easy to construct a Liar-like paradox that dialetheism 
cannot solve, a version involving ‘NOT’ rather than ‘not’.  
 One might have similar concerns about aberrationism. Suppose I am right that the key 
occurrence(s) of the word ‘true’ in any Liar-like sentence fails to refer to truth, and analogously 
for other alethic expressions. Still, cannot one simply define a new word, ‘TRUE’, by explicitly 
stipulating that all of its occurrences are to refer to truth, and then define a new Liar sentence 
using this new word? E.g.,  
(LT) LT is not TRUE  
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Indeed, if such a stipulation is possible, then that raises the question why our existing intentions 
and conventions for using ‘true’ do not already guarantee that all of its occurrences refer to truth. 
For surely, speakers of English do not set out to make the word ‘true’ sensitive to its component 
contexts; rather, we set out, if only implicitly, to have every occurrence of ‘true’ refer to truth. 
But if we can achieve this by stipulation, then it is hard to see why we didn’t achieve it already 
with our original intentions and conventions for using the word.  
 In response, a first point I want to make about LT is that however unappealing some 
might find this move, an available response is simply to bite the bullet and insist that no 
stipulation like the one that defines ‘TRUE’ could succeed. In fact, adopting this response will 
not perturb any of aberrationism’s central claims. One of the main lessons that aberrationists 
want to draw from the Liar paradox is that users of a language do not have complete control over 
what their expressions refer to and what their sentences say. It is perfectly congenial to this 
general outlook to hold that explicit stipulations can no more guarantee such control than tacit 
intentions can. So, the challenge posed by LT is not that no aberrationist diagnosis of LT is 
available in the logical space, but rather that, in light of the stipulation that defines ‘TRUE’, such 
a diagnosis is harder to swallow here than in other cases.  
 But, having pointed this out, we can now observe that nearly every competing diagnosis 
faces a similar problem. The problem arises from the fact that all diagnoses of the Liar paradox 
as it arises for natural languages must navigate between two conflicting requirements. On the one 
hand, a firm, widely accepted desideratum is to salvage as much as possible of our pre-
theoretical conception of these languages.26 This includes, in particular, doing justice to the idea 
                                                          
26 This desideratum is one of the things that distinguishes diagnoses from solutions. Because it involves providing 
an account of natural languages, a diagnosis must give due deference to what we already have reasons to believe 
about these languages. One can see this desideratum at work in the widespread recognition that (Tarski 1935)’s 
approach to the Liar paradox, which bans self-reference, was too “restrictive”. As (Feferman 1984) puts the point, 
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that natural languages are maximally expressive—that anything which can be said at all can be 
said in a single natural language, perhaps supplemented with some further vocabulary, and that it 
can be said in whatever ways the compositional grammar and lexical semantics of the language 
would seem to allow. On the other hand, however, unless the paradox renders natural language 
incoherent, some of the expressions involved must not behave as they pre-theoretically appear to 
behave; avoiding a diagnosis of incoherence requires one to violate our pre-theoretical 
conception at least somewhere. In practice, nearly all violations that one might posit involve 
some expressive limitations, and thus conflict to some degree with the idea that natural 
languages are maximally expressive. (See below for views that violate our pre-theoretical 
conception in other ways.) For example, Tarski-style approaches ban self-reference27; 
contextualists (see Section 4), and, in effect, (Kripke 1975),28 ban unrestricted quantification; and 
dialetheists insist that there is no way of using ‘not’ so that it expresses Boolean negation, the 
kind of negation that comports with the rule ex falso quodlibet.29  
At this point, we can start to see the situation for such diagnoses (those that violate 
maximal expressiveness) resemble the situation we had with aberrationism and LT. Against any 
proposed expressive restriction, a critic can always object by introducing an expression that is 
(purportedly) stipulated to violate that restriction. And in response, the advocate of the approach 
under consideration can always dig in her heels and simply insist that no such stipulation can 
succeed, that no natural language can, without further changes, accommodate an expression 
                                                          
“natural language abounds with directly or indirectly self-referential yet apparently harmless expressions—all of 
which are excluded from the Tarskian framework” (p.77). If the aim were simply to construct a new language in 
which to do most mathematics, with no attempt made to simulate the features of natural languages, then the charge 
of restrictiveness could hardly count as an objection to Tarski’s approach.  
27 See (Tarski 1935) and (Tarski 1944). Tarski constructs a hierarchy of languages, each with its own truth-predicate 
which can only be applied to sentences at strictly lower levels in the hierarchy.  
28 Kripke defines a language that is constructed over a transfinite hierarchy of stages. On pain of contradiction, the 
language does not allow for universal quantification over these stages.  
29 See (Scharp 2013) p.104-106 for discussion of this point. 
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defined in such a way and remain coherent. Deciding which of these views makes for the best 
diagnosis, then, is a matter of swallowing the pill that is least bitter. That is, the stipulation to 
sacrifice is the one whose loss inflicts the least mutilation on our pre-theoretical beliefs about 
natural languages, and in particular the thesis of maximal expressiveness.  
There is no space here for an exhaustive comparison of the many competing 
approaches,30 but two important points in favor of aberrationism are worth noting. Firstly, 
because it posits aberrations only in Liar-like sentences, aberrationism leaves the rest of language 
untouched. Thus, aberrationists can allow that the non-paradoxical areas of language are just as 
linguistics and casual inspection say they are, including when it comes to expressiveness. By 
contrast, for example, to reject unrestricted quantification31 is to deny that it can be achieved 
anywhere, not just that it can be achieved in Liar-like sentences. Similarly, dialetheists do not 
merely claim that occurrences of ‘not’ in Liar sentences fail to express Boolean negation; they 
deny that ‘not’, or any other expression, can ever express Boolean negation. This claim has 
strong consequences concerning the meanings of all non-paradoxical sentences that contain 
‘not’. Thus, the expressive limitations posited by contextualism and dialetheism go way beyond 
the sentences involved in the Liar paradox.  
A second, closely related point is that unlike many competing diagnoses, aberrationism 
has no need to posit any properties to which it is impossible to refer, or any proposition that 
cannot be expressed.32 As discussed in Section 3.1, such claims pose a prima facie challenge to 
the coherence of approaches that make them, since these views end up purporting to refer to the 
                                                          
30 See Chapter 1 for a more comprehensive discussion. 
31 See (Burge 1979), (Simmons 1987), and (Glanzberg 2004b) for such views. (Kripke 1975) can also be understood 
in this way, as denying the possibility that one can, while speaking a given language, quantify unrestrictedly over the 
stages in the construction of that language.  
32 Compare (Tarski 1935), which holds that no predicate in a language can refer to the property of being a true 
sentence of that language. See also the charge of incompleteness against (Kripke 1975) in Section 5 of Chapter 1.  
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property, express the proposition. Aberrationism avoids this problem. For one thing, although 
occurrences of ‘true’ in Liar sentences cannot refer to truth, plenty of other occurrences of ‘true’ 
(in non-Liar sentences) can—so there is no need for aberrationists to claim that no expression 
can refer to truth. Similarly, what a Liar-like sentence cannot say about itself (namely, that it is 
not true,) can be said by another, non-Liar-like sentence. For example, the sentence  
(L’) ‘L* is not true’ is not true  
succeeds in saying of L* that it is not true. To get the idea, it helps to note that L’ is not a Liar 
sentence: L’ attributes untruth not to itself but rather to the (distinct) sentence L*.33 So, there is 
no need for aberrationists to claim that no sentence can say of L* that it is not true. Again, the 
overarching point here is that while most diagnoses posit some expressive limitations on natural 
languages, the limitations posited by aberrationism are remarkably unrestrictive. To speak 
metaphorically, no area of reality is in principle inaccessible to language; it is just that certain 
areas cannot be reached by certain routes.  
 So far, I have only discussed competing views that violate the thesis of maximal 
expressiveness. Still, one might wonder whether cases like LT work to the advantage of views 
that do not posit any expressive limitations. The answer is that even if they do, it is far from 
obvious that this advantage is decisive, because views that posit no expressive restrictions are 
bound to violate other aspects of our pre-theoretical conception(s) of language. One could, for 
example, take the Liar paradox to show that natural languages, and indeed any languages with 
                                                          
33 Still, one might reasonably be concerned about the fact that L’ can be converted into a Liar sentence by 
substituting the name ‘L*’ for the co-referential quote name ‘‘L* is not true’’. Should not L’ therefore count as Liar-
like? See Section 5 below for a full discussion of this issue, including a definition of ‘Liar-like sentence’ which 
includes L* but excludes L’.  
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the features blamed for generating the paradox, are simply incoherent.34,35 But this claim is 
implausible on its face. It is just obvious that natural languages manage to be coherent, even 
despite the paradox; for not absolutely every sentence is true. If that is right, then positing pretty 
much any expressive limitation will make for a better diagnosis than positing incoherence.  
There are, however, less trivial diagnoses that refrain from positing expressive 
limitations. (Brandom 1994) defends a prosententialist view, on which the expression ‘is true’ is 
not a predicate whose job is to refer to a property, but rather functions as a prosentence-forming-
operator: when ‘It is true that’ is applied to a sentence, the resulting sentence is a prosentence—
a sentence which inherits its content from the original sentence, in much the way that a pronoun 
can inherit its content from an antecedent expression in the discourse.36 (E.g., ‘It is true that snow 
is white’ has the same content as ‘Snow is white’.) Prosententialism posits no expressive 
restrictions on English, insofar as it does not involve positing any property to which no predicate 
can refer, or banning any kind of unrestricted quantification, or positing any one-off aberrations, 
etc. However, (Wilson 1990) argues convincingly that views like Brandom’s conflict with the 
linguistic data about English: in sentences in which ‘it is true that’ occurs, prosententialists take 
that expression, rather than ‘is true’, to be a grammatical constituent. As Wilson illustrates, this 
hypothesis has a number of consequences that contradict speakers’ judgments of 
grammaticality.37 Weighing prosententialism against aberrationism, then, is a matter of weighing 
                                                          
34 (Tarski 1935) is most naturally read as taking self-reference to be incoherent, thus rendering incoherent any 
language that allows for it.  
35 One should be careful to distinguish this from the claim that natural languages do not genuinely possess the 
feature in question, and so are coherent after all. While this is not an accurate reading of Tarski, it is one way his 
ideas might be used.  
36 See Chapter 1 Section 8 for further elaboration of Brandom’s view. 
37 For example, if prosententialism takes the syntax of sentences containing ‘true’ to reflect their logical form, then it 
entails that the sentence ‘What is true is that Bleda is vicious’ is ungrammatical and that ‘What is true that is Bleda 
is vicious’ is grammatical. But these claims are clearly false. By contrast, the hypothesis that ‘is true’ functions as a 
predicate entails the reverse, that ‘What is true is that Bleda is vicious’ is grammatical and that ‘What is true that is 
Bleda is vicious’ is ungrammatical. (These examples are due to (Wilson 1990) pp.23-24.) Prosententialists can 
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these violations against the aberrationist’s denial that the stipulation which defines ‘TRUE’ could 
succeed. Without reconstructing that debate in full here, I will point out that whereas the theory 
of the relation of grammatical constituency is on comparatively solid footing, reference remains 
a topic of active research and competing theories. Accordingly, then, it is preferable to take the 
Liar paradox to teach us something new and surprising about reference than to take it to refute 
linguists’ canonical conception of grammatical constituency.  
Before moving on, let me make one final, important point about stipulations like the one 
that (purportedly) defined ‘TRUE’ above. When presented with LT, aberrationists should 
concede straightaway that it is possible to define an expression, ‘TRUE’, in a way that 
guarantees that all of its occurrences refer to truth. It is just that by aberrationist lights, one 
cannot—as was alleged in the original example—do this while keeping fixed everything else 
about one’s language. On the contrary; in the face of such a stipulation, the language would have 
to compensate in some other way, forestalling the construction of a sentence which says of itself 
that it is not true. For instance, the language could be such that no occurrence of ‘not’ in any Liar 
sentence expresses negation. Qua sentence of such a language, LT is quite unproblematic, since 
qua sentence of that language, it straightforwardly fails to say of itself that it is not true. The 
distinctive claim of aberrationism, then, is not that no language whatsoever can contain an 
expression like ‘TRUE’, but rather that natural languages cannot do so without undergoing 
various deformations that would result in a different language. Absent such deformations, in a 
natural language what breaks down in the face of the paradox is the reference of the key 
                                                          
respond by pointing out that syntax and logical form can come apart. E.g., in the sentence ‘I saw a woman’, the 
phrase ‘a woman’ serves as a noun phrase, even though at the level of logical form it is a quantifier phrase. Still, 
while there are known instances of mismatch between surface syntax and logical form, there is a general 
presumption against positing such mismatches.  
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occurrences of ‘true’ in Liar-like sentences. As I explain at greater length elsewhere,38 what 
justifies this strategy of targeting ‘true’ rather than, for example, ‘not’, for unusual behavior is 
that this strategy affords us the most uniform diagnosis of the many different Liar-like paradoxes 
as they arise for natural languages. Every such paradox involves ‘true’ or some similar 
expression,39 whereas only some involve the connective ‘not’, and similarly for many other 
traditionally targeted expressions such as those that make for self-reference.  
While there is of course more to discuss concerning revenge, the foregoing should be 
enough to give aberrationists reason for optimism. Accordingly, I will press on and consider 
threats of revenge that might come from aberrationist appeals to indeterminacy.  
 
3.4. Indeterminacy, and an Introduction to Parity Problems  
 Let us now try to obtain a revenge sentence using the notion of indeterminacy. A first 
thing to note here is that my own preferred version of moderate aberrationism in fact invokes two 
kinds of indeterminacy: indeterminacy as to the content of a sentence (what it says), and 
indeterminacy as to the sentence’s truth value. On my view, Liar-like sentences have both: they 
are indeterminate in truth value because they are indeterminate in content. This feature of the 
view will figure importantly throughout.  
We have reasons quite independent of the Liar paradox and its kin to hold that some 
sentences are indeterminate in content.40 Anyone who grants this will have to embrace some 
                                                          
38 See Chapter 1, Section 10. 
39 Grelling’s paradox involves the relation symbol ‘satisfies’.  
40 See (Heck 2003) and (McGee and McLaughlin 2004) for exposition of some views that take the Sorites paradox 
to involve indeterminacy in content. (Quine 1960) and (Kripke 1982) argue that such indeterminacy is in fact quite 
pervasive; they hold that no sub-sentential expression in any language is determinate in reference, and that the 
reference of each putatively-referring expression is indeterminate as between many radically different entities. 
Similarly, then, all declarative sentences are radically indeterminate as to their contents. Whether or not one thinks 
the situation is as bad as this, the considerations Quine and Kripke raise make it plausible that at least some small 
amount of indeterminacy in content holds for at least some expressions. 
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semantics of indeterminacy—that is, some account of how the indeterminacy of a word can 
influence the contents and truth values of sentences that contain it, and how indeterminacy as to 
a sentence’s truth value can influence the truth values of logically more complex sentences of 
which it is a constituent. So, the challenge of constructing a workable semantics of 
indeterminacy is one faced by many different theorists, not just those who incorporate 
indeterminacy into their approaches to the Liar paradox.  
That said, the question remains whether the appeal to indeterminacy in truth value in 
connection with the Liar paradox gives rise to a revenge problem. And many classic approaches 
that invoke such indeterminacy are indeed vulnerable to such problems. The standard way to 
make trouble is with a sentence like L**:  
(L**) L** is either indeterminate or false  
If L** is indeterminate, then it is either indeterminate or false. But that is precisely what L** 
says, making it true. However, a sentence cannot be both indeterminate and true,41 so we have a 
contradiction. Thus L** is not indeterminate. So, it is either true or false. If it is true, then, given 
what it says, it is either indeterminate or false. We showed already that L** is not indeterminate, 
so it must be false. But then it is not true, contradicting our assumption that it is true! We got this 
contradiction by assuming that L** is true. Since we showed already that L** must be either true 
or false, we now know that L** must be false. But then it is either indeterminate or false. 
However, that is precisely what L** says; so, L** is true after all! This contradicts what we just 
                                                          
41 (Barnes and Williams 2011) shows that this does not hold on all conceptions of indeterminacy. However, there is 
no point to invoking indeterminacy as an approach to the Liar paradox unless one can claim that some indeterminate 
sentences are neither true nor false. The appeal to indeterminacy as an approach to the Liar is motivated by 
sentences like L from above (‘L is false’). As we saw, we have trouble if L is true and trouble if L is false. The point 
of claiming that L is indeterminate is to escape the choice between these two scenarios. Positing indeterminacy is 
therefore of no help unless it can allow for such escape.  
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showed (namely, that L** is false). And now we have derived a contradiction with no 
undischarged assumptions.  
The appeal to indeterminacy in truth value, as we just saw, leads to trouble. That is 
because once we have a word ‘indeterminate’ that refers to the property being indeterminate in 
truth value, we can, it seems, use that word to formulate a revenge sentence.42 However, 
aberrationism can avoid this problem. L** generates contradictions only if it succeeds in saying 
of itself that it is either indeterminate or false. But that is precisely the sort of thing that 
aberrationists would deny. Such a denial can be secured by positing a one-off aberration in the 
occurrence of either ‘indeterminate’ or ‘false’ in L**. I will now explore some proposals to that 
effect. (Here again, I refer readers to Section 3.3 for discussion of the concern that one can 
simply introduce a predicate in a way that guarantees that its occurrences refer as desired.) 
There are several constraints on a consistent one-off aberrations diagnosis. For one thing, 
if the occurrence of ‘indeterminate’ in L** refers to the property being indeterminate in truth 
value, then on pain of inconsistency it can’t be that L** is indeterminate in truth value.43 In that 
case, the first disjunct of L** would say of L** that it is indeterminate, and because L** is 
indeterminate that disjunct would be true. But then that would make L** true, and so not 
indeterminate.44 Likewise, if the occurrence of ‘false’ in L** refers to falsehood, then it can’t be 
that L** is false. If the occurrence of ‘false’ refers to falsehood, then L**’s second disjunct says 
of L** that it is false. If L** is indeed false, then that disjunct is true, making L** true, and so 
not false, a contradiction. One can also check that on pain of contradiction, the occurrence of 
                                                          
42 Of course, theorists who favor the appeal to indeterminacy as a solution to the Liar paradox have attempted to 
resist the revenge problem I have just described. See (Soames 1999).  
43 Again, here I assume that indeterminate sentence cannot also be true. Recall footnote 25. 
44 For similar reasons, it can’t be that the occurrence of ‘false’ refers to being indeterminate and L** is 
indeterminate. But it is anyway difficult to see how the occurrence of ‘false’ could come to refer to being 
indeterminate. At least, it is hard to identify anything about our use of ‘false’ that could lead to this.  
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‘false’ in L** cannot refer to not being ascending true or to not being descending true—no 
matter whether L** is true, false, or indeterminate.  
Another constraint is the following. Suppose that the occurrence of ‘false’ refers, not to 
falsehood, but to the property not being true. And suppose that L** is indeterminate. By the first 
supposition, the second disjunct of L** says of L** that it is not true. Since L** is indeterminate 
(and so not true), that second disjunct is true, making L** true after all, a contradiction.  
Even with these constraints, however, there are a number of possibilities left open to 
aberrationists. Here are several:  
a) the occurrence of ‘indeterminate’ fails to refer to indeterminacy, the occurrence of 
‘false’ refers to falsehood, and L** is indeterminate.  
 
b) the occurrence of ‘false’ fails to refer to any of the following properties: falsehood, 
not being true, not being ascending true, not being descending true. It refers to some 
other property that L** lacks. The occurrence of ‘indeterminate’ refers to 
indeterminacy. L** is false.  
 
c) Both the occurrence of ‘indeterminate’ and the occurrence of ‘false’ in L** are 
indeterminate in reference. L** is indeterminate in truth value. But no contradiction 
follows since it is indeterminate what L** says. 
 
In each of these cases, the question ‘to what do the aberrant occurrences refer?’ is an interesting 
and difficult one. Unfortunately, I will have to postpone full discussion of these questions to 
another occasion.45 For now, I want to address an even more pressing question.  
Let us assume that either the occurrence of ‘indeterminate’ or the occurrence of ‘false’ in 
L** witnesses an aberration. Which occurrence does this? Or do both of them do it? This 
                                                          
45 Here is my preferred way to develop (c). Let’s say a sentence is ascending false if it is safe and not ascending true. 
(Recall Scharp’s definition of safety from my Section 1.2.1.2. See (Scharp 2013), p.170.) Likewise, let’s say a 
sentence is descending false if it is safe and not descending true. Now, let’s say a sentence is ascending 
indeterminate if it is indeterminate whether or not the sentence is ascending true. And likewise, say a sentence is 
descending indeterminate if it is indeterminate whether or not the sentence is descending true. Then the idea would 
be that the reference of the occurrence of ‘indeterminate’ in L** is indeterminate as between ascending 
indeterminacy and descending indeterminacy, and the reference of the occurrence of ‘false’ in L** is indeterminate 
as between ascending falsehood and descending falsehood. I thank Harold Hodes for this suggestion.  
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question is an instance of the more general phenomenon of parity problems, which will crop up 
frequently in what follows. It is worth taking a brief moment to introduce these problems, which 
I will now do. There are many cases in which we are faced with a pair of sentences, words, or 
occurrences that are quite similar in nearly all respects that seem relevant for diagnosing their 
semantic statuses—statuses like true, false, or indeterminate—but such that we face significant 
pressure to attribute different statuses to them. The problem of attributing semantic statuses is a 
parity problem. Solving a parity problem amounts to providing a non-paradoxical diagnosis, plus 
an explanation of how the expressions involved acquire the statuses they have under that 
diagnosis. As I proceed, it will emerge that fans of radical and moderate aberrationism will want 
to diagnose parity problems in characteristically different ways. Radical aberrationists will find it 
easier to assign different statuses, while moderate aberrationists will find it easier to assign the 
same status.  
Return now to the case of L** (that is, ‘L** is either indeterminate or false’). The 
question was, assuming that at least one occurrence in L** witnesses an aberration, and 
assuming that it could be either the occurrence of ‘false’ or that of ‘indeterminate’, which is it? 
Other things being equal, it is best to minimize the aberrations one posits to what is necessary for 
avoiding paradox. Thus, at least on that count, it is better to posit only one aberration. However, 
other things are not equal. It is hard to identify any feature of our use of either ‘false’ or 
‘indeterminate’ that would make that word a more likely candidate for undergoing an aberration. 
And neither expression is such that its behavior seems more responsible for the revenge problem 
than that of the other. Finally, we have assumed that each expression is such that targeting it for a 
one-off aberration can make for a consistent diagnosis of L*; considerations of consistency do 
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not force us to choose one or the other. Thus, there are pressures to assign both occurrences the 
same status. The presence of these pressures amounts to a parity problem.  
Different aberrationists are free to take different stands on this problem. First consider 
radical aberrationists. Because they deny Semantic Supervenience or Semantic Regularity, 
radical theorists are at greater liberty than their moderate counterparts to posit differences in the 
reference of words (or occurrences) in cases in which there are no seemingly relevant differences 
in our uses of these words. So, at the cost of treating semantic facts as sui generis, one can assign 
different statuses to the occurrence of ‘false’ and the occurrence of ‘indeterminate’ in L**. 
Again, that is, one occurrence witnesses an aberration and the other does not.  
Which occurrence gets which status? It is hard to see how to defend either of the two 
possible answers here. Normally, semantic claims are defended by appealing to facts about how 
expressions are used. However, in the present case we have already observed that nothing in the 
use of either expression justifies targeting either expression rather than the other, and in any case 
a radical aberrationist will tend to be skeptical about attempts to derive semantic facts from facts 
about language use. For her, then, the most promising strategy here is to endorse a sort of 
epistemicism, according to which when it comes to sentences like L** there is only one 
aberration, but no one can know which expression undergoes it. Since I myself do not want to 
reject Semantic Supervenience, I will leave the defense of this position here. But what I have 
said should suffice to make clear that radical aberrationists have a way to respond to the parity 
problem posed by L**, if there is one. (Again, I assumed for the sake of argument that we can 
consistently target either expression for an aberration. There may be more to say about this, but I 
cannot pursue the matter here.)  
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A less epistemological way of respecting our sense that the occurrences of 
‘indeterminate’ and ‘false’ in L** are on equal footing is, of course, to say that both occurrences 
undergo aberrations. The obvious problem for this diagnosis is that it fails to minimize the 
aberrations posited to exactly what is necessary for avoiding contradictions. However, one might 
insist that the need to minimize aberrations is not the only constraint that a diagnosis must satisfy 
in order to be adequate; it must also assign comparable statuses to expressions which are 
comparable in relevant respects, such as use. This is an appealing view for people who, like me, 
accept Semantic Supervenience and Semantic Regularity. Another reasonable consideration is 
the following: because ‘indeterminate’ and ‘false’ share a boundary, one expects that the 
occurrence of ‘false’ shifts reference if and only if the occurrence of ‘indeterminate’ does so. 
Still, it is worth noting that positing two aberrations is not the only way to assign 
comparable statuses to L**’s occurrences of ‘indeterminate’ and ‘false’. Another option is to 
claim that while one of these occurrences witnesses an aberration, it is indeterminate which one 
that is. An objection to this view is that our linguistic behavior could not determine that there is 
an aberration without determining which one it is. Here, an aberrationist might stress that when 
one compares cases of indeterminacy of reference, the concern looks unconvincing. For we 
typically do want to say, of expressions that are indeterminate in reference as between just two 
candidates, that these expressions refer; though we deny that the use of these expressions makes 
it determinate exactly to what they refer. If we can say that in those cases, then we can also say it 
in the present case.  
Another objection is that it is unsatisfying not to be able to state definitively of either 
occurrence that it does, or that it does not, witness an aberration. Of course, as a quite general 
feature of the notion of indeterminacy, if one holds that it is indeterminate whether X or Y 
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obtains then one is committed against definitively stating whether it is X or Y that obtains. Still, 
an objector might insist, the awkwardness of this commitment creates pressure to minimize the 
positing of indeterminacy. Aberrationists have no special answer to this objection. It is simply 
another problem whose seriousness should be evaluated in light of the problems that afflict 
alternative approaches to the Liar paradox. Though it is worth noting that the concern is 
particularly biting for aberrationists who also want to claim that the expression that undergoes an 
aberration (whichever expression that is) is indeterminate in reference. Such a position in effect 
posits three different layers of indeterminacy: indeterminacy as to which expression undergoes 
an aberration, indeterminacy in the reference of that expression, whichever expression it is, and 
then indeterminacy as to the truth value of the sentence containing the expression.  
 
3.5. Ascending truth and Descending truth 
 As we saw, my own preferred version of moderate aberrationism appeals to the properties 
ascending truth and descending truth.46 That is how I flesh out my claim that sentences like L* 
come close to saying what they appear to say, and that what these sentences say is influenced by 
how we use them and their component words. However, proponents of this version of moderate 
aberrationism must consider whether ascending truth and descending truth can be used to 
generate any new, recalcitrant, Liar-like paradoxes. Before answering this question in the 
negative, let me emphasize that the question is quite particular to my own preferred version of 
moderate aberrationism. Even if my answers should prove unsatisfactory, that need not affect the 
fate of moderate aberrationism in general.  
                                                          
46 My talk of ascending truth and descending truth raises the possibility of a different view, on which the reference 
of every occurrence of ‘true’ is indeterminate between these different properties, but for most purposes this does not 
matter since it is only on paradoxical contexts that the properties diverge from our pre-theoretical judgments of 
truth. I address this view in Chapter 1, Section 9.  
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  When it comes to ascending truth and descending truth, an obvious first place to look for 
revenge is the sentences α and δ from Section 1.2.1.2:  
(α) α is not ascending true 
(δ) δ is not descending true 
However, as we already saw, these sentences turn out to be quite unproblematic. As I explained 
shortly after introducing α and δ, every sentence which says of itself only that it is not ascending 
true is ascending true (and thus false). So α is simply false; no paradox here. Similarly with δ. 
Every sentence that says of itself only that it is not descending true is not descending true, and is 
thus true. So δ is not descending true, and so it is simply true; no paradox here.  
 One could experiment with more complex examples, but a moment of mindful reflection 
suggests this will be futile. As I explained in Section 1.2.1.2, (Scharp 2013) Chapter 6 and its 
appendix present a consistency proof for ADT. This proof takes the form of construction of a set-
theoretic model, M2. Thus, relative to their interpretation in M2, ADT and all of its classical 
consequences are consistent (relative to set theory). We can take the existence of M2 as evidence 
that ADT is consistent when ‘ascending true’ and ‘descending true’ are understood as predicates 
added to English, defined by adopting the elements of ADT as axioms. This line of reasoning 
provides a straightforward response to anyone claiming to have identified a problematic sentence 
involving ‘ascending true’ and ‘descending true’.47 For one thing, provided that Scharp’s 
consistency proof is correct, one cannot prove a contradiction from just this sentence, ADT, and 
the classical inference rules. Secondly, then, whatever additional principles one used to arrive at 
a contradiction are simply false in every model of ADT, since by hypothesis they are 
                                                          
47 It is worth noting that this argument also addresses the closely related concern that one can use ascending truth 
and descending truth to define truth, and arrive at a paradox that way. Suppose we have some formula φ such that 
‘for all x, φ(x) if and only if x is true’ is provable from ADT (and classical logic). Then using φ one can prove a 
contradiction from ADT. But this contradicts Scharp’s result that ADT has a model.  
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syntactically inconsistent with ADT. That gives us reason to believe that these additional 
principles will come out false if ‘ascending true’ and ‘descending true’ are added to English and 
defined by stipulating the elements of ADT as axioms.  
 So much, for now, for the issue of revenge. I will return to this matter in Section 5, where 
I will examine whether two putative definitions of ‘Liar-like sentence’ that I develop give rise to 
revenge. In the meantime, I will consider a variety of different, pre-theoretically Liar-ish 
paradoxes and briefly explain how an aberrationist diagnosis can be applied to them. 
 
4. Other Liar-like Paradoxes  
 Every approach to the Liar paradox is introduced by applying it to some particular 
version of the paradox. However, it is a fatal flaw if a putative solution works only for the 
specific version that is used to introduce it; to be satisfactory, a solution must be applicable to 
many different versions. In this section, therefore, I will show how the essential moves of 
aberrationism can be successfully used to diagnose and solve a number of paradoxes that are 
distinct from the Strong Liar, the version of the paradox with which I began. Then, in Section 5, I 
will examine two ways to define the term ‘Liar-like sentence’ that would allow aberrationism as 
defined in Section 1 to apply to these paradoxes.  
A quick word on the motivation for discussing the many paradoxes below. Of course, if 
an approach to the Liar paradox can also solve lots of other, distinct paradoxes, then that can 
only be a point in its favor. But on the other hand, if an approach is defective as a solution to the 
Liar then it cannot compensate for this by being applicable to lots of other paradoxes. For this 
reason, when assessing different approaches, it matters what exactly counts as a Liar-like 
paradox. Still, while there is room for disagreement about exactly what paradoxes count as Liar-
 173 
like, in practice it is uncontroversial to count all the paradoxes that I will discuss as Liar-like. 
(See Section 5.1.1 for a definition of ‘Liar-like paradox’ that builds on their common features.) 
As I proceed, I will show that in cases in which the solution afforded by aberrationism comes at 
a significant cost, the overall balance of considerations nevertheless favors aberrationism, and 
within that, moderate aberrationism.  
 
4.1. Contingent Liars  
 Imagine that sentence SC below, and nothing else, is written on a portable blackboard, 
B:48  
 (SC) The sentence written on the blackboard in room 103 is not true.  
Let C be a context in which B and no other blackboard is in room 103. Then SC is a Liar 
sentence, relative to C. For relative to C, the definite description ‘the sentence written on the 
blackboard in room 103’ refers to SC itself, and this makes SC the negation of a sentence whose 
grammatical subject refers to SC and whose grammatical predicate is an expression that refers to 
truth—a Liar sentence.  
On the other hand, imagine a different portable blackboard, B*, containing nothing but 
the sentence ‘Snow is purple’. And let C* be a context in which B* and no other blackboard is in 
room 103. Then relative to C*, SC is simply true. Similarly, imagine that the sentence ‘Snow is 
white’ is written on a blackboard B**, and let C** be a context in which B** alone is in room 
103. Relative to C**, SC is simply false; no paradox here. These examples demonstrate that the 
definite description ‘the sentence written on the blackboard in room 103’ is context-sensitive, 
                                                          
48 This example is taken from (Simmons 1993), p.101.  
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and that the referent, in a given context, of this description determines whether SC is true, 
whether it is false, and whether or not it is a Liar sentence.  
These examples also demonstrate something that is widely recognized by philosophers: 
that reference, at least for definite descriptions, must be relativized to contexts of use. Rather 
than being a two-place relation between an expression and an object or property, reference is 
now widely regarded as being, strictly speaking, a three-place relation between an expression, a 
context of use, and an object or property. Thus, rather than simply referring to SC, the description 
‘the sentence written on the blackboard in room 103’ refers to SC relative to C, to ‘Snow is 
purple’ relative to C*, and to ‘Snow is white’ relative to C**. For the same reasons, one who 
speaks of reference by occurrences will want to say that the occurrence of that description in S is 
context-sensitive: in C, it refers to SC, in C* it refers to ‘Snow is purple’, and in C** it refers to 
‘Snow is white’. 
As we saw at the beginning, whether or not a sentence is a Liar sentence depends on the 
reference of its grammatical subject and predicate expressions. If the reference of these 
expressions is sensitive to context of use, then being a Liar sentence must be not a property but a 
relation, one of whose relata is a context of use. And presumably, the same should hold for all 
manner of Liar-like sentences. (It is easy to verify that my definition of ‘Liar-like’ in Section 5 
below can be trivially modified so as to do justice to this desideratum.) Aberrationism must then 
be modified accordingly, so that it posits aberrations in a sentence relative to all and only the 
contexts in which that sentence is Liar-like. Let CS-aberrationism (for “context-sensitive 
aberrationism”) be the conjunction of the following three claims:  
(Context Sensitive Occurrences) Occurrences refer only relative to contexts of  
utterance 
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(Context Sensitive Aberrations) For any sentence S and any context of utterance C, 
if S is Liar-like relative to C then, relative to C, the 
key occurrences of the alethic expressions in S 
differ in reference (relative to C) from the 
expressions of which they are occurrences.  
 
(Context Sensitive Determined)  For any sentence S and any context of utterance C, 
if S is Liar-like relative to C then what S says 
relative to C is determined by the reference-in-C of 
the key occurrences of S’s alethic expressions, 
rather than by the reference-in-C of the expressions 
of which they are occurrences. 
 
Returning to the sentence SC from above, CS-aberrationism says that relative to any context in 
which the sentence in room 103 is SC itself, the occurrence of ‘true’ in SC fails to refer to truth; 
but relative to all other contexts, this occurrence refers to truth. (For my own part, I would add 
that in any context C in which S’s occurrence of ‘true’ or similar fails to refer to truth, the 
reference of this occurrence is indeterminate as between ascending truth and descending truth. 
This allows that in C, SC comes close to saying what it appears to say (in C).) Thus, CS-
aberrationism allows us to avoid paradox in precisely the same way as regular aberrationism. It is 
only for simplicity of presentation that I have suppressed issues of context-sensitivity 
throughout, defending a de-contextualized version of aberrationism rather than CS-
aberrationism.49  
A final, different concern is that relativizing reference by (some) occurrences to contexts 
gives rise to a new revenge problem. That would involve quantifying over contexts and 
mentioning reference by occurrences, as in the following variant on sentence X from Section 3:  
(X***) In no context does the unquoted occurrence of ‘true’ in X*** refer to 
anything which would render X*** true.  
 
                                                          
49 One might reasonably wonder how CS-aberrationism is different from classic contextualist solutions in the 
literature. For discussion of this issue, please see Chapter 1, Section 6.3.  
 176 
However, aberrationism can handle X*** much as it handles other variants on X. The one 
difference is that we must now admit that in some contexts other than the present one, ‘X***’, 
and likewise its occurrence in X***, refers not to X*** but to something else. (Keep in mind: in 
the present context ‘X***’ refers to the sentence-type displayed above.) Relative to any context 
in which ‘X***’ does not refer to X***, there is no danger whatsoever of revenge. And relative 
to other contexts, such as the present one, aberrationism applies. That is, for any context C*** in 
which ‘X***’ refers to X***, the occurrence of ‘true’ in X*** fails to refer to truth relative to 
C***. Thus, in no context does X*** say anything from which it follows that it (X***) is not 
true in any context.  
 
4.2. Curry’s Paradox:  
 A famous Liar-like paradox is the Curry paradox, which arises from consideration of 
Curry sentences. For all sentences S, S is a Curry sentence if and only if S is a conditional whose 
antecedent is a sentence that attributes truth to S and whose consequent is something entirely 
irrelevant to the antecedent.50 Cu below is a good example:  
 (Cu) If Cu is true then grass is purple 
As is the case with any Curry sentence, if indeed Cu says what it appears to say, then from the 
empty set of assumptions one can prove Cu’s conclusion:  
1. Cu = ‘If Cu is true then grass is purple’  (definition of ‘Cu’) 
2. |Cu is true       (assumption) 
3. |‘If Cu is true then grass is purple’ is true  (Substitution, (1), (2)) 
4. |If Cu is true then grass is purple   ((T-out), (3)) 
5. |Grass is purple      (conditional elimination, (2), (4)) 
6. If Cu is true then grass is purple   (conditional introduction, (2)-(5)) 
                                                          
50 One might have thought that only sentences that lead to unacceptable conclusions can count as Liar-like. 
However, if a sentence allows for the (apparent) deduction of an irrelevant conclusion, then the pattern of reasoning 
to which the sentence gives rise can easily be modified to obtain an unacceptable conclusion. See my definitions of 
‘paradox’ and ‘Liar-likeDEF’ in Section 5.1.2.  
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7. ‘If Cu is true then grass is purple’ is true  ((T-in), (6)) 
8. Cu is true      (Substitution, (1), (7)) 
9. Grass is purple     (conditional elimination, (6), (8)) 
 
It is fairly clear what aberrationists should say about Curry sentences: the occurrence of ‘true’ in 
the antecedent of any Curry sentence fails to refer to truth. Cu thereby fails to say what it appears 
to say, and so entering lines 5 and 6 is illegitimate. The legitimacy of these steps requires that Cu 
say what it appears to say, which it does not. More generally, the admissibility of an inference 
depends not only on the syntax of the sentences involved, but also on what propositions (if any) 
they express. Compare: if we adopted a convention according to which the 4th sentence in any 
derivation meant that grass is blue, then step 4 in the above would likewise be inadmissible, 
despite being licensed by the syntax of the sentences involved.  
  
4.3. The Bad Pair:  
 The paradox associated with the following pair of sentences is like the Strong Liar, 
except that it does not involve direct self-reference.  
(A) B is not true.  
(B) A is true.  
Suppose A is true. Then B is not true. But B says that A is true; so, for B not to be true, A must 
not be true. Contradiction! Thus, A must not be true. But A says that B is not true; so, if A is not 
true then B is true. But B says that A is true; so, if B is true then A is true. A contradiction!51  
                                                          
51 Here is a more formal presentation, leading to the same conclusion (continued on next page):  
1. A = ‘B is not true’  (definition of ‘A’) 
2. B = ‘A is true’  (definition of ‘B’) 
3. |A is true   (assumption) 
4. |‘B is not true’ is true  (substitution, (1), (3)) 
5. |B is not true   ((T-elim), (4)) 
6. |‘A is true’ is not true  (substitution, (2), (5)) 
7. |‘A is true’ is true  ((T-intro), (3)) 
8. |Contradiction  (contradiction introduction, (6), (7)) 
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Aberrationism gives us several ways to avoid paradox in cases like this. On one 
diagnosis, A fails to say what it appears to say, but B does not; that is, the occurrence of ‘true’ in 
A fails to refer to truth, but the occurrence of ‘true’ in B refers to truth. Another option is that B 
fails to say what it appears to say, but A does not: the occurrence of ‘true’ in B fails to refer to 
truth, but the occurrence of ‘true’ in A refers to truth. A third option is to claim that neither A nor 
B says what it appears to say; both occurrences witness aberrations. And a fourth option is to say 
that while there is just one aberration here, it is indeterminate which occurrence witnesses it. (I 
leave it to the reader to check that all these diagnoses avoid paradox.)  
By now, these options are familiar, as are the considerations weighing for and against 
each. As we saw with the putative revenge paradoxes involving L** in Section 3.4, other things 
being equal it is best to posit only such aberrations as one must to avoid paradox. A appears to 
say of B that it (that is, B) is not true, and B appears to say of A that it (that is, A) is true; and 
surely, other things being equal, the more one can respect these appearances the better. However, 
as we also had with L**, here we have a parity problem. It is hard to conjure up any principled 
reason for targeting one occurrence of ‘true’ that does not also justify targeting the other. A and 
B play equal and comparable roles in the derivation of a paradox; we are no less sanguine about 
steps that make use of A than we are about steps that make use of B, and vice versa. Only a 
diagnosis that gives A and B the same status can respect our equal treatment of these sentences.  
                                                          
9. A is not true   (negation introduction, (3)-(8)) 
10. |B is true   (assumption) 
11. |‘A is true’ is true  (substitution, (2), (10)) 
12. |A is true   ((T-elim), (11)) 
13. |Contradiction  (contradiction introduction, (9), (12)) 
14. B is not true   (negation introduction, (10)-(13)) 
15. ‘B is not true’ is true  ((T-intro), (14)) 
16. A is true   (substitution, (1), (15)) 
17. Contradiction  (contradiction introduction, (9), (16)) 
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The situation for different aberrationists is the same as it was for the earlier parity 
problems we saw. Radical aberrationism is freer to ignore similarities in use, and insist that only 
one occurrence witnesses an aberration. These theorists can avoid having to explain which one it 
is by embracing an epistemicist view, according to which it is impossible to know which 
occurrence witnesses the aberration. On the other hand, moderate approaches are more congenial 
to diagnoses that assign the same status to the occurrences of ‘true’ in A and B, since they are 
committed to respecting the links between reference and language use. These approaches must 
choose between positing two aberrations or claiming that there is one aberration and holding that 
it is indeterminate which occurrence witnesses it.  
  
4.4. The No-No Paradox:  
 The following “paradox” is a variant of one much discussed by Roy Sorensen, e.g., in 
(Sorensen 2001). It begins with the following sentences:  
(A*) B* is not true.  
(B*) A* is not true.  
Note first that one can consistently allow that one of these sentences is true and the other false, or 
allow that one is true and the other lacks a truth value. Accordingly, an available position is that 
there is no genuine paradox here, since there are assignments of truth values that one can 
consistently make.  
Paradox or no, the No-No sentences confront us with a very real parity problem. A* and 
B* are symmetrical with respect to all properties that seem relevant for attributing truth values, 
or lack thereof, and so any asymmetrical diagnosis is apt to seem quite arbitrary. Yet, as long as 
one allows that A* and B* say what they appear to say, one cannot consistently attribute the 
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same semantic status to both. If A* and B* are both true, then since A* is true, B* is not true, a 
contradiction. And one can reason similarly with A* and B* reversed. Likewise, if A* and B* 
are both false, then since B* is then not true, A* is true after all, a contradiction (since A*’s 
being false entails that it is not true). Again, one can reason similarly with A* and B* reversed. 
And finally, if A* has no truth value, then in particular it is not true. That would make B* true! 
Similarly with A* and B* reversed. So, if either sentence lacks a truth value then the other is 
true.  
 As we had with earlier parity problems, No-No sentences sit differently with different 
aberrationists. Let us start with the radical theorists—those that deny either Semantic 
Supervenience or Semantic Regularity. Such philosophers are at greater liberty to make an 
asymmetric attribution of truth values, and they can do this without positing any aberrations. 
That is, they can allow that both A* and B* say what they seem to say, and simply hold that one 
is true and the other false. To avoid having to explain which is which, they can make the by-
now-familiar appeal to epistemicism, claiming that it cannot be known which of A* and B* is 
true and which untrue.52 They can say all this, because it is part of their general outlook to be 
happy with divorcing the semantic properties of A* and B* from the properties that these 
sentences so plainly have in common, such as their syntactic and compositional properties. I find 
this general outlook to be deeply flawed, but a detailed critique is a project for another occasion.  
By contrast with radical aberrationists, moderate theorists are less inclined to ignore the 
similarities between A* and B*, and more inclined to respect the pressure that most of us feel to 
attribute the same status to these sentences. Still, there may in the end be ways for such theorists 
                                                          
52 Of course, it is also open to a radical theorist to claim that there is a single one-off aberration here. But that 
solution carries the cost of positing an aberration without providing the benefit of avoiding arbitrariness. So, I’ll say 
no more about it. Radical theorists can also posit two aberrations, but they have little reason to, given that their 
general outlook justifies ignoring the similarities between A* and B*.  
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to resist this pressure and give an asymmetric diagnosis, under the force of other considerations. 
In such a case, it would even be open to them to take an epistemicist stance as a way of 
defending such a diagnosis. Going this route, they would say that there are some non-semantic 
facts that determine, according to some unknown patterns, that A* and B* have different truth 
values, but that it is impossible to know which facts and patterns these are.  
However, the asymmetric route is rockier for a moderate theorist than for her radical 
cousins. It is hard to imagine what the difference-making non-semantic facts could be, given that 
all the relevant-seeming facts we can observe point to similarity between A* and B*. Thus, it is 
worth noting that several different ways of positing one-off aberrations allow one to assign A* 
and B* the same status. The options here are the ones familiar from the other paradoxes we have 
seen: either both of the occurrences of ‘true’ witness aberrations, or one does but it is 
indeterminate which one that is.  
These diagnoses are not without complications. One might hold that the No-No sentences 
do not present us with a genuine paradox; rather, what we have is simply a reductio of the idea 
that sentences which are similar in the manner of A* and B* always have the same semantic 
status. On that sort of view, one might hold that, all things considered, making an asymmetric 
assignment of semantic values is less costly than positing a one-off aberration. On the other 
hand, if asymmetric assignments of semantic values are unacceptable—whether because 
Semantic Regularity is true or for some other reason—then the No-No sentences confront us 
with a genuine paradox. In that case, there is as much justification for positing a one-off 
aberration here as there is in the case of the other paradoxes we have seen.  
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4.5. Yablo’s and Cook’s Paradoxes:  
(Yablo 1993) develops a Liar-like paradox that does not rely on self-reference. The 
paradox involves an infinite list of sentences:  
 (S1) For all n > 2, Sn is not true.  
 (S2) For all n > 3, Sn is not true.  
 … 
 (Sm) For all n > m + 1, Sn is not true.  
 … 
A few moments’ reflection on these sentences generates a paradox that is palpably Liar-like.53 
But it is clear that none of the sentences contains any expression referring to that sentence.  
While Yablo’s paradox does not strictly speaking involve self-reference, (Cook 2006) 
describes a more general kind of circularity—fixed points—that it does involve. (For my 
purposes here, it does not matter exactly what fixed points are. See Cook’s paper for a 
definition.) Using a language that allows for infinite conjunctions, Cook is able to construct a 
palpably Liar-like paradox that does not even involve fixed points. Here are the relevant 
sentences:  
 (S1’) S2’ is not true & S3’ is not true &…  
 (S2’) S3’ is not true & S4’ is not true &…  
… 
 (Sm’) Sm+1’ is not true & Sm+2’ is not true &… 
 … 
The paradox-generating reasoning here is quite similar to that associated with Yablo’s paradox.  
The question now is, what should aberrationism say about the sentences in these 
paradoxes? To start, there is reason to think that all the sentences must have the same semantic 
status—truth, untruth, falsehood, indeterminacy, witnessing an aberration, etc. This is because 
given any sentence in the list, what is essentially the same paradox can be raised for the sequence 
                                                          
53 Here is how to get a contradiction. Given any number m, suppose Sm is true. Then for all n > m + 1, Sn is not true. 
This includes Sm+1. But then also, for all n > m + 2, Sn is not true. That makes Sm+1 true after all, a contradiction. So, 
it must be that for all m, Sm is not true. But then in particular, for any m > 2, Sm is not true. Thus, S1 is true, a 
contradiction! Now we are in trouble.  
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of sentences that succeed it. Accordingly, then, any argument that justifies attributing a given 
status to one of the sentences can be mustered to justify attributing this status to any other 
sentence in the list.54  
By this reasoning, then, the only option for aberrationism is to deny that any of these 
sentences says what it appears to say. In particular, moderate approaches of the kind I favor will 
say that the occurrences of ‘true’ in each of these sentences are indeterminate as between 
referring to ascending truth and referring to descending truth, and so all the sentences are 
indeterminate. (Keep in mind: that does not make any of them true after all, since none succeeds 
in saying of all its successors that they are not true.)  
 
4.6. Grelling’s Paradox  
All of the paradoxes we have seen so far involve the notion of truth. However, there is a 
natural generalization of this notion which also gives rise to a paradox that is palpably Liar-like. 
To get the idea, note first that just as ‘true’ is governed by (T-intro) and (T-elim), we can 
formulate a predicate, ‘satisfies’, which applies to ordered tuples of arbitrary arity, and which is 
defined by the following rules:55 
                                                          
54 In particular, one might have thought that the first sentence is different from the rest, since it, and only it, has no 
predecessors. But as just explained, any other sentence can simply be treated as the first sentence in a new list, 
consisting of all subsequent sentences. For contrast, consider the following sentences, brought to my attention by 
Matti Eklund:  
 (S1*) It is not the case that for all 1 < n < 1, if Sn* exists then Sn* is true 
 (S2*) It is not the case that for all 1 < n < 2, if Sn* exists then Sn* is true 
 (S3*) It is not the case that for all 1 < n < 3, if Sn* exists then Sn* is true 
 … 
S1* has no predecessors, and so (trivially) all of its predecessors are true, making S1* false. But then for each n > 1, 
Sn* is true, since Sn* has at least one false predecessor (namely, S1*). The difference between this case and Yablo’s 
and Cook’s paradoxes is that here the sentences talk about their predecessors rather than their successors. This 
enables the S1*’s lack of predecessors to affect its truth value, and via this, the truth values of all subsequent 
sentences. In Yablo’s and Cook’s paradoxes, by contrast, each sentence addresses only those that succeed it, and so 
the first sentence’s lack of a predecessor is irrelevant to its truth value and to those of all subsequent sentences.  
55 It is worth noting that the notion of satisfaction is quite similar to the notion of respect, introduced in Section 
1.2.1.2. The difference is that respect is defined in terms of a modal condition on reference and in terms of truth, 
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(Sat-intro)  φ(a1,…,an)   
satisfies (<a1,…,an>, ‘φ(x1,…,xn)’)  
 
(Sat-elim) satisfies (<a1,…,an>, ‘φ(x1,…,xn)’) 
φ(a1,…,an) 
 
Suppressing issues of context-sensitivity, here the 21st letter of the Greek alphabet is a 
substitutional variable ranging over all formulas of English, for each Arabic numeral, the 24th 
letter of the lowercase Latin alphabet subscripted by that numeral is a substitutional variable 
ranging over all objectual variables in English, and for each Arabic numeral, the 1st letter of the 
lowercase Latin alphabet subscripted by that numeral is a substitutional variable ranging over all 
English singular terms.  
A moment’s reflection reveals (T-intro) and (T-elim) to be, modulo some trivial cosmetic 
differences, the special cases of (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim) where n = 0. This follows 
straightforwardly from the fact that declarative sentences are formulas with no free variables; 
when n = 0, for example, ‘satisfies (<a1,…,an >, ‘S(x1,…,xn)’)’ becomes ‘satisfies (‘S’)’. (The 
trivial cosmetic differences are those between, for example, ‘satisfies (‘S’)’ and ‘‘S’ is satisfied’, 
and between ‘‘S’ is satisfied’ and ‘‘S’ is true’.56) 
 With (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim) on the table, we can articulate Grelling’s Paradox, 
displayed below:  
                                                          
whereas the notion of satisfaction is introduced simply by stipulating that the rules (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim) are 
henceforth to define the word ‘satisfies’. 
56 Setting the two rules side by side makes the point obvious. E.g.: 
(T-intro)       S  
‘S’ is true 
 
(Sat-intro)  S  
    satisfies (‘S’) 
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1. |satisfies (‘~satisfies (x, x)’, ‘~satisfies (x, x)’)   (assume for reductio) 
2. |~satisfies (‘~satisfies (x, x)’, ‘~satisfies (x, x)’)    (Sat-elim), (1)  
3. |Contradiction        Contrad. Intro, (1), (2) 
4. ~satisfies (‘~satisfies (x, x)’, ‘~satisfies (x, x)’)   Red. ad abs., (1)-(3) 
5. satisfies (‘~satisfies (x, x)’, ‘~satisfies (x, x)’)   (Sat-intro), (4) 
6. Contradiction       Contrad. Intro, (4), (5) 
 
In what follows, let ‘U’ (for “unsatisfied”) be the name of the sentence written in steps (2) and 
(4):  
(U) ~satisfies (‘~satisfies (x, x)’, ‘~satisfies (x, x)’) 
One can quickly see that aberrationism can provide a solution to Grelling’s paradox. All 
we need to do is expand the notion of an alethic expression from the definition of aberrationism 
in such a way so that instead of applying only to expressions that are intersubstitutable with 
‘true’, it also includes ‘satisfies’. This allows us to count U as a Liar-like sentence, and then we 
can say that the unquoted occurrence of ‘satisfies’ in U fails to refer to satisfaction, since this is a 
key occurrence of an alethic expression in a Liar-like sentence.57 It then follows that U fails to 
say of the predicate ‘~satisfies (x, x)’ that it fails to satisfy itself. Thus, the sentences written on 
lines (1) and (2) fail to express genuinely contradictory propositions. Similarly for lines (4) and 
(5). Thus, the derivation does not go through.  
This concludes my presentation of different pre-theoretically Liar-ish paradoxes. In the 
next section, I will work toward a definition of ‘Liar-like sentence’ that will allows aberrationism 
to apply to all the paradoxes above.  
 
                                                          
57 These claims are uncontroversial. Thus, making them come out true will be a desideratum on our definitions of 
‘Liar-like sentence’ and ‘key occurrence’, once we have occasion to develop those.  
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5. Articulating Aberrationism in Full Generality: 
5.1. The Classification Problem:  
 An important task for any diagnosis of the Liar paradox is to solve the classification 
problem: to identify in a precise way all and only the sentences to which that diagnosis applies. 
This task is even more important for diagnoses that are simultaneously to serve as solutions, as 
aberrationism purports to do. A diagnosis that does not apply to the sentence(s) that generate a 
given paradox cannot be used to solve that paradox. And, as discussed at the beginning of last 
section, any adequate solution to the Liar paradox must solve all Liar-like paradoxes, not just the 
ones that are used to introduce that solution. Thus, a diagnosis cannot count as an adequate 
solution unless it applies to every sentence that gives rise to some Liar-like paradox.  
How can one can identify all and only the sentences that give rise to Liar-like paradoxes? 
A simple strategy is just to list them. For instance, an aberrationist might say that if a sentence is 
a Classic Liar sentence, a Strong Liar sentence, a Yablo sentence, etc., then the key occurrences 
of its alethic expression(s) undergo one-off aberrations. However, such disjunctive formulations 
are bound to be unsatisfying. For one thing, there are many Liar-like paradoxes, and so in 
practice there is always the danger of failing to include some overlooked category of sentences, 
namely, those that give rise to an overlooked version of the paradox. There is also another, 
deeper concern. Ideally, a diagnosis will have a criterion of application that brings out a shared, 
underlying feature of the sentences in question, one that explains why they all (appear to) induce 
paradox. Unless a diagnosis bases its applicability on such a feature, there is a worry that it fails 
to illuminate the underlying nature of Liar phenomena.  
In lieu of the simple listing strategy, the task of specifying all and only the sentences that 
give rise to Liar-like paradoxes can be approached from two different perspectives. One 
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perspective takes the second concern raised above to heart: it seeks to identify a shared, 
underlying feature of the Liar-like sentences, one that explains why they all (appear to) induce 
paradox. Philosophers with this perspective will be naturally inclined to pursue the abstraction 
strategy: consider a wide variety of different Liar-like paradoxes, note the sentences that give 
rise to them, and then try to abstract out a common feature of these sentences, one that explains 
how they give rise to these paradoxes. If the strategy yields a correct answer, then it will identify 
a feature the possession of which is both necessary and sufficient for giving rise to a Liar-like 
paradox. I explore this strategy in Section 5.1.1 below.  
It is worth noting that the abstraction strategy is compatible with aberrationism. 
Aberrationism claims that all and only the sentences that give rise to Liar-like paradoxes witness 
referential aberrations in the key occurrences of their alethic expressions. This claim is consistent 
with there being no interesting, shared feature of these sentences that explains why they all give 
rise to these paradoxes. But it is also consistent with there being such a feature.  
The abstraction strategy faces a challenge, since in principle there is room for 
disagreement as to exactly which paradoxes count as Liar-like. That creates unclarity as to 
exactly which sentences give rise to Liar-like paradoxes, and, in turn, unclarity about which 
sentences a diagnosis must apply to in order to be able to count as a solution. In light of the 
possibility of such disagreement, I can see only one method for identifying the sentences that 
must be targeted: acquiesce to one’s pre-theoretical impressions about which paradoxes are Liar-
like, and then look for common, problem-causing features of the sentences that give rise to these 
paradoxes. That is the method I will employ in Section 5.1.1.  
 So much, for now, for the abstraction strategy and the perspective that motivates it. A 
different perspective rejects the demand for an underlying feature that explains why various 
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sentences give rise to paradoxes. Rather, on this view, being a Liar-like sentence is simply 
identical with being a sentence that gives rise to a Liar-like paradox. (For convenience, but only 
for convenience, this is the definition of ‘Liar-like’ that I adopted above.) So, to get clear on 
which sentences are Liar-like, the important task is to define ‘Liar-like paradox’ and ‘gives rise 
to’ with some measure of clarity and precision. Call this task the definition strategy for 
identifying all and only the Liar-like sentences. I will explore this strategy in Section 5.1.2. 
Like users of the abstraction strategy, users of the definition strategy also need to 
acquiesce to their pre-theoretical impressions about which paradoxes are Liar-like. For the way 
that they refine their definitions of ‘Liar-like paradox’ is by checking against examples, and an 
example paradox can only be used to test a putative definition of ‘Liar-like paradox’ if it is 
known whether or not the example falls under that classification. That said, as with the 
abstraction strategy, the appeal to pre-theoretical impressions here is not a serious concern in 
practice, as philosophers’ pre-theoretical impressions tend to agree on most of the cases 
discussed.  
Although they are naturally associated with two different perspectives, the abstraction 
strategy and the definitions strategy can be pursued in tandem. For all that has been said, the 
definition of ‘gives rise to a Liar-like paradox’ yielded by the definitions strategy may specify a 
deep, explanatory feature of the sentences to which it applies. And even if not, even philosophers 
in search of such a deep, explanatory feature will in the meantime find it helpful to have an 
extensionally adequate characterization of the sentences that they need to target in order to solve 
the paradox.  
Before moving on and exploring the two strategies, I want to emphasize that because the 
task of formulating general definitions of ‘Liar-like paradox’ and ‘Liar-like sentence’ is shared 
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by many different philosophers who study the Liar, it is acceptable that the project of developing 
fully satisfactory definitions lies ultimately beyond the scope of this paper. The work of the next 
two subsections should be seen in the spirit of providing working approximations.  
 
5.1.1. The Abstraction Strategy 
As noted above, the abstraction strategy begins by acquiescing to one’s pre-theoretical 
impressions as to the Liar-like-ness of various paradoxes. Of those paradoxes discussed above, 
the only ones about which I can envision the slightest controversy are the Yablo, Cook, Bad Pair, 
Curry, and Grelling Paradoxes.58 I myself am inclined to count all of these as being Liar-like. In 
the rest of this subsection, I will explain the consequences of this choice. I will begin by 
developing a proposed necessary condition for being Liar-like, motivated by reflection on some 
of these sentences, and then move toward refining it into a necessary and sufficient condition.  
Looking at the Strong Liar, Yablo, Cook, and Bad Pair sentences, each of these contains 
an occurrence of ‘true’ within the scope of negation. Thus, one might be tempted to say that a 
necessary condition for a sentence’s being Liar-like is that it contain such an occurrence. 
However, the Grelling sentence contains in the scope of negation not ‘true’ but ‘satisfies’. Since 
we can view ‘true’ as a special case of ‘satisfies’ (the case where the relation symbol being 
satisfied is 0-ary), we can treat all the other sentences just mentioned as involving occurrences of 
‘satisfies’, modulo some trivial cosmetic differences. So, for inclusiveness, we can reformulate 
the condition as saying that a sentence should contain an occurrence of ‘satisfies’ in the scope of 
the negation operator.  
                                                          
58 The No-No “paradox” raises complicated issues, which I will discuss in Section 5.1.2. 
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Even this newly qualified condition will not do, however, since there are Liar-like 
sentences which contain neither ‘true’ nor ‘satisfies’. E.g., relative to the assumption that truth is 
the most philosophically interesting property, the sentence L1 below is a Liar sentence:
59 
(L1) ~(L1 has the most philosophically interesting property) 
Notice, however, that since (T-intro) and (T-elim) are needed to arrive at a contradiction, and 
since the predicate ‘has the most philosophically interesting property’ is not directly defined in 
terms of these rules, we need to substitute ‘true’ for ‘has the most philosophically interesting 
property’ in order to generate a paradox.60 Let us now say that an expression e is an alethic 
expression if  
(Base Clause) e is inter-substitutable with an expression that is governed by  
(Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim), for some n,  
or  
 
(Inductive Clause) the result of replacing each non-primitive component 
expression in e with its definiens contains an alethic 
expression.  
 
 (Here intersubstitutability can be relativized to a context of utterance or to further philosophical 
assumptions, as in the case of L1.) Given this notion, we can accommodate sentences such as L1 
                                                          
59 Here is why. Relative to that assumption, ‘has the most philosophically interesting property’ refers to truth. Thus, 
the sentence ‘L1 has the most philosophically interesting property’ attributes truth to L1. L1 is thus the negation of a 
sentence whose grammatical subject refers to L1 and whose grammatical predicate refers to truth. But that is the 
definition of a Liar sentence from the Introduction.  
60 Here is how the derivation would go:  
1. L1 = ‘~(L1 has the most philosophically interesting property)’ (definition of ‘L1’) 
2. The most philosophically interesting property = truth  (assumption) 
3. |L1 has the most philosophically interesting property  (assumption) 
4. |‘~(L1 has the most philosophically interesting property)’ has... (Substitution, (1), (3)) 
5. |‘~(L1 has the most philosophically interesting property)’ is true (Substitution, (2), (4)) 
6. |~(L1 has the most philosophically interesting property)  ((T-out), (5)) 
7. |Contradiction       (contradiction intro., (3), (6)) 
8. ~(L1 has the most philosophically interesting property)  (negation introduction, (3)-(7)) 
9. ‘~(L1 has the most philosophically interesting property)’ is true ((T-in), (8)) 
10. L1 is true       (Substitution, (1), (9)) 
11. L1 has the most philosophically interesting property  (Substitution, (2), (10)) 
12. Contradiction      (contradiction intro., (8), (11)) 
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by specifying that to be Liar-like, a sentence must contain an occurrence of an alethic expression 
within the scope of negation.  
Although it is good as far as it goes, this condition does not apply to Curry sentences. In 
these sentences, recall, ‘true’ occurs not in the scope of negation but rather in the antecedent of a 
conditional. With a little extra machinery, this complication can be accommodated. The notion of 
a relation symbol’s occurring within the scope of negation has a well-known generalization that 
also includes the antecedent clauses of conditionals: they are both ways that relation symbols can 
occur negatively in a formula. To see this notion, let us first define the notion of the 
deconditionalization d(χ) of a formula χ. This is simply the result of rewriting all occurrences of 
every conditional in χ (material conditional or otherwise) in terms of negation and disjunction, as 
though they were all occurrences of the material conditional.61 Thus, for example, if ‘F’ and ‘G’ 
are atomic one-place predicates and ‘a’ and ‘b’ are singular terms, then d(‘Fa → Gb’) is ‘(~Fa) v 
Gb’. We can now define the notion of a negative occurrence of an expression in a formula. If e is 
an expression of any kind, χ is a formula, and E is an occurrence of e in χ, then E is a negative 
occurrence of e in χ if, when χ is transformed in d(χ), the occurrence of e that corresponds to E 
lies under the scope of an odd number of negation operators.62 For example, the occurrence of 
‘F’ in ‘Fa → Gb’ is negative, since once we transform ‘Fa → Gb’ into ‘(~Fa) v Gb’, the 
occurrence of F lies under the scope of an odd number of negation operators.  
                                                          
61 More precisely, for any formula χ,  
d(χ) =  χ,   if χ is an atomic predication, 
  ˹~d(φ)˺,   if χ is ˹~φ˺ for some formula φ, 
  ˹d(φ) & d(ψ)˺,  if χ is ˹φ & ψ˺ for some φ and ψ, 
  ˹d(φ) v d(ψ)˺,  if χ is ˹φ v ψ˺ for some φ and ψ, 
  ˹(~d(φ)) v d(ψ)˺,  if χ is ˹φ → ψ˺ for some φ and ψ, 
  ˹zd(φ)˺,   if χ is ˹zφ˺ for some φ and some variable z, 
˹zd(φ)˺,  if χ is ˹zφ˺ for some φ and some variable z. 
62 Note: a relation symbol that occurs more than once in a formula can occur negatively and also occur non-
negatively.  
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With the notion of negative occurrences in hand, we can propose that for a sentence S to 
be Liar-like, it must contain a negative occurrence of an alethic expression. This proposal allows 
us to accommodate Curry sentences. For example, d(‘If C is true then grass is purple’) is ‘(~(C is 
true)) v grass is purple’. Clearly ‘true’ occurs under the scope of a single negation in the latter 
formula, so ‘If C is true then grass is purple’ contains a negative occurrence of ‘true’. Thus, this 
Curry sentence meets the proposed necessary condition for being Liar-like, as pre-theoretically it 
should.  
While the condition just proposed may be satisfactory as a necessary condition for being 
Liar-like, it is clearly not a sufficient condition, since plenty of unproblematic sentences satisfy 
it. For example, the sentence ‘‘Grass is purple’ is not true’ contains an occurrence of ‘true’ under 
the scope of a single negation, but is not Liar-like. In response to this observation, a natural 
suggestion is that a sentence S is Liar-like if and only if it contains a negative occurrence of an 
alethic expression which is applied to a name for S. On this suggestion, a sentence must refer to 
itself in order to be Liar-like.  
However, recall from previous sections that none of the Yablo, Cook, and Bad Pair 
paradoxes involves self-reference. Likewise, while Grelling’s sentence U involves self-
application of a predicate, it contains no term that refers to U itself. Finally, Cook’s paradox 
involves no kind of referential circularity whatsoever.63 Since we are counting all these 
paradoxes as Liar-like, we can conclude that a sentence or set of sentences need not involve self-
reference, or any other kind of referential circularity, in order to give rise to a Liar-like paradox. 
That is an important lesson about what it takes to be a Liar-like sentence.  
                                                          
63 For a general notion of referential circularity, see the notion of a fixed point, (Cook 2006). 
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Still, there is a general notion that includes both referential circularity and the patterns of 
reference involved in Grelling’s, Yablo’s, and Cook’s paradoxes as special cases. To develop 
this notion, I must introduce the idea of alethic reference.64 Very roughly, the idea is that a 
sentence S alethically refers to a formula φ if and only if there is an alethic expression e which 
occurs in S, and S refers to φ within the scope of that occurrence of e. Much less roughly:  
(i) For any alethic expression e, natural number n, singular terms a1,…,an, and 
formula φ(x1,…,xn), any sentence that contains the formula ˹e(<a1,…,an>, 
φ(x1,…,xn))˺ alethically refers to the sentence ˹φ(a1,…,an)˺ via the occurrence of e 
in the subformula ˹e(<a1,…,an>, φ(x1,…,xn))˺. 
 
(ii) Let e be an alethic expression, z be a variable that ranges over indices of 
formulas, f be a function that maps the index of each formula to the number of 
free variables in that formula, let ai be a name and xi be a variable for all natural 
numbers i, and let ψ be a formula that contains the formula  
˹e(<a1,…,af(z)>, φz(x1,…,xf(z)))˺. Then for all values p of z, the formula ˹ z ψ˺ 
alethically refers to the sentence ˹φp(a1,…,af(p))˺ via the occurrence of e in the 
subformula ˹e(<a1,…,af(z)>, φz(x1,…,xf(z)))˺.  
 
(iii) For any sentence S, natural number n, singular terms a1,…,an, and formula 
φ(x1,…,xn), S alethically refers to ˹φ(a1,…,an)˺ if and only if there exists an 
alethic expression e and an occurrence E of e in S such that S alethically refers to 
˹φ(a1,…,an)˺ via E. 
 
A sentence S negatively alethically refers to a formula φ(x1,…,xn) if S alethically refers to 
φ(x1,…,xn) via, and only via, a negative occurrence of an alethic expression.  
To get a grip on this definition, let’s look at some examples. Recall the Strong Liar 
sentence, ‘L* is not true’. By clause (i) above, the sentence L* alethically refers to itself. Modulo 
some minor cosmetic differences, L* is ‘~satisfies(L*)’, which is the result of substituting all 
zero of the names in the (unique) 0-tuple for all zero of the variables in L*. L* negatively 
alethically refers to itself, because the only occurrence of an alethic expression by which L* 
                                                          
64 This notion of alethic reference is modeled after Lavinia Picollo’s eponymous notion, defined in (Picollo 2017). 
Many thanks to Lavinia for her helpful suggestions.  
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alethically refers to itself is a negative occurrence (falling within the scope of a single negation 
operator).  
 In a slightly different way, it follows from clause (i) above that the Grelling sentence U—
that is, the sentence ‘~satisfies (‘~satisfies (x, x)’, ‘~satisfies (x, x)’)’—alethically refers to itself. 
U contains an occurrence of the alethic expression ‘satisfies’ applied to the pair <‘~satisfies (x, 
x)’, ‘~satisfies (x, x)’>. Therefore, U alethically refers to the sentence that results from 
substituting the name ‘‘~satisfies (x, x)’’ for the variable ‘x’ in the formula ‘~satisfies (x, x)’. 
But that sentence is just U itself. Therefore, U alethically refers to itself. U negatively alethically 
refers to itself, since the unique occurrence of ‘satisfies’ by which U alethically refers to itself 
occurs under the scope of a single negation operator.  
 It is also easy to check that by clause (i), each Cook sentence negatively alethically refers 
to all subsequent ones. Modulo cosmetic differences, given any natural number n, for each m > n 
the Cook sentence Sn contains the formula ‘satisfies (Sm)’ (establishing alethic reference) under 
the scope of a single negation operator (establishing negative alethic reference).  
Lastly, clause (ii) above allows us to say that each Yablo sentence alethically refers to all 
subsequent Yablo sentences. Modulo cosmetic differences, for each natural number n the Yablo 
sentence Sn is ‘y > n, ~satisfies (Sy)’. Here f is the constant function whose value is 0, since for 
each m, Sm is a sentence, containing no free variables. Since Sn contains the formula ‘satisfies 
(Sy)’ and the variable ‘y’ ranges over the indices of all subsequent Yablo sentences, Sn alethically 
refers to all subsequent Yablo sentences. This alethic reference is negative, since the formula 
‘satisfies (Sy)’ occurs in the scope of a single negation operator.  
From these examples, we can observe that all the Liar-like sentences we have seen 
involve negative alethic reference. To build toward a definition of ‘Liar-like sentence’, we now 
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need only a few further notions. Let an alethic referential chain be a countable sequence of (not 
necessarily distinct) sentences, each of which alethically refers to at least one of the subsequent 
sentences in the sequence. (So, every alethic referential chain is infinitely long.) An alethic 
referential chain C is a bad referential chain if every alethic referential subchain of C includes 
infinitely many instances of negative alethic reference.  
To get the idea, let’s look at a few examples. For starters, the sequence whose every 
element is L* is a bad infinite referential chain with L* at its head. Each sentence alethically 
refers to all subsequent ones, and all of these infinitely many instances of alethic reference are 
instances of negative alethic reference, so any alethic referential subchain contains infinitely 
many instances of negative alethic reference. For similar reasons, the sequence whose every 
element is the Grelling sentence U is a bad referential chain. As for the Yablo sentences, for each 
such sentence, the sequence that consists of all of the subsequent Yablo sentences, in order, is a 
bad referential chain. That is easy to see, given that each Yablo sentence negatively alethically 
refers to all subsequent ones. Similarly for Cook’s sentences.  
The case of the Bad Pair is a little more interesting. Sentence A—that is, ‘B is not true’—
is the first element of the bad referential chain  
‘B is not true’, ‘A is true’, ‘B is not true’, ‘A is true’,…,  
and B—that is, ‘A is true’—is the first element of the bad referential chain  
‘A is true’, ‘B is not true’, ‘A is true’, ‘B is not true’…..  
Let’s take a moment to verify that both of these sequences are bad referential chains. Both are 
alethic referential chains, for both sequences are infinitely long, and in both sequences, each 
sentence refers to the next sentence in that sequence. Moreover, for both sequences, the only 
alethic referential subchains are ones that contain infinitely many Bs. (Suppose we are given a 
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subsequence C that contains only finitely many Bs. Then after some number n of places in the 
sequence, C contains only As. Since the sentence A refers only to B and not to itself, the copy of 
A in place n+1 fails to refer to any subsequent sentences in C. Therefore, C is not an alethic 
referential chain.) Thus, any alethic referential subchain contains infinitely many Bs. But B 
negatively alethically refers to A. So, any alethic referential subchain contains infinitely many 
instances of negative alethic reference.  
With the notion of a bad referential chain in hand, we can now propose the following as a 
necessary and sufficient condition for a sentence’s being Liar-like:  
(ABS1) A sentence S is Liar-like if and only if S is the first element of a bad 
referential chain65 
 
Here ‘ABS’ stands for the abstraction strategy for identifying all and only the Liar-like 
sentences; we will soon consider some definitions that emerge from the definitions strategy. We 
will soon have reason to refine (ABS1) even further, but for now let us set the abstraction 
strategy aside and examine the definition strategy.  
 
5.1.2. The Definition Strategy 
In this section, I will explore the definition strategy for identifying all and only the 
sentences one needs to target in order to solve the Liar-like paradoxes. The motivating idea here 
is that whatever it is that explains why the Liar-like paradoxes arise, the most immediate task for 
a diagnosis is to target all and only the sentences that give rise to such paradoxes. For that 
purpose, one can simply identify the Liar-like sentences to be all and only the sentences that give 
rise to Liar-like paradoxes. The task of identifying all such sentences then reduces to that of 
                                                          
65 The ‘via, and only via’ clause prevents the sentence ‘This sentence is either true or not true’ from counting as 
negatively alethically referring to itself. Thus, the infinite sequence each of whose elements is that sentence fails to 
count as a bad referential chain, and so that sentence fails to be Liar-like, as pre-theoretically it should.  
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adequately defining ‘Liar-like paradox’ and ‘gives rise to’. In what follows, I will develop the 
idea that something is a Liar-like paradox if it is a paradox that makes ineliminable use of (Sat-
intro) and (Sat-elim), or, what comes to the same, (T-intro) and (T-elim).66 And I will propose 
that a sentence S gives rise to a Liar-like paradox P if (a) S cannot be removed from P, and (b) P 
contains a subderivation either of S or of S’s negation.  
 
5.1.2.1. Liar-like Paradoxes 
Say that a rule of inference is eminently plausible if it so strongly strikes us as acceptable 
as to be virtually immune to rejection. Similarly, a sentence is eminently plausible if what it says 
is so plausible as to be virtually undeniable.67 Likewise, a sentence is eminently implausible if 
what it says is so unacceptable as to be virtually immune to acceptance. With these definitions in 
place, I will move toward a definition of ‘paradox’. To start with, I will define a closely related 
notion, that of a formally-presented paradox. As a first pass, say that something is a formally-
presented paradox if it is a formal derivation which meets the following conditions:  
1. Each sentence in the sequence follows from the others by rules of inference that are:  
i. eminently plausible, but for the existence of the derivation, and 
ii. licensed by the syntax of the sentences to which they are applied.  
2. The premises are eminently plausible, but for the existence of the derivation.  
3. The conclusion is eminently implausible.68 
 
However, this definition of ‘formally-presented paradox’ will not do. Consider the following 
derivation:  
                                                          
66 Recall the discussion of Grelling’s Paradox, Section 5.6. 
67 Here I ignore issues of context-sensitivity. 
68 In personal communication, Volker Halbach raised the concern that this definition is vague, since it is a vague 
matter what sentences and rules of inference are eminently plausible. In fact, though, the vagueness in the definition 
should be embraced as a virtue, since the phenomenon the definition is attempting to capture—namely, the property 
being a paradox, as pre-theoretically understood—is itself vague in the same way.  
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1. C = ‘If C is true then there are infinitely many primes’  (definition of ‘C’) 
2. |C is true         (assumption) 
3. |‘If C is true then there are infinitely many primes’ is true (Substitution, (1), (2)) 
4. |If C is true then there are infinitely many primes  ((T-out), (3)) 
5. | there are infinitely many primes     (cond. elim., (2), (4)) 
6. If C is true then there are infinitely many primes   (cond. intro., (2)-(5)) 
7. ‘If C is true then there are infinitely many primes’ is true ((T-in), (6)) 
8. C is true        (Substitution, (1), (7)) 
9. There are infinitely many primes     (cond. elim., (6), (8)) 
 
Let’s call the above derivation ‘D’. D’s conclusion is not eminently implausible. In fact, it is 
eminently plausible! Still, however, D is highly problematic; the Curry-like reasoning that D 
exemplifies is not an acceptable way to reach the conclusion that there are infinitely many 
primes. One reasonable way to explain what is wrong with D is to emphasize that reasoning of 
this same kind could be used to derive any declarative sentence one likes. For example, replacing 
the clause ‘there are infinitely many primes’ with ‘grass is purple’ throughout yields a derivation 
that still meets conditions (1) and (2), and whose conclusion is absurd.69  
In light of cases like D, then, I propose to define ‘formally-presented paradox’ as follows. 
Something is a formally-presented paradox if it is a formal derivation which meets the following 
conditions:  
1.  Each sentence in the sequence follows from the others by rules of inference that 
are:  
iii. eminently plausible, but for the existence of the derivation, and 
iv. licensed by the syntax of the sentences to which they are applied.  
2. The premises are eminently plausible, but for the existence of the derivation.  
3. If one replaced the conclusion with one that is eminently implausible, making at most 
minor adjustments throughout, then (1) and (2) would still hold.  
                                                          
69 Here is how that would go:  
1. C = ‘If C is true then grass is purple’ 
2. |C is true     (assumption) 
3. |‘If C is true then grass is purple’ is true (Substitution, (1), (2)) 
4. |If C is true then grass is purple  ((T-out), (3)) 
5. |Grass is purple    (conditional elimination, (2), (4)) 
6. If C is true then grass is purple  (conditional introduction, (2)-(5)) 
7. ‘If C is true then grass is purple’ is true ((T-in), (6)) 
8. C is true    (Substitution, (1), (7)) 
9. Grass is purple   (conditional elimination, (6), (8)) 
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This definition takes account of derivations like D, enabling them to count as paradoxical in 
virtue of clause (3).  
One last remark before moving on. Clauses (1)-(3) serve only to define ‘formally-
presented paradox’, not the more general term ‘paradox’. That is because not every bit of 
reasoning that we would want to call a paradox is a formal derivation. For my purposes, the most 
relevant obstacle is that of missing steps. For example, assume that truth is the most 
philosophically interesting property. Then the sentence ‘This sentence lacks the most 
philosophically interesting property’ generates a version of the Liar paradox. But to get from that 
sentence to a contradiction in a formal derivation, one needs the premise ‘Truth is the most 
philosophically interesting property’. That is because the predicate ‘lacks the most 
philosophically interesting property’ is not ordinarily governed by (T-intro) and (T-elim); one 
needs to substitute in ‘is not true’ in order to apply these rules.  
With these reflections in mind, let us say that something P is a paradox if P is a sequence 
of sentences, and either: 
A) P is a formally-presented paradox,  
   or  
B) Inserting some extra, eminently plausible steps into P results in a formally-presented 
paradox that uses all of the sentences in P to arrive at its conclusion.70 
 
For any sequence of sentences P, if P is a paradox that is not formally-presented, then anything 
that is a result of applying the operation described in (B) to P is a formalization of P. If P is a 
formally-presented paradox, then P is its own (unique) formalization.  
                                                          
70 The clause about using all of the sentences in P prevents a great many pre-theoretically unparadoxical sequences 
of sentences from counting as paradoxes. For example, take the one-line formal derivation of ‘a = a’ and append to it 
a formally presented paradox. This is now a formally-presented paradox. Without the clause requiring that all the 
lines be used in deriving a contradiction, the original derivation (that is, the single line consisting of the sentence ‘a 
= a’) would count as a paradox. 
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With the notion of a paradox in place, I will now begin explaining the notion of a 
paradox’s making ineliminable use of a rule of inference. Let us say that a derivation D involves 
an ineliminable use of an inference rule R if D involves an instance of R, and in addition there is 
no sequence of transformations of D that preserve syntactic consequence and whose end result is 
a derivation with the same conclusion as D that contains no instances of R. (A transformation T 
preserves syntactic consequence if and only if for every derivation E, if the conclusion of E is a 
syntactic consequence of the premises of E then the conclusion of T(E) is a syntactic 
consequence of the premises of T(E).) 
Now for the rules of inference that make a paradox Liar-like. It is tempting simply to 
identify these with (T-intro) and (T-elim), since these rules have featured in most of the 
paradoxes we have seen so far. However, we saw in connection with Grelling’s Paradox that (T-
intro) and (T-elim) can be viewed as merely special cases of (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim), modulo 
some trivial cosmetic differences. So, to be satisfyingly general, our definition of ‘Liar-like’ 
should focus on (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim).71  
Here, then, is my definition of ‘Liar-like paradox’:72  
a) A formally-presented paradox P is Liar-like if for some n > 0, P makes 
ineliminable use of (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim), perhaps modulo some trivial 
cosmetic differences.  
 
b) A paradox is Liar-like if all of its formalizations are Liar-like.  
                                                          
71 See (Scharp 2013) chapter 2 and Section 3.6 for justification for a focus on (T-intro) and (T-elim). Given the 
connections between these rules and the rules (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim), the same considerations justify a focus on 
the latter.  
72 This definition rules out several paradoxes that some philosophers might feel to be pre-theoretically Liar-ish, such 
as Berry’s paradox, Richard’s paradox, and the paradox of the name. However, I myself simply do not find these 
paradoxes to be Liar-ish, so I am unmoved by their exclusion. Note, though, that the definition does apply to 
paradoxes that turn on the notion of definability, given that definability is understood in terms of satisfaction: to be 
definable by a predicate E is to be the unique satisfier of E.  
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This definition is fairly easy to support. As the presentations given in earlier sections suggest, it 
is highly plausible that any formalization of the Strong Liar, Yablo, Cook, Bad Pair, Curry, and 
Grelling paradoxes will involve ineliminable applications of (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim), or of (T-
intro) and (T-elim). Thus, these paradoxes all count as Liar-like according to my definition. That 
agrees with most philosophers’ pre-theoretical reactions to these paradoxes.  
What is less immediately obvious is that even in cases in which the offending sentence 
does not make explicit reference to truth or satisfaction, once the paradoxical reasoning is 
formalized it emerges that (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim) are playing an ineliminable role in arriving 
at a contradiction. To see the point, recall the Classic Liar Sentence, L—that is, ‘L is false’. One 
can easily check that both (T-intro) and (T-elim) are used in the associated paradox. Enough 
failures to represent the reasoning in a formal way without them have convinced me that they are 
ineliminable.  
 In my discussion of the No-No “paradox”, I left open whether or not aberrationism 
applies to it. That is because I take it to be an open question whether or not the No-No is indeed a 
paradox. As I have defined ‘paradox’, the matter hinges on whether or not the presupposition 
that the No-No sentences must receive the same status is eminently plausible, but for the fact that 
using standard rules of inference one can derive a contradiction from this presupposition. If the 
presupposition is indeed eminently plausible, then we have a genuine paradox. Indeed, in that 
case, we have a Liar-like paradox, since it is highly plausible that (T-intro) and (T-elim) play 
ineliminable roles in the derivation. In that case, the No-No sentences are Liar-like, and so one-
off aberrations diagnoses apply to them. According to these diagnoses, a one-off aberration 
occurs in connection with these sentences. In Section 3.4, I laid out the best available ways of 
developing this claim: one can, as I prefer, hold that the occurrences of ‘true’ in both sentences 
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witness aberrations, or one can claim that there is a single aberration and it is indeterminate 
which occurrence witnesses it.  
For my own part, I am strongly inclined to believe that the No-No paradox is indeed a 
genuine paradox, and to say that both of the sentences involved witness aberrations. However, 
other philosophers, such as Nicholas Smith, might be more willing to take the lesson to be that 
some deeply similar sentences have different semantic statuses. In that case, the No-No 
sentences do not present us with a genuine paradox, and so there is no need to wheel in any kind 
of solution, let alone aberrationism. Moderate aberrationists such as myself will find this 
situation hard to accept, since we are committed to positing strong, explanatory links between a 
sentence’s semantic status and the kinds of non-semantic properties that the No-No sentences 
obviously have in common. However, only moderate aberrationists are committed to Semantic 
Regularity; radical aberrationists will find an asymmetric diagnosis perfectly acceptable. The fact 
that each account of the No-No “paradox” is consistent with some version of aberrationism 
demonstrates that the No-No poses no threat to the general idea of aberrationism.  
 
5.1.2.2. Liar-like Sentences 
Again, the motivating idea in this subsection is that a sentence is Liar-like if and only if it 
gives rise to a Liar-like paradox. Now that the notion of a Liar-like paradox is in place, the only 
remaining work is to define ‘gives rise to’ in a precise, satisfying way. To motivate the definition 
on which I will settle, it will be helpful first to consider two simpler attempts.  
An initial idea is to say that a sentence S gives rise to a paradox P if S occurs in every 
formalization of P. But many sentences satisfy this condition without being pre-theoretically 
Liar-ish. For example, if P is a formally-presented paradox that contains the sentence ‘1 = 1’ as 
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an extraneous step, then because P is its own unique formalization, every sentence in P, 
including ‘1 = 1’, will occur in every formalization of P. That would render the sentence ‘1 = 1’ 
Liar-like. And it would do likewise for a great many other entirely unproblematic sentences 
which serve as extraneous steps in other formally-presented paradoxes. Clearly this is 
unacceptable. We need to pin down the informal sense in which a sentence can be responsible 
for a paradox, as opposed to merely occurring in it.  
Thinking along these lines, one might next propose that a sentence S is Liar-like if there 
is a Liar-like paradox from which S cannot be removed. More precisely, if S is a sentence and D 
is a formal derivation, say that S cannot be removed from D if there is no transformation T of D 
such that  
1. T consists only of removing steps from D, other than the conclusion, and  
2. T preserves syntactic consequence, and 
3. T removes S everywhere from D except possibly the conclusion.  
 
Given this definition of ‘cannot be removed’, we can propose that  
(DEF1) For all sentences S, S is Liar-like if there is a Liar-like paradox P such that 
P contains S, and for every formalization D of P, S cannot be removed 
from D.  
 
Even (DEF1) however, fails to state a sufficient condition for being pre-theoretically Liar-ish, as 
many pre-theoretically unparadoxical sentences fit the above description. For example, the 
sentence ‘Grass is purple’ bears this relation to the Curry-type paradox exhibited below:  
1. C = ‘If C is true then grass is purple’ 
2. |C is true       (assumption) 
3. |‘If C is true then grass is purple’ is true  (Substitution, (1), (2)) 
4. |If C is true then grass is purple   ((T-out), (3)) 
5. |Grass is purple      (conditional elimination, (2), (4)) 
6. If C is true then grass is purple   (conditional introduction, (2)-(5)) 
7. ‘If C is true then grass is purple’ is true  ((T-in), (6)) 
8. C is true      (Substitution, (1), (7)) 
9. Grass is purple     (conditional elimination, (6), (8)) 
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The sentence ‘Grass is purple’ cannot be removed from the derivation, because of the important 
role it plays in the derivation of step (6). Yet although this sentence is false, it is not pre-
theoretically Liar-ish. Moreover, and perhaps more controversially, I claim that the same holds 
of the sentence ‘C = ‘If C is true then grass is purple’’, written on line (1). That is, although this 
sentence is ineliminable from the derivation, it is not Liar-ish. The paradox arises, I urge, not 
from this sentence, which is used to define the name ‘C’, but rather from C itself.73 Again, the 
point is, not every sentence that occurs in a Liar-like paradox is responsible for that paradox in 
the way that pre-theoretically Liar-ish sentences appear to be.  
What, then, distinguishes pre-theoretically Liar-ish sentences from others that are bound 
to occur in their associated paradoxes? Examining all the paradoxes we have seen, we find 
something striking: in each case, the sentence that we pre-theoretically take to be most 
responsible for the paradox is entered into the derivation via a sub-derivation. For instance, in the 
case of the Strong Liar, from the undischarged assumption of ‘L* is true’ we derive a 
contradiction. Discharging the assumption, we then use this sub-derivation to enter L*—that is, 
‘L* is not true’. Similarly, in the Curry paradox, from the undischarged assumption of ‘If C is 
true then grass is purple’ we derive ‘Grass is purple’. Discharging the assumption, we then use 
this sub-derivation to enter C—that is, ‘If C is true then grass is purple’.  
However, as it happens there are some Liar-like paradoxes that contain no sub-derivation 
of their offending sentences. Consider, for example, the following:  
                                                          
73 Given the existence of the lexical constituents of C and of the ways of combining them afforded by English 
grammar, the existence of C is incontrovertible. And since this sentence exists and we have the letter ‘C’ available 
as a name, we can simply stipulate that ‘C’ will henceforth name the sentence ‘If C is true then grass is purple’. 
Even aberrationists, who claim that stipulations as to the reference of terms cannot always succeed (recall Section 
3.3), can perfectly well allow that the stipulation that defines ‘C’ succeeds. And in the interest of minimizing the 
ways that our linguistic stipulations can go awry, they should allow this.  
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1. L* = ‘L* is not true’  definition of ‘L*’ 
2. |L* is not true    (assume for reductio) 
3. |‘L* is not true’ is true (2), (T-intro) 
4. |L* is true   (1), (3), substitution 
5. |contradiction   (2), (4), contradiction introduction 
6. Not (L* is not true)  (2)-(5), negation introduction 
7. L* is true    (6), double negation elimination 
8. ‘L* is not true’ is true  (1), (7), substitution 
9. L* is not true    (8), (T-elim) 
10. Contradiction   (7), (9), contradiction introduction 
 
This formally-presented paradox does not involve a subderivation whose conclusion is L*. Still, 
it accomplishes this only by including a subderivation whose conclusion is L*’s negation.  
In light of this example, then, I propose that a sentence S gives rise to a Liar-like paradox 
P if and only if for every formalization D of P, D includes either a subderivation whose 
conclusion is S or a subderivation whose conclusion is S’s negation, and S cannot be removed 
from D. Plugging this definition into the definition of ‘Liar-like sentence’, we get the following:  
(DEF2) For all sentences S, S is Liar-likeDEF if and only if there is a Liar-like 
paradox P such that  
for every formalization D of P, 
a. D contains, as a sub-derivation, a derivation either of S or 
of S’s negation,74  
and 
b. S cannot be removed from D.  
 
Although (DEF2) may stand in need of yet further refinements, I will leave my exploration of the 
definitions strategy here.  
 
5.1.3. Accommodating the Maximal Expressiveness of Natural Languages 
 Some of aberrationism’s motivations impose significant constraints on which sentences 
its advocates can take to be Liar-like. In this subsection, I will explore whether (ABS1) and 
                                                          
74 Given that Curry’s paradox does not involve negation, one might worry that there is some Curry-like paradox that 
involves a Curry sentence but no subderivation of either it or its negation. However, the most straightforward 
attempt to achieve this ends up including a subderivation of the sentence after all:  
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(DEF2) can meet these constraints. To see the constraints in question, it will help to introduce the 
notion of a Russellian proposition. For our purposes, it is safe to think of Russellian propositions 
as ordered pairs of objects and properties. Whenever an object o and a property P exist, there 
exists the Russellian proposition <o, P>, which attributes the property P to the object o.  
One might reasonably want to hold that for every Russellian proposition, there is some 
sentence of English which expresses that proposition. Likewise, for every Russellian proposition, 
there is some sentence of English which negates that proposition. At least, these claims are part 
of the pre-theoretically plausible notion that natural languages are maximally expressive (recall 
Section 3.5)—in particular, that anything which can be said at all can be said in a single natural 
language, perhaps supplemented with some further vocabulary. As I explained in Section 3.3, the 
idea that natural languages are maximally expressive constitutes part of the motivation for 
aberrationism.75 
To illustrate the problem that I want to discuss, I will consider two examples. Look first 
at the Strong Liar sentence, L*. Aberrationists claim that what L* fails to say about itself can be 
said by some other sentence. In particular, in Section 3.3, I claimed that L’ will do the job:  
(L’) ‘L* is not true’ is not true 
                                                          
1. |If C is true then (if C is true then grass is purple) 
2. ||C is true 
3. ||If C is true then grass is purple 
4. ||Grass is purple 
5. |If C is true then grass is purple 
6. If C is true then (If C is true then grass is purple) 
7. |C is true 
8. |If C is true then grass is purple 
9. |Grass is purple 
10. If C is true then grass is purple 
11. ‘If C is true then grass is purple’ is true  
12. C is true 
13. Grass is purple 
So, Curry’s paradox does not furnish us with a counterexample to the proposed definition.  
75 See also the discussion of incompleteness in Chapter 1, Section 5.  
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However, this suggestion raises the immediate question of whether L’ is Liar-like in turn. If it is, 
then by aberrationists’ own lights, its unquoted occurrence of ‘true’ witnesses a referential 
aberration. In that case, L’ fails to negate the Russellian proposition <L*, truth>. But that is a 
problem, given that L’ was introduced precisely in order to negate that proposition! 
Similar remarks hold for the sentence L1 from above: 
(L1) ~(L1 has the most philosophically interesting property) 
Relative to the assumption that truth is the most philosophically interesting property, L1 is a Liar 
sentence. Yet one might hope that the Russellian proposition <L1, truth> can be negated in some 
other way. A straightforward suggestion is L’’ below:  
(L’’) L1 is not true  
As we had with L’ above, this suggestion immediately raises the question whether L’’ is Liar-
like. If it is, then L’’ fails to negate the Russellian proposition <L1, truth>. But that was why L’’ 
was introduced in the first place!  
Now for a response. If one is positing aberrations only in Liar sentences, then it is easy to 
avoid positing them in sentences like L’ and L’’. Start with L’. L’ is not a Liar sentence; at least, 
not by the definition I gave in Section 1.1. (In short: a Liar sentence talks about itself, whereas L’ 
talks about a different sentence.) Admittedly, despite its not being a Liar sentence, one can derive 
a contradiction from L’, given the indisputable premise ‘L* = ‘L* is not true’’ and the rule of 
substitution. Here is how that would go: 
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1. L* = ‘L* is not true’   (definition of ‘L*’) 
2. |‘L* is not true’ is true    (Assume for reductio) 
3. |L* is true     (Substitution, (1), (2),) 
4. |L* is not true    ((2), (T-elim)) 
5. |Contradiction     (Contradiction Introduction, (2), (4)) 
6. ‘L* is not true’ is not true   (Negation Introduction, (1)-(4)) 
7. L* is not true    (Substitution, (1), (6)) 
8. ‘L* is not true’ is true   ((T-intro), (7)) 
9. Contradiction     (Contradiction Introduction, (6), (8)) 
 
Still, aberrationists can simply reject the instance of substitution that gets us from L’ in step (6) 
to L* in step (7). For if it is just Liar sentences that undergo aberrations, then L* but not L’ 
witnesses an aberration. In that case, the two sentences say different things, and thus we have 
principled grounds for rejecting the instance of substitution that gets us from L’ to L*. All the 
same points can be made regarding L1 and L’’: as long as we are only positing aberrations in Liar 
sentences, we have no problem finding a way to say of L1 that it is not true. L’’ is not a Liar 
sentence, for precisely the same reason that L’ is not; and so long as we are only targeting Liar 
sentences, we can exploit this fact when positing referential aberrations.  
However, aberrationism aims to diagnose all Liar-like sentences, not just Liar sentences, 
and the problem is harder in that more general setting. Since sentences can be Liar-like in many 
different ways, the mere fact that a sentence fails to be a Liar sentence does not automatically 
guarantee it against witnessing an aberration. Aberrationists need a definition of ‘Liar-like’ that 
is inclusive enough to apply to all the sentences that give rise to Liar-like paradoxes, but 
exclusive enough to leave room for the possibility of expressing, negating, etc., the Russellian 
propositions that these sentences fail to express, negate, etc. In particular, they need a definition 
that applies to L* and L1, but not also to the sentences that they take to negate the propositions 
<L*, truth> and <L1, truth>.  
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 Whatever its other virtues may be, the definition (ABS1) will not fit this bill. It is easy to 
see that both L’ and L’’ lie at the heads of bad referential chains. L’ lies at the head of the chain  
 ‘‘L* is not true’ is not true’, ‘L* is not true’, ‘L* is not true’, …, 
and similarly, L’’ lies at the head of the chain consisting of itself, followed by infinitely many 
copies of L1. An initial suggestion is that  
(ABS2) A sentence S is Liar-likeABS if and only if  
 
(a) it lies at the head of a bad referential chain 
and 
(b) not all of the singular terms in the scope of S’s negative 
occurrence of its alethic expression are quote names of 
sentences 
 
Clause (b) of ABS2 exonerates L’, rendering it non-Liar-like. And while (b) does not exonerate 
L’’ from counting as Liar-like—this owing to the fact that L’’ contains the name ‘L1’, which is 
not a quote-name—clause (b) does exonerate the sentence L’’’ below: 
 (L’’’) ‘~(L1 has the most philosophically interesting property)’ is not true 
So, we have a way to negate the proposition <L1, truth>, as we need.  
Grelling’s sentence U is a trickier case. As it pre-theoretically should, ABS2 counts U as 
Liar-like: although all the singular terms in the scope of U’s negative occurrence of ‘satisfies’ are 
quote names, they are quote names of formulas, not sentences. Still, a challenge remains to find a 
sentence which negates the proposition <‘~satisfies (x, x)’, self-satisfaction> without itself 
counting as Liar-like. While I am hopeful that there is a way for aberrationists to improve on 
(ABS2), I will leave that investigation here, turning now to the case of (DEF2).  
Recall that to be Liar-likeDEF, a sentence S must give rise to a Liar-like paradox P. For 
that, S must be non-removable from every formalization D of P. Now consider again the paradox 
associated with L’:  
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1. L* = ‘L* is not true’   (definition of ‘L*’) 
2. |‘L* is not true’ is true    (Assume for reductio) 
3. |L* is true     (Substitution, (1), (2)) 
4. |L* is not true    ((T-elim), (2)) 
5. |Contradiction     (Contradiction introduction, (2), (4)) 
6. ‘L* is not true’ is not true   (Negation Introduction, (1)-(4)) 
7. L* is not true    (Substitution, (1), (6)) 
8. ‘L* is not true’ is true   ((T-intro), (7)) 
9. Contradiction     (Contradiction introduction, (6), (8)) 
 
The only role of L’ in the derivation is to introduce the sentences ‘L* is true’ (in step (3)) and L* 
(in step (7)), via the principle of substitution. This derivation can be easily transformed into the 
Strong Liar Paradox by simply removing L’ and making a few other minor changes. By contrast, 
L* clearly cannot be removed, either from the derivation above or from the Strong Liar Paradox. 
So, L’ does not count as Liar-like, whereas L* does. I’ll spare the reader the details, but it is easy 
to check that similar remarks apply to L’’; the only role of L’’ in getting a contradiction is to 
reintroduce L1, and so we can safely count L’’ as not being Liar-like.76  
 
5.1.4. Being Liar-Like and Revenge 
Now that I have moved toward making aberrationism more precise, the question arises 
once again whether it suffers from revenge. In particular, one might wonder whether either of the 
definitions of ‘Liar-like sentence’ that I explore gives rise to a revenge problem. The standard 
way to create such a problem would be with the sentences LLABS and LLDEF below, considering 
each under the assumption that Liar-like-ness is identical with the property that that sentence 
appears to attribute to itself: 
                                                          
76 Still, though, one might worry about Yablo’s and Cook’s sentences. For each of these sentences, one can obtain an 
almost identical version of the paradox just by considering all the subsequent ones in the list. Does it follow that 
each sentence is eliminable? If so, then (DEF2) needs to be revised. However, the fact that all the sentences are 
nearly identical, plus the fact that the paradox cannot be run without using at least some or other of these sentences, 
provide an undeniable sense that the sentences are close to being non-removable. E.g., it is impossible to remove all 
sentences which are of the form ˹For all m > n, Sm is not true˺ for some natural number n. Refining (DEF2) so as to 
incorporate this observation is a project for future research.  
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 (LLABS) LLABS is Liar-likeABS 
 (LLDEF) LLDEF is Liar-likeDEF 
For both these sentences, however, there is a quick answer to the revenge worry. If the sentence 
is indeed Liar-like, according to its own definition of ‘Liar-like’, then according to 
aberrationism, the key occurrence of its alethic expression undergoes an aberration. Thus, the 
sentence fails to say what it appears to say, and so paradox is blocked.  
 A complication here is that neither ‘Liar-likeABS’ nor ‘Liar-likeDEF’ is intersubstitutable 
with ‘satisfies’, either in general or for any particular natural number n. So, neither LLABS nor 
LLDEF contains any alethic expressions; and so, strictly speaking, aberrationism does not allow 
either of these sentences to witness an aberration. However, the obvious response to this problem 
is to think of the term ‘Liar-likeABS’ not as a primitive predicate but rather as an abbreviation of 
the phrases to define it; that is, to imagine that instead of ‘Liar-likeABS’, we simply had the 
definition written out in full. Then we consider whether the resulting sentence would witness an 
aberration.  
 Even with the quick argument from above in place, it is worth considering whether LLABS 
and LLDEF even count as Liar-like according the definitions of ‘Liar-like’ that they presuppose. If 
each turns out to be simply false, then there was no cause for concern to begin with. Start with 
LLABS. Again, a sentence S is Liar-likeABS if and only if S lies at the head of a bad referential 
chain and not all of the singular terms in the scope of S’s negative occurrence of its alethic 
expression are quote names of sentences. Clearly LLABS contains no quote names, so the 
important question here is whether LLABS lies at the head of a bad referential chain. Since LLABS 
refers to itself, if there is a bad referential chain in the vicinity, then it is the infinite sequence 
each of whose elements is LLABS itself. To decide whether this is a bad referential chain, we have 
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to see whether every alethic referential subchain contains infinitely many instances of negative 
alethic reference. Since all subchains will be identical with the original chain, the question is 
simply whether LLABS negatively alethically refers to itself; that is, whether it alethically refers 
to itself via, and only via, a negative occurrence of an alethic expression. Since we are 
pretending that LLABS contains the exhaustively-spelled-out definition of ‘Liar-likeABS’, the thing 
to do is look through this spelled-out definition and see whether we find the name ‘LLABS’ within 
the scope of a negative occurrence of an alethic expression. On reflection, the definition does 
contain an alethic expression. The definition of ‘Liar-likeABS’ includes the term ‘bad referential 
chain’, whose definition in turn includes the term ‘alethic expression’, whose definition in turn 
includes the term ‘intersubstitutable’; and intersubstitutability here is intersubstitutability salva 
veritate, which is defined in terms of truth. (Recall: for all expressions x and y, x is 
intersubstitutable with y if and only if: for any sentence S1 containing x, if S1 is true then the 
result of substituting y for x in S1 is true; and for any sentence S2 containing y, if S1 is true then 
the result of substituting x for y in S2 is true.) The point is, given the involvement of 
intersubstitutability, we may treat LLABS as “containing” an alethic expression. Still, for LLABS to 
negatively alethically refer to itself, the name ‘LLABS’ would have to occur in the scope of at 
least one negative occurrence of this expression. That does not hold.  
To see why, plug the definition of ‘intersubstitutable’ into the definition of ‘alethic 
expression’, plug the result into the definition of ‘bad referential chain’, and then restate LLABS 
using the result. Omitting some irrelevant clauses, that gives us roughly the following:  
(LLABS*) LLABS* is the first in an infinite sequence of sentences, each of which 
contains a name for some subsequent sentence in the sequence, within the 
scope of a negative occurrence of an expression e which is such that: 
 
a) there is an expression x that is governed by (Sat-intro) and (Sat-
elim), and  
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b) for any sentence S1 containing x, if S1 is true then the result of 
substituting e for x in S1 is true; and for any sentence S2 containing 
e, if S1 is true then the result of substituting x for e in S2 is true 
 
The occurrence of ‘LLABS’ in LLABS* does not fall within the scope of any occurrences of ‘true’, 
let alone the negative ones. Therefore, LLABS is not Liar-likeABS. So, it is not paradoxical; it is 
simply false.  
Now consider LLDEF. Let us begin by asking whether the predicate ‘is not LLDEF’ is an 
alethic expression. Recall the definition: for a sentence to be Liar-likeDEF is for it to give rise to a 
Liar-like paradox. Being a Liar-like paradox involves making ineliminable uses of (Sat-intro) 
and (Sat-elim). Admittedly, a derivation that makes ineliminable use of (Sat-intro) and (Sat-elim) 
must itself contain some alethic expressions. But the description of these rules does not itself 
employ any alethic expressions; rather, the description merely mentions the word ‘satisfies’ 
without using it or any other, intersubstitutable term. Moreover, no trouble arises from the notion 
of an inference rule’s being ineliminable from a derivation. The term ‘ineliminable’ is defined in 
terms of syntactic consequence. (Recall: a derivation D makes an ineliminable use of an 
inference rule R if there is no sequence of transformations of D that preserve syntactic 
consequence and result in a derivation with D’s conclusion and that does not involve R.) But 
syntactic consequence is not defined in alethic terms. It is defined by simply listing the rules of 
inference that are standardly regarded as acceptable. For a conclusion to be a syntactic 
consequence of a set of premises just is for there to be a sequence of inferential steps from the 
premises to the conclusion in which every step is an instance of one of the rules listed in the 
definition. Again, the point of these remarks is that ‘Liar-like paradox’ is not an alethic 
expression. Similar remarks apply to ‘giving rise to’, but I will spare the reader the details. 
Because ‘gives rise to a Liar-like paradox’ is not an alethic expression, there is no way that 
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LLDEF can give rise to a derivation that makes ineliminable uses of (T-intro) and (T-elim). So, 
LLDEF is simply false; there is no revenge problem here.  
 
5.2. Monster-Barring and the Classification Problem  
5.2.1. Introducing Monster-Barring 
In (Scharp 2013), Kevin Scharp criticizes a kind of diagnosis that he calls “monster-
barring.” Approaches of the kind Scharp has in mind target paradoxical sentences simply on the 
grounds that they are paradoxical. It should be fairly clear that if it uses either of my proposed 
criteria for applicability—that is, either definition of ‘Liar-like sentence’—aberrationism is 
bound to do this. For aberrationism singles out certain sentences as being subject to a distinctive 
kind of semantic aberration, simply on the grounds that these sentences give rise to Liar-like 
paradoxes. Note that this criticism applies even when the criterion used is being Liar-likeDEF, 
since ultimately the motivation for positing aberrations in sentences that are Liar-likeDEF is the 
fact that they give rise to paradoxes. So, although Scharp himself does not discuss aberrationism, 
his criticisms of monster-barring can be applied to it. In this subsection, then, I will present 
Scharp’s criticisms and explain how aberrationists can elude them.  
As Scharp defines them, monster-barring approaches hold that  
it is illegitimate to use the sentences in the reasoning involved in aletheic paradoxes. 
These approaches seek to find something wrong with the paradoxical sentences 
themselves. There are several versions of this approach: syntactic (paradoxical sentences 
are not syntactically well-formed), semantic (paradoxical sentences are meaningless), 
pragmatic (paradoxical sentences cannot be asserted), and inferential (paradoxical 
sentences cannot be supposed in hypothetical reasoning). (p.21) 
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On the best interpretation of Scharp’s remarks here,77 monster-barring approaches are views 
according to which the reasoning goes wrong because of “something wrong with the paradoxical 
sentences themselves.” On this interpretation aberrationism counts as monster-barring. Part of 
what these approaches claim is that due to the facts about what Liar-like sentences mean, the 
seemingly-contradictory steps in the inferences involving them do not genuinely contradict. For 
example, recall the reasoning associated with L*:  
1. L* = ‘L* is not true’   (definition of ‘L*’) 
2. | L* is true      (Assume for reductio) 
3. | ‘L* is not true’ is true    (substitution, (1), (2)) 
4. | L* is not true    ((3), (T-elim)) 
5. | Contradiction     (Contradiction introduction, (2), (4)) 
6. L* is not true     (Negation Introduction, (1)-(4)) 
7. ‘L* is not true’ is true   ((T-intro), (6)) 
8. L* is true      (substitution, (1), (7)) 
9. Contradiction     (Contradiction introduction, (6), (8)) 
 
According to aberrationism, L* fails to say of itself that it is not true, whereas the sentence in 
steps (2) and (8) does say of L* that it is true. Thus steps (2) and (4) do not genuinely contradict, 
and neither do steps (6) and (8); and so the applications of the rule of Contradiction Introduction 
in steps 5 and 9 are unjustified. That amounts to saying that because of what L* means, “it is 
illegitimate to use” L* in “the reasoning involved” in the Strengthened Liar paradox.  
Scharp’s criticisms of monster-barring approaches focus on variants of these approaches 
that take paradoxical sentences to be in some sense meaningless. In particular, he addresses the 
views of (Goldstein 2009) and (Armour-Garb and Woodbridge 2013). Goldstein argues that Liar 
                                                          
77 For any Liar-like paradox, the reasoning associated with that paradox is not truth-preserving—that is, unless 
absolutely every declarative sentence is true. So, anyone who wants to resist the claim that absolutely every 
declarative sentence is true has to hold that “it is illegitimate to use the sentences in the reasoning involved in 
aletheic paradoxes.” Illegitimate, that is, at least in the sense that such uses of those sentences do not constitute 
reasoning that is truth-preserving. However, by that criterion, every solution to the Liar paradox that involves 
retaining the concept of truth counts as a monster-barring approach. Scharp clearly takes the monster-barring 
approaches to be some narrower, more specific class of solutions, and the quoted passage strongly suggests the 
definition that I adopt in the main text. 
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sentences and their ilk fail to express propositions. For their part, Armour-Garb and Woodbridge 
distinguish two types of meaning that declarative sentences can have—meaning1 and 
meaning2—and argue that paradoxical sentences lack meaning1.78 Scharp sums up his criticisms 
of these views in the following statement:  
a successful monster-barring strategy cannot be just a made-up condition on 
meaningfulness or expressing a proposition or making a statement (or whatever) that 
paradoxical sentences fail to meet. One has to motivate it—show that sentences that meet 
it are intuitively meaningful (or whatever) and sentences that do not meet it (other than 
the paradoxical ones) are intuitively meaningless. Moreover, simply saying that 
paradoxical sentences lead to paradoxes is not a legitimate justification—the fact that 
they have been thought to be paradoxical is actually evidence that they are grammatical, 
contentful, assertable, and supposable. Otherwise, no one would think they pose any kind 
of problem. (p.61, italics his, formatting mine) 
 
In what follows, I will consider Scharp’s remarks as they relate to aberrationism.  
 
5.2.2. Meaninglessness 
One of Scharp’s categories of monster-barring approaches is the “semantic” approaches. 
One might naturally think that aberrationism falls under this heading, since the centerpiece of 
any one-off aberrations diagnosis is a semantic claim—namely, that the occurrence of the key 
alethic expression in any Liar-like sentence fails to co-refer with that term, and that this causes 
the sentence not to say what it appears to say. However, it is important to notice that advocates of 
these approaches need not hold that paradoxical sentences are meaningless. My own preferred 
view is that they are far from meaningless. I explained in Section 1.2 that according to the 
moderate one-off aberrations diagnosis, the reference of the occurrence of ‘true’ in any Liar-like 
sentence is significantly influenced by how we use the word ‘true’. Although nothing we do 
short of changing how we use other words could force every occurrence of ‘true’ to refer to truth, 
                                                          
78 For present purposes the definitions of meaning1 and meaning2 are irrelevant. For details see (Scharp 2013) p.59. 
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our use of ‘true’ in accordance with (T-intro) and (T-elim) guarantees that any occurrences 
which cannot refer to truth nonetheless come close to doing so. In particular, my own view is 
that these occurrences are indeterminate in reference as between ascending truth and descending 
truth. So, Liar-like sentences are far from meaningless; what they mean is strongly influenced by 
how we use their component words and the manner in which these are combined. And since the 
key occurrence(s) of its alethic expression(s) comes close to co-referring with that term, any 
Liar-like sentence will come close to saying what it appears to say. This picture contrasts sharply 
with views that simply insist, with no further explanation, that Liar-like sentences are 
meaningless, or that they fail to express any propositions.  
Still, Scharp might respond by insisting that it is just unbelievable that Liar sentences fail 
to say what they seem to say. Of course, barring some other solution, it would follow that the 
reasoning associated with any Liar-like paradox really is truth-preserving, and therefore 
absolutely every sentence is true. But Scharp can take this line, since he is ultimately out to show 
that (at least for purposes of thinking rigorously about language and thought) we must get rid of 
the concept of truth. So much the better for his view, then, if it turns out that truth is a trivial 
property, in the sense that absolutely every declarative sentence has it.  
However, it is unacceptable to hold that absolutely every declarative sentence is true. For 
one thing, making this claim involves making an unacceptable use of the term ‘true’—a use that 
licenses its application to every declarative sentence whatsoever. Implicit in our use of the word 
‘true’ are norms that restrict its application in significant ways. Speakers try to conform to these 
norms even once they have been made fully aware of the Liar paradox. To insist that the Liar 
paradox licenses the profligate application of ‘true’ is to insist on a change in use that the rest of 
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the linguistic community has resisted, even in the face of the tremendous pressure exerted by the 
paradox.  
Still, since Scharp holds that the norms for the use of ‘true’ are incoherent,79 he would 
deny that we have any good reasons to abide by them. But this diagnosis of our norms is 
radically uncharitable, as it ignores the linguistic community’s struggle to resist incoherence. 
Before jumping ship, it is worth exploring the prospects of a response to the Liar paradox that 
involves a more charitable interpretation of the behavior of English speakers. Such a response is 
precisely what aberrationism promises to provide.  
 
5.2.3. Targeting Paradoxical Sentences Because They Are Paradoxical  
 A familiar but more serious challenge emanates from some of Scharp’s other remarks in 
the passage quoted above:  
simply saying that paradoxical sentences lead to paradoxes is not a legitimate 
justification—the fact that they have been thought to be paradoxical is actually evidence 
that they are grammatical, contentful, assertable, and supposable. Otherwise, no one 
would think they pose any kind of problem. (p.61, italics his, formatting mine) 
 
Scharp is right to point out that Liar sentences and their kin appear to be perfectly meaningful. 
And relatedly, we have very strong pre-theoretical impressions about what they say. These facts 
call out for explanation, and it is bad for a solution to claim that Liar-like sentences do not mean 
what we think they mean—whether because they are meaningless or because they mean 
something else—without giving any further explanation.  
At the same time, however, any solution to the Liar paradox will involve violating some 
of our pre-theoretical impressions, and our pre-theoretical impressions about what our sentences 
mean are no more immune from revision than any others that one might reasonably take the 
                                                          
79 See Chapter 2 of (Scharp 2013). 
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paradox to threaten. One cannot rule out prior to investigation that giving up these impressions is 
what affords us the overall best solution. The most that Scharp’s remarks show is that one who 
does decide to give up these impressions must be able to explain them away. But as I argue in 
Chapter 1, this is precisely what my own version of moderate aberrationism does. In that respect, 
it improves markedly over its radical cousins that reject Semantic Supervenience or Semantic 
Regularity. Unlike these, my approach allows that Liar-like sentences come close to saying what 
they seem to say, and allows that what they say is significantly influenced by how we use their 
component terms and the manner in which they are combined. It is an important theoretical 
discovery, a surprising lesson of the Liar paradox, that these sentences cannot say what they 
appear to say. That explains why this was not obvious at the outset.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 In this essay, I argued that aberrationism can successfully avoid revenge problems, and 
that it provides a compelling solution(s) to all prominent Liar-like paradoxes, not just the Strong 
Liar Paradox that I used to introduce it. With respect to revenge, we saw that competing 
approaches generally face a trilemma: they must either fail to apply to the language in which 
they are stated, assert the incoherence of the phenomena to which they themselves centrally 
appeal or that are closely related, or else face a revenge problem. Aberrationism, by contrast, 
avoids all of these bad alternatives. It can allow for reference to the phenomena that it invokes—
viz., component contexts, reference by occurrences, a sentence’s being Liar-like, indeterminacy, 
and ascending truth and descending truth (when it comes to my own preferred view)—because 
by aberrationist lights, reference to these phenomena cannot in turn be used to construct new, 
problematic sentences. With respect to the Contingent Liar, Curry, Bad Pair, Yablo, Cook, and 
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Grelling paradoxes, we saw that aberrationism provides us with a straightforward, appealing, and 
effective way to avoid contradictions.  
 In the course of discussing the No-No paradox and certain putative revenge problems for 
aberrationism, an interesting phenomenon emerged. These paradoxes confronted us with parity 
problems—pairs of profoundly similar sentences that cannot consistently be assigned the same 
classical truth value, but to which one can consistently assign distinct classical truth values. 
While all aberrationists are able to solve these parity problems, it became clear that different 
such theorists will approach these problems in interestingly different ways. It is my hope that the 
further development of these solutions will become a topic for fruitful research.  
 In the final section, I made some headway on the important task of formulating a precise 
criterion of applicability for aberrationism, one that can be used to generalize the approach 
beyond the Strong Liar. I developed two approximate definitions of ‘Liar-like sentence’, and 
then illustrated the appeal of these definitions. I showed that adopting these definitions would 
allow aberrationism to diagnose and solve a variety of different pre-theoretically Liar-like 
paradoxes, including the Contingent Liar, Curry, Grelling, Bad Pair, Yablo, and Cook paradoxes, 
as well as the No-No “paradox,” provided that the latter counts as a paradox.  
 
  
 221 
REFERENCES 
 
1. Armour-Garb, Bradley, and Woodbridge, James. (2013) “Semantic Defectiveness and the 
Liar.” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 164, pp.845–863.  
2. Barnes, Elizabeth J., and Williams, J. Robert G. (2011) “A Theory of Metaphysical 
Indeterminacy.” In Bennett, K. & Zimmerman, Dean W. (eds.), Oxford Studies in 
Metaphysics, Volume 6, pp.103-148. Oxford University Press. 
3. Brandom, Robert. (1994) Making it Explicit. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.  
4. Burge, Tyler. (1979) “Semantical Paradox.” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 76, No. 4, 
pp.169-198. 
5. Feferman, Solomon. (1984) “Toward Useful Type-Free Theories. I” The Journal of 
Symbolic Logic, Vol. 49, No. 1, pp.75-111. 
6. Glanzberg, Michael. (2004a) “A Contextual-Hierarchical Approach to Truth and the Liar 
Paradox.” Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp.27-88. 
7. Glanzberg, Michael. (2004b) “Truth, Reflection, and Hierarchies.” Synthese, Vol. 142, 
pp.289-315. 
8. Goldstein, Laurence. (2009) “A Consistent Way with Paradox.” Philosophical Studies, 
Vol. 144, pp.377–389. 
9. Grim, Patrick. (1995) “Book Review: Universality and the Liar: An Essay on Truth and 
the Diagonal Argument.” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 104, No. 3, pp.467-469.  
10. Heck, Richard. (2003) “Semantic Accounts of Vagueness.” In J. C. Beall (ed.), Liars and 
Heaps, pp.106-127. Oxford University Press. 
 222 
11. Icard, Thomas. (2012). Surface Reasoning Lecture 4: Negative Polarity and Antitonicity 
[PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from http://www.nasslli2012.com/files/courses/icard-
slides-4.pdf 
12. Kripke, Saul. (1975) “Outline of A Theory of Truth.” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 72, 
No. 19, Seventy-Second Annual Meeting American Philosophical Association, Eastern 
Division, pp.690-716. 
13. Kripke, Saul. (1982) Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
14. Lewis, David. (1970) “How to Define Theoretical Terms.” The Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. 67, No. 13, pp.427-446. 
15. McGee, Vann and McLaughlin, Brian. (2004) “Logical Commitment and Semantic 
Indeterminacy: A Reply to Williamson.” Linguistics and Philosophy, Vol. 27, pp.123–
136. 
16. McGee, Vann. (2005) “Inscrutability and Its Discontents.” Noûs, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp.397–
425. 
17. McLaughlin, Brian and Bennett, Karen, “Supervenience,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/supervenience/>. 
18. Priest, Graham. (1990) “Boolean Negation, and All That.” Journal of Philosophical 
Logic, Vol. 19, No.2, pp.201-215. 
19. Quine, Wilard Van Orman. (1960) Word and Object, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press. 
20. Scharp, Kevin. (2013) Replacing Truth. Oxford, U.K., Oxford University Press. 
 223 
21. Simmons, Keith. Universality and the Liar, Cambridge, U.K., Cambridge University 
Press, 1993. 
22. Smith, Nicholas. “Semantic Regularity and the Liar Paradox.” The Monist, Vol. 89, No.1, 
(2006), pp.178-202. 
23. Sorensen, Roy. (2001): Vagueness and Contradiction, Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
24. Tarski, Alfred. (1935) “Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen,” Studia 
Philosophica, Vol.1, pp.261–405.  
25. Tarski, Alfred. (1944) “The Semantic Conception of Truth: and the Foundations of 
Semantics.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp.341-376. 
26. Wilson, W. Kent. (1990). “Some Reflections on the Prosentential Theory of Truth.” In J. 
M. Dunn & A. Gupta (eds.), Truth or Consequences, pp.19-32. Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers. 
 
 224 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
INTENTIONALITY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION 
 
 
1. Introduction 
2. Field’s Pilot Case 
3. Dynamical Approaches to Cognition 
4. Intentionality in the Explanandum 
5. Concluding Remarks 
  
 225 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Definitions 
In this essay, I will defend the claim that intentionality plays an ineliminable role in 
psychological explanation, both when it comes to explanantia and when it comes to explananda. 
With explanantia, a central case in point will be the talk of beliefs and desires that occurs in 
everyday life, the humanities, and the social sciences. I will argue that when we explain 
someone’s behaviors by saying what she believes and desires, these explanations also shed light 
on how she would react to various counterfactual circumstances. This kind of modal 
informativeness is a distinctive virtue of our folk-psychological explanations, which has not yet 
been replicated in explanations that are framed in entirely non-intentional terms. Until we have 
found a way to replicate this virtue, it is premature to insist that intentional talk, and in particular 
talk of beliefs and desires, is dispensable when it comes to explaining people’s behaviors. 
Although it concerns our everyday explanations, this point is also relevant to the status of 
intentional talk in scientific explanations, insofar as the distinctive modal informativeness 
afforded by intentional talk is a feature that also matters for scientific explanation.  
As with explanantia, one may likewise wonder whether intentional talk can be excised 
from all characterizations of explananda in psychology. There are, I will argue, important 
reasons to think it cannot. Explananda in psychology are overwhelmingly characterized in 
intentional terms, and so as long as intentionality continues to resist attempts at reduction, 
switching to non-intentional characterizations of the explananda will amount to simply changing 
what is being explained. So, the status of intentional talk in psychology is at least as secure as the 
propriety of its current explananda.  Moreover, I will show that a prominent explanatory program 
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that is embraced by many would-be skeptics of the necessity of intentional talk itself indulges in 
intentional characterizations of its explananda.  
Such are my positions and the arguments for them, in broadest strokes. To give a more 
precise sense of what I want to say, I’ll begin by clarifying the meanings of ‘intentionality’ and 
‘psychological explanation’. Following common use among philosophers, call a thing intentional 
if it has or purports to have1 a subject matter: something that it is of, is about, or represents. And 
similarly, a characterization of an entity is an intentional characterization, or equivalently, 
characterizes its subject matter in intentional terms, if it presents that entity as having a subject 
matter.2 The examples of intentional entities and intentional characterizations are ubiquitous. For 
instance, when someone believes that snow is white, her belief is about snow and whiteness; it 
has snow and whiteness as its subject matter. The belief itself represents snow as being white, 
and so does the believer, in having that belief. In addition to beliefs, one can give a long list of 
familiar things that are intentional.3 And beyond familiar things, the mental representations 
invoked in cognitive science4 are also intentional; or at least, they are standardly characterized in 
                                                          
1 I want to count as intentional items like the name ‘Santa Claus’, whose purported subject matter doesn’t exist. For 
brevity, I’ll simply speak of such items as having a subject matter.  
2 Of course, intentional characterizations are also intentional in the straightforward sense given a moment ago: they 
themselves have a subject matter (that being the thing(s) of which they are characterizations). Since this is obvious, 
in the rest of the paper when I say that a characterization is intentional I will mean that it presents its subject matter 
as having a subject matter. I only raise the point here in order to observe that on the most straightforward 
interpretation of ‘intentional characterization’—namely, the interpretation given in the main text—one who claims 
to want to get rid of intentional characterization has, in making this claim, herself indulged in it.  
3 Here are some more examples. Concepts are intentional in my sense of the term. E.g., the subject matter of 
anyone’s concept of Barack Obama is Barack Obama. Perception is another case: when someone perceives 
something, the subject matter of her act of perception is the thing(s) she perceives, and, if applicable, the properties 
that she perceives it as having or the relations in which she perceives it as standing. Desires are also intentional: the 
subject matter of anyone’s desire that Hillary Clinton be president of the U.S. consists of Hillary Clinton and the 
property being president of the U.S. Certain bits of language are another case: declarative sentences, imperative 
sentences, and words are intentional in much the way that beliefs, desires, and concepts, are, respectively. Maps and 
pictures are also intentional in my sense of the term: their subject matter consists of the objects, properties, and 
relations that they depict. 
4 To give just one example, (Churchland 2012) claims that people have “neural maps” of the spectrum of humanly 
visible colors. Never mind the details about what exactly these maps are and how they work; the point is that if this 
claim is correct, then our neural maps have these colors and the relations between them as their subject matter. 
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intentional terms. For these entities, their (purported) subject matter consists of the things they 
represent and the ways they represent these things as being. Overall, my point here is that 
intentionality and intentional characterization are ubiquitous; a great many familiar entities and 
descriptions are thoroughly saturated with it, and it has shown up in cognitive science as well.  
Now I’ll say a little about ‘psychological’ and ‘explanation’. Psychological explanation 
is the explanation of people’s and sophisticated animals’ behaviors and cognitive capacities. The 
range of these behaviors and capacities is quite broad, including basic capabilities such as the 
ability to perceive the distances of external objects, but also complex behaviors like political 
decision-making. Within psychological explanations we can distinguish those that are familiar 
from everyday life, those that appear in current cognitive science, and those that would appear in 
a cognitive science that was ideal in various respects.  
Within explanations more generally, we can distinguish between communicative 
explanation and ontic explanation.5 Communicatively explaining is something that people do. 
More specifically, it is a type of speech act—that is, a type of action that one can perform by 
uttering words or displaying images. For example, when we say that Rebecca explains how 
action potentials work, we are identifying something that Rebecca does, by, e.g., giving a lecture 
or displaying a diagram. That act which Rebecca performs is communicative explanation. 
Similarly, I will take communicative explanations to be what is said when someone performs an 
act of communicatively explaining something. Thus, I will take communicative explanations to 
be arguments that consist of propositions. As a convenient shorthand, I will say that a 
communicative explanation mentions (or invokes, or refers to, or posits, etc.) an object, property, 
or relation if giving that explanation involves mentioning (invoking, referring to, positing) that 
                                                          
5 For more on this distinction see (Craver 2014), p.30. Craver also introduces two further kinds of explanation, 
which it will be safe to ignore here. I owe the example in the main text to Craver.  
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object, property, or relation. Throughout, I will use ‘explains’ and ‘explanation’ interchangeably 
with ‘communicatively explains’ and ‘communicative explanation’, except where I explicitly say 
otherwise.  
Whereas Rebecca might explain how action potentials work to her students, it also seems 
correct to say that the working of action potentials is explained by the flux of ions across 
neuronal membranes. This latter kind of explanation is ontic explanation; it is a relationship that 
can hold between phenomena “out in the world,” so to speak, rather than just between a 
phenomenon “out in the world” and a human communicating about that phenomenon. An 
illustrative example is the mechanistic conception of ontic explanation, according to which what 
ontically explains something is what produces or constitutes it. On that view, what ontically 
explains how action potentials work is not Rebecca but rather the flux of ions across neuronal 
membranes, since ion flux is something that helps to constitute the working of action potentials.  
The issue of the relationship between communicative and ontic explanation will loom 
large in what follows, in the form of two different conceptions of communicative explanation. 
Both conceptions take (communicatively) explaining to be a kind of speech act, but they differ in 
what they require of a speech act for it to count as an act of explaining. The metaphysical 
conception of communicative explanation6 takes ontic and communicative explanation to be 
tightly connected. It says that to count as an act of explaining, an act must involve description of 
the entities and activities that ontically explain the explanandum. This view can take different 
forms, depending on one’s views about ontic explanation. One particularly clear example, which 
I will return to frequently in what follows, is the mechanistic conception of communicative 
explanation, which combines mechanistic conception of ontic explanation with the metaphysical 
                                                          
6 A more standard term here is ‘ontic conception’, but I use ‘metaphysical’ since I am already using ‘ontic’ in a 
different, (also standard) way, in the phrase ‘ontic explanation’. 
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conception of communicative explanation. This view says that to count as an act of explaining, 
an act must involve description of the entities and activities that produce or constitute the 
explanandum.7 On this view, Rebecca can succeed in (communicatively) explaining how action 
potentials work only if she describes the entities and activities that give rise to (that is, ontically 
explain) the working of action potentials.  
Importantly, on the metaphysical conception of communicative explanation, what makes 
a speech act an act of explanation is the nature and properties of the entities that the speaker 
posits. By contrast, on the epistemic conception of communicative explanation, what makes an 
act one of explaining is not the nature of the entities posited but rather the virtues of the ways 
these entities are characterized. For instance, these characterizations might aid in producing 
understanding,8 help us make useful predictions,9 or facilitate manipulation and control of the 
explanandum.10,11 In what follows I will stay neutral between the metaphysical and epistemic 
conceptions, exploring the consequences of each.  
                                                          
7 This position is also commonly phrased as the claim that communicative explanations must specify the structures 
and causes at work in the systems whose behaviors they explain. Variants of the mechanistic conceptions of 
communicative explanation are advocated in (Machamer et al. 2000), (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005), (Craver 
2006), (Craver 2007), (Bechtel 2008), (Eliasmith 2010), (Kaplan and Craver 2011), and (Hochstein 2012).  
8 See (Achinstein 1983), (Waskan et al. 2014), and (Braverman et al. 2012). 
9 See (Batterman 2001), (Batterman 2002), (Hochstein 2012), and (Rice 2013). 
10 For this last view see (Woodward 2000) and (Woodward 2003).  
11 Of course, one’s views about what it takes to enhance prediction, understanding, or manipulation may in turn 
simply lead one back to the metaphysical conception. For example, one might claim that understanding consists in 
having true, relevant beliefs about the entities and activities that produce the explanandum—so that then something 
counts as an explanation only if it correctly identifies the entities and activities that produce the explanandum, as on 
the mechanistic conception of communicative explanation, a version of the metaphysical conception. Or, with a 
similar result, one might claim that the descriptions that best enable us to make useful predictions simply are those 
that identify the structures and causes of the systems they describe, because such descriptions allow us to directly 
intervene in the workings of the system to determine how it behaves in various circumstances. In both cases above, 
supplementing the epistemic conception of explanation with certain further claims leads back to the metaphysical 
conception, by shifting the emphasis back onto the entities described rather than the descriptions themselves. 
However, since these further claims (about prediction, understanding, manipulation, etc.) are themselves 
controversial, until they are decided, we do best to allow ourselves a distinction between the metaphysical and the 
epistemic conception of communicative explanation.  
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The metaphysical and epistemic conceptions yield, in turn, two different senses in which 
a communicative explanation could be said to involve intentionality. On the metaphysical 
conception, a communicative explanation is an intentional explanation if its explanandum or 
explanans is something which is, or which reduces something that is, intentional, regardless of 
whether the explanation employs any intentional characterizations. Here we need not concern 
ourselves too much with what exactly reduction is; what will matter for my purposes is that for 
all X and Y, if X reduces to Y then in any situation in which Y obtains, so does X.  
On the epistemic conception, by contrast, an intentional explanation is one that employs 
an intentional characterization of its explanandum or explanans—that is, again, the language 
used in giving the explanation presents the explanandum or the explanans as having a subject 
matter. It is easy to see why these definitions are appropriate. On the metaphysical conception, 
what matters for explanation are the nature and properties of the entities described, as opposed to 
the characterizations employed. So, it is fitting that on this conception, an explanation is 
intentional (or not) depending on the intentionality (or not) of the entities it describes. By 
contrast, on the epistemic conception what matters for explanation are only the virtues of the 
characterizations employed. Fittingly, then, on this conception an explanation is intentional (or 
not) depending on the intentionality (or not) of the characterizations used in describing the 
explanantia and explananda.  
 
1.2. Skepticism About the Explanatory role of Intentionality  
However one understands ‘intentional explanation’, it is clear that intentional 
explanations are a staple of everyday discourse, the humanities, and many social sciences. For 
example, we quite often explain why someone behaves as she does, or how she is capable of 
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doing something, by saying what she believes and desires. And many explananda in psychology, 
such as the capacity to perceive the distances of external objects, to add numbers, and to 
recognize human faces, are standardly characterized in intentional terms.  
Despite their ubiquity, however, intentional explanations have been subject to some 
skepticism. The following is frequently taken for granted by numerous philosophers: 
(Elim) Intentional explanations can always, in principle, be eliminated in favor of 
non-intentional explanations, and performing such eliminations would 
almost always yield better explanations.  
 
Below I will present and assess some arguments for (Elim), considering how it fares when 
interpreted, respectively, under the metaphysical and the epistemic conceptions of explanation.  
Advocates of (Elim) are to that extent skeptical of the explanatory importance of 
intentionality, so throughout I will refer to them as skeptics. Still it is worth noting straightaway 
that skeptics are not ipso facto committed to the doctrine that intentionality does not exist.12 
Moreover, there are philosophers who endorse something like (Elim) for some but not all kinds 
of intentional explanations. For example, (Churchland 2012) only targets explanations that 
involve propositional representation.  
Propositional representation will figure frequently in what follows, so it is worth taking a 
moment to understand. Propositional representation is representation in which what is 
represented can be expressed using a that-phrase, such as the phrase ‘that snow is white’ as it 
occurs sentences like ‘Tamar believes that snow is white’. Believing and desiring are the most 
familiar varieties. Similarly, propositional representations are intentional items, such as beliefs 
and desires, whose contents can be specified using that-phrases. And propositional explanations 
                                                          
12 In earlier work, such as (Churchland 1979), (Churchland 1981), Churchland goes so far as to deny the existence of 
beliefs and desires. (Churchland 2012) is less explicit on this matter. At any rate, in (Churchland 2012), Churchland 
countenances some intentionality, since he advocates the existence of map-like mental representations that represent 
various aspects of the external world. (See Section 4 below.) For a similar view see also (Eliasmith 2013).  
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are explanations that involve propositional representation, either in the explanans or the 
explanandum. Folk-psychological explanations of people’s behaviors in terms of (among other 
things) their beliefs and desires are the most familiar propositional explanations. Throughout his 
career, Churchland has persistently raised concerns about all of the above.  
In addition to the propositional / non-propositional distinction, two further distinctions 
will be important in what follows. One is the distinction between explanation in everyday life 
and in science. Most skeptics claim only that intentionality can be eliminated from science, not 
that it can be eliminated from everyday discourse.13 Similarly, because psychology as it currently 
stands is saturated with intentionality (see Sections 3 and 4), skeptics are best conceived as 
claiming that an ideal science would eschew intentional explanation. Lastly, different skeptics 
might variously advocate (Elim) for explanations that involve intentionality in the explanans, for 
those that involve it in the explanandum, or for all intentional explanations whatsoever.  
Given that the available skeptical positions exhibit such variety, one wonders which ones 
I will be addressing. In Section 2, I will discuss an argument due to Hartry Field that works 
under the metaphysical conception of communicative explanation, and that, as stated, targets the 
invocation of (instances of) propositional representation as explanantia. Despite its focus on 
propositional representation, however, we will see that if Field’s argument is good then it easily 
generalizes to threaten all invocation of intentional facts as explanantia. Moreover, although 
Field’s argument targets everyday intentional notions like that of belief, the argument’s failure 
bears significantly on the appropriateness of intentional discourse in science. Everyday 
intentional explanations, I will argue, are informative in a distinctive way. If this kind of 
informativeness matters in science, then the fact that no one has found a way to achieve it 
                                                          
13 (Stich 1983) and (Dennett 1987) can be read in this way. See also my discussion of Hartry Field in Section 2.1 
below. 
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without involving intentionality gives us a reason to believe that (Elim) is false as concerns 
scientific explanations, as well as our everyday ones.  
Whereas Field works under the metaphysical conception of explanation, in Section 3, I 
will discuss a skeptical position which also targets explanantia but embraces the epistemic 
conception. The focus will be on (Chemero 2009), who can be interpreted as arguing for (Elim)14 
by extrapolating from empirical, scientific studies rather than by invoking the assumption that is 
central to Field’s argument, (Jerry Rig) below. Then in Section 4 I will turn to the matter of 
intentionality and explananda in psychology. I will examine, respectively, skeptical positions 
under this heading that adopt the metaphysical (4.2) and the epistemic (4.3) conceptions of 
communicative explanation.  
 
2. Field’s Pilot Case 
2.1. Background 
In (Field 2001), Hartry Field gives an argument for (Elim). Field’s argument is an 
especially sophisticated instance of a more general kind of argument for (Elim) that many 
different philosophers have given, whose characteristic feature is reliance on the following 
premise:  
(Jerry Rig)  Multiple radically different and incompatible sets of intentional 
descriptions can always be jerry-rigged ad hoc to provide equally good 
explanations of the same phenomena.15 
                                                          
14 I am uncertain whether Chemero actually embraces (Elim). His primary aim is to argue against the invocation of 
internal representations in psychology—that is, he is concerned to show that the manifestation of psychological 
capacities emerges from dynamic, closely-coupled interactions between the agent and the world, rather than from 
the manipulation of internal items (that is, internal representations) that serve as intermediaries between the agent 
and the external world. This position can easily take on an anti-intentional appearance, since the most obvious 
bearers of intentionality are internal items such as concepts and states of belief and desire. If, however, Chemero 
does not embrace (Elim), then one should interpret my discussion of him as being directed toward philosophers who 
would use his views to justify (Elim).  
15 I thank an anonymous reader for help with the formulation of (Jerry Rig). (Jerry Rig) also admits of a linguistic 
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While (Jerry Rig) owes its origins to Chapter 2 of (Quine 1960), many different philosophers 
continue to endorse it in one form or another.16 However, focusing on Field’s argument will be 
especially fruitful and informative. Operating against the backdrop of his reductionist orientation 
and metaphysical conception of communicative explanation will bring out a number of 
interesting points, and will shed light on the kinds of phenomena to which we should expect to 
appeal in attempting to explain intentional facts of various sorts.  
 
2.2. Field’s Argument  
In the postscript to (Field 1994) in (Field 2001), Field writes: 
It is perfectly obvious that in explaining how [any given17] pilot manages to land a plane 
safely with some regularity, one will appeal to the fact that she has a good many true 
beliefs: beliefs about her airspeed at any moment, about whether she is above or below 
the glideslope, about her altitude with respect to the ground, about which runway is in 
use, and so forth. (None of these beliefs need be based very directly on observation; she 
might be flying in bad weather with some of her instruments not working, so that she 
must rely on complicated cues). (p.153)  
 
From these remarks one might be tempted to infer that talk of beliefs plays an ineliminable role 
in some explanations of how some people are able to do certain things. But then Field tells us 
                                                          
version, which readers of (Quine 1960) will recognize:  
(Interpretations) When interpreting a language, there are always multiple, radically different 
interpretations that serve equally well for explaining the behaviors of the language users.  
Much of I want to say applies to (Interpretations) as well as (Jerry Rig), but for ease of exposition I’ll focus on (Jerry 
Rig).  
16 In addition to (Quine 1960) Chapter 2, some especially prominent and influential examples include (Quine 1992) 
Chapter 3, (Churchland 1979) p.94, (Stich 1983), (Dennett 1987) p.342, and, as we will see, (Field 2001) pp.153-
156. It is also worth noting that some claims from (Kripke 1982) have a similar flavor, although there the role of 
interpretation in the explanation of behavior is not explicitly mentioned.  
17 Given the context, it is plausible that Field takes his argument to show that, quite generally, reference to 
intentional phenomena (or to reduction bases for some such phenomena) is never essential in order to explain 
anything. Evidence of this view is abundant throughout Field’s other writings; for some examples see (Field 1986) 
p.84 bottom paragraph, (Field 1994) the paragraph straddling p.254 and p.255, and (Field 2001) pp.153-155. So, we 
should read Field as saying something about all pilots, not just some.  
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that “talk of representation is serving a merely heuristic role in the explanation of the pilot’s 
ability.”  
Although Field is not explicit in making this claim, here the phrase ‘merely heuristic’ 
carries with it a strong suggestion that whatever falls under this classification has no place in a 
truly scientific psychology. For on the most common way of understanding ‘heuristic’, 
something serves a heuristic role if it serves merely to facilitate further investigation, if it merely 
enables people to discover or learn something for themselves, as opposed to being, itself, directly 
or explicitly informative. Presumably, then, anything that serves a merely heuristic role can 
under more opportune circumstances be eliminated,18 replaced by something more directly or 
explicitly informative. Indeed, elsewhere Field tellingly refers to intentional explanations as 
being “second-class” explanations (see Section 2.4.2 below), and considers non-intentional ways 
of replacing intentional talk.19  
In particular, right after presenting the standard intentional explanation of how a pilot is 
able regularly to land a plane, he goes on to sketch a generic non-intentional explanation of the 
pilot’s ability, an explanation which would, in an ideal psychology, presumably replace the 
everyday one:  
put without the heuristic, the explanation…involves the existence of some class C of 
internal representations20 in the pilot and two subclasses C1 and C2 of C such that  
 
(Behavioral Effects)  when she believes a representation in C1 she slows  
the plane and when she believes one in C2 she  
speeds it up, and 
 
(Relation to Airspeeds) there is a 1-1 function f from C to a certain set of  
real numbers such that  
                                                          
18 The claim I attribute here is also evidenced by Field’s remarks elsewhere, e.g., (Field 1986) p.84, where Field 
considers a non-intentional way of replacing intentional talk in an explanation.   
19 See, respectively, (Field 2001) p.55, (Field 1994) pp.254-255, (Field 1986) p.84, and immediately below in the 
main text.  
20 Given the dialectical context, Field must be using ‘representations’ and ‘believes a representation’ to describe 
things that are non-intentional. See below in the main text. 
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a) C1 is that subclass of C that is mapped into 
numbers above a certain threshold and C2 is 
that subclass of C that is mapped into 
numbers below a certain (slightly lower) 
threshold, and 
b) she tends to believe a representation r in C 
when the airspeed in knots is approximately 
f (r).  
(Field 2001, pp.153-155, formatting and labels mine)  
 
(The “certain thresholds” are the threshold above which the pilot’s airspeed is too fast for her 
safely to land, and below which it is too slow.)  
An immediate reaction is that since Field’s explanation involves positing a class C of 
internal “representations” that the agent “believes,” it invokes some intentional facts. Given the 
terminology, the reader could hardly be blamed for supposing that the class C represents the 
pilot’s possible airspeeds, that each of its elements represents some particular airspeed, and that 
for each element r of C, there is a number n such that when the pilot “believes” r, she thereby 
represents the plane as having an airspeed of n. If all that is correct, then Field’s example does 
not show that talk of propositional representation, let alone all talk whatsoever of intentional 
facts, can in principle be safely excised from our explanations.  
Clearly, then, the most charitable interpretation of Field’s remarks is that at the very least, 
intentionality cannot simply be read off of Field’s description. That is, talk of an agent’s 
“believing” a “representation”, as he understands it, does not amount to intentional 
characterization; it is not to be taken for granted from the beginning that Field’s 
“representations” are representations of anything in particular, or that “believing” a 
“representation” involves representing anything(s) as having any properties or as standing in any 
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relations.21 Rather, we should assume, if indeed “believing” a “representation” involves 
intentionality then that is something that will have to be shown.  
Of course, the anti-skeptic can be expected to insist immediately that it can be shown. 
That is, even if Field’s explanation does not employ any intentional characterizations (hence the 
quote marks around ‘representations’ and ‘believes’), the anti-skeptic could still insist that 
Field’s explanantia are in fact intentional. In particular, she could insist that the properties that 
Field invokes reduce the intentional properties attributed in the original intentional explanation: 
having a class C of internal “representations” that satisfies (Behavioral Effects) and (Relation 
to Airspeeds) reduces having available a set of beliefs about one’s possible airspeeds, and 
“believing” a “representation” in C reduces tokening a belief about one’s airspeeds.  
It is worth noticing that this kind of anti-skeptical move can be repeated against any 
advocate of (Elim). Any advocate of (Elim) will hold that all intentional talk in our explanations 
could in principle and should wherever possible be replaced by some non-intentional analog(s). 
But in response, and whatever the specifics of the skeptic’s proposal, the question can then be 
raised whether this analog appeals to the reduction bases for some intentional properties. For 
skeptics who adopt a metaphysical conception of communicative explanation, this is an 
important question, since a positive answer would render the purportedly non-intentional 
explanation, by their lights, intentional “in fact if not in name.” (Here I use Field’s phrase.22) So, 
                                                          
21 In addition to Field’s stated argumentative goal (Field 2001 p.153), there is some further evidence supporting this 
non-intentional interpretation. See (Field 1978) (Field 1994) p.254 where he talks of sentences, or “sentence-
analogues,” as being objects of belief. Also, in (Field 1978) p.18, he says that representations have “the same kind of 
meaning or content which sentences have.” In (Field 1978), Field proposes to explain belief (the ordinary, 
intentional relation) by “factoring” it into two further relations, both definable in non-intentional terms: a 
dispositional relation, belief*, which one can bear to a representation, and a relation R which a representation can 
bear to a proposition. Throughout, he suggests that believing* a sentence involves having certain dispositions with 
respect to it (seep.13 and p.17). So, there is reason to think that belief* can be understood in non-intentional terms. 
(Field 1978) would understand (Field 2001)’s talk of believing representations as talk of believing* representations, 
and he would understand (Relation to Airspeeds)(b) to be a description of an instance of R. 
22 (Field 1994) bottom p.254. 
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even if one does not like Field’s particular non-intentional explanation, the same kind of 
response is available against other skeptics.  
(On the other hand, it is worth noting, a skeptic who adopts the epistemic conception of 
communicative explanation would hold that an act of explanation owes its quality not to what 
entities it describes, but rather to the descriptions themselves. Thus, she could insist that the 
explanation given in non-intentional terms is superior, even though the phenomena it invokes can 
be accurately described in intentional terms. Insofar as Field is working under the metaphysical 
conception (recall Section 2.1) this move is not available to him.)  
Field anticipates that the anti-skeptic might claim his explanantia as a reduction base for 
something intentional, and he has a reply.23 He grants that “part [(Relation to Airspeeds)(b)] of 
the explanation uses an indication relation,”24 but insists that  
The function [f ] mapping internal representations into airspeeds needn’t…give the 
intuitive truth conditions of [the pilot’s] representations in all cases: one could tell a story 
in which the pilot’s beliefs about what she was doing were so weird that it would be 
natural to assign quite different truth conditions to her representations. (Perhaps she 
believes she isn’t in an airplane at all, but is using the controls to direct U.S. ground 
forces on a foreign mission). (Field 2001, p.154)  
 
Two important observations about this reply of Field’s. Firstly, Field’s reply amounts to an 
invocation of (Jerry Rig), since it assumes that, as far as intentional explanations go, one could 
get by just as well by attributing an extreme delusion. This is what I take Field to be getting at 
when he says “one could tell a story”; there would be no reason to point out that one could tell 
                                                          
23 The fact that Field responds to this reaction evidences that he is working under the metaphysical conception of 
communicative explanation. For as we just saw, it is only under that conception that the appeal to the reduction base 
for something intentional counts as a problem for the skeptic. 
24 Indication has been understood in different ways in the literature. (Stampe 1977), (Dretske 1981), and (Stalnaker 
1984) p.18 have appealed to indication in trying to explain intentionality. The most common theme in definitions of 
indication is that one state of affairs indicates another only if they are reliably correlated. For instance, if the cross 
section of a tree trunk has 54 rings, then that indicates that the tree is 54 years old.  
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such a story, unless telling that story would amount to giving an explanation that was just as 
good as the original.  
Secondly, although Field’s primary concern is with propositional representation,25 his 
remarks here commit him to a strong claim, one that concerns all intentionality. The key 
observation here is that when Field’s story shifts the beliefs attributed to the pilot, it does so in a 
way that shifts the subject matter attributed to the pilot’s ideation (airspeeds vs. U.S. ground 
forces). This move of shifting the subject matter can be applied to any intentional explanation, 
since all it requires is that the explanans have a subject matter; one simply replaces the original 
explanans with something that has a different subject matter, and then claims that the result is an 
equally good explanation, as far as intentional explanations go.26 It is because Field’s reply to the 
anti-skeptic can be applied to any intentional explanation that I take him to be committed to 
(Elim) in its most general form, targeting all intentionality rather than just propositional 
representation. Field is not alone in this. To date, all extant arguments that invoke (Jerry Rig) 
share the wide scope of Field’s.27 
Before moving toward a response, let us briefly review the dialectic. Earlier on, Field 
claimed that describing such facts as those specified in (Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to 
Airspeeds) is all that one needs to do in order adequately to explain any pilot’s ability to land a 
plane. Conceding this, the anti-skeptic then proposed that “believing” a representation which 
                                                          
25 This is because propositional representation involves truth-conditions, and Field’s ultimate concern is to motivate 
what he calls a “deflationary” attitude about truth. See (Field 1994) p.271 as well as (Field 2001) pp.153-156. 
26 On the other hand, imagine that Field’s story kept fixed that the pilot had beliefs which were about her airspeeds, 
and shifted only what these beliefs said about these airspeeds. Stated thus, the argument would apply only to things 
like beliefs, which not only have a subject matter but, moreover, say something about that subject matter. It would 
be harder to generalize the argument to things like words and concepts, which have a subject matter (a referent) but 
need not say anything about it. 
27 Compare the argument from (Quine 1960) Chapter 2, which shifts the subject matter from rabbits to undetached 
rabbit parts or rabbit-stages. Similarly, (Kripke 1982) and (Field 1994) shift not the truth-conditions ascribed to a 
sentence, but rather the referent ascribed to a word, ‘plus’ and ‘or’, respectively.  
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belongings to a set C that satisfies (Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds) reduces 
having a belief about one’s airspeed. In reply, Field now produces a counterexample. In general, 
for A to reduce B, A must be necessarily sufficient for B; and Field’s delusional pilot is meant to 
give us a possible counterexample to sufficiency.28 Field is claiming that for some possible pilots 
who have a set of “representations” that satisfy (Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds), 
their “representations” do not represent their airspeeds; rather, these “representations” represent 
movements of U.S. ground forces.29 Due to this failure of reduction, it cannot be said that Field’s 
explanation in terms of “representations” ends up being intentional in fact if not in name.30 So, if 
this explanation is indeed just as good as the everyday intentional one, then that counts in favor 
of the view that invocation of intentional facts can be harmlessly excised from psychological 
explanations.  
At this point, one might reasonably be puzzled about the role of (Jerry Rig) in Field’s 
argument. After all, the claim that a pilot with an extreme delusion could have a set of 
                                                          
28 In this connection, note the significance of the fact that the delusion is an extreme one. Field needs an extreme 
delusion, in order to show that the non-intentional facts that (ontically) explain the pilot’s ability do very little to 
constrain the subject matter of her beliefs. For example, suppose the pilot merely believed that her altimeter was off 
by two feet. That would not be different enough from the original, sane belief to make Field’s point. It is like the 
situation with indeterminacy of translation: recognizing that there is some modest degree of indeterminacy doesn’t 
support (Quine 1960)’s strong conclusions. 
29 More precisely: for some possible worlds w1 and w2 and individuals x in w1 and y in w2, x in w1 is indiscernible 
from y in w2 with respect to satisfaction of (Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds), but in w1, the 
representations of x which are in (x’s version of) C represent x’s airspeed, whereas in w2 the representations of y 
which are in (y’s version of) C do not represent y’s airspeed. Rather, they represent movements of U.S. ground 
troops. 
30 Now, technically, as long as “believing” a representation which belongings to a set C that satisfies (Behavioral 
Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds) reduces some intentional property, the explanatory importance of intentional 
properties is in no serious trouble; all that is in trouble is the idea that the intentional properties that we ordinarily 
posit are essential for explaining anything. For all that conclusion shows, there might be intentional properties of 
some other kinds that are indeed essential. However, admittedly it is hard to see what intentional properties 
“believing” a representation which belongings to a set C that satisfies (Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to 
Airspeeds) could reduce, if it could underlie having a belief about one’s airspeed in one pilot and underlie having a 
belief about U.S. ground troops in another. In particular, it is hard to see what could be the subject matter of states 
that in one pilot would count as beliefs about airspeeds and in another would count as beliefs about ground troops. 
So, I’ll grant that there is a genuine threat to the explanatory importance of intentionality here. 
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“representations” that satisfies (Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds) is not identical 
with the claim that as far as intentional explanations go, the attribution of an extreme delusion 
works just as well as an explanation as the attribution of normal beliefs. However, these two 
claims are rendered equivalent by an assumption that is shared by all parties to the debate at this 
point in the dialectic: namely, that the only property that is relevant to explaining a pilot’s 
landing ability is the property having a set of “representations” that satisfies (Behavioral 
Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds).31 Since both a sane and an extremely delusional pilot could 
have this property (in the latter case, as long as the delusion has certain very specific properties,) 
Field’s idea is then that both belief-attributions can serve equally well in the heuristic role of 
guiding us to this property, provided that the attribution of delusional beliefs is suitably tweaked. 
Given Field’s assumption that intentional explanations serve a heuristic role, the claim that both 
belief attributions serve equally well as guides to the same, ontically-explanatory non-intentional 
property is identical with the claim that both intentional explanations are equally good, as far as 
intentional explanations go.  
 
2.3. A Characteristic Virtue of Intentional Explanations 
Field is right that (Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds) do not reduce having 
beliefs about one’s airspeeds. But he is wrong to suggest that one could profitably replace the 
original intentional explanation with the non-intentional one that he provides. There may be 
some kinds of explanation of a pilot’s ability reliably to land a plane that need only describe the 
                                                          
31 Field makes this assumption when he claims that the attribution of beliefs to the pilot serves as a heuristic for the 
attribution of this property. And the anti-skeptic implicitly grants the assumption when she proposes this property as 
a reduction base for something intentional. What she needs to show is that the property that ontically explains the 
pilot’s capacity to land the plane reduces some intentional property. So, there is no need for her to consider the 
property that Field identifies unless she grants that it really is the property that ontically explains the pilot’s capacity.  
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likes of (Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds), for instance, any kind of explanation 
whose only purpose is to say something about the pilot’s “representations” which entails that the 
pilot tends to land the plane. Perhaps cognitive science has or would ideally have some uses for 
such explanations. However, both in everyday life and in the sciences, we frequently want our 
explanations to do more than just entail the occurrence of the phenomenon being explained. 
Below I’ll describe in detail one important further thing that everyday intentional explanations 
do.  
Let’s give the name ‘folk psychology’ to our everyday conception of humans as 
sometimes-rational agents who act on the basis of beliefs, desires, fears, suspicions, hopes, traits 
of character, etc. For our purposes here, it will ease exposition to assume that folk psychology is 
a theory that traffics in ceteris paribus generalizations which relate beliefs, desires, and other 
intentional states, often together with traits of character, to behaviors.32 An example of such a 
generalization in the pilot case might say something like this: ceteris paribus, a pilot who wants 
to land the plane she is flying, who believes her airspeed to be approximately n knots and her 
height to be approximately m meters, who believes that airspeeds of n knots at heights of m 
meters are too fast for landing the plane, and who believes that doing X will slow the plane, will 
do X.  
A common virtue of many good psychological explanations is that they provide modal 
information about the agents whose behaviors they explain.33 In particular, define the 
                                                          
32 The idea that folk psychology involves some such generalizations is a common one. For some advocates, see 
(Stich 1983) pp.130-133 and (Fodor 1987) pp.1-6 and 10. However, (Anscombe 1971) and (Miller 1987) deny that 
explanation in folk psychology generally involves appeal to any ceteris paribus generalizations. So, the assumption 
that I make here is controversial. However, while there is not space to attempt it here, I am confident that the main 
points I want to make can be put without embracing this assumption. 
33 Here I am merely saying that modal informativeness of a certain kind is a good-making feature of many 
explanations. It is worth distinguishing this claim from versions of the epistemic conception of communicative 
explanation which insist that providing such modal information is required for something to count as an explanation. 
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counterfactual spread34 of a psychological explanation to be the information that it provides 
about how the agent would behave under various counterfactual circumstances. Put in these 
terms, my main point is that everyday intentional explanations enjoy a distinctive, wide 
counterfactual spread. This spread is wide in the sense that it contains information about a wide 
variety of different scenarios.35  
The counterfactual spread of an everyday intentional explanation arises from the 
interaction of one salient part of the explanans—in the pilot case, this would be propositions 
about the pilot’s beliefs, desires and perceptions that are directly relevant to her capacity to land 
the plane—with background propositions (ceteris paribus generalizations) that form part of folk 
psychology. In various alternative circumstances, many of those most relevant states would still 
obtain (e.g., those states that are most relevant to how to fly an airplane), and the same folk-
psychological background propositions would be in play. However, some salient parts of the 
explanans would undergo replacement by attitudes that the pilot doesn’t actually have. The 
background propositions tell us how the pilot would behave in those scenarios. In this way, an 
intentional explanation of an episode of behavior provides some information about how the agent 
would behave under various circumstances other than the circumstances of that episode.  
We just saw how everyday intentional explanations acquire wide counterfactual spreads 
by employing concepts that figure in the background theory of folk psychology. In principle, this 
can also happen with other kinds of explanations and other theories. Say that a theory about 
minds (or some minds) is holistic if, for a wide variety of cognitive and affective states, the 
                                                          
Someone who makes only the claim I make here could, for instance, embrace the mechanistic conception of 
communicative explanation, maintaining that what makes something an explanation is that it describes the objects 
and activities that produce the explanandum.  
34 I owe this phrase to Harold Hodes.  
35 Field recognizes this point in (Field 2001, p.78).  
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theory describes a wide variety of relations that these states bear to one another, to the state-
bearers’ external environments (including, perhaps, the states and behaviors of other cognitive 
agents), and to the state-bearers’ behaviors, dispositions, and capacities. In general, a 
psychological explanation can acquire a wide counterfactual spread by attributing states (types) 
that figure in a holistic background theory.  
To see an example outside of everyday intentional explanations, let us look again at 
Field’s “representations”, letting b0,…,bn be the “representations” described in (Behavioral 
Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds). Then a holistic theory about the pilot would be one that not 
only describes how b0,…,bn are implicated in the pilot’s capacity to land planes, but also 
connects the very simple regularities described in (Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to 
Airspeeds) with a much broader set of regularities governing the ways that b0,…,bn function in 
the pilot. These broader regularities might include some causal links between tokenings of 
b0,…,bn and tokenings of various further “representations” of the pilot, as well as some of the 
relations in which these further “representations” stand to the pilot’s bodily movements and to 
her environment, and maybe even some of the relations that tokenings of b0,…,bn bear to 
tokenings of various further “representations” used by other members of the pilot’s linguistic 
community. A theory that described relationships such as these would be holistic, in the sense 
that it would situate b0,…,bn and the pilot’s capacity to land planes in a bigger picture. When 
given against the backdrop of such a theory, an explanation that described the contributions of 
b0,…,bn to the pilot’s capacity to land planes would have a wide counterfactual spread, since 
some of the propositions in the explanans—such as propositions to the effect that the pilot tokens 
b0,…,bn—would also feature in a wide variety of further propositions about how the pilot would 
react to various counterfactual circumstances, these background belonging to the holistic theory.  
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It is worth noting that in both everyday explanations and in the Fieldian one just 
imagined, an explanation can achieve a wide counterfactual spread without itself including many 
propositions from the background theory. In both cases, the explanation does not explicitly 
describe how the pilot would react to various alternative circumstances. Indeed, perhaps that 
would simply fill the explanation with clutter.36 Rather, for a wide spread to be achieved, it 
suffices that some of the propositions in the explanans figure in many further propositions that 
form part of a holistic theory.  
I have claimed that everyday intentional explanations enjoy a distinctive, wide 
counterfactual spread. But exactly what modal information do they provide? This can be brought 
out nicely by contrasting the normal explanation and the aberrant explanation in the pilot case. 
Suppose, for example, that while landing, a pilot tokens a “representation” r, which on a normal 
attribution of truth-conditions has the truth-condition that the pilot’s speed is approximately n 
knots and the altitude is approximately m meters, where a speed of n knots is too fast for landing 
that plane from m meters. In accordance with (Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds), r 
tends to cause the pilot to make a bodily motion that slows the plane. Suppose also that 
according to the delusion Field sketches, r has the truth-condition that U.S. ground troops are 
being attacked from the west, and suppose that any pilot with this delusion thinks that the bodily 
motion that is typically caused by tokening r amounts to an order to the effect that the troops 
make a certain defensive maneuver. Now, if we attribute this delusion to the pilot, what answer 
                                                          
36 This remark raises a question: if detailed modal information about the subject is irrelevant for explaining the 
pilot’s capacity, then how could the failure to provide such information count against Field’s non-intentional 
explanation? As I will soon explain in the main text, the information contained in the counterfactual spreads of 
everyday intentional explanations is useful in everyday life, the humanities, and the social sciences, for at least the 
reason that it helps us predict how the agent might likely react to various circumstances. So, at least when prediction 
is a going concern, one should resist the temptation to say that this information is completely irrelevant to 
psychological explanation. At the same time, however, it does seem plausible that an explicit spelling out of this 
modal information would count as clutter.  
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do we get to the question, “Imagine the president were to announce that enemies have begun 
pretending to attack U.S. ground troops from the west, but that these appearances were certainly 
not to be trusted. Would tokening r still cause the pilot to slow the plane?” The answer is ‘no’ for 
the situation as so-far described. And it remains ‘no’ unless we meticulously tweak the delusion, 
inventing some reason why the pilot wouldn’t believe the announcement. By contrast, if we 
attribute to r the truth-condition that the airspeed is approximately n knots, we get no such 
answer; other things being equal, a sane pilot would not inhibit the belief that her airspeed is 
approximately n knots from causing her to slow the plane just because she heard an 
announcement about U.S. ground troops. Rather, for such a pilot this announcement would 
simply be irrelevant to how her beliefs about her speed affected her control of the plane. So, if 
indeed a pilot would react in a normal way to such announcements, the delusion-attribution fails 
to entail this unless it is meticulously tweaked, whereas the belief-attribution entails it without 
any tweaks.  
Similarly, if we attribute the delusion, what answer do we get to the question, “Suppose 
the pilot were to hear a service announcement over the radio, to the effect that speedometers in 
that type of plane were defective, readings being typically 100 knots faster than the true speed. In 
that case, would seeing a speedometer reading of n knots still cause r?” We get a bad answer 
unless we tweak the delusion in some quite specific ways, for instance, by stipulating that—and 
how—the pilot interprets service announcements as code-talk for events taking place in the battle 
on the ground.37 Unless the pilot has some such specific delusion, such a service announcement 
wouldn’t change the typical causes of r in a delusional pilot.38 By contrast, a sane pilot would 
                                                          
37 I owe this observation to Richard Boyd. 
38 Or, at any rate, even if there is such a delusion when we only look at reactions to service announcements, it is 
highly implausible that there is a delusion so thoroughly tweaked that a pilot thus deluded would behave in all the 
ways predicted by the attribution of beliefs about airspeeds. See Section 2.4.1 below. 
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react to such an announcement by inhibiting a speedometer reading of n knots from causing r—
that is, by inhibiting such a reading from causing her to believe that her speed is approximately n 
knots. Again, unless the delusion is tortuously tweaked, only the normal belief-attribution 
explains why the pilot would react in some such way. So, it is just false that the normal belief-
attribution could be replaced by a suitably tweaked, radically aberrant attribution, with no loss in 
the quality of the explanation. 
Returning to the big picture, the point is that to describe the likes of (Behavioral Effects) 
and (Relation to Airspeeds) is not to give an explanation that is informative in all the same ways 
as the original intentional one. Everyday intentional explanations have, and are supposed to have, 
a certain counterfactual spread; they provide certain modal information about the agents whose 
behaviors they explain. This information is useful in everyday life, the humanities, and some 
social sciences, because it helps us anticipate people’s behaviors in a wide range of different 
circumstances. To replace everyday intentional explanations without any loss of explanatory 
goodness, the skeptic must come up with non-intentional explanations whose counterfactual 
spreads are comparable to those of everyday intentional explanations. In the pilot case, an 
equally good non-intentional explanation would have to connect to a background theory which 
described a variety of facts about the pilot that would be more complex than the likes of 
(Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds). This theory would at least have to shed some 
light on how those of the pilot’s “representations” that are implicated in landing the plane are in 
turn linked to some of her dispositions to react to radio announcements. Arguably, it also would 
have to say something about the circumstances under which these radio announcements would 
have different effects. E.g., if the pilot believed she were landing the plane in a battle then she 
might indeed respond to announcements about enemy troops. Furthermore, the theory would 
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need to go beyond describing the pilot’s dispositions to respond to radio announcements; it 
would need to describe any other dispositions about which the ascription of beliefs about her 
airspeeds provides information.  
But now suppose that the skeptic could give a non-intentional explanation that provided 
similar information about these dispositions, by employing explanantia that figured in a holistic 
theory applicable to the pilot. Then the anti-skeptic could respond by claiming that the skeptic’s 
explanantia form a reduction base for some intentional phenomena. For instance, a simple 
version of this kind of response would claim that having “representations” that are describable by 
(Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds) and are such that i) the effects of tokening these 
“representations” would be uninfluenced by announcements about enemy troop movements, and 
ii) the effects of tokening them would be changed by the service announcement, is a reduction 
base for having beliefs about one’s airspeeds. If that claim turned out to be true, then the 
skeptic’s explanation would turn out to be an intentional explanation, at least as the latter is 
construed by the metaphysical conception of communicative explanation.  
 
2.4. Replies from the Skeptic and Anti-Skeptical Responses 
2.4.1. Tweaking Again 
In a moment, I will consider how the skeptic might reply to my remarks about 
counterfactual spread by tweaking her aberrant intentional explanation. But let us first pause a 
moment and remind ourselves of the skeptic’s argumentative strategy and the role that tweaking 
plays in it. So far, the skeptic’s tactic has been to try to produce an intentional description of a 
deluded pilot whose ability to land the plane would be ontically explained by non-intentional 
facts equivalent to those that ground the ability of a sane pilot, this showing that the non-
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intentional facts which ontically explain both pilots’ abilities do not reduce any intentional facts. 
The skeptic tinkers with—tweaks—her description of the deluded pilot, to make it compatible 
with non-intentional facts that ontically explain the ability of a sane pilot. Equivalently, the 
skeptic can be seen as trying to concoct a competing, equally good intentional explanation of an 
apparently sane pilot’s behaviors and abilities, an explanation that depicts this pilot as severely 
deluded. Under that description of the skeptic’s strategy, tweaking is a matter of modifying the 
competing, aberrant explanation to make it as good as the non-aberrant one.  
It is clear how a skeptic who persists with this kind of approach would reply to my 
remarks about counterfactual spread: she would say it is possible for a pilot with a suitably 
tweaked, extreme delusion to satisfy (Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds) and have 
all the behavioral dispositions about which the attribution of normal beliefs informs us. 
(Equivalently, she would say that the behaviors and capacities of a sane pilot can be equally well 
explained by attributing a suitably tweaked, extreme delusion, one that is consistent with the 
pilot’s dispositions to react to various counterfactual scenarios.) Let’s say that such a suitably-
tweaked delusion is specifically tailored to these dispositions. If indeed there is an extreme 
delusion specifically tailored to the dispositions about which the attribution of normal beliefs 
informs us, then the skeptic can insist that the non-intentional facts underlying these dispositions 
fail to reduce any intentional facts. So, non-intentional explanations that mimic intentional 
explanations in providing information about these dispositions need not appeal to the reduction 
bases for any intentional facts, and so can count as non-intentional explanations.  
To assess the plausibility of these claims, let us remind ourselves what they amount to. 
Imagine a pilot who is able to land a plane reliably, and for whom we would normally explain 
this by saying that she has various true beliefs about her airspeeds. The skeptic claims that the 
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facts about the pilot that (ontically) explain her ability and that connect it with her dispositions to 
react to various counterfactual scenarios do very little to constrain the subject matter of her 
beliefs—that is, these facts do not come anywhere near to determining that her beliefs are about 
her airspeeds. (Compare: if these facts are compatible with the pilot’s beliefs’ being about her 
airspeeds times 0.999, then the skeptic is not vindicated. To make Field’s point, the delusion has 
to be an extreme one.) In particular, for example, she claims that all of these facts could hold for 
an extremely delusional pilot who has beliefs about U.S. ground troops.  
But this is simply unbelievable. If the skeptic’s claim were merely that for all the 
dispositions in some small range, (e.g., dispositions to react to radio announcements,) there could 
be an extreme delusion specifically tailored to these, then perhaps that could be granted; though I 
think even this rather unlikely. But, if the relationship between beliefs and behaviors is anything 
like what we normally take it to be, then it is just utterly implausible that there could be an 
extreme delusion specifically tailored to all of the dispositions about which the attribution of 
beliefs about airspeeds informs us. Rather: if someone is able to land planes because she has true 
beliefs about how fast she is going, then it is overwhelmingly plausible that there be some 
circumstances in which she would be disposed to behave differently from someone who is able 
to land planes because she believes she is controlling U.S. ground troops. Our beliefs constrain 
our behaviors in at least this minimal way.  
Admittedly, in making this claim about how our beliefs constrain our behaviors, I am 
relying on our ordinary understanding of beliefs. This understanding is not beyond dispute; in 
principle, a skeptic could respond to the foregoing by denying that beliefs are connected with 
behavior in anything like the way we ordinarily take them to be. However, surely the burden of 
proof would be on the skeptic here. Our ordinary understanding of belief, including of the ways 
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it is connected with behavior, has been honed continuously over millennia of everyday use.39 It 
would be quite surprising if it turned out to be wrong in as radical a way as what the skeptic 
suggests.  
The two most important points here are as follows. Firstly, just because a belief’s role in 
the production of behavior is always mediated by various desires, traits of character, and other 
beliefs, it does not follow that a given belief can, if suitably supplemented by these other factors, 
give rise to any pattern of behavior whatsoever; rather, our beliefs place some constraints on our 
behavioral dispositions. Secondly, for this reason, it is not the case that for any belief, attributing 
it can, if suitably supplemented by attribution of desires, traits of character, and other beliefs, 
serve to (communicatively) explain any behavior or capacity whatsoever. 
While these points most obviously concern our everyday explanations, they are also 
potentially relevant to explanation in a scientific psychology. As we saw, in the pilot case, a 
virtue of the ordinary intentional explanation is its counterfactual spread: it provides certain 
information about some of the pilot’s dispositions to react to various counterfactual situations. 
So, if there are scientific contexts in which this kind of modal informativeness is important, then 
in these contexts, a non-intentional explanation that can apply equally well to a sane and to a 
delusional pilot would be no substitute for the everyday explanation that attributes beliefs about 
airspeeds. Now of course, for all that I have said, there may be a variety of non-intentional 
explanation that shares the counterfactual spread of everyday ones; but then these non-intentional 
explanations will not be applicable to wide a range of agents whose beliefs have wildly different 
subject matters. For such explanations, if someday they are produced, there will be a better case 
for the claim that they describe reduction bases for some intentional facts than there was for 
                                                          
39 To mention just two out of many ancient sources, strongly belief-like notions can be found in Plato’s Theaetetus 
and the Hebrew Bible. 
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Field’s explanation that invokes only (Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds) in the 
absence of a holistic background theory.  
 
2.4.2. A Different Skeptical Reply  
In the “delusion-tweaking” line of argument just considered, the skeptic argues that there 
are some explanations that enjoy the counterfactual spread of everyday intentional explanations 
but do not appeal to any intentional properties, or to the reduction bases for any such properties. 
In response, I argued that this skeptic illicitly stretched the concept of belief to the breaking 
point: Field’s claim that a radically delusional pilot could have the same dispositions as a sane 
pilot (and thus that the facts relevant to explaining the pilot’s ability to land the plane do not 
reduce any intentional facts) ignores the significant constraints that our beliefs impose on our 
behavior.  
However, in personal communication, Field has described an alternative approach that a 
skeptic might take. Instead of stretching the concept of belief to accommodate ever more 
intricately-deluded pilots, she offers a new, unsympathetic account of everyday intentional 
explanations. On this account, these explanations are second-class explanations—that is, they 
involve tacit reference to the person giving the explanation (see below for a full definition). But, 
the skeptic insists, second-class explanations would have no place in a truly scientific 
psychology.  
To understand Field’s line of thought in full detail, I will begin Section 2.4.2.1 by 
defining ‘second-class explanation’. Then I will present a representative passage in which Field 
claims everyday intentional explanations to be second-class. After that, I will discuss some 
reasons why one might deem second-class explanations unsuitable for science. Finally, I will 
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present (2.4.2.2 - 2.4.2.3) and evaluate (2.4.2.4 - 2.4.2.6) Field’s reasons for taking everyday 
intentional explanations to be second-class.  
 
2.4.2.1. Background: Second-class Explanations and Science 
Define first-class explanations to be those that proceed via context-insensitive reference 
to (or, if one prefers, attribution of) some explanatorily-relevant properties. By contrast, second-
class explanations operate by effecting a rough comparison to the person giving the explanation, 
this comparison serving to fix the reference of some of the expressions used on some relevant 
properties.40 It need not be fully determinate to which properties reference is fixed (see Field’s 
remarks later in this subsection), but presumably for the explanation to be useful, there must be 
some non-trivial degree of determinacy.  
In second-class psychological explanations, the comparison being made is between the 
speaker and the agent whose behaviors or capacities are being explained. The objective property 
on which reference is fixed is, or is similar to, an objective property that the speaker herself 
instantiates; that explains how comparison to the speaker can succeed in fixing reference to this 
property. For example, on one straightforward version of how everyday intentional explanations 
might be second-class explanations, in any explanatory context in which the predicate ‘believes 
that snow is white’ is applied to an agent, the use of this predicate triggers a comparison to the 
speaker, which in turn fixes the reference (relative to that context) of the predicate ‘believes that 
snow is white’ on an objective property shared by the speaker and the agent.  
                                                          
40 I am grateful to Harold Hodes for mentioning the idea of reference-fixing in this setting. Field makes no explicit 
mention of reference-fixing, but it is a plausible interpretation of passages like the one immediately below in the 
main text. Moreover, after several attempts to understand second-class explanations in alternative ways, I have come 
to the conclusion that this is the only plausible account of how they operate.  
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Field endorses something closely akin to this account of belief-attributions in a number of 
remarks throughout his work since the 1980s. For instance, he writes:  
When explaining a person’s behavior (say the raising of his gun) in terms of his belief 
that there is a rabbit nearby, what I am in effect doing is explaining the behavior in terms 
of his believing* a representation that plays a role in his psychology rather similar to the 
role that ‘There are rabbits nearby’ (or the mental representation associated with it) plays 
in mine…Such an explanation is still basically non-intentional: truth conditions play no 
real explanatory role. Of course, there is a sense in which my sentence ‘There are rabbits’ 
plays an explanatory role here: obviously not as a causal factor in the explanation, but as 
a device we use in picking out the agent’s internal representation (which is a causal 
factor). (Field 2001, p.78)41 
 
Here belief* is a non-intentional relation that an agent can bear to an internal “representation”. 
For purposes of illustration, it will be harmless to identify believing* a “representation” with 
tokening it.  
There is room for disagreement about what Field means by ‘picking out’, but one 
straightforward possibility is that in any explanatory context C, the use of the predicate ‘believes 
that there is a rabbit nearby’ interacts with the explanatory interests at hand to make salient some 
role X that a “representation” can play in an agent’s psychology, a role possessed, in particular, 
by some of the speaker’s own “representations”. This fixes the reference, in C, of the predicate 
‘believes that there is a rabbit nearby’ on the property believing* a “representation” which plays 
role X.  
Now that we have a clear account of what second-class explanations are, we are in a 
position to see why one might be uneasy about their suitability for science,42 or at least for an 
                                                          
41 For similar remarks, also (Field 1978), p.47, (Field 1986) p.82, and (Field 2001) p.78 and p.155. This picture of 
belief-attribution echoes a similar one from (Quine 1960) p.219, and both philosophers display affinity for the 
simulation theory of folk psychology, prominently stated in (Gordon 1986) and cited in both (Field 1986) p.87 and 
(Field 2001) p.78. According to the simulation theory, in folk psychology “we represent the mental states and 
processes of others by mentally simulating them” (Gordon 2009). For example, we predict others’ behavior by 
putting ourselves in their shoes and asking how we would act, rather than by deducing propositions about how they 
will behave from generalizations that relate beliefs, desires, and traits of character to behaviors.  
42 That said, it is worth noting that second-class explanations will count as genuine explanations under the 
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ideal science. The most obvious concern has to do with indexicality. Arguably, a distinctive 
feature of science is a kind of independence from the inquirer of the product of her inquiry, an 
independence which is hampered by indexical reference. For example, if one tries to fix 
reference to a temperature property by saying ‘hot to the touch’, the inquirer-relativity of that 
concept makes an explanation that employs that phrase unscientific. That is because another 
inquirer might differ in her judgments about what is hot to the touch, if (e.g.,) the first just had 
his hands in front of a fire, whereas the second just had her hands in ice-water. For this reason, 
one might reasonably think, good science avoids indexical reference, e.g., by preferring 
measurement (50 degrees Fahrenheit) to qualitative descriptions (hot). This consideration counts 
against the inclusion of second-class explanations in an ideal science.  
In addition to their reliance on comparison to the explanation-giver, second-class 
explanations might be unsuitable for science in virtue of being affected by contextual shifts in 
the relevance of different respects of comparison. Consider, for example, the attribution to an 
ancient Greek of the belief that there is a thunderstorm nearby.43 If all we care about is the 
Greek’s ability to keep safe in storms, then the fact that a state leads the Greek to seek shelter 
may license the description of it as being a belief that there is a thunderstorm nearby. But in 
contexts in which we also care about explaining her attempts to control the weather by offering 
sacrifices to (what she takes to be) the gods, it might be better to describe her as having the belief 
that Zeus is hurling thunderbolts rather than as believing that it is thundering. For our belief that 
it is thundering is dissimilar to the Greek’s state, in that it does not lead us to make sacrifices; so, 
in this context, likening the Greek to ourselves will be misleading. Again, the point is that if 
                                                          
metaphysical conception of explanation, whenever the properties whose attribution they involve ontically explain 
their (the explanations’) explananda.  
43 This example is due to (Field 2001), p.80-81.  
 256 
 
indeed everyday intentional explanations are second-class, then the appropriateness of any given 
belief-attribution is liable to vary in response to contextual shifts in what we are out to explain. 
As with indexicality, one might take this feature of context-shiftiness to make belief-attributions 
inappropriate for purposes of science.  
Finally, the reference-fixing involved in second-class explanations may be vulnerable to 
indeterminacy. Two plausible sources of indeterminacy are the indexicality and sensitivity to the 
explanatory interests at hand that these explanations involve. Indeed, for example, Field takes the 
reference-fixing (allegedly) involved in everyday intentional explanations to be indeterminate:  
A natural view is that when we use representational concepts or properties44 to explain 
facts described in nonrepresentational terms, the representational concepts or properties 
just code for conceptual or functional role properties: we specify the functional role 
property by specifying the representational property. This is certainly very plausible, if 
we don’t take it as committed to there being any very uniform account of what 
conceptual role properties a representational property codes for, and if we don’t suppose 
that even on a given occasion there is a very precise conceptual role property that is 
coded for. (Field 2001, p.77, italics mine) 
 
The point, again, is that one might reasonably take indeterminate reference to make those 
second-class explanations that suffer from it unsuitable for an ideal science.  
By now, we have seen Field claiming that everyday intentional explanations are second-
class, and we have seen some reasons why an ideal science might not include any second-class 
explanations. Still, what reasons do we have to take everyday intentional explanations to be 
second-class? As I will explain in the next subsection, Field arrives at this conclusion via an 
inference to the best explanation.45 
 
                                                          
44 Field’s use of ‘representational concepts or properties’ rather than simply ‘belief and desire’ shows that his claim 
concerns not only everyday intentional explanations but all propositional explanations whatsoever, and, indeed, 
perhaps all intentional explanations, insofar as, for instance, reference by words and concepts, which is non-
propositional, counts as a kind of representation. 
45 To my knowledge, Field never explicitly makes this inference. Rather, I attribute it to him as part of my best 
attempt to develop his position, based on his remarks in personal communication.  
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2.4.2.2. Outline of Field’s Inference to the Best Explanation 
To explain Field’s reasoning, I will need to discuss two important notions. The first we 
have already seen; it is the notion of a theory’s being holistic. A theory about minds (or about 
some minds) is holistic if, for a wide variety of cognitive and affective states, the theory 
describes a wide variety of relations that these states bear to one another, to the state-bearers’ 
external environments (including, perhaps, the states and behaviors of other cognitive agents), 
and to the state-bearers’ behaviors, dispositions, and capacities. As we saw, a psychological 
explanation can acquire a wide counterfactual spread by attributing states (types) that figure in a 
holistic background theory.  
The other notion I need to discuss is that of a theory’s being widely applicable. Roughly, 
the idea here is that a theory is widely applicable if the patterns of explanation that it embodies 
can be applied to many different phenomena. To introduce the idea more precisely, I will borrow 
some terminology from (Kitcher 1989), helpfully explained in (Woodward 2017): 
A schematic sentence is a sentence in which some of the nonlogical vocabulary has been 
replaced by dummy letters. [E.g.,] the sentence ‘Organisms homozygous for the sickling 
allele develop sickle cell anemia’ is associated with a number of schematic sentences 
including ‘Organisms homozygous for A develop P’ and ‘For all X if X is O and A then 
X is P’. Filling instructions are directions that specify how to fill in the dummy letters in 
schematic sentences. For example, filling instructions might tell us to replace ‘A’ with 
the name of an allele and ‘P’ with the name of a phenotypic trait in the first of the above 
schematic sentences. Schematic arguments are sequences of schematic sentences. 
Classifications describe which sentences in schematic arguments are premises and 
conclusions and what rules of inference are used. An argument pattern is an ordered 
triple consisting of a schematic argument, a set of sets of filling instructions, one for each 
term of the schematic argument, and a classification of the schematic argument. The 
more restrictions an argument pattern imposes on the arguments that instantiate it, the 
more stringent it is said to be. Roughly speaking, Kitcher’s guiding idea is that 
explanation is a matter of deriving descriptions of many different phenomena by using as 
few and as stringent argument patterns as possible over and over again. (Woodward 
2017, Section 5.1, italics mine)  
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In what follows, I will assume that part of the business of theories is to furnish explanations, and 
that for many theories, there are specific argument patterns that are associated with, and 
characteristic of, those theories. I will speak of such argument patterns as belonging to these 
theories. An explanation belongs to a theory if it instantiates an argument pattern that belongs to 
the theory and uses terminology that is characteristic of (or, as I will also sometimes say, belongs 
to) the theory.46 In what follows, I will assume that everyday intentional explanations instantiate 
argument patterns that are distinctive of folk psychology. E.g., the schematic sentences that these 
patterns involve might be ones such as ‘For all X, Q, and W, if X desires Q and believes that 
doing W will bring about Q then X does W’. 
The range of application of a theory is the range of phenomena descriptions of which can 
be derived from the theory’s argument patterns. A theory is thus widely (narrowly) applicable if 
the argument patterns that belong to it can (respectively, cannot) be used to derive descriptions of 
many different phenomena. Similarly, an explanation that forms part of a theory is widely 
(narrowly) generalizable if the argument pattern(s) that it instantiates can (respectively, cannot) 
be used to derive descriptions of a wide range of phenomena in addition to the explanandum. An 
explanation of the behavior or capacities of one agent can be generalized to a different agent if 
the argument pattern(s) that the explanation instantiates can be used to derive a description of the 
other agent’s behavior or capacities.  
Using the notions of holism and wide applicability, I can now explain how Field arrives 
at his claim that everyday intentional explanations are second-class. The idea is that although 
pre-theoretically, folk psychology appears to be quite holistic and also quite widely applicable, it 
                                                          
46 We need not assume that in general the terminology that is characteristic of a theory is implicitly defined by its 
role in that theory. E.g., perhaps the terminology of a genetic theory is ultimately defined not by any theory in the 
discipline of genetics but rather in some theories of organic chemistry.  
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is in fact indeterminate on both counts. Moreover, as one might expect, this indeterminacy 
infects everyday intentional explanations. When we learn that a pilot has beliefs about her 
airspeeds, it is indeterminate what we learn about her dispositions to react to various alternative 
circumstances, and which the circumstances are such that we learn something about how the 
pilot would react in them. And for any everyday intentional explanation, it is indeterminate to 
which other agents the explanation can be generalized. That is, fixing the folk-psychological 
argument pattern(s) that this explanation instantiates, it is indeterminate for which other agents 
this pattern can be used to derive descriptions of their behavior.  
In turn, Field’s idea is that it makes sense that the counterfactual spread and 
generalizability of everyday intentional explanations would be indeterminate, if indeed giving 
such an explanation consists in inviting a comparison with oneself in unspecified but 
contextually salient respects. As we saw, second-class explanations are vulnerable to an 
indeterminacy as to which objective property is attributed.47 Thus, Field arrives at the claim that 
everyday intentional explanations are second-class by an inference to the best explanation: this is 
the hypothesis that best explains their indeterminacy in the two respects just described.  
By contrast, on Field’s view, the background theories that would be employed in a truly 
scientific psychology would not be indeterminate, either with respect to holisticness and the 
width of the counterfactual spread of their explanations, or with respect to their range of 
applicability and the degree of generalizability of their explanations. However, he asserts, for 
truly scientific theories, holism and wide applicability are conflicting properties; no such theory 
                                                          
47 Recall also Field’s claim that although talk of beliefs “codes for” some “conceptual role properties,” on any 
particular occasion on which we attribute a belief, it is indeterminate which such property is “coded for.” (Put in my 
terms, Field is claiming that it is indeterminate to what property reference is being fixed by the comparison to the 
explanation-giver.) If everyday intentional explanations indeed involve indeterminacy in this way, then that would 
explain the (alleged) indeterminacy as to their counterfactual spread and generalizability. 
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can have both properties in the proportions that folk psychology purports to. Rather, any truly 
scientific explanations with the counterfactual spread of folk psychological explanations would 
be less generalizable than the folk ones; and any truly scientific explanations that were as 
generalizable as folk psychological explanations would be less holistic than the folk ones.  
In the next section (2.4.2.3), I will flesh out these claims by describing in detail the two 
kinds of background theories that Field thinks would be available for a scientific psychology, 
and comparing them both to folk psychology. Then in Sections 2.4.2.4 - 2.4.2.6, I will respond to 
Field’s inference to the best explanation. 
 
2.4.2.3. Two Types of Non-Intentional Background Theories 
What I will call type 1 theories are quite widely applicable. Explanations that are based 
on type 1 theories provide information about only rather simple properties and relations of the 
agent’s “representations”, such as those properties and relations mentioned in (Behavioral 
Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds). The regularities invoked in such an explanation, such as 
those described in (Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds), are ones that could be 
instanced by the states of many different agents, including many agents to whom we would, pre-
theoretically, ascribe radically different beliefs. As Field points out, an explanation along the 
lines of (Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds) could apply to both a sane pilot and a 
delusional pilot. Moreover, perhaps some argument patterns in some type 1 theories could even 
be applied both to genuine cognitive agents and also to some non-cognitive but still minimally 
environmentally-responsive systems, such as thermostats. After all, just like the representations 
in (Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds), the states of the bimetal strip in a thermostat 
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can systematically trigger “appropriate”48 behaviors in response to changing environmental 
conditions.49  
At the same time, however, a type 1 theory about, for example, pilots, would provide 
little information about how the “representations” implicated in landing the plane are related to 
the agent’s other “representations”, or to those of other individuals in the pilot’s community. 
Thus, any explanation based on a type 1 theory would have a quite limited counterfactual spread, 
shedding little light on how the agent would react to a variety of other possible circumstances. 
For this reason, by themselves, the facts invoked in explanations that are based on type 1 theories 
are unsuitable to serve as reduction bases for any intentional facts, familiar or otherwise. 
Accordingly, as I granted in Section 2.4.1, the facts described in (Behavioral Effects) and 
(Relation to Airspeeds), taken by themselves, do not reduce any intentional facts.  
So much for type 1 theories. Type 2 theories differ from type 1 theories in that they are 
quite holistic. For instance, when it comes to agents like Field’s pilot, a type 2 theory would 
describe many quite complex relations in which the agent’s “representations” stand. These would 
include relations that connect the “representations” which are directly involved in landing the 
plane (that is, b0,…bn) with the representations that would be tokened in response to various 
radio announcements, as well as a whole host of other circumstances. Explanations based on type 
2 theories have wide counterfactual spreads, comparable to the spreads of everyday intentional 
explanations.  
                                                          
48 Of course, these behaviors are not “appropriate” in the sense that they satisfy desires or intentions that the 
thermostat has, but rather only in the sense that they tend to give rise to the capacity being explained (namely, the 
capacity to bring and maintain the local environment at a specified temperature).  
49 A simple thermostat contains a bimetal strip which bends to different degrees of bent-ness in response to different 
ambient temperatures. When the strip is bent to a certain degree of bent-ness (set by the control knob), it closes an 
electronic circuit that triggers a furnace.  
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However—and this is Field’s crucial point—type 2 theories are not applicable to a wide 
range of different agents in the way that folk psychology is supposed to be. For example, pre-
theoretically, it appears that the attribution of beliefs about airspeeds could adequately explain 
the landing capacities of both a Democrat pilot and a Republican pilot, of both a Sikh pilot and a 
Zoroastrian pilot, of both a Dutch pilot and a South Korean pilot, etc., despite the differences in 
these pilots’ other beliefs. The explanation is thus widely applicable in at least these ways. But 
the same does not hold of type 2 theories. Any type 2 theory describes state-state, state-
environment, and state-behavior relationships that are so specific and detailed that they can only 
be instanced by the states of highly similar cognitive agents, falling within a narrow range. 
Indeed, perhaps each type 2 theory applies only to a single agent at a single point in her life. As 
we have with our familiar folk-psychological argument patterns, few if any argument patterns 
belonging to a type 2 theory could apply both to a sane pilot with beliefs about her airspeeds and 
also to a severely deluded pilot with beliefs about U.S. ground troops. But the range of 
application of the argument patterns belonging to type 2 theories is much narrower than that. 
Unlike with folk psychology, for instance, no argument pattern from a type 2 theory could be 
used to derive descriptions of both a Westernized 21st century person and an ancient Greek, even 
if in many circumstances, we would ordinarily want to describe both people as having the belief 
that it is thundering. Field’s idea is that the Greek’s psychology is sufficiently different enough 
from our own that no reasonably detailed scientific theory could apply to both.  
Folk psychology appears to occupy a middle ground between type 1 theories and type 2 
theories, enjoying the virtues of both. Its argument patterns can be applied to a wide variety of 
different agents (Dutch, South Korean, Sikh, Zoroastrian, etc.), yet it also manages to be quite 
holistic, giving rise to explanations which have wide counterfactual spreads.  
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However, Field’s view (personal communication) is that folk psychology is in fact 
indeterminate on both counts. Any everyday intentional explanation is indeterminate, both as to 
the extent of its counterfactual spread and as to its range of generalizability. And on Field’s view, 
the best way to explain this indeterminacy is to hold that everyday intentional “explanations” are 
second-class.50 Moreover, he thinks, no theory that employs only first-class explanations can 
achieve the balance between holistic-ness and wide applicability that folk psychology 
(misleadingly) appears to achieve; and likewise, no variety of first-class explanations can 
achieve the balance between wide counterfactual spread and wide generalizability that everyday 
intentional explanations (misleadingly) appear to achieve.  
 
2.4.2.4. First Response: Middle Ground and the Metaphysical Conception  
As an immediate reaction to the foregoing, it is worth making the following observations. 
On the metaphysical conception of communicative explanation, most of an explanation’s virtues 
derive from how well it serves as an accurate depiction of, or guide to, what ontically explains 
the explanandum. Some virtues, such as brevity, simplicity, and accessibility to non-specialists, 
might be exceptions; but all of these have obviously to do with ease of communication. Most 
other virtues, by contrast, do, on the metaphysical conception, owe themselves to the 
explanation’s being, in one way or another, tightly connected to what ontically explains its 
explanandum.  
This view about where explanations get their virtues affects the picture of second-class 
explanation that emerges under the metaphysical conception. In particular, on this conception, it 
is plausible that when a second-class explanation has a wide counterfactual spread, it owes this to 
                                                          
50 See (Stich 1983), and (Churchland 1981) for similar views.  
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the properties being attributed, those on which reference is fixed by the comparison to the 
explanation-giver. Similarly, on the metaphysical conception, it is plausible that if a second-class 
explanation is widely generalizable—that is, if the argument pattern(s) that it instantiates can be 
used to derive descriptions of many different agents—then it owes this wide generalizability to 
the properties being attributed. That, again, is because wide counterfactual spread and wide 
generalizability are virtues that have to do with informativeness and not merely with ease of 
communication.51  
However, given these consequences of the metaphysical conception, the fact that folk 
psychology appears to be both holistic and widely applicable should count as compelling 
evidence that there is some scientific theory that is both holistic and widely applicable in much 
the same ways, and whose explanations (non-second-class, non-indexical, context-insensitive 
ones, we are assuming,) have wide counterfactual spreads and ranges of applicability, 
comparable to those of everyday intentional explanations. Otherwise, the appearance that folk 
psychology and its explanations possess these virtues, and our ability to employ folk psychology, 
with great success, as though it possessed these virtues, would be quite mysterious. But now 
notice that if indeed there is a scientific theory as just described, then the door is opened for the 
claim that some of the explanantia of the explanations belonging to this theory reduce some 
intentional facts.  
All that said, however, if folk psychology really is indeterminate with respect to its 
degree of holism and range of applicability, and if no theory that trafficked in first-class 
                                                          
51 This is easier to see in the case of counterfactual spread than it is in the case of generalizability. I take it that an 
explanation’s degree of generalizability bears on its informativeness in that it bears on the degree to which the 
explanation is informative about other agents.  
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explanations would be similarly indeterminate,52 then it is doubtful that there can be a scientific 
theory that furnishes us with materials for reducing any intentional facts. So, we must carefully 
consider the plausibility of Field’s allegations of indeterminacy.  
 
2.4.2.5. Second Response: The Impression of Indeterminacy is Illusory 
When it comes to holism, I suspect that Field’s impression of indeterminacy is illusory. It 
is a misinterpretation of the fact that, taken by themselves, attributions of single beliefs are often 
insufficient to pin down exactly how the agent under consideration would react to a variety of 
alternative scenarios. This in turn stems from the fact that individual beliefs do not produce 
behaviors on their own, but rather in concert with other beliefs, desires, and traits of character. 
For the sake of simplicity, I left many of these factors implicit when discussing Field’s pilot 
example. For example, when I suggested that in hearing that the pilot has beliefs about her 
airspeed we also learn how she would react to certain radio announcements, I tacitly held fixed 
that the pilot wants to land the plane rather than crash. Obviously, a pilot who wanted to crash 
might react differently.  
However, I hasten to add that just because a belief’s role in the production of behavior is 
always mediated by various desires, traits of character, and other beliefs, it does not follow that a 
given belief can, if suitably supplemented by these other factors, give rise to any pattern of 
behavior whatsoever. For this reason, it does not follow that for any belief, attributing it can, if 
suitably supplemented by attribution of desires, traits of character, and other beliefs, serve to 
explain any behavior or capacity whatsoever. That was the point of my remarks at the end of 
Section 2.4.1; I will not repeat the argument here.  
                                                          
52 Field simply assumes the second conjunct of this if-clause. Its plausibility is worth examining, although there is 
no space to do so here. 
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More to the present point, just because the effects of beliefs on behavior are mediated by 
various other factors, it does not follow that it is indeterminate what information attributions of 
individual beliefs provide about a subject’s dispositions to react to a wide range of alternative 
scenarios. Surely there are patterns that govern how sets of beliefs, desires, and personality traits 
interact to produce behaviors; otherwise the attribution of beliefs, desires, and personality traits 
would not have survived. And the fact that a subject has a given single belief relates her to those 
patterns in a definite way. My working hypothesis that these patterns are describable as ceteris 
paribus generalizations provides a clear model of how this might go: any given belief will 
feature in the if-clauses of a wide variety of such generalizations, and so the attribution of a 
single belief allows us to apply any such generalization to the subject, conditional on the rest of 
the if-clause.  
Here it will help to compare a similar example. Rain is caused by the condensation of 
water in the upper atmosphere. This condensation is influenced by many different factors, 
including temperature, pressure, air currents, and levels of humidity, in accordance with patterns 
that are, I take it, enormously complex and not yet fully understood—hence our quite-imperfect 
ability to predict the weather. If one describes the temperature in a given location at a given time, 
that alone may not give one’s interlocutor enough information to explain why it would rain at 
that location under various counterfactual conditions which hold that temperature fixed. 
Nonetheless, however, the information that one provides does relate the case at hand to those 
patterns in a definite way: relative to the case at hand, it fixes the value of one of the variables 
that those generalizations relate to one another. This allows the interlocutor to make some 
inferences about what would happen in the scenarios described by those generalizations.  
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Now for concerns about indeterminacy in everyday intentional explanations’ degree of 
generalizability. A first point to be made here is that insofar as these concerns emanate from 
concerns about indeterminacy of counterfactual spread, there is no cause for concern. On this 
way of motivating the generalizability worry, if it is indeterminate what an explanation tells us 
about how the agent would react to various alternative circumstances, then it is therefore also 
indeterminate to what extent the argument pattern the explanation instantiates can be used to 
derive descriptions of other agents, who may have different dispositions. However, I have just 
been arguing at length against Field’s concerns about indeterminacy when it comes to the 
counterfactual spread of everyday intentional explanations. If those concerns are ill-founded, 
then they cannot generate any further concerns about range of applicability. All the same points 
can be put in terms of theories, holism, and range of applicability, rather than in terms of 
explanations, counterfactual spread, and generalizability.  
 Still, in practice it remains true that there are many agents to whom we are uncertain 
whether or not folk psychology can be applied. Some minimally-cognitive agents, such as cats, 
might be one example; another is cognitively-impaired humans, such as those who suffer 
significant amounts of dementia.53 In such cases, the skeptic can be expected to insist that the 
best explanation of our uncertainty is that there is no fact of the matter—indeterminacy—
whether or not folk psychology applies.  
In response, a fervent anti-skeptic could insist that all that is needed to resolve our 
uncertainty is to learn more about these agents; folk psychology as we know it is precise enough 
to give a definite verdict, once we know enough about those to whom we would apply it. 
However, when taken fully generally, this is an extreme position; it is plausible that for at least 
                                                          
53 See (Stich 1983) p.54-56 for exposition of a similar problem.  
 268 
 
some kinds of agents, we may have to make at least some modifications to the concepts and 
generalizations of folk psychology in order to have a definite verdict on whether or not it applies 
to agents of that kind. The issue, in that case, is whether these modifications would count as 
genuine theory change and replacement of our folk concepts, or simply a refinement of the 
existing theory and the existing concepts. (Though note that the changes would not increase the 
plausibility of (Elim) unless the new concepts were non-intentional.) This complicated issue 
remains to be resolved. There is no space to resolve it here; but I see no reason to assume in the 
meantime that it will be resolved as the skeptic hopes.  
 
2.4.2.6. Third Response: Other Intentional Properties 
Now that I have brought up the matter of intentional explanation outside of folk 
psychology, let me briefly mention a different line of response to Field’s claims about everyday 
intentional explanations. These explanations are a reasonable target for skeptics, since they are 
the most familiar and uncontroversial example of intentional explanations. Thus, the debate so 
far has centered around the possibility of first-class explanations that emulate everyday 
explanations, thereby having a claim to being intentional in fact if not in name. However, for all 
Field says, the facts described in type 2 psychological theories (holistic theories that are only 
narrowly applicable) might reduce some hitherto-unrecognized intentional facts. On this view, 
the unavailability of any scientific theory that is both holistic and widely applicable impugns 
only the intentional phenomena familiar from folk psychology, not all intentionality whatsoever; 
for it is only folk psychology that is required to be widely applicable.  
To see the point, recall the example of the ancient Greek who is able to keep herself safe 
in thunderstorms. Suppose that we try to explain this ability by saying that when there is a 
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thunderstorm where the Greek is located, she believes that it is thundering. As we saw, Field 
thinks that such a description might not be fully satisfactory.54 For example, taken by itself, it 
might fail to explain the Greek’s attempts to control the weather by offering sacrifices to (what 
she takes to be) the gods. For that purpose, it might be more useful to describe her as having the 
belief that Zeus is hurling thunderbolts, rather than as believing that it is thundering. In this way, 
the explanation that ascribes the belief that it is thundering might not apply to the ancient Greek 
in the way that it applies to 21st century Westerners; there might be facts about the Greek that it 
doesn’t explain, and in addition it might suggest things about the Greek that are only true of 21st 
century Westerners. To explain the Greek’s behaviors, the idea is, we would need a quite holistic 
theory that restricts itself to agents who are very similar to the Greek.  
Now as it happens, I think folk psychology does just fine in the case of the Greek. We 
can safely attribute the same content to both us and the ancient Greeks, as long as we posit lots of 
differences in collateral beliefs. For example, we both believe that it is thundering, but the 
ancient Greek also believes that Zeus is throwing thunderbolts, which we don’t believe. Given 
that behavior is generated by collections of beliefs (strung together by inference, prior to action, 
for example), it’s not surprising that members of the two groups behave differently, even though 
they share some of their beliefs.55  
However, assuming for the sake of argument that folk psychological intentional notions 
are less applicable to the Greek than they are for 21st century Westerners, there nonetheless does 
seem to be some sense in which the Greek’s mental state is about thunder, and also, for that 
matter, in some sense about Zeus. In that case, perhaps what we need is to posit intentional states 
of some other, hitherto-unrecognized kinds, instantiable not by both 21st century Westerners and 
                                                          
54 See (Field 2001), p.80-81. 
55 Thanks to Robert Rupert for bringing this point to my attention.  
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ancient Greeks, but only by ancient Greeks. The anti-skeptic’s suggestion would then be that the 
explanantia of a type 2 theory that applied to ancient Greeks would furnish the materials for a 
reduction of such states.  
Of course, what I have provided here is just speculation. It could also turn out not make 
much sense to associate any subject matter with the Greek’s states. The point is merely that until 
we have learned more about the explanantia in the holistic explanations that Field envisions 
(recall the second, highly detailed variety of first-class explanations described above), we need 
not conclude that they fail to reduce any intentional facts. At most what we can conclude is that 
they fail to reduce any intentional facts of the sorts that are familiar from everyday life. Given a 
metaphysical conception of explanation, Field’s picture leaves open that intentionality has a role 
to play, in fact if not in name.  
 
2.5. Concluding Remarks on Field 
My discussion of Field’s argument has three general lessons. The first is that if one 
succeeds in identifying some non-intentional facts that explain what appeal to some intentional 
facts is supposed to explain, then it is open to the friend of intentionality to claim that the former 
facts reduce the latter facts. If correct, that would provide intentional facts with an explanatory 
role after all, given a metaphysical conception of explanation.56 As I emphasized in the 
introduction and as the dialectic of this section illustrates, this train of thought yields a distinctive 
approach to reducing intentional facts: to figure out what goes in one’s reduction, try to identify 
some non-intentional facts that (ontically) explain what the intentional facts in question are 
supposed to explain, and in just as effective a way. As one refines one’s proposed non-
                                                          
56 In fact, I owe this insight to Field himself, who recognizes it throughout his work. See again (Field 1986) p.84 
bottom paragraph, (Field 1994) the paragraph straddling p.254 and p.255, and (Field 2001) pp.153-155.  
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intentional explanations, their explanantia provide the materials for increasingly plausible 
reduction proposals. A second lesson is that skeptics who endorse a metaphysical conception of 
explanation should be prepared to address this approach to reducing intentional facts; to make 
their strongest case, skeptics should address accounts of intentional facts that are developed with 
an eye toward their (purported) explanatory role. Most importantly, the final lesson is that if a 
skeptic is to replace our everyday intentional explanations with ones that replicate all of their 
virtues except brevity, simplicity, and accessibility in everyday life, then she must take care to 
replicate their characteristic counterfactual spread.57 This point has obvious implications for 
attempts to reduce intentional facts of the sorts we posit in everyday life: the reduction base must 
be such as to give rise to this counterfactual spread.  
Clearly, the metaphysical conception of explanation played a highly significant role in 
this debate. It motivated the idea that non-intentional explanations can serve as a source of 
materials for attempts to reduce intentionality, thus enabling the anti-skeptic to raise the concern 
that intentionality was being invoked in fact if not in name.58 By contrast, in the next section we 
will see that these moves are unavailable against the backdrop of an epistemic conception of 
explanation. Indeed, that conception changes the dialectic on both sides.  
 
3. Dynamical Approaches to Cognition  
3.1. Background 
                                                          
57 Of course, a skeptic could simply insist that there are virtues other than counterfactual spread which are more 
important in science, and for the sake of which it is acceptable to sacrifice counterfactual spread. My point here 
applies only to skeptics who are interested in retaining the informativeness of everyday intentional explanations. I 
leave it to scientists to decide how important such informativeness is in their fields.  
58 See above, top p.12, bottom p.17, top p.25. 
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Implicit in many of the skeptical arguments in the last section is the idea that 
intentionality is not ontologically respectable, and that an accurate description of the structures 
and causes that give rise to behavior will always yield better explanations. However, there is 
some empirical evidence against the second of these two claims.59 In practice, an explanation 
that is highly simplified or idealized can often provide a better counterfactual spread than an 
explanation that more accurately describes the causes of the system’s behaviors. Thus, even 
theorists who take intentionality to be ontologically disreputable can resist the conclusion that 
non-intentional explanations will therefore be guaranteed to have wider counterfactual spreads 
than intentional ones. What is more, a realist about intentionality can maintain that while 
intentionality is ontologically respectable, but that the explanatory virtues of intentional 
discourse do not depend on its being so; and so, it is for some other reason that many intentional 
explanations have distinctive, wide counterfactual spreads. Both the realist and the anti-realist 
positions just described abandon the metaphysical conception of explanation, since they abandon 
the idea that the quality of an explanation depends on the nature of the phenomena it describes.  
All that said, in principle, intentional explanation can be attacked from the standpoint of 
the epistemic conception of explanation, as well as the metaphysical conception. Although I 
know of no such attacks, advocates of the dynamical systems theory approach to cognition seem 
                                                          
59 See, for example, (Batterman 2001), (Batterman 2002), and (Rice 2013). One can make a similar point about 
Field’s tweaked intentional explanations. Even if it is possible to tweak any intentional explanation to get it to 
explain all of a subject’s counterfactual behaviors, this will invariably have to be done after these behaviors are 
already known. To see the point, consider again Field’s aberrant belief-attribution in the pilot case. One doesn’t 
know how to tweak the delusion until one knows how a sane pilot would react to radio announcements. By contrast, 
our everyday attributions of intentional properties can be made in advance of observing the behaviors that would 
arise in alternative scenarios, giving these attributions predictive power. This speaks in favor of our everyday 
attributions of intentional properties, and against aberrant stories like Field’s: of the two, only the everyday 
attribution gives predictive power to our explanations. I mention this point here rather than in the previous section 
because it has to do with the virtues of an explanation’s descriptions rather than the nature of the entities it describes, 
and so only someone with the epistemic conception of explanation need be moved by it. Field, recall, works under 
the metaphysical conception.  
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a likely potential source. The working hypothesis of the dynamical approach is that cognitive 
capacities are properly explained by appealing to appropriate sets of differential equations, 
typically equations that describe interactions between parts of the brain and its external 
environment.60 Some authors take this idea to conflict with views of the mind as a 
representational or information-processing system.61 More precisely, mental representations are 
causally effective items internal to the agent that represent objects, relations, or situations in the 
environment, and so act as intermediaries between the agent and the external world. Dynamicists 
resist the idea that cognition consists in the manipulation of mental representations; rather, they 
take cognition to emerge from direct, dynamic interactions between processes in the brain, parts 
of the body, and the external world.  
The reason the dynamicist perspective easily lends itself to (Elim) is that some of the 
most obvious and familiar candidates for bearers of intentionality, such as beliefs and desires, are 
most straightforwardly understood as mental representations. However, it is worth noting that the 
dynamical approach to understanding cognition is not ipso facto committed to (Elim), even when 
it comes to propositional representation (though it is committed to eschewing talk of 
propositional representations). For example, one might deny that believing something amounts to 
tokening an internal, causally effective state, and instead hold that it amounts to bearing a certain 
relation something in the external world, in virtue of engaging in various dynamic interactions 
with it. All that said, as of now, dynamicists have characterized their explanantia in non-
                                                          
60 This approach is advocated and developed in (Thelen & Smith 1994), (Van Gelder & Port 1995), (Port 2003), 
(Kelso 1995), (Chemero 2009), (Silberstein & Chemero 2011), and (Riley, Shockley & Van Orden 2011). 
61 See (Thelen & Smith 1994), (Van Gelder & Port 1995), (Kelso 1995), (Chemero and Silberstein 2008a), 
(Chemero and Silberstein 2008b), and (Chemero 2009). 
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intentional terms, in addition to avoiding mention of mental representations. For this reason, it is 
worth pointing out the phenomena that their research has yet to explain.  
Dynamical theorists often leave open or even explicitly concede that many of their 
explanantia can be accurately characterized in terms of mental representations.62 However, what 
they emphasize is that even if these descriptions are accurate, they contribute nothing to the 
explanations in which they figure. Rather, the best (communicative) psychological explanations 
are to be framed without any mention of mental representations. And one can easily imagine 
someone making a similar claim about intentional characterizations. This sort of position is most 
congenial to the epistemic conception of explanation, since it emphasizes the language in which 
explanations are framed rather than the nature of the entities they describe. Accordingly, even if 
an explanation’s explanantia are in fact intentional, it can count as a non-intentional explanation 
as long as the explanantia are not characterized in intentional terms.  
In fact, there are further reasons why the dynamical approach to cognition fits especially 
well with an epistemic conception of explanation. Dynamicists do not operate by describing in 
detail the mechanisms that physically produce the explanandum, though their accounts can be 
supplemented with such descriptions. Rather, these scientists model various aspects of cognitive 
systems with equations that relate some posited, coarsely described mechanisms to various other, 
further mechanisms, or to various elements in the systems’ environments, and thereby shed light 
on some of the systems’ behaviors. (See below for an example.) These equations are particularly 
useful for making predictions; they show exactly how some features of the system will change, 
given that others change in specified ways. Thus, dynamicists who take themselves to be 
providing complete explanations need to hold that modeling a system by a set of equations can 
                                                          
62 See (Van Gelder and Port 1995) p.2 and (Chemero 2009) pp.67-68.  
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count as explaining the system’s behaviors, as long as it enables one to make a suitable variety of 
accurate predictions about those behaviors. In particular, they need to hold that presenting such a 
model can count as giving a complete explanation, even if the model is not supplemented with 
descriptions of the mechanisms that actually produce the behavior. It is worth noting that this 
claim is highly controversial, even when restricted to cognitive science rather than taken as a 
general thesis about explanation.63 However, properly disputing it is beyond the scope of this 
paper, so in this section I will grant it for the sake of argument.64  
Overall, I will have two points to make against dynamicism as a route to (Elim). Firstly, 
so far, dynamical systems theorists have only shown that some kinds of behaviors and capacities 
can be explained without invoking representations, not that all of them can. To justify (Elim), 
dynamical systems theorists would have to give us reason to think they will someday be able to 
give dynamical, non-intentional explanations of the things that we paradigmatically explain by 
invoking intentionality. While these scientists have shown intentional explanation to be 
unnecessary in a surprising variety of cases, a large gap remains between the explananda in these 
cases and the explananda for which we paradigmatically invoke intentionality. Secondly, 
although dynamical explanations allow one to make more precise predictions than everyday 
intentional ones do, so far, the range of these predictions is significantly narrower: the 
predictions only describe the ways that the parameters that feature in the equations can influence 
one another, and not how they can be influenced by yet further phenomena. This point is highly 
                                                          
63 See (Kaplan and Craver 2011) for some compelling objections, and (Chemero 2009) for some responses.  
64 (Hochstein 2012) is friendly to an epistemic, prediction-based conception of explanation, and uses it as a platform 
for touting the virtues of intentional explanations. However, unlike my main claims in this section, his do not 
obviously conflict with (Elim). Hochstein emphasizes that intentional explanations are “ideal for situations where 
statistical and dynamical models are unavailable and/or uninformative. Intentional models allow us to make 
predictions without having to quantify over features of the system that we may not know how to measure” (p.553). 
This claim is compatible with intentional explanations being gainfully eliminated as soon as the domain of statistical 
and dynamical models is sufficiently extended.  
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reminiscent of one of my criticisms of Field from Section 2.4: unless dynamical theorists can 
produce explanations that are as modally informative as everyday intentional ones, they will not 
have justified the elimination of the latter. A pair of explanations will help to bring out these 
points.  
 
3.2. Syllable Placement vs. Political Decisions 
Human speech tends to take on regular, periodic patterns, giving every episode of speech 
something that (Port 2003) calls a basic period. What is more, the stressed phonemes within 
words tend to occur at certain regular intervals within the basic period of an episode of speech, 
especially halves and thirds of the basic period (p.599). The task of (Port 2003) is to explain this 
fact. Port suggests that there are neural oscillations that take place during speech. According to 
Port, the oscillations attract our attention to the half and third intervals, and also influence the 
motor system to produce the stressed syllables at these times. Port models the interaction of the 
neural oscillation with our attention and motor system with a differential equation.  
Challenging Port’s widely celebrated results is well beyond the scope of this essay as 
well as my level of expertise. It is also unnecessary for the point I want to make. Suppose Port 
does a perfectly good job of explaining why we tend to place our stressed syllables on the halves 
and thirds of our speech periods. The question for us now is, does that support (Elim)? Perhaps 
some fans of intentionality might have hoped to explain our speech regularities by suggesting 
that we have some internal items that represent the half and third intervals of our speech periods, 
and that these items are causally efficacious in guiding the placement of our stressed syllables. 
That would be an intentional explanation, since it involves saying that these items represent—are 
about—these intervals. However, assuming that Port’s explanation is a good one that strategy is 
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now closed off. Importantly, though, one must avoid getting carried away. The explanandum 
here is one out of very many for which we might hope to invoke intentionality, and not a 
paradigmatic one at that. It is not at all clear that the general unsuitability of intentional 
explanations for cognitive science can be extrapolated from this case. (To be fair to Port, that is 
not what he is out to do in the paper.)  
The point is especially easy to see when we return our attention to everyday 
psychological explanations. The kinds of explananda for which we typically invoke familiar 
intentional phenomena like beliefs differ in innumerable ways from the speech patterns that Port 
considers. Furthermore, nothing in Port’s paper rules out that the practitioners of a mature 
cognitive science will explain these explananda by invoking intentionality, either in its familiar 
varieties or in some hitherto unknown ones. For example, consider the following paradigmatic 
intentional explanation and hotly disputed piece of political analysis:65  
(Background)  
Throughout his career in Israeli politics, Ariel Sharon had solid  
right wing credentials. At several points in his career, he  
vociferously opposed the idea of Israel’s withdrawing its military  
and civilian establishment from any of the territories Israel  
acquired in 1967, including the Gaza Strip. Yet as Prime Minister  
of Israel in 2005, Sharon orchestrated a withdrawal from the Gaza  
Strip, removing Israeli forces and evacuating the Israeli settlements  
there. This fact cries out for explanation: why did he do it? 
 
 
(One Explanation) 
 
Sharon’s decision was caused by his (correct) belief of the following things:  
 
1. Many Palestinians would credit Hamas, an Islamist militant group, with 
bringing about Israel’s withdrawal.  
2. That would increase popular support for Hamas.  
                                                          
65 Ross Brann advocated something like this in his Fall 2015 course on the subject. The explanation is also described 
in (Tessler 2009).  
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3. The ascendancy of militants following a Gaza withdrawal would give 
Israel’s government a persuasive argument for refusing to withdraw from 
any more territory.66,67  
 
For our purposes here, it does not matter whether or not (One Explanation) is correct.68 Whether 
or not it is, whoever endorses it is attempting to explain why Sharon orchestrated the withdrawal 
by saying something about what he believed—that is, by giving an (everyday) intentional 
explanation.  
It is worth noticing that behaviors like Sharon’s are of central interest in subjects like 
ethics, political theory, and historical analysis. They are not irrelevant outliers that scholars in 
these disciplines can afford to ignore. Cognitive science must eventually address behaviors of 
these kinds, if it has any hope of contributing positively to the foundations of such disciplines, 
which occupy themselves with behaviors that we pre-theoretically judge to be paradigmatically 
cognitive. It is therefore significant that the explanandum in Port’s experiment is very different 
from the one in the Sharon case. An especially obvious difference is that placement of stressed 
syllables and complex political decisions are no doubt produced by cognitive processes of 
radically different kinds. For example, it is quite plausible that the production of these two 
different kinds of behavior requires significantly different amounts of conscious control. Now, 
Port holds that placement of stressed syllables is susceptible to some amount of conscious 
control; but that still allows that it is generally accomplished in a comparatively unconscious and 
                                                          
66 According to this reason, Israeli territorial withdrawals simply serve to strengthen the hand of the Palestinian 
militants who threaten Israel’s security. Therefore, one cannot reasonably ask Israel to cede any more territory than 
it already has, especially not tactically significant territory like the West Bank.  
67 Whether or not Sharon anticipated (1)-(3), these propositions accurately describe what took place following the 
withdrawal.  
68 While Sharon may have anticipated (1)-(3), for my own part I find it implausible that this was his primary 
motivation in effecting the withdrawal. As an alternative explanation, commentators have held variously that Sharon 
was caving to the financial and logistical difficulty of protecting the Israeli settlements in Gaza, that he was 
attempting to relieve the great international pressure on Israel to offer something to the Palestinians, and that he had 
genuinely come to believe that any lasting peace would require significant territorial concessions on Israel’s part.  
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automatic way, as introspection strongly suggests. By contrast, the process that led to Sharon’s 
decision undoubtedly involved much painstaking, conscious deliberation; that man in particular 
was known for his elaborate strategizing. At any rate, whatever exactly the difference between 
these behaviors consists in, that they are quite different is obvious and surely something Port 
would grant. So, for all that the case of stressed syllable placement shows, there is room for 
cognitive scientists to invoke intentionality in order to explain things like Sharon’s political 
behavior.  
3.3. A Dynamicist Response 
Although I have not seen it raised in connection with political examples, this sort of 
objection is not new. (Chemero 2009) anticipates a similar point, which he attributes to (Clark 
and Toribio 1994): 
Much work in radical embodied cognitive science explores what is often called minimally 
cognitive behavior, such as categorical perception, coordination, locomotion, and the 
like….The focus on minimally cognitive behavior is also necessary…given the current 
state of analytical and computational tools available. (I would be remiss if I didn’t point 
out, though, that these tools get better every day.) What cognitive science needs, so the 
objection goes, is an approach that can explain real cognition, and for this you need 
representations. To my knowledge, the first version of this kind of response to radical 
embodied cognitive science is by Clark and Toribio (1994)….They wonder 
whether…radical embodied cognitive science…can ever account for what they call 
representation-hungry cognitive tasks. There are certain tasks, Clark and Toribio claim, 
that simply cannot be accomplished without representations. How, for example, could 
one think about temporally and spatially distant objects and events without mental 
representations of them?  
 
One response that Chemero identifies is essentially what I have been recommending in response 
to Port’s example:  
[A]gree that nonrepresentational analyses may be appropriate for what Brooks (1991) 
calls “the bulkiest parts of intelligent systems,” but [insist] that more advanced 
cognition—thinking about the past, the future, the distant environment—requires internal 
[what I have called mental] representation and computation. [Such a] 
compromise…seems to some to find support in evidence about the brain69….One could, 
                                                          
69 Here Chemero cites (Milner and Goodale 1995) and (Norman 2002).  
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of course, accept this and resign radical embodied cognitive science to vision for action, 
using computational approaches for “real” representation-hungry cognition. (pp.38-39) 
 
However, that is not the response that Chemero himself recommends. “Another, less defeatist 
possibility,” he writes, “is to use empirical work to show that radical embodied cognitive science 
has the resources to explain representation-hungry tasks” (p.40). Chemero describes a study in 
(Van Rooij, Bongers, and Haselager 2002), in which agents are presented with a series of sticks 
varying in length, and asked whether they could use the sticks to move a distant object. The 
authors present an equation that, they hypothesize, describes the agents’ responses in terms of the 
distance of the object and a parameter k, which is determined by “the length of a rod on a 
particular trial, the rod length on previous trials, and the agent’s response on previous trials” 
(p.41). The task is representation-hungry because  
the subjects are asked to predict the outcome of an imagined action, one that hasn’t yet 
happened and so is not perceivable….It would seem to require a comparison of a judged 
distance with a judged combined stick-plus-arm length. Indeed, some would argue that 
judging the distance of the to-be-poked object also requires a mental comparison of the 
expected size of the object with its apparent size. (p.40)  
 
Yet, Chemero insists, “the model accurately accounts for the imagination of the action without 
calling upon mental representations of the action” (p.42). The authors were able to use the 
equation to predict a number of things about the agents’ responses, predictions which were then 
confirmed when the experiment was performed.70  
I have two points to make about this example. I grant that the task in (Van Rooij et al 
2002) is a representation-hungry one. Moreover, Chemero emphasizes that it is a conscious task, 
since it requires agents to “report on their imagination” of something that has not happened 
(p.42). In that respect, it is arguably closer to Sharon’s political behavior than placement of 
stressed syllables in the speech period is. However, the stick task is still far less sophisticated 
                                                          
70 See pp.41-42 for some of these predictions.  
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than the kinds of behaviors that we saw in the Sharon example. Sharon’s decision involved 
making educated guesses about the interaction of comparatively quite abstract social and 
political forces, not just his own possible bodily movements.  
Chemero implicitly recognizes the limited scope of the extant dynamical explanations 
when he writes, “it is still an open question how far beyond minimally cognitive behaviors 
radical embodied cognitive science can get. We will have to wait and see.” Indeed, we will. But 
in the meantime, there is the issue of which working hypotheses we are justified in adopting, and 
here skeptics must take care not get ahead of themselves. While it is illuminating to attempt to do 
without intentionality as far as one can, and while scientists should surely continue to produce 
studies like (Van Rooij et al 2002), so far, no such studies have gone so far as to explain 
behaviors like Sharon’s, which are not merely representation-hungry but paradigm candidates for 
intentional explanation. I conclude that no such studies have gone far enough to justify (Elim). 
(In principle one can make a similar point about (Churchland 2012)’s explanations. Due to space 
limitations, I won’t try to develop that point here.) 
My second point is that even if we assume that facilitating useful predictions can be 
sufficient to make something an explanation, there are important kinds of predictions that Van 
Rooij et al’s equation by itself cannot be used to make. What would happen, for example, if the 
agent were told, “Now put down the sticks and leave the room”? Simply saying that the agent’s 
answers conform to the equation in a given context does not account for the ways that 
conformance to the equation is mediated by other facts about the agent, such as her belief that 
she is looking at sticks. We saw a similar point in connection with Field’s pilot case: folk 
psychological explanations situate the behaviors being or capacities explained in a broader 
network of other cognitive states, behaviors, and facts about the external environment; and like 
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(Behavioral Effects) and (Relation to Airspeeds), by itself Van Rooij et al’s explanation does not 
do this.  
Now to be fair, what Van Rooij et al purport to be offering is a scientific explanation, not 
an everyday one, and it might be that all extant scientific intentional explanations that could 
compete with the dynamical one would likewise fail to be informative in the same ways as 
everyday ones. My point is only that because people’s behaviors are systematically linked to one 
another in ways we ordinarily take to be mediated by their beliefs, any science of behavior that 
aspires to provide explanations that are informative in all the same ways as everyday ones will 
inevitably need to account for these links somehow or other. Perhaps that can be done by 
appealing to yet further differential equations, but it has not yet been done. Until more is said to 
show that this can be done, we are not forced to give up on the idea that intentional descriptions 
of our explanantia play a distinctive, ineliminable role in psychological explanation.  
 
4. Intentionality in the Explanandum  
4.1. Explanantia and the Nature of Psychological Explanation 
In Section 2 and to some extent Section 3, I emphasized the distinctive qualities of 
explanations that appeal to familiar intentional phenomena, such as beliefs and desires. But in 
contemporary cognitive science, we also find many less familiar explanantia that are intentional, 
or at least that are standardly characterized in intentional terms. For example, computational 
approaches model cognition as the manipulation of internal representations, which represent 
various entities or aspects of the subject’s external environment.71 E.g., perception of an external 
object might consist of interactions between elements in the visual system that represent the 
                                                          
71 See, for example, (Marr 2010). 
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object’s edges. Likewise, connectionist approaches model cognition as the disciplined transition 
between states of neural activation, where these states are conceived of as representing various 
aspects of reality that are relevant to the capacity being explained.72 In both cases, cognitive 
capacities that are intentionally characterized to begin with, such as the capacity to multiply 
numbers, the capacity to perceive the distances of external objects, or the capacity to recognize 
human faces, are then also explained in intentional terms.  
On one plausible, prominent conception of psychology, this appeal to intentionality in the 
explanantia is an inevitable consequence of the widespread characterization of explananda in 
intentional terms. On this conception, the business of psychology is to explain cognitive 
capacities by breaking them down into their components and then showing how these 
components are realized in physical systems.73 But so long as intentionality proves to be difficult 
to reduce, some of the components are bound to be intentionally characterized; otherwise, the 
explanans will be expressed in a vocabulary that is un-relatable to the explanandum in any clear 
way.74 It follows, then, that wherever the capacities being explained are intentionally 
characterized, so too will be some of the explanantia.  
Still, one might think, if intentionality in the explanantia arises from intentionality in the 
explananda, then that simply gives us another reason to ask whether intentionality can be excised 
from the explananda. I will now address this question, arguing that there are important reasons to 
think it cannot be excised.  
                                                          
72 For example, see (Churchland 2012), who describes tokenings of activation states as being analogous to indexings 
of a map—that is, to acts of pointing to a particular spot and saying ‘we are here’.  
73 (Cummins 2000) observes that despite the lip-service frequently paid to the Deductive-Nomological account of 
explanation, “actual theory building and explanation” in psychology “takes place in frameworks…not designed for 
the elaboration of laws but rather…for the elaboration of functional analyses” (p.137). To explain a capacity by 
giving a functional analysis is to break down the capacity into sub-capacities, the organized manifestation of which 
constitutes manifestation of the capacity being explained. 
74 See (Egan 1995) p.189 for similar remarks.  
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4.2. Under the Metaphysical Conception of Explanation  
At the beginning, I defined psychological explanations to be explanations of people’s and 
sophisticated animals’ behaviors and cognitive capacities. As (Burge 2010) forcefully 
emphasizes throughout, in actual practice many of the capacities that cognitive psychologists try 
to explain receive intentional descriptions, and indeed strongly appear to be themselves 
intentional. For example, a celebrated explanandum in perceptual psychology is two-eyed 
organisms’ capacity to estimate the distances of objects in their environments using the 
disparities in the images received from their two retinas. But on this standard characterization the 
capacity is clearly intentional: any act of estimating the distance of a perceived object has that 
distance as its subject matter. On the metaphysical conception of explanation, those who think 
intentionality can be eliminated from the explananda of scientific psychology must make the 
obviously false claim that many of our standard characterizations of our explananda, including 
the one just given, are false: these explananda are in fact non-intentional.  
In fact, given a metaphysical conception of explanation and a reasonable conception of 
perceptual psychology, the inevitable presence of intentional explananda in the latter can be seen 
from the armchair. As explained at the beginning (see footnote 3), perception necessarily has a 
subject matter—viz., the things that are perceived and the ways they are perceived as being—and 
is therefore intentional. If the business of perceptual psychology is to explain how agents manage 
to perceive things, then the explananda of perceptual psychology are bound to be things that are 
intentional, regardless of how they are described. That makes the explanations intentional too, 
given a metaphysical conception of explanation and the explananda-inclusive reading of 
‘intentional explanation’.  
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This argument applies whether one is doing mainstream perceptual psychology or 
ecological psychology (see (Gibson 1966) and (Gibson 1967)). This is an important point to 
emphasize, since many dynamical systems theorists are committed to some version of ecological 
psychology.75 The difference is that while in standard psychology the objects of perception are 
familiar things like rocks, chairs, and colors, in ecological psychology they are affordances—
environmental opportunities for behavior. But that is quite irrelevant to the anti-skeptical point I 
am making here. Whether perception is of familiar things or of affordances, there is something it 
is of; and thus, it has a subject matter, and so is intentional in my sense of the term. (Ecological 
psychologists who adopt the epistemic conception of explanation have a response to this, which 
I’ll criticize in the next subsection.)  
The observations I have been making apply also to (Churchland 2012), which envisions a 
psychology that assigns no role to propositional representation.76 Rather, on Churchland’s view, 
one can explain many of our cognitive capacities by positing certain non-propositional 
representations. These representations are map-like, in the sense that they represent features of 
the external world by being homomorphic to them. However, as I’ll now explain, there is a risk 
that Churchland’s explanation of how his map-like representations manage to represent will in 
turn furnish an explanation of one form of propositional representation.  
To see the point, notice that in general there are aspects of the content of any map that 
can be specified by that-phrases. For example, a map of the United States can (incorrectly) 
represent that Washington, D.C. is situated directly on a coast. (In fact, D.C. sits somewhat 
inland, on a river.) Thus, even if the content of the map as a whole cannot be specified by a 
single that-phrase, some aspects of its content can be specified in this way; one need only fix on 
                                                          
75 For another example, see (Turvey and Shaw 1979).  
76 See p.4, 24, and 49 for some representative passages.  
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specific features that are being represented, such as the location of Washington, D.C. The point 
is, once we have allowed that the map is a map of the United States that contains a representation 
of Washington, D.C., we have sufficient materials to explain what it is for the map to represent 
Washington, D.C. as being situated directly on a coast; and the claim that D.C. is located on a 
coast is propositional.  
Moreover, on the metaphysical conception of communicative explanation, Churchland’s 
picture arguably gives propositional representation a role as an explanans as well. For it is 
plausible that if an item’s being a map of the U.S. can serve as an explanans, then its 
propositional features, such as representing that D.C. is situated on a coast, can also serve as 
explanantia. (For instance, that could explain why map users who take routes through D.C. 
systematically fail to arrive at the beach.) Churchland’s mental representations, being map-like, 
are no exception in this regard; see pp.38-45 and p.85 for some examples.77 If, as Churchland 
grants, his representations succeed in representing various objects, then it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that they also succeed in representing these objects as having various properties and 
as standing in various relations to one another. And if non-propositional representation by map-
like entities serves as an explanans in psychology as Churchland conceives of it, then it is hard to 
avoid the conclusion that the associated propositional representation serves as an explanans as 
well.  
                                                          
77 One can make the same point again when it comes to momentary indexings of maps. When your companion 
points to a spot on the map in order to indicate where you are, she thereby commits to any number of propositions: 
e.g., that you are south of Oregon, west of the Mississippi, etc. To see why this act of pointing involves 
propositional commitments, consider that it would make sense to accuse your companion of communicating 
something false, based on her act of pointing. Similar things can be said about indexings of Churchland’s map-like 
representations. For Churchland, undergoing certain kinds of momentary neural activation can amount to 
representing an object as instancing a particular combination of properties—thus placing the object at a particular 
location in the space of properties that the map represents. But then such momentary activations have propositional 
content: namely, that the object in question has the properties associated with that point in the property space. See 
his p.4 for an example.  
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4.3. Under the Epistemic Conception of Explanation  
I just discussed skeptics who adopt the metaphysical conception of explanation. I will 
now consider the fate of skepticism about intentionality in the explanandum under the epistemic 
conception. An immediate observation is that prima facie, the epistemic conception renders the 
intentional nature of many of psychology’s explananda irrelevant to the debate. For on the 
epistemic conception, the skeptic’s claim does not concern the nature of the entities explained, 
but rather the descriptions employed in the explanations. Her characteristic thesis is that 
intentional description of these explananda contributes nothing to the explanation, and so can be 
profitably jettisoned in favor of non-intentional characterizations. For example, such a skeptic 
would hold that in perceptual psychology, the standard explanations of how agents manage to 
perceive the distances of objects in their environments can be profitably rephrased so that the 
explananda are described in non-intentional terms. Perhaps, for instance, she would take the 
proper explananda simply to be the patterns of behavior typically associated agents’ perceptions 
of the distances of objects in the environment, rather than these perceptions themselves.78  
The suggestion just fielded highlights a concern about the skeptical claim on offer: the 
skeptic would not only have psychologists modify the ways that they describe their explananda, 
she would have them explain different phenomena altogether. In the example just given, the 
standard, intentional explanation was of how agents perceive the distances of external objects. 
By contrast, the non-intentional explanation is of something else: certain patterns of behavior 
typically associated with such perceptions. I proposed the latter because I was unable to concoct 
a non-intentional description of the original explanandum. Now, if everything intentional can be 
                                                          
78 This view is methodological behaviorism. Although it has fallen out of favor, from the late 1910s to the 1950s it 
was a very popular conception of the ideal towards which scientific psychology should strive.  
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fully described in non-intentional terms, then my failure was simply due to lack of ingenuity. In 
that case the skeptic can simply claim that standard explanations of how agents judge object 
distances should instead describe that explanandum—the very same one—in non-intentional 
terms.  
However, my failure to come up with a non-intentional description of perceiving the 
distances of external objects may well not have been an accident. Many philosophers suspect 
that nothing intentional is reducible to anything non-intentional; and if that is the case then 
nothing intentional can be fully (correctly) described in non-intentional terms. Thus, in the many 
cases in psychology in which the explanandum at hand is described in intentional terms, the 
move to non-intentional description will render the explanation an explanation of something else. 
Therefore, insisting on non-intentional descriptions across the discipline amounts to changing the 
subjects of much of psychology. Of course, a skeptic could simply insist that this change is all 
for the good, since the non-intentional explananda are what psychologists should have been 
explaining all along. But one might reasonably be suspicious of such a radical, sweeping claim.  
Another concern is that an insistence on non-intentional characterization of the 
explananda in psychology would hinder psychology’s ability to contribute to other disciplines. 
To see why, note that a virtue we might reasonably ask of a scientific psychology is that some of 
its explanations shed light on disciplines such as epistemology, ethics, political theory, historical 
analysis, and sociology by explaining the cognitive phenomena in which these disciplines traffic. 
But the applicability of a non-intentional psychology to these disciplines is unclear, given their 
wholesale reliance on intentional talk. For example, given that we explain why politicians do 
what they do by saying what they believe, prima facie what historians and political theorists need 
from a purportedly more fundamental discipline like cognitive psychology is an explanation of 
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belief. It is not obvious that these scholars would be equally well served by an explanation of 
some other, non-intentional phenomenon. Likewise, in many disciplines the definitions of central 
concepts are given in intentional terms. E.g., in epistemology many philosophers have tried to 
understand epistemic justification in terms of “virtuous” processes of belief formation, and in 
turn to understand rationality in terms of such processes, together with the logical coherence of 
one’s beliefs.79 And even philosophers who do not want to understand these fundamental notions 
in terms of beliefs do understand them in an intentional way, in terms of non-propositional 
representations.80 On first blush, at least, it is hard to see how rationality and epistemic 
justification could be understood in entirely non-intentional terms.  
All that said, there may well be ways for a non-intentional psychology to shed light on 
other subjects that are currently saturated with intentionality. One rather modest way would be 
by formulating generalizations that relate psychology’s non-intentionally-described explananda 
to the intentionally described explanantia of other disciplines. Due to the inclusion of intentional 
terms, a skeptic could not regard such generalizations as being themselves proper explananda of 
psychology. But nonetheless, once these generalizations are on the table, scholars in other 
disciplines might find some of them useful as working hypotheses. For example, one might 
assume as a working hypothesis that people who undergo certain non-intentionally described 
processes, these being explained by psychology, tend to believe that social justice will never be 
achieved in the country in which they live. If the non-intentionally described processes had clear, 
readily-identifiable causes, then the above generalization (if true) could provide sociologists with 
a useful means of predicting the behaviors associated with despair in social justice movements.  
                                                          
79 See (Sosa 1985), (Zagebski 1997), and (McDowell 1994). 
80 See (Churchland 2001). 
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The skeptical line just discussed allows for intentional talk in other disciplines. But a 
different, more radical project would be to insist on the non-intentional reformulation of 
discourse in other disciplines outside psychology. Whatever the prospects of this project turn out 
to be, it is worth noticing just how radical the project is. It promises a sweeping reform of the 
central concepts of many different disciplines, wherever these concepts are standardly defined in 
intentional terms. E.g., in epistemology, the central notion of a justified belief would have to be 
replaced. Moreover, since many of these disciplines characterize their explanantia in intentional 
terms, the view under consideration would have to insist on replacing these characterizations. 
This project is thus much more ambitious than the one with which we initially began; the latter 
only proposed to eliminate intentional characterization of explananda, and that only in 
psychology.  
So far, my anti-skeptical remarks in this section have been rather tentative and 
cautionary. However, skeptics who embrace ecological psychology, it is possible to raise a more 
biting criticism. Ecological psychology (recall Section 4.2) claims that perception is not of 
external objects, but rather of affordances, environmental opportunities for behavior. Ecological 
psychology is meant to serve as a guide to discovery: a working hypothesis that helps scientists 
to predict new phenomena and generate new experiments.81 These are precisely the sorts of 
virtues that skeptics who embrace an epistemic conception of explanation deny of intentional 
characterizations when they accept (Elim). But then these skeptics must also deny that ecological 
psychology’s characterization of perception has these virtues. That is because, as we saw in 
Section 4.2, ecological psychology describes perception as having a subject matter (viz., 
affordances).  
                                                          
81 See (Chemero 2009) p.85 for this definition. And see (Chemero 2009) chapter 5, and (Turvey, Shaw, and Mace 
1981) for endorsement of ecological psychology as a guide to discovery.  
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Given that it conflicts with a central presupposition of her approach—viz., that one can 
gainfully characterize perception as being of affordances—saddling an ecological psychologist 
with (Elim) might seem uncharitable. In fact, this observation leads us to an important point. 
Although this can be obscured by their sometimes-radical pronouncements against familiar 
varieties of intentionality, the most charitable conception of dynamical systems theorists is not 
that they are attempting to excise intentionality from cognitive psychology. Rather, it is that for 
them, intentional phenomena, even explicitly so-characterized, serve as central explananda. It is 
just that they regard intentionality as a property of agents which emerges from their dynamic 
interactions with their environments—that is, interactions that can be described by sets of 
coupled82 differential equations—rather than as a feature of some objects or states that serve as 
intermediaries between the agent and the external world.83 This process-focused conception of 
intentionality is evidenced in many places. For example, the slogan “perception is of 
affordances” speaks of perception, an activity, rather than, say, of perceptual states. Still the 
description is quite obviously intentional, as I have emphasized throughout, since in being of 
affordances, perception is thereby of something. As further evidence, (Chemero 2009) frequently 
identifies his adversary as the idea that “the main business of cognition is…mental gymnastics, 
the construction, manipulation, and use of representations of the world” (p.18). But one can hold 
that agents represent things in the external world without claiming that they do so by means of 
manipulating any internal items that serve as intermediaries or stand-ins for those things. I 
submit that in light of the difficulties that arise for skepticism about intentionality, this is 
                                                          
82 A pair of differential equations is coupled if the variables in one serve as parameters in the other.  
83 That said, some dynamical systems theorists leave little doubt about their intention to eliminate intentionality from 
the explanantia of cognitive science. Hence my discussion of Chemero in Section 3. 
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precisely how we should most charitably characterize the outlook of most dynamical systems 
theorists, particularly those who embrace ecological psychology.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks  
In this essay, I have defended the claim that intentionality plays an ineliminable role in 
psychological explanation. The content of this claim is significantly influenced by one’s 
conception of communicative explanation, and by whether one is targeting intentionality as an 
explanans or as an explanandum. Against skeptics who adopt a metaphysical conception of 
communicative explanation and focus on explanantia, it is possible to argue that the non-
intentional explanations that these skeptics favor appeal to intentionality in fact if not in name, 
and so are intentional after all. The better these explanations approximate the virtues of 
intentional ones, the more plausible that claim becomes. A central case in point was everyday 
intentional explanations, which have a distinctive counterfactual spread that has yet to be 
replicated in non-intentional explanations.  
On the other hand, skeptics who adopt an epistemic conception of explanation can resist 
the charge of appealing to intentionality in fact if not in name. Their point is that intentional 
description contributes little to the virtues of an explanation. However, I argued that at the time 
of writing, even the  considerable achievements of a congenial branch of cognitive science do not 
go far enough to justify (Elim) as such skeptics construe it.  
Whatever one thinks about intentionality in the explanans, it is hard to play down the role 
of intentional phenomena as explananda in much of cognitive psychology. This point is 
especially clear in the case of perception, which necessarily has as its subject matter the things 
that are perceived. Moreover, the theoretical orientation of many would-be skeptics, that of 
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ecological psychology, in fact commits them to intentional description of their explananda. They 
are most charitably understood as targeting not intentionality itself, but merely a conception of 
intentionality as necessarily involving the manipulation of internal intermediaries that stand in 
for external objects.  
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